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Abstract
This thesis examines the strategies applied by two German 
trade unions after the collapse of the GDR. It looks at the 
causes of stability and instability of corporatist systems 
and their institutions and how these maintain membership 
and organizational coherence. The study explores the 
reconstruction strategies of two contrasted West German 
trade unions seeking to maintain their organizational 
position and to protect the neo-corporatist industrial 
relations system that secures their survival. Their 
strategies for the organizational survival of the unions 
are determined partly by the neo-corporatist industrial 
relations structure and partly by their different 
organizational constraints.
The first section looks at explanations of how encompassing 
trade unions in a neo-corporatist system maintain their 
membership and their organizational coherence. After 
delineating the various incentives which encompassing trade 
unions provide to their membership, the study examines the 
threats posed by the disintegration of the GDR to the 
provision of union services and thus to their ability to 
attract members. The effects of the collapse of the GDR 
could reduce their membership's willingness to define 
interests in collective terms (i.e. a favourable trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment). The study then 
examines the objectives for an intervention by the West 
German trade unions in the GDR in order to secure neo­
corporatism by incorporation of the East German membership 
within the encompassing body of the West German unions.
The second section looks at the main determinants of the 
reconstruction process which have been the legacy of low 
trust in former East German industrial relations as well as 
the e d g e's inadequate efforts which facilitated the 
intervention by the West German trade unions in the form of 
incorporation.
The third section assesses the motives of two West German 
trade unions related to the reconstruction strategies of 
free labour representation in the GDR. Both trade unions 
followed the strategy of incorporating the East German 
workforce by narrowing the existing East-West wage gap 
(contractual exchange) as well as offering solidarity 
(diffuse exchange). In particular the motive of contractual 
exchange reveals the unions' desire to maintain stability 
within the neo-corporatist environment.
As the research on corporatism rarely examines the causes 
of stability of corporatist systems and institutions, this 
thesis makes a contribution to our understanding of the 
strategies to maintain corporatist structures. The sudden 
collapse of the GDR, with its repercussions for the ERG, 
provides a special opportunity to analyse the strategy of 
corporatist institutions seeking to maintain stability.
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I Introduction
1. The reason for the research
The literature^ on corporatism^ has almost exclusively 
concentrated on the results of corporatist structures and 
institutions. The research on corporatism rarely examines 
the causes of stability or instability of corporatist 
systems and their institutions and how they maintain 
membership and organizational coherence. This thesis aims 
to contribute to a better understanding of the strategies 
to maintain corporatist structures.
The German reunification provides an excellent opportunity 
for case studies to examine the strategies applied by 
corporatist institutions. The process of German 
reunification did not consist of the gradual removal of 
barriers between two countries with different legal, 
political and economic systems. The sudden collapse of the 
GDR and socialism caused a major shock to the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) (cf. Hickel 1990, p.62), its 
economic system, its industrial relations system and to the 
neo-corporatist institutions. The shock emanating from the
1) Cf. Crouch (1990), Lehmbruch (1979), Olson (1971), 
Schmitter (1979) and Streeck (1981).
2) Schmitter (1979, p.13) defines corporatism 'as a system 
of interest representation in which the constituent 
units are organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized (if 
not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls 
on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports.'
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German reunification offers the opportunity to analyse the 
behaviour of corporatist institutions in their efforts to 
maintain stability. The disintegration of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) caused a severe shock to West 
German industrial relations in a number of respects; (i) a 
considerable migration wave from East to West Germany took 
place, (ii) the East German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) 
appeared on the scene as a rival organization to the near- 
representational monopoly^ of the West German Trade Union 
Federation (DGB) affiliates, (iii) the dissatisfaction with 
the former East German low trust^ industrial relations 
system and the FDGB could have meant a loss of 
encompassiveness (iv) and the possible loss of a unionised 
sector in the former GDR (increased fear of undercutting by 
the East) might have occurred. All these threats enumerated 
can have a severe impact on the stability or instability 
and hence on the future of neo-corporatism as practised in 
the FRG.
The aim of the thesis is to study the strategies applied by 
two differing West German trade unions (IG Metall and IG 
Chemie) seeking (i) to maintain their organizational 
position and (ii) to protect the neo-corporatist industrial 
relations system that secures the survival of the West
3) The near-representational monopoly describes the 
situation that most DGB affiliates virtually lack 
competition on the side of union representation in West 
Germany.
4) The connotations of low trust or transmission belt 
industrial relations apply to industrial relations 
systems imposed by dictatorships. Their task is to 
discipline the workforce and to adjust the members to 
the prevailing party line.
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German trade unions. Thus we look at trade unions, not 
solely as altruistically or ideologically bound to maintain 
neo-corporatism framework, but we argue they do so 
predominantly as a part of their strategy for 
organizational survival.^
We argue that the organizational cohesion of the unions 
determine their institutionalised behaviour within the neo- 
corporatist system. The institutionalised behaviour of the 
unions and their neo-corporatist environment have a 
considerable influence on a country's economic performance 
(e.g. the Okun-index^ ), and thus on the outcome of the 
collective bargaining process. If the outcome of collective 
bargaining is desirable for the membership, it will be of 
vital importance for the unions. Thus we argue that there 
is a virtuous circle between a desirable outcome to the 
union membership of collective bargaining and the 
organizational cohesion of the union. If the outcome of 
collective bargaining is not desirable for the membership, 
the level of encompassiveness will deteriorate. As the 
disintegration of the GDR has inflicted severe strains on 
the economic, social, and industrial relations, and on the 
legal system of the FRG, and thus on the outcome of 
collective bargaining and the structure of industrial 
relations, we expect that these momentous changes may have 
repercussions on the encompassiveness of the unions.
5) According to Ross (1948, p.16) the organizational 
survival is 'the central aim of the leadership.'
6) The Okun-index is a measure of the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation.
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The strategy for organizational survival of the unions is 
partly determined by the neo-corporatist industrial 
relations structure and their different organizational 
constraints. This research concentrates on the question of 
how centralised encompassing trade unions can sustain their 
organizational cohesion despite the shock emanating from 
the collapse of the GDR.
2. The structure of the research
The aim of the thesis is to study the reconstruction 
efforts of two West German trade unions in order to 
maintain their organizational position and neo-corporatism? 
from 1989 to 1992. For the subsequent analysis of trade 
union behaviour in the reconstruction process 'strategy' 
means a 'consistent approach over time which is intended to 
yield results in the medium and long term for a specific 
problem' (Thurley and Wood 1983, p.197).
The study uses case studies of trade union strategies 
applied by two West German trade unions. The decision to 
focus on the Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IGM) (Metal 
Workers' Union) and the Industriegewerkschaft Chemie- 
Papier-Keramik (IGCPK) (Union of Chemical, Paper and 
Ceramic Workers) was made for several reasons.
The central importance of the IGM and the IGCPK to the West 
German economy is underscored by the fact that the
7) For the classification of industrial relations systems 
cf. Crouch (1985).
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industries they represent account for three-quarters of all 
employees in former West Germany. Over the last decades 
both trade unions proved to be controversial pace-makers 
within the West German federated trade union body (DGB).
As far as the unions are concerned, there are two 
tendencies within the DGB, which Markovits (1986) labels as 
'activists' and 'accommodationists'. To a certain degree 
the DGB is made up of these two opposing tendencies. The 
activists advocate a militant self-reliance and an 
expansive wage-bargaining stance. The accommodationists 
rely on legally guarantied status rights. The activist 
unions are often inspired by Old Left as well as New Left 
theories of the capitalist economy and society, while the 
accommodationist union officials tend to adhere to what is 
often called a 'state fixation'® and the exercise of social 
partnership^ with the employers.
The IGM, the largest trade union in the western world, 
encompassing a little over one-third of the entire
organized West German labour movement makes 'it the
hegemonic force in post-war developments concerning the
working class' in former West Germany (Markovits 1986, 
p. 158). IGM's significance pertains not only to the most 
crucial sectors of the West German industry (automobile
8) The expression 'state fixation' refers to the 
accommodationists' reliance on the juridification of 
labour relations enacted by the government.
9) The early penetration of the labour side by capital led 
to highly developed cooperation programmes between 
labour representation and management in the chemical 
industry (cf. Markovits 1986, p.319).
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manufacturing, electronics, machinery and steel) but also 
to its leadership position in various areas of trade union 
policy-making (e.g. '35-hour week', 'new-manoeuverability', 
quantitative bargaining), as well as the collective 
consciousness and militancy of its strong and self- 
confident shopfloor organization (shop stewards and works 
councillors). The IGM can count on strong socialist 
sympathizers among its many rank-and-file activists. The 
IGM's strong shopfloor poses a much more serious problem of 
legitimation for the leadership than the weak shopfloor of 
the IGCPK (cf. Markovits 1986, pp.177-178). The IGM's 
leadership has to court and convince the strong rank-and- 
file activists to continue their active support and to 
cooperate within the union. To gain the support of this 
influential faction within the IGM, socialist ideology has 
been a means to incorporate the activists within the union 
body (cf. Markovits 1986, p.178 and pp.208-209).
Whether in its role as the vanguard for almost every annual 
wage round, in the formulation of new concepts regarding 
collective bargaining issues and economic policy, or in the 
key realm of union-state and union-party relationships, the 
IGM represents a 'first-among-equals within the DGB 
federation' (Markovits 1986, p.158). From the very 
beginning a pronounced ambivalence^® has characterised the 
IGM's position within the political economy of the FRG. 
While consistently trying to cultivate an 'image as a 
challenger of the system' (countervailing power), the IGM
10) The IGM is engaged in industries depending on exports 
and working with advanced technologies.
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has with equal tenacity attempted to project itself as a 
responsible and legitimate actor within the parameters of 
the post-war FRG economy (Markovits 1986, p.184). According 
to Markovits (1986, p.184) both strains have coexisted 
since the 1950s and their contradictory relationship has 
influenced all of IGM's policies and strategies.
The IGCPK, the leader of the accommodationist movement 
within the DGB, perceives its function in German industrial 
relations in emphasising social order and in practising a 
pragmatic social partnership. The German chemical industry 
developed fast after the war and is distinguished by its 
export orientation, high propensity towards automation and 
rapid centralisation into larger units of production 
(Markovits 1986, p.268). The IGCPK is beset by weak and 
fragmented shopfloor representation, and partly dependent 
on employer support. This union has not developed a viable 
alternative to the existing strategy of social partnership 
and cooperation with management (Markovits 1986, p.322). 
The organizational weakness on the shopfloor has posed the 
most serious structural impediment to the development of 
the IGCPK's political power and its bargaining strength. As 
in the IGM, the decision-making power for bargaining in the 
IGCPK is centralised at the peak of the union. However, the 
IGCPK does not have to fear militant actions from its 
placid shopfloor representation. The IGCPK securely 
established itself during the 1980s as the DGB's 'most 
outspokenly accommodationist union, advocating strategies 
with vastly different visions' (Markovits 1986, p.326) from
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those favoured by the activist DGB affiliates (e.g. early 
retirement, workers' wealth formation plans, qualitative 
bargaining, common classification for blue- and white- 
collar workers).
The two strands of unionism within the DGB can be 
distinguished by the differences in the conduct of 
collective bargaining, the ideology, and their respective 
sources and exercise of trade union power. Because of their 
leading positions in the DGB and their significance in the 
West German economy, these two industrial trade unions 
serve as a test case. How have they acted and reacted to 
the strains stemming from the collapse of the GDR. We argue 
that in accordance with the different organizational 
constraints the unions will choose appropriate and possibly 
different strategies in order to secure their 
organizational survival.
The study sets out a strategy model followed by an
assessment of common and different approaches by the
unions. The study addresses these questions:
(i) Why did the West German trade unions intervene in the 
GDR?
(ii) Which factors influenced the strategies to reconstruct 
labour representation in East Germany?
(iii) How did the West German trade unions intervene in the 
GDR?
(i) The task of the first section is to build up a
predictive trade union strategy model to explain the
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strategies applied by the two West German trade unions to 
secure their organizational coherence and strength. The 
predictions centre on possible courses of action which can 
be and are likely to be applied by neo-corporatist unions 
due to the shock created by the collapse of the GDR and its 
repercussions on the FRG. The theoretical part starts with 
an assessment of different types of incentives (public and 
selective) which centralised and encompassing trade unions 
provide for their membership or the workforce as a whole.
As West German trade unions are 'neutralized'^^ from the 
shopfloor (the accommodationists such as the IGCPK often 
lack strong representation on the shopfloor), the 
organizational success of the centralised West German 
unions rests predominantly on the provision of collective 
goodsl2. The influx of a skilled workforce, the emergence 
of a 'low wage country' and of rival union organizations in 
the former GDR could inflict damage on the West German 
unions' ability to provide public benefits to their 
members. As most accommodationists lack organizational 
alternatives to the social partnership practised with the 
employers, the emergence of rivals to the West German 
unions could violate their potential for success. Their 
potential for success in collective bargaining is based on
11) According to Marsden (1978, p.10) the key weakness of 
the West German unions lies in the 'neutralization' of 
the workplace through the exclusion from it of the 
union as a collective institution by the 
Codetermination Acts.
12) A collective good is a good that, if it is consumed by 
one person, is still available for consumption by 
others.
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the 'growth alliance'll with the employers - a specific and 
intensive application of neo-corporatism. It is necessary 
to underscore that the erosion of the near-monopoly of 
collective representation would also have an impact on the 
provision of collective goods by the activists, but the 
difference is that the activists did not lack the 
organizational alternative of a strong shopfloor 
representation. The strength of the activists and the 
weakness of the accommodationists on the shopfloor is an 
important organizational constraint which helps to explain 
the different reconstruction strategies applied by the two 
unions.
By assessing the different types of incentives for union 
membership, it is possible to draw conclusions about the 
extent to which the West German trade unions are vulnerable 
to the troubling effects stemming from the disintegration 
of the East. The subject of this assessment is to 
demonstrate that the organizational success of the West 
German trade unions rests predominantly on the provision of 
collective goods and on the virtual single status^* of 
trade union representation. The main point of this 
assessment is that the cohesion of the encompassing trade 
unions is fragile. Thus any deterioration in the economic
13) The expression 'growth alliance' refers to the trade 
unions' ability to develop a bargaining policy which 
does not endanger the economic growth process.
14) After World War 11 the West German industrial 
relations system had been structured according to the 
principle of unitary unionism and the principle of one 
company one union. Thus the West German industrial 
relations structure is shaped by centralised and 
encompassing industrial unions with clear demarcation.
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performance of the neo-corporatist environment might have 
severe repercussions on the encompassiveness of the unions 
and such on the future of neo-corporatism (cf. Streeck 
1981a).15
The following section provides a short assessment of the 
decision-making process within the centralised West German 
trade unions. The study is based upon the assumptions that 
there is a principal-agent relationship between membership 
and leadership and that a dominant objective of the 
leadership is their re-election.
The trade union strategy scenario includes a short 
assessment of the alternative union strategies. Due to the 
FDGB's inexperience and discredited reputation, however, 
the options of the West German unions were limited to a 
one-way intervention in the East. Describing the various 
aspects of the disintegration of the GDR, a following 
chapter assesses several types of intervention, and the 
motives for the West German unions' strategies in the East. 
The study comprises economic and sociological theory. By 
assessing the vulnerability of the centralised and 
encompassing unions some interventionist categories of the 
predictive trade union model will be derived.
15) Streeck (1981a) argued that qualitative demands could 
not be so easily incorporated within the union policy 
as the wage demands could. Streeck argued that the 
introduction of qualitative demands could disrupt the 
neo-corporatist balance.
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(ii) The subject of the second question (which factors 
influenced the reconstruction strategies) is to identify 
the main determinants of the reconstruction process. The 
study therefore concentrates on the factors that generated 
a comparative advantage on the side of the West German 
unions, (i) It starts with a critical analysis of former 
East German industrial relations. The objective of this 
second section is to prove the distance and even hatred 
felt towards this imposed system on the part of the East 
German workforce. As the FDGB resisted reform, its 
organization and the one-way movement of the East German 
system towards the West triggered a reaction that the East 
German workforce expected, and partly encouraged the West 
German unions to intervene in the GDR. (ii) Another 
important factor has been the one-way convergence of the 
GDR towards the West German economic, political and social 
system. This convergence produced a competitive advantage 
for the West German trade unions in comparison with the 
FDGB and its inexperienced affiliates.
(iii) The third part (question; How did the trade unions 
intervene?) of the thesis is the comparison and contrast of 
the strategies applied by the two unions. This descriptive 
section follows the contemporary history of the unions in 
their reconstruction efforts from 1989 until 1992. In the 
case of the IGCPK the reconstruction had already been 
achieved in 1991. The intention of this part is to test the 
hypothesis set out in the predictive model. In the 
predictive model we assume that (i) the accommodationist
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union will intervene early in the GDR by a take-over in 
order to sustain organizational coherence by the protection 
of the outcome of corporatism and (ii) in the case of the 
activist we assume a take-over after a period of ideology- 
determined cooperation. The activist will focus on the 
protection of corporatism in order to avoid further 
decentralisation efforts by the self-confident membership. 
Both unions focus on the protection of neo-corporatist 
industrial relations and thus on centralised collective 
bargaining and the encompassing trade union structure.
3. The methodological approach
The methodology was divided into several approaches. The 
reason is that each methodological approach has 'at least 
one intrinsic weakness' (Smith 1982). Consequently, the 
research strategy consisted of choosing a combination of 
several research methods in order to compensate for the 
intrinsic weakness of a single method and thus to enhance 
empirical knowledge.
Firstly, a survey of the literature on the theory of 
collective action, corporatism and different industrial 
relations systems was made. The main structure of the 
research has been based on documentation analysis. For the 
documentation analysis of trade union reconstruction 
processes the material was collected from as many relevant 
sources as possible - trade unions, employers' 
associations, newspapers and journals - in order to ensure
25
the validity and the reliability of the processed data. The 
comparison of the various publications^^ helped to identify 
the bias of each type of document. The contents of the 
documents were analysed to draw conclusions and make 
comparisons regarding the strategies employed.
By obtaining the support of the unions' executive 
departments, reservations on the part of local union 
officers concerning the provision of internal documents 
were dissipated. Both trade unions provided confidential 
internal documents (the minutes of several of the trade 
unions' executive board meetings). This improved the 
quality of the data, but official trade union publications 
exhibit ideological and thus biased elements. Especially 
the minutes of the executive boards helped to reveal the 
various problems during the reconstruction period. Despite 
the revelation of important information by the minutes 
provided, it is necessary to bear in mind that they are 
also biased. Often minutes leave out critical assessments 
or are limited to decisions taken by the majority vote of 
the union executives. The collection of material was 
supplemented by correspondence with union executives and 
the former West German Home Secretary Dr Schauble in order 
to assess the reliability of data which the unions provided 
concerning their strategies. In addition, the employers' 
associations also supplied materials. In the case of
16) To ensure the completeness of the strategies taken by 
the two West German unions the author compared the 
information obtained with that of Wilke's and Müller's 
(1991) summary on the DGB affiliates' history of early 
reunification efforts.
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Schauble we assume a certain conservative political bias. 
The data provided by the employers' associations also show 
biased elements.
In the second information-gathering method, the author 
attended a number of union congresses^?, the centenary 
anniversaries of the IGM and IGCPK, and union training 
sessions for East German personnel and membership. The 
participant observation involved the collection of data in 
a 'field' setting by a degree of direct observation. In all 
instances note-taking and tape recording were permitted and 
much confidential internal material was supplied. On 
occasion personal attendance was not possible, as in the 
case of the IGM's centenary anniversary admission, because 
of security demands and restricted participation. In this 
case the author sought to substitute a thorough analysis of 
the video tapes covering all the speeches to which 
admission had been denied. The personal attendance by the 
author turned out to be a strategy for gaining further 
access, and presented a rich yield of data.
Thirdly, interviews were held with East and West German 
union executives. West German union officers. East and West 
German labour delegates^® and members of the employers' 
associations, as well as experts in the area of West German 
industrial relations. The interviews were held both on an
17) Cf. appendix no. 2.
18) To verify the various levels and number of interviews 
conducted with trade union members, union delegates, 
union officers and union executives we refer to 
appendix no.l.
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individual as well as on a group basis. A variety of venues 
were used. The trade union members and labour delegates, 
and also the inexperienced East German union members 
preferred to meet on union premises to avoid retaliation by 
management.
A senior official of the IGM requested that his identity be 
concealed in light of the critical assessment of the IGM's 
tardy and inappropriate reunification strategies. The 
author is aware that the answers of trade union executives 
can be biased. Union leaders' behaviour^^ is often 
politically determined and they sometimes have an interest 
in 'rewriting union history'. Some difficulties occurred as 
interviewees, for example trade union officers deployed to 
the East, often could not be contacted because of the poor 
telecommunication facilities.
Fourthly, questionnaires^® were distributed to trade union 
leaders. East German labour delegates and West German union
membership.21
To analyse the strategies of trade union leaders 
systematically, a written questionnaire was circulated to 
10 union executives. The questionnaire was chosen to assess
19) In the case of the union leaders and union personnel 
the author assumes a bias of 'bureaucratic 
conservatism' (Kelly 1988, p.149).
20) In the case of the questionnaires the author was aware 
of the halo-effect. To reduce possible halo-effects a 
pretest had been chosen followed by a subsequently new 
arrangement of the questions asked.
21) Appendix no. 3 gives details on the composition and 
characteristics of the respondents of the various 
questionnaires.
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the objectives stated in the minutes and to receive further 
information that had been left out of the minutes. Of the 
questionnaires 7 were returned (4 from IGCPK and 3 from 
IGM(W) ) and processed. Follow-up interviews with trade 
union executives (2 from IGCPK and 2 from IGM(W) ) took 
place in order to verify the results of the questionnaire 
and to provide further information. Arrangement for 
interviews with trade union executives turned out to be 
difficult. Due to their time restrictions, the interviews 
were structured.
420 questionnaires were circulated to East German labour 
delegates (both IGM and IGCPK). The decision to chose 
labour delegates was based on several considerations. 
Firstly, the participation rate proved to be high and the 
delegates easily accessible. Secondly, as a result the 
delegates' composition the research sample turned out to 
offer an almost representative sample of the East German 
m e m b e r s h i p . 22 The response of 402 returns23 (IGCPK 186 and 
IGM 216) was high because the leadership of both unions 
encouraged participation. The survey was conducted and 
collected after lunch during the trade union congresses 
with bad weather conditions outside. In this case a pilot 
study (trial run) had been conducted earlier in order to 
test the validity and reliability of the questionnaire. It 
is interesting to note that the willingness to participate
22) Cf. appendix no. 3.
23) Information on those labour delegates who did
not participate was not available regarding a non­
response bias. Six of them did not want to 
participate, twelve delegates did not attend lunch.
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in questionnaires and interviews was high in the case of 
the East German labour delegates. We report that the 
interviewees turned out to be extremely active in all 
venues of the trade unions (training activities, trade 
union congresses). Thus a more critical assessment of the 
history of the FDGB was possible. The results were 
consistent with the findings of other research projects 
(e.g. Bust-Bartels 1980, Voigt 1971, Wilke and Müller 
1991), and the election results show that the data does not 
seem to be biased in the direction of a more critical 
assessment of former East German industrial relations and 
opportunism towards the West German industrial relations 
system.
A further short questionnaire was conducted with West 
German IGM and IGCPK members concerning the collapse of the 
GDR and its repercussions on West German industrial 
relations.24 The venues were union training sites, but 
despite the support of the local union officers the 
participation rate was lower than in the case of the East 
German labour representatives. Of 398 questionnaires 347 
were returned and analysed. In the case of both the IGM(W) 
(182 questionnaires) and the IGCPK (165 questionnaires) 
each individual member's assessment of the threats 
emanating from the East often was identical with the 
assessment of the threats stated in union publications 
(even the wording often corresponded).
24) Appendix no. 4 gives the characteristics of the 
participants and assesses the sample in comparison 
with the membership composition of both unions.
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Fifthly, a variety of empirical methods have been applied 
in order to avoid as far as possible the limitations of the 
single research method. In almost all cases several methods 
had been combined in order to assure the validity of the 
data. The data obtained from interviews and questionnaires 
have been supplemented and checked by document analysis 
(and vice versa). The principle of cross examination of the 
data proved to be cumbersome and time consuming, but helped 
to reveal and identify contradictions in the data set.
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4. The Theory of an encompassing trade union
4.1. The trade union as an organization
According to Hirsch and Addison (1985, p.9), a trade union 
can be viewed as an 'association of employees whose primary 
goal is to improve the well-being of its members.' 
Associations exist to fulfil purposes which a group of 
people have in common. Such organizations are expected to 
further the interests of their members. Every organization 
presupposes a set of interests which its members share. By 
analogy with Coase's theory of the firm (1988), we derive 
the existence of a trade union organization from advantages 
in the internalisation of transactions. A trade union 
reduces the multitude of individual and expensive exchange 
processes on the labour market to very few exchanges 
through collective bargaining and collective 
representation. Thus Külp (1994, p.291) expects a 
macroeconomic-based reduction of costs in the case of 
industrial unions.
The mechanism by which trade union members induce their 
representatives to behave in a manner which realises the 
members' objectives is explained by the economic theory of 
agency. A trade union leadership pursues its members' 
interests by acting as their agent in collective bargaining 
and in the political process. Typically, the trade union 
leader, the agent, has to choose a course of action, from a 
number of alternatives, and the action chosen affects the
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membership's welfare. A labour union is expected by its 
membership to strive for higher wages and better working 
conditions. Sometimes a group sets up a formal organization 
before it can obtain a collective or selective^S good.
Behavioural decision-making theory explains the existence 
of an organization by its ability to adapt to its changing 
environment. The equilibrium of an organization with its 
environment is determined by the balance between the 
inducements provided by the organization and the 
contributions of its membership. According to Simon (1957, 
p. 173) '... each participant will remain in the
organization if the satisfaction (or utility) he derives 
from the net balance of inducements over contributions 
(measured in terms of their utility to him) is greater than 
the satisfaction he could obtain if he withdrew.' As 
demands and perceived alternatives, and thus the balance of 
satisfaction and burden, vary constantly, the 'vitality' of 
an organization means its ability to accommodate to such 
constant changes.
Talking of trade unions as physical entities made up by 
workers is unrealistic (cf. Hyman 1985, p.47). As in a 
simple collectivity, we can neglect any problems concerning 
the representation of the various interests of a quite 
heterogeneous membership. Trade unions, and especially 
encompassing trade unions, are organizations which are made
25) A selective good or benefit is consumed by an 
individual by the exclusion of others from the 
consumption.
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up of a quite heterogeneous membership and different groups 
(e.g. blue- and white-collar workers, skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled,...). With a high level of encompassiveness, 
trade union leaders have to face the difficult task of 
binding together the different interests within the actual 
and the potential membership. On occasion, workers 
dissatisfied with their trade union might form 'break­
aways', by leaving their former trade union (exit) or by 
setting up a new forum or organization of labour 
representation. The very task that trade union leaders have 
taken has been to prevent workers forming or joining 
rivals. Further, a union leadership must be concerned to 
prevent free-riding behaviour in the case of public goods, 
such as collective representation.
Labour organizations are not simply the embodiments of 
their members' interests; they are social institutions in 
their own right, and develop their own internal patterns of 
power, goal-seeking and conflict (cf. Kirsch 1993, p.18). 
One implication of the potential for conflicting interests 
between trade union leaders and membership can be explained 
by the bargaining process. Crouch (1982, p.176) assumes 
that the union leadership's central interest is in securing 
its capacity to make deals; the membership's interest on 
the other hand is focused on the substantive outcome. 
Crouch (1982, p.176) demonstrates that the trade union 
leadership will take steps to secure the unity and strength 
of its organization, and to maintain the stability of the 
bargaining relationship, in order to establish its
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credibility as a bargaining partner. In the case of 
bargaining we can infer that divergent interests between 
the objectives of the membership and the leadership can 
occur especially with reference to the time horizon.
Regarding centralised collective bargaining as practised in 
West Germany, problems of remoteness between trade union 
leadership and the rank-and-file are understandable 
(evidence for central organization-membership tensions; ÔTV 
bargaining in 1992, when the membership dismissed in a 
ballot the ÔTV leadership's collective bargaining results). 
Crouch (1982, p.177) points out that the Olsonian 
problems^^ of collective action will not be so serious at 
the plant level as the membership's involvement and 
participation is generally more focused at this level. 
Therefore there is not the same gulf between a passive 
trade union membership and the organization erected to 
conduct collective tasks for themf?. When collective action 
and trade union representation are focused in a very 
centralised^® organization we assume some distance between 
the interests of the leadership and the membership. To 
exemplify the potential divergence of interests between
26) The Olsonian problem consists in insufficient 
preference revelation and free-riding behaviour.
27) To support this view we refer to the West German 
trade unions' dislike of and behavioural inertia 
towards introducing workplace-related co­
determination. Vilmar(1971, p.6), Wachter (1983, 
pp.70-71) and Drumm (1993, p.32) argue that the 
unions' behaviour is explained by their apprehension 
of losing 'control over the organizational and plant- 
related opinion leading' of the workforce by the 
unions.
28) Bendix (1978, p.6) submits that the power of 
trade unions lies at the level at which collective 
bargaining takes place.
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trade union leadership and its membership, it is possible 
to refer to Michels' (1915) contributions. Michels' 'iron 
law of oligarchy' says that the leaders of trade unions 
dominate the membership. This happens for three reasons 
(Crouch 1982, p.163); technical, organizational and 
psychological. First, technical knowledge, which is a 
precondition for the conduct of the union's campaigns, 
offers the leadership a certain degree of expertise. This 
superior knowledge can be used by the leadership to refute 
critics (Crouch 1982, p.164). Second, the control over the 
organizational structure of the union enables its 
leadership to fend off challenges from rivals (cf. Lipset 
et al. 1968, pp.9-10). Finally, the leadership enjoys 
psychological advantages. The rank-and-file identify^^ with 
their leaders, and they actively desire that their 
leadership exercise power on their behalf (Crouch 1982, 
p.164).
Reinforcing the domination of trade union leadership over 
its membership is an important underlying assumption that 
there is a principal-agent^® relationship between the trade
29) Barnard (1938, p.152) demonstrates that the 
organizational leadership is often able to influence 
demands of their members by an 'injection of motives' 
in order to make them perceive the provided 
inducements as satisfactory.
30) According to Turnbull (1988) 'empiricism and the 
predominance of market clearing models, has led to a 
mistaken view of the trade union as simply a 
"bargaining agent", acting on behalf of others in the 
process of collective as opposed to individual 
bargaining. Action on behalf of others certainly 
introduces the notion of "agency", but many of the 
services trade unions offer fall outside that 
description, and unions also play a crucial role in the 
social and political fabric of society.'
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union leadership and the rank-and-file. The principal-agent 
relationship only reinforces Michels' view if there is no 
alternative agent. If there is competition among the 
agents, and there is no serious information asymmetry, then 
the principal need not to be dominated by the agent. 
Despite the fact that the trade union leadership does not 
always follow the substantial interests of its membership 
(e.g. Crouch 1982, p.164), we have to raise the question 
why people join a trade union. This question is also 
important for the objectives set out for research, as the 
benefits^l which the trade unions provide are essential for 
its strategy in the reunification process. The question why 
people join a trade union can be answered by explaining the 
different kinds of goods the trade unions provide. By 
assessing the various kinds of goods trade unions provide, 
it is possible to analyse the different threats to an 
existing trade union by the emergence of another trade 
union or the collapse of the East German industrial 
relations system. The analysis is of interest, as it offers 
an assessment of the vulnerability towards the cohesion of 
the trade union with reference to the goods provided. As 
the emergence of a second trade union can cause harm to the 
provision of goods provided by a trade union, this could 
mean that the organizational existence of the trade union 
is threatened. If the organizational existence of a union 
is threatened, we assume that the trade union leaders will
31) According to Fleisher and Kneisner (1980, p.223)
workers' decisions to form or join unions depend on 
the benefits from union membership.
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intervene by an appropriate strategy in order to reduce the 
strains on the existence of their trade union organization.
What do trade unions provide?
The most fundamental question in a study of trade unionism 
is: Why do workers combine together in unions at all? The 
simplest answer is to point to the weakness of the isolated 
individual worker in his relations with his employer. 
Combination appears to be an effective strategy for the 
workforce, because it offers a chance of reducing the 
inequality between workers and employers. The key 
characteristic of a trade union is that it combines the 
power of individual workers in a situation in which the 
'sum is more powerful than its parts' (Batstone et al. 
1986, p.2). Some form of cartelisation or monopoly can^^ 
offer potential gains over what individual sellers of 
labour services could achieve. Having established an 
organizational form for a trade union combination, it is 
necessary to express its power against the employer.
In order to classify the type of goods the trade unions 
which the DGB affiliates provide, the author refers to the 
categories of public (collective) and selective (private or 
non-collective) incentives. The assessment of the different 
categories is of importance as it exemplifies the fragile 
cohesion of the West German unions. To the extent that the
32) 'Can' refers to the situation that some individual
sellers of labour are likely to find themselves forced 
in the non-union sector as the unionised employers 
moved up their labour demand curve.
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shock stemming from the disintegration of the GDR has a 
severe impact on the provision of goods, the cohesion of 
the unions can be affected.
4.2. Collective incentives/benefits
One important aspect of industrialised societies is the 
existence of goods with collective character realised by 
collective representation. For example, the gain for an 
individual worker from collective representation is that 
the net gain for an individual worker consists of the 
probability of extra benefits from a job in a covered 
sector multiplied by the wage gains minus the probability 
of a job in the non-covered sector multiplied by the wage 
loss. An important problem for organizations that provide 
collective representation is to diminish and control the 
incentive for individual free-riding.
Free-riding takes place where the individual gain from not 
joining the union outstrips the marginal utility of the 
collective gains to an individual (cf. Buchanan 1986). 
Free-riding is likely to occur in situations where 
excluding others from consumption is impossible or 
prohibitively expensive. Free-rider problems and non- 
optimal preference revelation^^ will lead to less than an 
optimum amount of public goods being provided by the market
33) The problem of non-optimal preference revelation is 
that if dues are collected according to the demand, 
individuals have an incentive to lie. If the people 
lie, the supply of collective goods will be less than 
in the case of true preference revelation.
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(Hirsch and Addison 1985, p.24). As 'competitive markets 
will not provide enough of such goods; some form of 
collective decision-making is needed' (Freeman and Medoff 
1984, p.9). A further reason for free-riding can be seen in 
the perception of individuals that the various costs of 
membership or joining do not pay off, and where the 
individual contribution is virtually imperceptible. Trade 
union membership has similar characteristics: if it is a 
large trade union, an additional membership subscription 
will be such a small proportion of its assets or income 
that it will hardly affect the trade union's strength. On 
the other hand, if the trade union negotiates improvements 
in working and living conditions, all employees will gain, 
whether or not they are members of the trade union. With 
increasing size (membership) and remoteness from the 
organization that provides collective representation, free­
riding might be more likely than in the case of local 
representation with personal interactions between the 
members and various forms of direct and immediate sanctions 
for non-contribution. The quality of the internal control 
and disciplining system of an organization accounts to a 
certain degree for the level of free-riding.
A free-rider is someone who gets to consume a good that is 
costly to produce or to provide without paying for it. The 
free-rider problem applies particularly to public goods. A 
public good is a good that, even if it is being consumed by 
one person, is still available for consumption by others. 
To get a better understanding of public goods one has to
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think of externalities^^ in the consumption of such goods. 
Externalities exist when actions by one person or an 
organization affect the welfare of others without any 
action on the part of those affected. Collective 
representation provided by trade unions exhibits features 
of a public good. For instance the outcome of collective 
bargaining can improve the working and living conditions 
(e.g. humanisation of work) not just of its membership but 
also of non-members. According to Freeman and Medoff (1984, 
p.8), collective rather than individual bargaining with the 
employers is necessary for two reasons for the workforce to 
develop an effective voice. Firstly, many important aspects 
of an industrial setting are 'public goods', that is, goods 
which will affect the well-being of every employee in such 
a way that one individual's partaking of the good does not 
preclude someone else from doing so. Safety conditions, the 
speed of the production line, cyclical wage adjustments, 
and pension plans all obviously affect the entire workforce 
in the same way that defense and social security affect the 
community. Secondly, collective action is necessary because 
workers who are tied to a company are unlikely to reveal 
their true preferences to the employers, for fear that the 
employers may dismiss them. The danger of job loss puts 
individuals at risk and makes them reluctant to speak out. 
Collective representation is a means to overcome the free­
rider problem that arises where individual workers express
34) An externality arises whenever the production or
consumption of a good has spillover effects beyond the 
consumer or producer involved in the market. The idea 
of externalities is based on the fact that a 
particular good is not priced. This lack of pricing 
leads to a misallocation of resources.
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grievances on behalf of other workers. A subsequent 
function of trade unions is to monitor the fulfilment of 
collective agreements.
The opportunity to voice criticism and the monitoring 
activities exercised by unions offer externalities to non­
members. In the discussion of public goods with
externalities the problem of exclusion of free-riders 
arises. Considering collective representation as a public 
good with its beneficial externalities, one has to bear in 
mind that exclusion of free-riders from consumption is 
impossible or expensive. One aspect of free-riding as a
behavioural pattern in the case of public goods can be 
explained by the individual decision not to reveal
preferences.
Associations that supply collective goods often welcome 
new, and especially paying members. In the non-market 
capacity (public representation) each trade union has an 
interest in acquiring new members, outside its own industry 
or craft, as well as inside it, as long as this does not 
cause any form of congestion problems^^ (cf. Buchanan 
1965). Public or collective representation and its
35) In the case of public goods as public representation 
in a union an additional member will improve the 
union's capacity to realise economies of scale. Then 
the optimal size of a union is determined by its 
capacity. Increasing the size of members despite the 
limit of the capacity the union will have to invest in 
improved or new computer facilities in order to coop 
with the new situation with repercussion on the 
financial aspect.
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externalities (higher wages, better working conditions) can 
be denoted as a public good for the workforce.
The utility of collective representation varies with the 
usefulness of the trade union to the workers in question 
(cf. Musgrave et al. 1986). According to Crouch (1982, 
p.67), the more unionism is useful to an employee, the less 
able he or she is to use other means of advancing his or 
her interests - that is, the more dependent he or her is on 
collective action for improving his or her standard of 
living or the enhanced provision of job security. Or, as 
Farber and Saks (1980) have put it, the perceived advantage 
of unionisation is inversely related to the individual's 
position in the distribution of earnings.
If all workers have identical preferences regarding 
appropriate trade union wage-employment policy, then the 
problem of preference aggregation is trivial. However, the 
assumption of homogeneous preferences is untenable in 
reality, and the preferences of workers solely with regard 
to optimum wage-employment policy will differ along a broad 
scale. The most important differences are likely to be that 
workers have varying labour market alternatives and 
different amounts of seniority affecting their job security 
through the job allocation system. The heterogeneity in 
preferences among workers raises an important question. Why 
can industrial trade unions keep up their encompassiveness
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despite the fact that the utility of trade union 
representation is highest for the less able.^^
If in an encompassive trade union the membership's 
preference structure does turn out to be unimodal (single 
peaked preferences), the median voter model^? will be able 
to explain the phenomenon of cohesion causing the 
encompassiveness of the organization. In order to sustain 
organizational cohesion, the trade union leadership could 
also foster another approach: namely the 'marginal
voter^®.' In this concept the union leadership's policy and 
strategy is determined by the preferences of that 
membership faction that is most likely to leave the trade 
union soon. This implies that the trade union leadership is 
always aware of membership's preference structure and able 
to implement the appropriate policy. But there is 
considerable ambiguity if such a stop-and-go policy can 
provide organizational encompassiveness in the long run.
36) For a further discussion of this issue the author 
refers to Crouch's (1982, p.68) 'dimensions of 
usefulness of collective organization.'
37) The median voter model only works for preferences such 
as seniority based rights - so that the workers have a 
hope of reaching above median seniority. If they have 
no such hope, they have no incentive to follow or join 
the union and they should set up a rival organization.
38) As the main bulk of all German trade unions lack 
participation by the young membership, trade union 
policy has shifted to a certain degree on issues 
concerning the demands of the future membership (e.g. 
'green' issues). Interviews with the trade union 
leadership revealed that future union policy will 
focus on the recruitment of the 'marginal voter' a 
young, mobile, dynamic fellow with few seniority 
rights and consequent low job security. 'Marginal' in 
this context means that those workers will leave the 
union soon if the union does not satisfy their demands 
for job security.
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Therefore it is necessary to determine those factors that 
will stabilise a union's organizational coherence.
The cohesion of a trade union depends on three factors: How 
much individual members gain from group membership; how 
effectively the group members punish those who violate its 
formal and informal rules; and the membership's altruistic 
sentiments stemming from the exercise of solidarity with 
the less able. Despite solidaristic and group-oriented 
sentiments, the better qualified trade union members still 
face the situation that a trade union is more useful to 
employees if collective bargaining is both widespread and 
concerned with important questions, rendering it easier to 
achieve success through combination of the different skills 
within one union (cf. Berghahn and Karsten 1987, p.44).
If we assume that the utility of collective representation 
provided by the unions varies inversely with the ability of 
an employee, the question arises why the highly trained 
workforce sustains membership in an encompassing 
organization? An important argument for the existence of an 
encompassing body is given by Turner (1952, p.232) who 
explains the feature of the narrowing of wage differentials 
by the extension of trade unionism to all sections of the 
workforce. It was the time when the great new amalgamations 
and federations of trade unions appeared, especially in the 
case of industrial trade unions. An industrial union is one 
which seeks to organise all members of the workforce - 
irrespective of occupation - in a particular industry. Thus
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an industrial union is made up of various separated 
groups^B, but what drives those groups to form and sustain 
a bargaining alliance?
Turner (1952, p.236) explains the formation of these 
amalgamations by the 'conviction to the generality of their 
members' that the prospect of 'these mergings of sectional 
identities' triggered 'general improvements in wages and 
conditions superior to those which the separate groups 
could achieve alone.'^ 0 on the other hand, several 
industrial trade unions are in fact subject to a recurrent 
threat from break-away organizations (cf. Berghahn and 
Karsten 1987, p.44), which aim at representing groups of 
the workforce which believe their interests to have 
received insufficient consideration from the comprehensive 
organization. The decision of the skilled workforce to 
maintain membership in an encompassing organization is 
based upon a number of reasons.
Firstly, regarding West German encompassing industrial 
unions with only a comparatively small wage differential 
among the members, it seems predictable that the trained 
workforce might form break-away organizations. The 
formation of a break-away organization for the skilled 
workers refers to the following arguments. Large unions 
imply pay scales which bring up the relative pay of low-
39) The elasticity of demand for labour is probably less 
for highly skilled than for unskilled.
40) In Turner's case, there was the skilled workers' fear 
of losing control of semi-skilled workers as mass 
production methods spread during the 1914-1918 war.
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skilled members in order to attract them. Therefore, in 
such unions, the skilled gain less in proportion. In terms 
of short-run benefits, the skilled workers could do better 
on their own, hence by the incentive to break away. An 
argument against a splinter organization is the skilled 
workers' apprehension of undercutting by the less skilled 
workers. According to Turner (1952, p.248) 'where such a 
danger exists, it is not to the craftsmen's deeper interest 
to maintain a too wide gap between their rates and those of 
the unskilled.' The egalitarian sentiments of narrowing the 
differentials and thus the existence of an encompassing 
trade union has its rationale to prevent a substitution by 
less skilled sections of the workforce.
Incorporating the less skilled into a broadly-based union 
results in reducing the impact of substituting skilled by 
unskilled workers. Thus the argument of incorporation 
refers to a union's enhanced ability to control the process 
of skill substitution by the employers. This means to 
prevent employers from reorganising work in such a way that 
the unskilled can be substituted for skilled workers. 
Possible means for enhanced union control of this 
substitution process are craft rules, industry agreements 
on job classifications, job evaluation, and possibly 
skilled control of the works councils. Even the extension 
of the coverage of collective agreements will improve trade 
union strength (e.g. density) by avoiding substituting
41) The existence of non-union workers can reduce the 
effectiveness of unions in securing higher wages, 
because firms considering contract demands must 
consider the competition of non-union rivals.
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behaviour by other latent groups in the union society. For 
a trade union incorporating groups from the outside means 
an improvement in collective representation. In order to 
attract the less skilled, the organization can be forced to 
narrow wage differentials, often by a flat rate. The 
closing of the wage gap indicates the determination of 
encompassing organizations to prevent differentiation or 
discrimination among its members. If one section within the 
organization feels treated as 'second class', its members 
probably will voice opposition or even exercise the exit 
option. From this point of view the demands of the DGB 
trade unions for abolishing the differences in status 
between blue-collar and white-collar workers seem 
reasonable (for example, the IGCPK succeeded in equalising 
the status of blue- and white-collar workers in the 1987 
collective bargaining round; the IGM intends to achieve 
equalisation by 1996).
By including the strong and the weak parts of the workforce 
in one comprehensive system for collective bargaining, the 
industrial unions intend to effect a redistribution of 
bargaining power and hence of income in favour of the weak. 
This is confirmed by Markovits (1991, p.42) when he claims 
that centralised collective bargaining is a 'good minimum 
base for a universalising solidarity. It protects the weak
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without obstructing the s t r o n g . '*2 The rationale why the 
West German unions favour centralised collective bargaining 
is determined by the 'averaging out' of market power among 
the different groups of their heterogeneous membership
(Streeck 1984, p.37). Thus 'averaging out' implies some
loss of relative gains for the skilled. Incorporating weak
groups of the workforce and allowing them to share the 
bargaining power of strong sections prevents attempts at 
differentiation within the workforce (cf. Külp 1994, 
p.292). In strategic terms, encompassing industrial unions 
are able to fend off employers' divide-and-conquer
(substitution) attempts between different groups of the 
workforce. Incorporating the less skilled seems to be 
understood to arise from a feeling of 'solidarity', but the 
strategy outlined by Turner (1952) has a defensive 
connotation as its rationale coincided with the protection 
of the skilled workforce determined by an individualistic 
contractual exchange.
Secondly, an alternative to the above mentioned attempt to 
secure encompassiveness and thus prevent undercutting and 
substituting by incorporating other groups is the opening 
up of better channels of communication within the trade 
union body. The intricate task of the trade union 
leadership consists in providing a sufficient voice to each
42) In terms of the Hicks-Marshall rules the skilled
workers can gain: (i) at the e^ense of the unskilled 
(a coopérant factor of production with a lesser 
elasticity of supply); (ii) at the expense of the 
consumer (but if the unskilled have larger wage 
increases than the skilled they will gain a larger 
share of monopoly rent). These arguments can 
invalidate Markovits' claim.
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section within the membership in order to prevent 
dissatisfied groups from using the exit option. When the 
membership exercise their right to speak out, this means 
that the rank-and-file is sufficiently convinced that their 
voice will be effective. The options exit and voice do not 
comprise the whole scope of trade union policy. Following 
Hirschman (1970, pp.77-78) we predict that members with a 
'considerable attachment' to an organization 'will often 
search for ways to make them influential, especially when 
the organization moves in what they believe is the wrong 
direction and these members are convinced that they can get 
the organization back on the track.' Loyalty towards a 
trade union may act as a brake on the decision to exit or 
break away. We further assume that the 'usefulness of 
loyalty depends on the closeness of the available 
substitute' (Hirschman 1970, p.80). As there is virtually 
no rival to the DGB trade unions a high degree of loyalty 
seems likely. Loyalty prevents the break-away of 
dissatisfied members (cf. Külp 1994, p.288). A promising 
strategy of the trade union leadership consists in 
fostering activities to build up loyalty within the 
membership.
Thirdly, a further reason in favour of sustaining a unitary 
trade union has been based on the historic failure of the 
fragmented and weak German trade unions in 1933. These 
conditions caused the disintegration of the unions under 
the pressure of the Nazi dictatorship almost without 
resistance by the free trade unions (cf. Ruck 1988 and Blüm
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1979). Democratic forces in society, such as the trade 
unions, have condemned the cruelty of the Nazi 
dictatorship, and during the reconstruction period after 
1945 encompassiveness has been viewed by DGB's leadership 
as an organizational precondition to counter anti­
democratic tendencies. The formation of unitary unions had 
been 'the common experience' of trade union leaders in the 
concentration camps in order to counter the outgrowth of 
the Nazi dictatorship (Blüm 1990, p.43). After the 
experience of the sudden collapse of trade unionism in 
1933, encompassiveness is contemplated especially by the 
incumbent union leadership as an historic and moral 
obligation to membership and society (cf. Markovits 1986, 
pp.64-6 5).43 Recalling this moral obligation to avoid self­
paralysis can be an incentive to keep up the unions' 
organizational structure and thus to enforce the procedural 
objectives. The procedural objectives of the union 
leadership will secure the union's capacity to make deals 
and thus enable the substantive outcome of the collective 
bargaining process.
Fourthly, the positive effects of collective representation 
by an encompassing union may contribute to strengthening 
this type of organization. Thus we have to assess the 
incentives of comprehensive organizations. Olson (1971, 
p.134) argues that the incentives facing a special interest 
group are dramatically different from those facing an
43) An indication of this moral obligation on the side of 
union leadership and its membership can be seen in 
the determination to condemn right-wing terrorism and 
demonstrations against in 1993.
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organization that represents a third of the benefit from 
any effort to make the society more productive. An 
organization whose membership comprises a large bulk of 
society is naturally concerned about the efficiency and 
welfare of the society as a whole. The leadership and 
membership of the highly encompassing organization own so 
much of the society and owe so much to it that they have an 
important incentive to be actively concerned about how 
productive it is. Thus we assume that the leadership of 
large and comprehensive organizations will care about the 
excess burden^* arising from distributional policies 
favourable to its membership and will strive out of sheer 
self-interest to make the excess burden as small as 
possible. In comparison with other countries (e.g., Britain 
- the British disease^^) the West German trade union 
members are partly aware of the mutually beneficial power 
of neo-corporatism to avoid severe excess burden to society 
and the workforce. Thus they envisage encompassing 
organizations as a precondition for achieving corporatism. 
This means that the trade union policy of a unitary 
organization has to offer a significant share of the 
achieved benefits to the different constituents within the 
organization. Securing the encompassiveness of an 
organization can be sustained if there are barriers to 
entry for the market of trade union representation (e.g., 
financial resources, refusal of management to bargain with
44) An excess burden is a losses by one group or the other 
that are not captured by someone else. They are net 
social losses to society.
45) Cf. Jordan (1991, p.39) describes the structure of 
the British trade unions as an 'organized chaos.'
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factions of the workforce or to recognise a new faction). 
Schmitter (1979, p.13) argues that a 'representational
monopoly' on the part of the industrial relations actors is 
of paramount importance for the maintenance of neo­
corporatism and thus stability.
Market forces work against any organization that operates 
only in a part of a market. Employers often will not be 
able to survive if they pay higher wages than competing 
firms^^. Thus an existing trade union often has an interest 
in seeing that all firms in any given market are forced to 
pay trade union wage scales. When only a part of an
industry or skill group is organized, employers also have a 
ready source of strike-breakers among non-organized 
segments. In addition, workers with a given skill who
migrate from one community to another have an interest in
belonging to a national trade union.
Finally, the political strength of a large trade union is 
obviously greater than that of a small one. Further, the 
strategic position of a trade union can gain an industrial 
and political power for them extending far beyond their 
numbers. The Hicks-Marshall rules provide a framework for 
considering the objective conditions which enhance trade 
union power on the demand side of the labour market. Trade 
union policy can be directed at reducing the own wage 
elasticity of the demand for union labour by reducing the 
elasticity of supply of substitute factors. In the attempt
46) Employers might survive if Freeman and Medoff are 
correct about the productivity effects of unions.
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to increase bargaining strength, the union recognises the 
advantage of monopolistic control over the labour supply. 
The incentive to federate local trade unions and organise 
unorganized firms increases considerably as improvements in 
transportation and communication enlarge the market. The 
attempts to create large national trade unions are 
accordingly logical and understandable.
History^?, political economy and the structure 
(neutralization strategy from the shopfloor) of West German 
industrial relations have led the trade unions to act in a 
comprehensive (centralised and integrated) and thus 
coordinated (predictable) way^®. Traxler (1993, p.162) 
states that encompassiveness, and thus centralised 
collective bargaining, triggered a reduction of uncertainty 
and supported the incomes policy of the government 
especially during the period of economic reconstruction in 
the 1950s. The political concept behind the choice by West 
German unions if a centralised and integrated pattern of 
collective bargaining can be summed up in the notion of a 
solidaristic wage policy.*9 streeck (1984, p.37) reports 
that the West German unions believe that the benefits of 
economic progress should be shared by the whole workforce, 
and that a worker should suffer as little as possible from
47) 'History' refers to the failure of the fragmented 
German trade unions to counter the Nazi-dictatorship.
48) West German management has always had an interest
in stable parameters for planning with regard to the 
individual firm and the desire to limit the areas of 
discretion of its adversaries in bargaining (cf. 
Conrad 1986, p.178).
49) Solidaristic wage policy implies a commitment towards 
equality, i.e., reducing wage dispersion.
54
his employer's incapacity to achieve a high level of 
productivity. Wage increases and improvements in working 
conditions are thus negotiated in a common round for the 
whole workforce rather than for individual groups of 
workers separately. For decades employers, governments and 
trade unions have appreciated the outcome (the public good 
character) of the neo-corporatist West German industrial 
relations system. The gains from supporting an encompassing 
union within a corporatist environment are collectively 
available to the workers. Thus we assume that workers have 
an incentive to achieve those collective benefits. With 
reference to Crouch (1985) neo-corporatist industrial
relations systems are shaped by the following features,
which have also characterised the West German economic and
industrial relations system as compared to pluralist
systems :
- low involvement in industrial conflicts,^0
- low inflation rates,
- low unemployment records.
In line with Crouch's above enumerated items of 
macroeconomic performance Schmitter (1990, p.9) emphasised 
that OECD data revealed that productivity growth of the 
neo-corporatist systems was 'significantly better' than in 
the case of pluralist systems. Large, encompassing trade
50) According to Shanks (1961, p.115) the main functions 
of trade union leadership are to deter the membership 
from putting in ambitious wage claims, stop them from 
going on strike,... .
51) Econometric research conducted by Schnabel (1989) 
confirmed Crouch's characteristics in the case of West 
Germany.
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unions negotiate on behalf of such a large number of 
workers that their actions have direct and predictable 
macroeconomic consequences. According to Schmidt (1986, 
p.331) economic growth has been characterised by a high 
degree of motivation to work, high morale, the workers' 
motivation and readiness to adjust to technical and 
structural change, and only to a minor extent in comparison 
with other countries by a readiness to strike. Furthermore, 
Visser (1987, p.37) argues that centralised collective 
bargaining increases the visibility of the effects of wage 
increases on price levels, unemployment^^ and government 
policies. In a highly unionised economy with centralised 
wage bargaining, trade unions are probably encompassing and 
are willing to choose a growth-oriented economic policy 
strategy.
Over the last 30 years the West German labour force and its 
trade unions have experienced continuously rising wages, 
the reduction of working time, and the expansion of the 
social security system, raising the living standards of the 
West German workforce to an unprecedented level. These 
achievements are among the public goods which are secured 
by the encompassiveness of the West German unions. The 
trade unions, which made only occasional use of their 
potential to conduct labour disputes, gradually developed a 
collective bargaining policy, the aim of which was to 
participate in economic progress. The strategic motive
52) An argument to explain an industrial trade union
leadership's interest in low unemployment records is 
that high levels of unemployment weaken trade unions 
(Batsone and Gourlay 1986, p.2).
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underlying this policy was not to endanger the conditions 
of the growth process (Jacobi 1986, p.213: 'growth
alliance'53). Streeck (1981a, p.152) reports that 
comprehensive trade unions, if they want to avoid their 
disintegration, will 'have to make their members define 
their interests in terms of collective goods' (low 
inflation^*, low unemployment, productivity, economic 
growth, a good social system^S) that can benefit all of 
them.56 According to Streeck (1981a p.153), such 
accomplishments have contributed to legitimate trade union 
compliance with the legal and economic system, especially 
on the shopfloor (neutralization), and have enabled the 
trade union leadership^? to fend off demands from militant 
sections for shopfloor autonomy, hereby securing
53) 'Growth alliance' refers to the trade unions' 
willingness to develop a bargaining policy that does 
not endanger economic growth: i.e. productivity- 
oriented bargaining).
54) The struggle against inflation has been the dominant 
objective of West German economic policy as the West 
German population shows extreme sensitivity towards 
changes in the price level (cf. Mussel and Patzold 
1993, p.84-85). The anti-inflation policy is also 
viewed as the 'best social policy'. Violating this 
collectively internalised objective could be dangerous 
for the unions.
55) The application of corporatism combines features of 
'economic' and 'social efficiency' (Marr and Stitzel 
1979, p.79).
56) To confirm Streeck's argument we refer to Nickel's 
research (1974, p.274) on the scope of trade union 
welfare policy. 84 per cent of the trade union members 
stated that the scope of trade union action is focused 
on the public welfare, 12 per cent said the scope of 
trade union action is limited just to the membership 
and 4 per cent did not state anything.
57) Today the union leadership praises the juridification 
of industrial relations as an institution that 
provides continuity and essential predictability 
which are crucial to reducing uncertainty among the 
contracting partners.
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organizational cohesion, especially in the case of the 
activist unions.
The securing of economic growth demanded not only a high 
investment rate, but also - above all, in view of the high 
export dependency of the West German economy - the 
strengthening of the competitiveness of the West German 
goods and services on the world market. The West German 
trade unions in the export-sensitive sectors are likely to 
be more concerned with problems of international 
competitiveness than those in the protected sectors.
To the extent that a trade union movement is dominated by 
industrial trade unions in the export sector, 'foreign 
trade-conscious behaviour' characterises the movement as a 
whole (Crouch 1990, p.70). Jacobi and Müller-Jensch (1991, 
p.131) describe Germany as a country with more or less 'one 
single export lobby and the skill of the unions consists in 
getting as much as possible for their contribution toward a 
secured continuation of production and technology.' 
Exposed-sector oriented industrial trade unions represent 
the union type most capable of internalising national 
economic requirements within its policy (e.g. Crouch 1990, 
p.71 and p.81). Streeck (1981, p.152) argues that in the 
past, the DGB affiliates had in principle accepted that 
long-term employment security in an export-oriented 
environment depends on high productivity; that sustaining 
international competitiveness requires high rates of
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technological innovation; and that the latter demands a 
certain degree of labour mobility.
Often corporatist scholars (Lembruch 1979) argue that 
corporatism can be interpreted as an attempt to negotiate 
efficientes wage bargains at the macroeconomic level^^. 
Lehmbruch (1979) argues that corporatism represents the 
deliberate construction of institutions required to conduct 
negotiations on wages and employment and to insure
subsequent compliance by both employers and trade union
membership. The corporatist arrangements are 
'institutionalized patterns which involves bargaining' 
between interest groups, 'one element in the bargain being 
that the groups receive certain institutionalized' (often 
by the government) 'or ad hoc benefits in return for 
guarantees by their groups' representatives that their
membership will behave in certain ways considered to be in 
the public interest' (Crouch and Dore 1990, p.3). Thus
corporatism is based on a comprehensive trade union's 
ability to 'break or control the violence of faction' 
(Schmitter 1979, p.15) of its membership. The legalisation 
of unions and granting of rights can in 'itself mute some 
of the radicalism associated' with their former demands 
(Hyman 1975, p.55).
58) 'Efficient' means pareto optimal results, that can be 
verified by a good Okun trade-off.
59) According to Lehmbruch (1979, p.55) macroeconomic 
analysis, especially Keynesian theory has become an 
important frame of reference for the strategy of 
elaborating and promoting wage demands by Austrian and 
West German trade unions.
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Where unions are willing to confine their demands within 
the limits of the 'public interest', often®® employers have 
little reason to resist, and some reason to welcome, the 
unionisation of their employees. Unions help to make 
workers' behaviour more predictable and manageable.®^ 
Firstly, the involvement of unions in various consultative 
and administrative bodies in a corporatist environment can 
generate a degree of identification with government and the 
economic system on the part of the union leaders, and 
encourages them to cut back their own demands accordingly 
(Hyman 1975, p.54). Once trade unions have acquired a 
recognised social status, their membership tends 'to 
integrate their members into the larger body politic and 
gives them a basis for loyalty to the system' (Lipset 1959, 
p.113). Secondly, we argue that trade unions stick to 
corporatism as its application has been appreciated by the 
membership by reaching public goods without relying on 
charitable behaviour by other bargaining parties involved.
Corporatist scholars claim that in organized economies 
performance and adjustment are better in countries with 
centralised and consensus-prone interplay between the
60) If the benefits of corporatism outstrip the costs 
of corporatism employers will be willing to pay for 
positive externalities. In the case of some small 
employers individual employer interest and public 
interest may diverge if they complain about the costs 
of corporatism (e.g. uniform pay rates crush weaker 
and smaller firms).
61) Glismann et al. (1987, p.266) refer to the notion of 
predictability by referring to the duration of the 
long-term cloak agreements (with a duration up to six 
years). They also argue that long termed agreement 
reduce the 'costs' of the annual collective bargaining 
procedures.
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relevant actors of the system. Corporatist decision-making 
is based on consensual agreements between partners. The 
system of consensual decision-making guarantees that the 
interests of every collaborating group will be respected, 
which means that this theory is based on the Pareto 
criterion^Z. Corporatist decision-making has also been 
analysed as an institutional way of getting cooperative 
solutions in many prisoner's dilemmas^^. Inflation may be 
analysed as a set of prisoner's dilemmas. Wage-wage 
prisoner's dilemmas may occur between sections of the 
workforce (Paloheimo 1990, p.116). Paloheimo (1990, p.116) 
demonstrates that in an non-cooperative environment 'wage 
maximisation is a rational strategy as opposed to wage 
restraint, but still a co-operative solution with wage 
restraint has been, at least under certain conditions, even 
more beneficial giving better pay-offs in employment and 
perhaps also in real w a g e s . ' 4^
We argue that the German trade unions have served their 
members' interests by helping to make the society in which
62) A situation is Pareto optimal where no one in the 
economy can be made better off without someone else 
being made worse off. The Pareto criterion describes a 
situation in which a policy introduced caused some 
people to be better off and some worse off. But the 
surplus resulting from this policy allows the better 
off to compensate the worse off.
63) The prisoner's dilemma has been a mainstay of game 
theory and is closely allied to Olson's (1971) free­
rider dilemma. Both suggest discouraging perspectives 
regarding the problems of human cooperation and 
coordination.
64) That does not mean that corporatism is the best 
outcome. Corporatism may score better on the Okun- 
index than the semi-decentralised bargaining 
structure, but it may not do better than fully 
decentralised pay determination (cf. Paloheimo 1990 
and Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 'inverted U-curves').
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they operate more productively^^ by enhancing economic 
growth. The securing of industrial efficiency and 
international competitiveness are closely related and have 
brought about extensive efforts to encourage technological 
innovations in order to offer highly advanced goods (cf. 
Kern and Schumann 1990, pp.123-125). During the 1980s the 
DGB trade unions countered their membership's increasing 
anxiety about a progressive devaluation of traditional 
manual skills (cf. Kern and Schumann 1990) by technological 
innovation with the application of agreements concerning 
the 'protection against rationalisation' (Streeck 1981, 
p. 150) as well as the promotion of training and 
qualification programmes. One aspect in favour of strong 
unions and codetermination rights is that union 
representation plays a central role in the regulation of 
skills and training - on which especially the economic 
position of the skilled workers depends (cf. Schmid 1984, 
p.148).
Trade union organization can in principle serve its members 
either by making the pie the society produces larger, so 
that its members would get larger slices even with the same 
shares as before, or alternatively by obtaining larger 
shares or slices of the societal pie for its members 
(Metcalf 1988, p.4). If industrial relations with the
65) The West German trade unions have encouraged society to 
invest in the kinds of skills and knowledge that have 
indirectly contributed to secure or enhance the unions' 
position (e.g. making labour demand more inelastic). 
Such investments shape the long-run growth of skills 
and knowledge, which are the underlying determinants of 
economic growth (growth alliance).
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employers are good, the trade unions and government working 
together can produce a bigger 'pie' as well as contending 
over the size of the slices. Thus we assume that 
determining the style of industrial relations can be 
perceived as a non-zero-sum game^G. And as Olson (1982) 
describe this kind of behaviour; 'The familiar image of the 
slicing of the social pie does not really capture the 
essence of the situation; it is perhaps better to think of 
wrestlers struggling over the contents of a china shop.' 
Kendix and Olson (1990, pp.44-45) suppose that 
organizations attempt to obtain a large share of the 
national income through special-interest legislation or 
cartelistic price or wage setting, which will in general 
generate excess burdens and normally also entail agreements 
and regulations that slow innovation.
Among West German trade unions pay rises are not the only 
goal of union policy. Their leaders also keep price 
developments and unemployment in mind, which can mean that 
the trade union leadership is interested in limiting 
negative externalities (cf. Calmfors and Driffill 1988, 
p.33). An important reason for these results is found in 
industrial relations systems with the following 
characteristics (e.g. Visser 1987): unified trade union
movements, low degree of fragmentation, high member 
concentration, monopoly of the umbrella organization, 
hierarchical superiority of the peak associations.
66) Glismann et al. (1987, p.153) argue that the 'general 
societal consensus' is based on the positive 
achievements of industrial relations.
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centralised wage negotiations and cooperation with the 
state - thus conditions corresponding to Schmitter's (1981) 
definition of neo-corporatism.
There are a number of reasons why comprehensive and 
centralised trade unions have exercised the kind of 
restraint which has led to the neo-corporatist industrial 
relations style. Olson (1982) has argued that encompassing 
trade unions must somehow mix distributional and production 
goals. Small and narrowly defined trade unions are more 
likely to behave as 'distributional coalitions', which are 
'overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the distribution 
of income rather than the production of additional output' 
(Olson 1982). Over the decades the West German trade unions 
have exercised neo-corporatist industrial relations. A high 
degree of encompassiveness in a trade union is shaped by 
the following characteristics prevailing in Austria, Sweden 
and West Germany (e.g. Visser 1987): a monopolistic,
unified and concentrated trade union system. Crouch (1990, 
p.84) submits that over the last decade the DGB and its 
affiliates have successfully reduced the power of rivals, 
retaining their former dominance as a virtually 
monopolistic representative on the side of trade unions.
Until now all explanations for the organizational coherence 
of an encompassing union have been dominated by the 
Olsonian assessment of collective action, which is based on 
rational individual behaviour. However, the cohesion of 
trade union membership and especially the existence of
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large and encompassing trade unions cannot be solely based 
on rational individual self-interest^? (cf. Sen 1987, 
p.41). Von Rosenstiel (1992, pp.267-268) submits that the 
cohesion of a group is also based upon a shared acceptance 
of certain group norms, a sense of belonging to a groupé®, 
and on a common interpretation of the individual's 
environment. Perceiving and defining employers or 
employers' associations as a powerful force in collective 
bargaining might also account for keeping the coalition of 
a heterogeneous membership on the side of the unions 
intact. The perception of a mighty organization on the 
opposing side can ensure trade union c o h e s i o n . ^9 a unions' 
warning of the employers' associations power can be an 
indicator of the effectiveness of the unions' 
indoctrination in strengthening organizational cohesion.
Because neo-classical analysis in general concentrates 
solely on market exchange relations, the scope of trade 
union research has been limited. The rationale of forming a 
comprehensive collective representational body cannot be 
derived solely from standard individualistic (economic) 
exchange models (e.g. Olson, Turner) often based on the
67) Cf. Olson (1971, pp.1-3) 'Olsonian' assumptions on 
rational self-interest.
68) Evidence of the German workforce's group consciousness 
is given by Popitz (1971).
69) The cohesion might be explained by enhancing class 
consciousness.
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assumption of individual utility maximisation^®. Akerlof 
(1986) shows that standard neo-classical models often 
cannot explain the behaviour of groups; we have to apply 
some sociological theory in order to explain the non­
economic sentiments in the interactions of groups.
Assessing the work done by Akerlof (1986), Aoki (1990) and 
Fox (1974) we introduce the argument of diffuse exchange, 
which to an important degree determines work relations. 
Furthermore, we assume that if workers have an interest in 
the welfare of their coworkers, they gain utility if the 
management relaxes pressure on the workers or groups within 
the workforce who are hard pressed. In return for reducing 
pressure, even excellent workers are willing to work harder 
or even join a trade union organization in order to 
increase trade union strength to counter the pressure of 
the management. The reason for such behaviour by the 
talented workers is explained by the fact that in working 
together people acquire sentiments for each other. An 
indication of this can be seen in the fact that trade 
unions alter the distribution of power between marginal 
(generally junior) and more permanent (generally senior) 
employees, causing unionised companies to select different
70) In reality trade union policy is not shaped by
individualistic utility maximisation (cf. Oswald 1986, 
p.4), or just an aggregation of individual to group 
preferences. According to Arrow (1963), aggregated 
sets of individual preferences, which are transitive 
at the individual level, can violate the rule of 
transitivity on the aggregate level. Regarding Arrow's 
voting paradox, it is possible to demonstrate that 
even transitive individual preference orderings cannot 
necessarily be aggregated into a collective transitive 
ordering (cf. Marsden 1986, p.77).
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compensation packages and personnel practices from those of 
non-union firms. According to Elliott (1991, p.205), trade 
unions can be viewed as a 'powerful vehicle for 
implementing notions of fairness and for codifying these in 
a set of formal and informal rules.' Thus trade unions are 
able to insure that these notions of fairness become 
enshrined in custom and the network of informal rules of an 
industrial relations s y s t e m . a feature of these informal 
rules is that trade union negotiators and workers draw 
comparisons between the rate of change of their wages and 
those negotiated in previous contracts. The implicit 
understandings between workers and firms, the implicit 
contracts between workers and firms, will embody such 
notions as comparability.
Exchange is defined as the voluntary actions of individuals 
who are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring 
and do. Fox (1974) distinguishes between two types of 
exchange; first the Olsonian approach of an economic 
exchange, where the transaction rests on a formal 
individual standard economic contract stipulating the exact 
quantities to be exchanged (e. g., incorporating the less 
skilled in an encompassing body in order to avoid 
undercutting). The second exchange type, the diffuse, or 
social one, is characterised by the fact that the social 
exchange 'entails unspecific obligation' (Fox 1974, p.71). 
Social exchange means that one person does another a
71) An example is that trade unions promote the idea of a 
'common rate for the job', or of 'taking wages out of 
competition.'
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favour, and while there is a general expectation of some 
future possibly unspecified pay-off, its exact nature is 
definitely not stipulated in advance. Social exchanges 
between people engender feelings of personal obligations, 
gratitude and trust. The outcome of the social interactions 
can be help, social support (solidarity) and companionship. 
According to Fox (1974, p.71) these 'diffuse transactions 
give the partnership some intrinsic significance.' By 
providing voice trade unions can have some positive effects 
on the productivity of a company, an industry or the whole 
economy. The outcome can improve management's policies, 
reduce the quit rates and can account for an improvement of 
morale and cooperation among the workforce (Freeman and 
Medoff 1984, p.13). In his explanation of group behaviour 
Akerlof (1986) assumes that the results are highly 
appreciated by the workforce. The partial gift exchange can 
lead to reciprocity and solidarity within the workforce.
From the perspective of a group of workers, socialising 
recipients feel obligated when the donor is perceived to 
have acted from altruistic motives. This serves to 
reinforce and maintain altruistic dispositions in group 
members, thereby enhancing group cohesion and cooperation. 
Greenberg (1980, p.5) found that the perceived magnitude of 
the donor's motivation to help was significantly correlated 
with the magnitude of reciprocity. 'Altruistic' solidarity 
can cause the following multidetermined forms of 
reciprocity; First, reciprocity may be motivated by the 
recipient's desire to receive future rewards from the
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donor. The major determinant for this type of reciprocity 
is the belief that the donor has the ability to provide him 
with future benefits. Second, reciprocity may derive from 
the recipient's increased attraction to the donor following 
the receipt of a benefit. An attraction to the donor can 
result from a number of attributions made about the donor's 
motives, such as his liking for the recipient and his 
concern about the recipient's welfare. Kirsch (1993, pp.23- 
24) assumes that the concern about the recipient's welfare 
has an 'emotional intensity' symbolising the donor's 
'devotion' to the recipient.
Now we shall discuss an explanation of diffuse exchange 
relationships in order to secure the cohesion of an 
encompassing union. Diffuse exchange relationships can be 
incentives in which people are motivated by a desire to win 
prestige, respect, friendship and other social and 
psychological objectives. With the support of the works 
councils the trade unions encourage the formation of 
company leisure and sporting groups to exercise the 
considerable influence of the trade unions on the potential 
membership to join the trade union. As West German trade 
unions are debarred from shopfloor representation, we argue 
that developing loyalty to the trade union is of 
importance. It is necessary to mention that the trade union 
leadership never tires of emphasising the achievement of 
its organization, which might be explained by the desire to 
proclaim proud sentiments within its membership in order to 
generate a feeling of corporate identity, hereby promoting
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a certain degree of loyalty towards the organization.^^ The 
promotion of a corporate trade union identity and loyalty 
can increase trade union strength as well as insulate the 
trade union from 'exits' and competition by other labour 
organization.
Recalling the macroeconomic performance of former West 
Germany (e.g., the Okun-index) the argument of diffuse 
exchange relationships can account to an important degree 
for the records achieved. Evidence from Japan (cf. Aoki et 
al. 1990) revealed that the diffuse exchange relations 
partially explained the high productivity which has been 
based upon flexible work assignments, job rotation and the 
long term of employment. According to Fox's (1974) research 
such key features enumerated above are components of high 
trust operating in an industrial relation system.
Friends, trade union members, shop stewards, and especially 
the works councillors use 'social pressure' to encourage 
other workers to do their part in achieving the group goal. 
The consciousness of belonging to a group and shared 
perceptions by group members are used by the trade union to 
mobilise latent groups. For instance, the successful 
conduct of a strike can improve the group consciousness of 
the workforce and thus forge membership together. The trade 
union leadership might use emotional and ideological 
elements for the recruitment of trade union members.
72) The sentiment of 'being a <Metaller> means to be a 
member of IGM' is a quite common answer of the blue- 
collar workers in the metal industry expressing 
loyalty towards their trade union.
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Ideology might be an integrative force for organizations, 
but in the case of large and encompassing trade unions the 
application of a certain degree of ideology could turn out 
to cause disintegration of the embracing unit. The 
organizational principle of an unitary union means a non­
partisan organization, but this does not mean that German 
trade unions lack ideology or political attitudes. 
Especially in the case of the activist trade union 
movement, leftist ideology has been used by the union 
leadership to inspire and mobilise their socialist-minded 
rank-and-file activists. In the case of the IGM and the IG 
Medien, socialism has been a force to secure 
encompassiveness?^, and thus to incorporate the militant 
left rank-and-file.
Streeck (1981, p.160) argues that, while corporatist 
systems depend on the horizontal integration of 
heterogeneous interests, encompassing trade unions seem to 
be accompanied by the process of 'structural de- 
ideologisation', which has worked especially in the case of 
the accommodationist trade unions (Streeck 1981, p.160). As 
the DGB's coop enterprise system collapsed shortly before 
the East German socialist system the activist trade unions 
were concerned about the integrative force of socialist 
ideology. Thus it might be possible to argue that the 
prevailing West German corporatist industrial relations
73) Examples are the unions' enthusiastic backing for the 
SPD's Ostpolitik ('East Policy') and their willingness 
to intensify contacts with their counterparts in the 
GDR (cf. Markovits 1986, p.27, p.79, pp.115-118, 
p.446).
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structure fulfilled its task of de-ideologisation?^ of the 
workforce. The left often denounced corporatism as a 'means 
of incorporating and emasculating the working class' 
(Crouch and Dore 1990, p.9).
Large or latent groups have no incentive to act to obtain a 
collective good, because, however valuable the collective 
good might be to a group as a whole, it does not offer the 
individual any incentive to pay dues to any organization. A 
separate and 'selective' incentive will stimulate a 
rational individual in a latent group to act in a group- 
oriented way. There are further problems with collective 
membership, as the expected benefits are spread out over a 
period of time. This might be an argument to abstain from 
trade union subscriptions especially for workers whose 
employment is likely to last only a short period. Even a 
recruitment policy that refers to the 'marginal voter' 
concept seems to be of no value. Another problem is, while 
all members within a bargaining unit are subject to a 
single contract, their preferences as to the mix of 
contract provisions are not likely to be identical. In 
comparison with a private good, where individuals adjust 
their consumption until marginal valuation equals price, 
the output of a public good is unlikely to realise exactly 
his preferred contract or working conditions through 
collective bargaining (Hirsch and Addison 1985, p.24).
74) De-ideologisation can be interpreted as an attempt to 
counter the main official ideology of the German 
socialists and German Marxist tendencies.
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Defining interests in collective terms is an incentive to 
set up an encompassing trade union in order to receive the 
positive public good results of neo-corporatism and thus an 
important integrative force for maintaining a cohesive 
body. The encompassiveness of the union is a precondition 
to achieve this desirable outcome. An erosion in the
provision of the desirable neo-corporatist outcome, 
probably by the shock stemming from the disintegration of 
the GDR, can have severe repercussions on the 
attractiveness of the union for the West German membership 
and thus on the encompassiveness of the unions. Thus we 
argue that in accordance with the significance of the
public goods provided by the neo-corporatist structure, the 
West German unions will secure this institutional 
environment by avoiding a disintegration of their
encompassiveness.
Group solidarity can account for the cohesion of an
encompassing trade union, but it cannot solve the Olsonian 
problem of free-riding. Olson (1971) contended that 
organizations which mainly or only provide public goods 
will find it difficult to generate membership commitment or 
raise financial support for their activities. Olson (1971) 
claims that the existence of a chronic free-rider problem 
in trade unions explains the selective benefits which trade 
unions provide for their members (sickness, old age, 
unemployment, etc.) and the occurrence of quasi-compulsory 
membership (closed shop, etc.).
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4.3. 'Selective incentives' - non-collective benefits
Kendix and Olson (1990, pp.42-43) have pointed out that, 
since all collective action must overcome a public good 
problem, even those groups that have the potential to 
develop selective incentives will be able to organise only 
when they have good leadership and favourable 
circumstances. The incentives must be 'selective', so that 
those who do not join the trade union working for the 
group's interest, or in other ways contribute to the 
attainment of the group's interest, can be treated 
differently from those who do. Olson (1976) claims that a 
mass organization has to develop a range of services which 
are secondary, possibly even unrelated, to its central 
public purpose, but which meet some individual need of 
actual and potential members and which are available only 
to the membership.
An important question to answer is how the encompassiveness 
of trade union organizations can be sustained. Crouch 
(1982, pp.52-53) submitted that there is a further problem 
built into Olson's model, that is, while the cohesion of an 
organization can be partly based upon individual self- 
interest, it is also based upon a shared acceptance of 
certain group norms. Despite selective incentives, group 
behaviour can provide the cohesion which allows group 
action to be more stable and more effective. According to 
Marsden (1986, p.88), group pressures can be divided into 
four kinds. These four kinds of pressure might also be used
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by the trade union leadership to exercise discipline over 
their membership. The first concerns direct pressures upon 
deviant members who fail to conform to group norms 
involving material sanctions^S (e.g. IGM's works councils 
inhibit the career of a deviant member even if the person 
leaves the company and wants to start in an other metal- 
producing company) and the second, moral pressures. The 
third concerns elements of group consciousness, and the 
fourth, perceptions and orientations shared by group 
members which can lead them to interpret their situation 
and the action of other groups in similar ways (cf. Taylor 
1989 'moral space'). All four elements can facilitate the 
process of individualistic socialisation within the union.
In this section we shall assess to what extent selective 
incentives might be used to provide organizational 
coherence regarding the following group pressures;
(i) Moral and material sanctions
Social sanctions and social rewards are selective 
incentives; they are among the kinds of incentives that may 
be used to mobilise a latent group. Large organizations 
that are not able to make membership compulsory must also 
provide some non-collective goods in order to give
75) According to Marsden (1986, p.89) the self-interest of 
individuals can be bolstered by the threat of sanctions 
by coworkers, such as being 'sent to Coventry'.
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potential members an incentive to join^®. A selective 
incentive can be either negative or positive. They can 
either coerce by punishing those who fail to bear an 
allocated share of the costs of the group activity, or they 
can provide positive inducements for those who act in the 
group inte res t.B y far the most important single factor 
enabling large national trade unions to survive is that 
membership in these trade unions, and support of the strike 
they might call, is to a large degree compulsion. According 
to Olson (1971, p.68), silent and unseen, but absolutely 
complete compulsion (e.g., the closed shop), 'is the ideal 
of every trade union.' Organized labour in the FRG has 
consistently suffered from the free-rider problem stemming 
from the constitutional ban on closed-shop agreements 
(Article 9, Paragraph 3, German Basic Law)7®, a prohibition 
which accords with the unions' self-perception as the 
representatives of all workers.
76) Shop stewards and union-controlled works councillors 
exercise considerable power over the workforce in 
order to establish a deeply-felt sentiment, that free­
riding is wrong, and the belief that one is morally 
obliged to share the costs of trade unionism, as one 
enjoys the benefit.
77) There are two ways in which an institution assures 
compliance (cf. North 1990). First, it is necessary 
to form a communications mechanism that provides the 
information necessary to know when punishment is 
required. By making available the relevant 
information, institutions make possible the policing 
of defections. Second, because punishment can often be 
perceived as a public good from which the community 
benefits, but the costs are borne by a small set of 
individuals, institutions must also provide incentives 
to carry out punishment when called on to do so.
78) Trade union power is curbed by the so called 'negative 
coalition freedom', i.e. whether one has the absolute 
right not to join a trade union (ban of a closed
shop).
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Virtually every DGB trade union has discussed the 
implementation of 'advantage schemes' and preferential 
treatments ('selective incentives'), which were designed to 
exclude those who, as free-riders, gained all the 
contractual benefits that the trade union had achieved 
without having to bear the burdens and responsibilities of 
active trade union membership, such as paying the 
relatively high membership fees. Despite the constitutional 
ban on closed shop arrangements, especially in large 
companies (e.g. Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen), the trade unions 
considerably influence their works councils to accept only 
trade union members and their family m e m b e r s ^ o r  to 
exercise pressure on blue-collar applicants to join the 
trade union.
In addition to compulsory membership, picket lines, and 
violence, some trade unions also have selective incentives 
of a positive kind: they have offered non-collective
benefits to those who join the union and denied these 
benefits to any who do not. In certain cases the non­
collective goods have been important. For a classic example 
we need to look no further than the early trade union 
movement. In addition to their work in pressing for 
improvements in collective goods as wages and in working 
class living standards, the early trade unions developed a 
range of individual services such as contributory funeral 
benefit schemes and insurance funds. These were important
79) Works councillors especially in the chemical industry 
are extremely eager to support the applications of 
IGCPK membership's friends and family (cf. Kern and 
Schumann 1990, p.299)
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in recruiting members for immediate and tangible 
objectives, while also affording the trade union funds and 
organizational facilities which could be used for more 
collective purposes.
The early establishment of Bismarck's state social security 
system cut the ground away®® from the German trade unions 
as regarded providing a British trade union model (cf. 
Hartwich 1991, p.28). While thus retaining trade union 
membership, the system was partly based on mutual 
insurance. All DGB trade unions have offered various forms 
of mutual insurance and friendly benefits to those who join 
the union. Since the 1960s the DGB trade unions have 
accepted non-members. The growth of social security and 
unemployment insurance, sponsored by the government, and 
the proliferation of private insurance companies (caused by 
increasing and more evenly distributed wealth) have made 
trade union insurance schemes much less useful for 
attracting members than they once were. But the DGB and 
affiliated trade union staff does not tire of proclaiming 
(and this is widely believed by trade union members)®^ that 
these social achievements resulted from an active trade 
union policy.
80) Despite the fact that these social insurance schemes 
were far from universal.
81) Trade unions nominate one third of members for boards 
which monitor state social welfare funds. The DGB is 
first and foremost the voice of labour, lobbying for 
legislation and particular policies in the areas of 
social welfare (old age pensions, unemployment 
insurance, sickness benefits). Nickel (1974, pp.18-19) 
supports the view that unions are perceived by their 
membership as a force for improvements in the West 
German social system.
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Despite the extensiveness of the West German social system, 
the trade unions do provide something in the way of non­
collective benefits, such as insurance, welfare benefits, 
and seniority rights. Seniority, defined as the length of 
service in an employment unit, governs numerous personnel 
decisions in virtually all unionised companies. The 
seniority of one worker relative to another frequently 
determines who gets temporarily laid off, terminated, or 
promoted (Freeman and Medoff 1984, p.122). Such a situation 
may arise because the typical trade union member, or the 
members whose preferences are reflected in union policy, 
are insulated from involuntary redundancy.
Seniority rules can be an effective kind of a selective 
benefit since they cost the union nothing, bring gains to 
its members, and provides a basis for stable groups and 
peer group pressures. Since the administration of such 
rules is rarely absolute®^, unions have the possibility of 
selective defence of seniority cases. Trade union policy 
reflects the preferences of the median voter, and 
redundancies are on a last in, first out basis. Bergmann 
(1985, p.104) points out that until 1982 'trade union 
membership had been widely perceived' by the organized 
workforce as a means 'for a secure job and more generous 
dismissal compensations.' Despite that fact that the 
dismissal procedures are subject to codetermination and 
thus conducted in accordance with the 'independent' works
82) Employers often insist on seniority only when 
productive characteristics are similar.
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councils, the West German workforce is aware of a 'slight' 
trade union membership influence.
An example of a selective good highly appreciated by the 
trade union membership is the provision of individual legal 
representation®^. Some selective social incentives can be 
powerful and inexpensive, but they are available only in 
certain situations. We argue that today the selective goods 
offered by the trade unions to their members have lost 
their appeal. The DGB, with its holdings such as the 
insurance company 'Volksfürsorge', are extremely active on 
the German insurance market with quite respectable profits. 
As insurance polices are offered to the public for the same 
insurance premium as for union members, it is exaggerated 
to call it a selective incentive. The argument of 
profitability accounts for DGB's other holding companies 
(BGAG), such as the banking organization ('Bank für 
Gemeinwirtschaft'), the food shop company ('coop') and the 
building construction company ('Neue Heimat'). The 
revelation of corruption and mismanagement within these 
holdings caused the end of the coop-enterprise system and
83) This refers to the fact that most work councillors are 
members of a trade union. § 102 BetrVG demands that 
the employer has to inform the works council before 
taking legal steps for a dismissal. The works council 
has to approve a dismissal but also exercises 
extensive rights to reject it. In ber Gewerkschafter 
(7/1990, p.39) the IGM(W) leadership 'reminds' its 
membership and free-riders that the offering of voice 
and representation tasks of the works councils depends 
upon union membership.
84) All DGB trade unions offer individual legal 
representation to their members. This includes the 
provision of hired or trade union lawyers in 
labour courts. According to Nickel (1974, p.154) 
individual legal representation is the second most 
important reason for joining a trade union.
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generated resentment among the trade union membership®^ 
(cf. Stuttgarter Zeitung 7.3.1990, p.9 and 22.5.1990, p.2).
A further selective incentive in sustaining trade union 
membership can be seen in the fact that the DGB's regional 
offices sell a quite respectable contingent of less 
expensive theatre and concert tickets to organized members. 
As the West German trade unions use a considerable part of 
their resources for education and training purposes, 
members are encouraged to enrol and improve their skills. 
Thus attendance at these elaborate training courses might 
be perceived as a selective benefit.
Despite the extensiveness of the social system and the 
failure of the coop-enterprise system, there is still a 
strong selective incentive for the rank-and-file to join 
and stay in a trade union, which is the trade unions' and 
DGB's ability to provide experienced legal representation. 
Another selective incentive for its membership is the DGB's 
and affiliates' support with personal tax advice. As the 
German workforce expects to receive high strike 
compensation, this might be an important selective 
incentive to join and stay in a trade union. Regarding the 
accelerating militancy of the West German trade unions 
after 1975 Bergmann (1985, p.104) noted that 'joining a 
trade union had been rational for non-members with 
reference to economic self-interest (strike compensation).'
85) A common feature within the DGB affiliates has been 
that they 'renounced the system of coop-enterprise' as 
not practicable (Wolf 1990a, p.15).
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But this selective incentive also became blurred as the 
trade unions nowadays offer strike payments even to non­
members to prevent them from strike breaking or to 
encourage subsequent trade union membership. It might seem 
to be a contradiction to offer strike payment to the non­
organized workforce as well as simultaneously organising 
strict and expensive picket lines. We argue that the 
offering of strike compensation to non-members diminishes 
the incentive to join the trade union, but on the other 
hand one could say that the ineffectiveness of a called 
strike due to strike breakers could cause more harm to the 
attractiveness of a trade union.
fii) Group consciousness and shared perceptions
The studies of German workers' attitudes conducted by 
Popitz et al. (1971) revealed a strong degree of 
consciousness of belonging to a distinct community of 
manual work.®^ Despite the consciousness of belonging to a 
group, which can be a feature of a feeling of solidarity, 
it is necessary to point out that collective sentiments 
have declined in favour of individualistic ones (cf. 
Bleicher and Detje 1991, Mückenberger 1993, p.210). Not 
just the consciousness of belonging to a distinct community 
of the workforce creates the necessity to organise 
collectively, but awareness of the horrifying impact of the 
globalisation of markets intensifies the desire, especially
86) According to Herkommer et al. (1979) West German trade 
union density is shaped by the union consciousness of 
the workforce.
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within the manual workforce, to avoid sectionalism in order 
to counter the strengthening of the management's 
prerogatives (cf. Steinkühler 1989a, p.12). The task of the 
trade union leadership is to publicize the various threats 
(e.g., by means of such a slogan as 'together we stand, 
divided we fall') to the workforce stemming from the 
environment and other important factors in the industrial 
relations system. Upholding awareness of the various 
threats to the workforce can assure the organizational 
encompassiveness (cf. French and Bell 1994, p.152). Thus 
one cornerstone of trade union existence and survival is to 
hold up a certain kind of identification of class 
relationship between capital and labour as a major 
determinant of social relations (cf. Schmitter 1990, p.30). 
Thus trade unions are an expression of workers' 
dissatisfaction within society and a means of resolving 
workers' grievances by offering them a voice. There might 
nevertheless be some doubt about the issue of whether there 
is still a 'class' relationship between capital and labour. 
In all the free elections in East and West Germany the 
workforce showed virtually no indication of revolutionary 
consciousness (cf. Kirsch 1993, p.248).
Crucial to Olson's (1971) theory of collective action is 
the fact that the trade union in question is so large that 
an individual member's contribution hardly affects the 
union's financial assets. In the first instance, most trade 
unions are denoted as so called mass organizations. 
According to Crouch (1982, p.64), evidence from research
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shows that the majority of the workforce defines a 'trade 
union' as the shopfloor organization, and in the German 
case probably the works councillors loyal to the trade 
union rather than the remote national body with its 
headquarters. If workers had to orient themselves solely to 
the national organization, there would be a major problem 
of Olson's logic of collective action in the form of 
pronounced free-riding and reduced encompassiveness. 
According to research undertaken by Batstone (et al. 1977, 
p.180) the propensity to sustain an encompassing union lies 
in the role of the shop stewards and the works councillors. 
They are also most familiar with the prevailing community 
and work group customs. They also know the management 
culture of their company. Thus the shop- or plant-level 
trade union organization is the linking pin of the 
centralised trade union in enforcing cohesion in remote 
areas.
More important is the fact that in almost every free 
country the trade unions handle members' grievances against 
the employer. In some countries the non-collective benefits 
provided through trade union action on individual members' 
grievances have also been limited in recent decades by the 
legal requirements that a trade union must represent all 
workers in a given group fairly, whether or not they belong 
to the trade union. Especially in the FRG, where trade 
unions are 'neutralized' from the shopfloor, the trade 
unions' influence on their firms' works councils is of 
paramount importance. The collectivist solidarity provided
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by the unions stands to become eroded by the self-interest 
of the works councils, whose protective actions only help 
employees in their own plants (plant syndicalism). Thus the 
desire to 'control' the works councils is crucial for the 
provision of non-collective goods. Various DGB-affiliated 
trade unions launched campaigns to create a shop steward 
system within the c o m p a n i e s . The works councils depend on 
the specific knowledge of the union officers (cf. Kern and 
Schumann 1990, pp.231-232). The more elaborate the 
regulations, the greater the need for specialists to deal 
with these regulations. When these specialists become 
significant enough, as in the case of the German industrial 
relations system's juridification, there is even the 
possibility that the specialists with a vested interest in 
the complex regulations will collude or lobby against 
simplification or elimination of the regulation.
Selective benefits are an important factor in reducing 
free-riding behaviour, and thus can help to secure the 
cohesion of the trade unions. But the application of 
selective incentives by the unions is curbed by the 
extensiveness of the social security system and the decline 
of collective in favour of individualistic sentiments.
87) In the 1950s the IGM introduced a shop steward system 
in response to the Works Constitution Law cf.
Markovits (1986, pp.186-187). The same happened in the 
case of the IGCPK, cf. Markovits (1986, pp.294-295).
By the works councillors the creation of a shop steward 
system had been viewed as a potential rival or control 
organization which caused severe irritation. Hence the 
union leadership stopped this strategy of implementing 
a shop steward system (Schmidt and Trinczek 1993, 
p.174).
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4.4. Conclusion ; The worries of the West German trade 
unions
As was discussed in the previous chapters, the cohesion of 
the West German trade unions is determined by the 
application of collective and selective benefits. Going 
from analysis of the benefits provided by the encompassing 
trade unions, we argue that their cohesion is rather 
fragile in a number of respects: (i) the encompassing
impact of the selective benefits is limited; (ii) 
collective sentiments have declined in favour of individual 
sentiments; (iii) the willingness to define interests in 
collective terms (growth alliance) will decline if economic 
performance is stagnating and (iv) the collapse of the coop 
enterprise and the East German 'socialist' system could 
have a severe impact on trade union cohesion in the case of 
the activist trade unions.
The external shock of the disintegration of the GDR can 
have a severe impact especially on the incorporating force 
of defining interest in corporatist terms (e.g. high wages, 
low inflation, etc.). In the case of the activist trade 
unions we assume that with the collapse of the socialist 
states leftist ideology applied by the union executives 
might lose its force and thus weaken the unions' cohesion. 
The next step to take in pursuing this analysis is to 
examine how the threats resulting from the disintegration 
of the GDR can affect the provision of collective goods 
(e.g. growth alliance) by the unions and correspondingly
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its repercussions on the unions' organizational cohesion. 
There are four main threats stemming from the East: (i) the 
migration wave from East to West Germany, (ii) the 
emergence of the possible rival organization FDGB, (iii) 
the dissatisfaction of the East German workforce with the 
former East German industrial relations system and the 
FDGB, which could mean a loss of encompassiveness, (iv) the 
loss of a unionised sector in the former GDR.
The provision of collective benefits largely determines the 
attractiveness of the West German trade unions and thus 
their membership's willingness to form an encompassing 
organization. This means that these trade unions are not 
small and narrowly defined, and do not act just as a
distributional coalition. In the case of West German 
industrial relations, the success of the trade unions has 
rested to a certain degree on the attractiveness of the 
collective incentives and thus of the structural 
preconditions to generate corporatism as a unionised trade 
union movement, with a low degree of fragmentation, a 
monopoly of the umbrella organization, the hierarchical 
superiority of the peak associations, and centralised wage 
negotiations. In a country such as West Germany, where
trade union rights belong only to particular organizations 
which are recognised by law, and where a rationalised 
system of industrial trade unions exists, there are few 
opportunities for the existence of more than one trade
union available to any category of worker (Crouch 1982,
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p. 169). The shock emanating from the disintegration of the 
GDR caused the following worries:
(i) The influx of labour from the East, with likely 
undercutting of West German wages and working conditions, 
could lead to a deterioration of union strength in 
collective bargaining®®. The sudden removal of the Iron 
Curtain, with its influx of labour to the West, and the 
mobility of all factors of production, especially capital, 
eroded the DGB trade unions' belief in the continuation of 
beneficial neo-corporatism. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980, 
p.74) point out that capital is always a collectivity and 
automatically has the advantages of organization®^, while 
organization presents special problems for workers.9® The 
dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the comparatively high 
level of training and education in the GDR could lead to 
massive investments in the GDR, which could mean an 
investment strike for the western parts of Germany. 
Eventually West German equipment would become obsolete and 
economically non-competitive.
(ii) Having been used to a virtually single trade union 
status, the DGB and affiliates underwent moments of extreme 
anxiety immediately after the collapse of socialism. The
88) A theoretical model of the competitive fringe of 
oligopoly is given by the kinked demand curve. OPEC's 
decline is a good illustration of the organizational 
weakness of such a cartel.
89) Capital's advantage of organization increases with 
intensified competition.
90) Offe and Wiesenthal tend to forget that firms in a 
market economy are also in competition with each 
other, and face the possibility of new entrants in 
their markets.
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DGB and affiliates feared that the very existence of a 
rival organization, such as the East German FDGB or its 
affiliates could erode the near-monopolistic position of 
the West German umbrella organization (DGB) and the conduct 
of collective bargaining by the member unions, increase 
fragmentation within the workforce, and undermine 
centralised wage b a r g a i n i n g . This meant that the FDGB or 
its affiliates could erode the West German trade unions' 
stronghold in the provision of collective goods and thus 
inflict damage on West German industrial relations and the 
trade unions' cohesion. Thus the process of German 
reunification had an extremely worrisome effect on the West 
German trade union movement, as this event could impose 
severe strains upon the organization's encompassiveness.
The idea of trade union encompassiveness seeks to combine 
the principles of the centralisation of decision-making and 
control (vertical integration) with that of horizontal 
integration (cooperation between trade unions and groups 
within the trade unions). Visser (1987) proposes two 
separate measures of the power of confederations: the
internal, horizontal integration of the movement as a 
whole; and the vertical integration of the main 
confederation. According to Crouch (1990, p.74), vertical 
integration includes the following variables: ... 'the
locus of control over strikes, allocation of finances and 
staff resources, characteristic bargaining levels, the role
91) Swedish evidence suggests (Ahlen 1989, p.338) that the 
centrifugal forces of decentralisation and wage drift 
interact with what seem to be irreconcilable union 
rivalries.
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of officials in bargaining and organizational 
concentration.' The existence of a second mighty trade 
union organization such as the FDGB, or the emergence of 
new trade unions in the GDR could mean that the 
organizational strength and thus the success of the West 
German trade unions could be at stake (e.g. market share 
unionism). Corporatism entails that the economic actors are 
organized, and order is secured by hierarchical control of 
the organization.
A rival organization competing against the DGB unions could 
cause disintegration in the exercise of control of the 
trade union leadership over its membership (e.g., the locus 
and the control of strikes) or workforce and thus in the 
predictability of the economic and industrial relations 
system. If wage bargaining became decentralised and the 
labour force is highly unionised but at the local level, 
there would be a number of groups looking mainly at their 
sectional interests. Prisoners' dilemmas could emerge in 
decision-making both between different trade unions and 
between the trade unions and employers. Cooperative^^, 
growth-oriented and stable solutions would be difficult to 
achieve because of a lack of coordination in decision­
making. Redistributing strategies will be easier to 
mobilise. Different small groups would have good 
possibilities for externalising the negative side effects 
of their redistributing policies. According to Buchanan et
92) According to North (1990, p.12) cooperation is
difficult to sustain when the game is not repeated, 
when information on the other player is lacking, and 
when there are a large number of players.
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al. (1980) this can be denoted as a trend towards a rent- 
seeking^^ society. This also means that, if trade unions 
become weak and fragmented, prospects for active interplay 
between the government and the trade unions will be low.
In societies with powerful trade unions, both governments 
and trade unions are highly dependent on each other. The 
government cannot implement a growth-oriented economic 
policy without the support of the trade unions, and the 
strategy of the trade unions is dependent on their 
relations with government. In a unionised country with 
centralised collective bargaining, trade unions are liable 
to choose growth-oriented strategies. With the FDGB 
representing labour the growth-orientation policy of the 
Conservative-Liberal government could be jeopardised. 
Industrial relations would cease to be predictable and the 
respected industrial relations climate of high trust could 
be eroded.
(iv) The disintegration of the GDR could have triggered the 
loss of the unionised sector, as one can presume (iii) 
increasing dissatisfaction with the former low trust 
transmission belt industrial relations system. Especially 
in the case of the activist trade unions the stated 
dissatisfaction of the East German workforce with low trust 
industrial relations might have had an impact on the 
socialist ideology's integrative and visionary force. This
93) In such a society each faction tries to exploit a 
given system to its own advantage.
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argument applies to the strongly socialist-minded rank-and- 
file of the West German activist unions.
The disintegration of the GDR and growing dissatisfaction 
of East German union members with their situation could 
improve recruitment efforts of the West German unions. 
Because these two factors could cause the loss of a 
unionised sector, it is a worrying feature to the extent 
that it could weaken the union strength. The decline in 
union strength could have repercussions on the substantive 
outcome of collective bargaining. Upholding the 'growth 
alliance' with the employers and the government has 
resulted in the strengthening of the trade unions as a
factor of order. Over the past forty years a stable trade
union density has been achieved within West German 
industrial relations, securing the success and cohesion of 
the West German trade unions.
All those negative impacts stemming from the disintegration 
of the GDR could have interfered with the provision of 
collective goods to the West German union membership.
Trade-offs in the provision and outcome of collective goods
can trigger subsequent dissatisfaction in the membership 
that can reduce their willingness to define their interests 
in collective terms and thus weaken organizational 
cohesion. Securing corporatist structures and institutions 
can be seen as a means for the organizational coherence of 
encompassing unions.
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In the face of threats from East Germany, it would be 
predictable that the West German trade unions would apply 
such strategies to restore neo-corporatism. Markovits' 
(1986) research on West German trade unions outlined a 
split within the DGB's affiliates, dividing them into the 
activist and the accommodationist wing. Especially the 
accommodationist affiliates, such as the IGCPK, practise 
social partnership with the employers and government. The 
explanation is the IGCPK weakness on the shopfloor. The 
attraction of these trade unions rests strongly on the 
collective incentives and thus on the further conduct of 
the mutually beneficial neo-corporatism. Any erosion of 
neo-corporatism by the FDGB would have inflicted severe 
damage especially on the accommodationist trade unions and 
German industrial relations.
Crouch (1982, p.147) distinguishes two types of trade union 
objectives, which are the substantive (pay), and procedural 
(control) goals. Procedural objectives encompass the 
extrinsic end of controlling the means of securing their 
intrinsic goals (improving wages and working conditions). 
In other words the trade union membership and its 
leadership is interested in the right to control, to co- 
determine, or to bargain every detail of a work 
relationship (Crouch 1982, p.149). Thus trade union 
decision-making is centred around the substantive and 
procedural goals, or pay and control. According to Crouch 
(1982, p.158), the pursuit of control goals implies a 
degree of organization, whereas material gains may be
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achieved more or less automatically. Thus we assume that 
the emergence of a second rival trade union organization or 
growing non-unionism in the GDR, and thus an erosion of the 
procedural objectives, could impede a high level of 
substantive bargaining outcomes. To counter these dangerous 
effects, the West German trade union will have to determine 
appropriate strategies in order to generate a stable 
solution.
5. Trade union decision-makina and a predictive trade union 
strategy model
5.1. The classes of trade union decisions
Confronted with the collapse of the GDR, the influx of East 
German workers to West Germany, a possible loss of a 
unionised sector, or the emergence of a rival organization, 
the erosion of neo-corporatism and the unions' cohesion, 
the West German trade union leadership, had to determine 
appropriate strategies in order to protect this system of 
industrial relations. Before we can determine appropriate 
strategies we have to assess the process of decision-making 
within the DGB unions. Who within the trade union will 
decide and what type of decision will it be?
Collective bargaining of all corporatist industrial 
relations systems entails centralisation on the part of the 
actors. Thus we assume that in the decision-making process 
the union executives will decide on appropriate strategies
94
to counter the effects stemming from the collapse of the 
GDR. Despite the existence of a principal-agent 
relationship between union leadership and the rank-and- 
file, these important decisions will be taken by the union 
leadership (cf. Berghahn and Karsten 1987, pp.54-65). The 
reason for this prediction is that such a type of decision 
is two-fold, as the reconstruction situation is shaped by a 
high degree of uncertainty, and thus requires a high 
potential of problem-solving.
From a decision viewpoint, the overall problem of 
leadership is to configure and direct the resource 
conversion process in such a way as to optimize the 
attainment of the objectives. Since this calls for a great 
many distinct and different decisions, a study of the 
overall decision process can be facilitated by dividing the 
total decision 'space' into several distinct categories. 
Using Ansoff's (1965, p.5) terminology, the distinctions 
occur in three categories called respectively (i) 
operating, (ii) administrative and (iii) strategic^*, each 
related to a different aspect of the 'resource conversion 
process' of trade unions.
(i) The operating decisions usually absorb the main bulk of 
the trade union's energy and attention. The objective is to 
improve the efficiency of the trade union. Examples are the 
collection of information and dues, provision of legal
94) According to Ansoff (1965, p.5), the term 'strategic' 
means pertaining to the relationship between the 
organization and its environment.
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advice, the conduct of regular consultation with works 
councillors and shop stewards, and representation of trade 
union members on supervisory boards and labour courts. 
Operating decisions contrast with strategic decisions in 
that they take place by almost regular turns.
(ii) Administrative decisions are concerned with 
structuring the trade union resources in a way which 
improves performance potential. One part of the 
administrative problem is concerned with organization: the 
structuring of authority, work and information flows, 
location of facilities, personnel and bargaining districts. 
The other part is concerned with acquisition and 
development of resources: financing, personnel training and 
development, recruitment of membership.
(iii) The strategists decisions are primarily concerned 
with the external rather than the internal problems of a 
trade union. They comprise the selection of the mix of 
'services' to its membership, the selection of cohorts for 
subsequent recruitments, decisions on the level of 
collective bargaining, decisions on the industrial 
relations climate between a trade union and other actors in 
the industrial relations system (e.g. employers, 
government, other trade unions). Strategic decision-making
95) Referring to the situation of the collapse of socialism 
and the introduction of pluralism with a market economy 
'strategic' denotes 'important.' Thurley and Wood 
(1983, p.213) assume that in strategic theory 'it is 
clear that the survival of the organization and the 
extension of its powers are assumed as given and 
strategy is seen as a way of rationally building in the 
modifications of policies for survival and growth.'
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relies on gathering extensive information on future events 
as well as strategic planning. The task is to analyse and 
assess future relationships between the environment and the 
trade union. The necessity to conduct such an assessment 
depends on how far the environment of the trade union is 
perceived by its leadership as unstable and turbulent.
The important features of strategic decisions are that they 
are centralised on the level of the top trade union 
leadership, and non-repetitive. In the case of the DGB 
trade unions, strategic decision-making is predominantly 
focused on the level of the trade union leadership, which 
is responsible for informing the advisory council, the 
highest inter-congress trade union body. The by-laws often 
allow all trade union leaders to be permanent members of 
the advisory council. Thus it does not seem to be difficult 
to reach approval for the strategic proposals. Referring to 
Lehmbruch (1979, p.61), and from the author's experience 
with DGB trade union organizations, it is possible to 
report a growing role played by experts. Bahnmüller (1993, 
pp.823-824) confirms that over the last twenty years trade 
union policy has been determined by the specialisation and 
professionalising of trade union work, which has 
intensified the significance of scientifically trained 
staff.
Despite the fact that strategic decisions are centralised 
at the peak of the hierarchy, one should not underestimate 
the influence of the personal assistants to the trade union
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leaders as well as the experts of the trade union's central 
office. The author's interviews with trade union leaders 
and their assistants revealed a significant one-way 
relationship in the form of informational dependence 
between the leaders and their highly trained assistants. 
Lehmbruch (1979, p.55) also reports that the macroeconomic 
bias of the German trade union policy is explained by the 
influence which experts (Keynesian-influenced approaches'^) 
have gained within the DGB affiliates. Thus we predict that 
personal assistants and trade union experts, in order to 
retain their influence, are interested in a continuation of 
macroeconomically determined trade union policy, hereby 
incorporating neo-corporatist effects, such as low 
inflation (cf. Kromphardt 1987, pp.209-211).
At the time of strategy formulation it is not possible to 
enumerate all the project possibilities which will be 
encountered.97 This is why bounded rationality (Simon 1957) 
is a necessary precondition to explain strategic decision­
making. Normally, strategy formulation is based on highly 
aggregated, incomplete and uncertain information about 
classes of alternatives. These facts on strategic decision-
96) The macroeconomic bias refers to the former WWI, which 
was later renamed the WSI, and especially to Agartz, 
who took responsibility for the dissemination of the 
Keynesian interpretation of wage policy (cf. Markovits 
1986, pp.83-86).
97) In the case of strategic decision-making, not every 
possible outcome of particular courses of actions 
can be specified. These decisions are said to be 
made under conditions of uncertainty. In other cases 
outcomes can be specified, but nothing is known about 
the likelihood of the occurrence of each particular 
one. Insofar as the situation can be appraised, the 
generation of alternatives and the examination of 
adverse consequences are hampered by uncertainty.
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making account for the growing influence of experts within 
a trade union. Once strategic decisions are implemented, 
they are virtually irreversible. According to Ansoff (1987, 
p.107) in most organizations the pre-strategy decision­
making is heavily political in nature.
The formulation of strategies by the West German trade 
unions was accelerated when rapid, unpredicted and 
discontinuous changes occurred in their environment. With 
reference to the ambiguity of trade union objectives one 
can infer from strategic decision-making that the survival 
of the organization is the central purpose of the trade 
union leadership^®, especially in the abruptly competitive 
shock stemming from the collapse of the GDR. Regarding 
trade union objectives, we infer that the shock eroded 
mainly the procedural ones with likely repercussions on the 
substantive goals and the cohesion of the organization. The 
sharp increase in potentially competitive labour forces 
(e.g., the FDGB, influx of East German labour) intensified 
the pressure on the West German trade unions to make 
decisions with far-reaching effects. The collapse of the 
East German system has thus had severe impacts on the West 
German system and on the trade union movement. The 
environment of the trade unions was accordingly affected. 
Thus the trade union leaders would have to assess a 
sequence of decisions set in motion by the collapse of the 
GDR.
98) In the case of the union leadership the author assumes 
an in-built bias of 'bureaucratic conservatism' (Kelly 
1988, p.149)
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We argue that the West German trade unions seek to maintain 
their organizational position, and want to protect the neo- 
corporatist industrial relations system and the 
organizational cohesion that secures the survival of the 
West German trade unions in order to avoid the impacts of 
trade union competition, the East-to-West migration wave, 
the deterioration of pursuing real wage growth within a 
macroeconomic balance (e.g. a shift towards competitive 
wage bargaining), decentralisation of decision-making, as 
well as the loss of a unionised sector. Those impacts can 
have cause a deterioration in the provision of public goods 
and a possible change in the union strategy with a 
consequence on the individual willingness to sustain union 
membership.
To support the argument of protecting neo-corporatism in 
order to secure organizational cohesion, we shall consider 
the most plausible rival explanation. If we assume that the 
West German trade unions do not intend to protect the neo- 
corporatist environment, what would be the repercussions on 
their encompassiveness?
The answer could be that the shocks stemming from the 
disintegration of the GDR could destabilise neo­
corporatism, causing competitive wage bargaining on the 
side of the unions. The main argument in this case is that 
a rival trade union could cause a change in the conduct of 
macroeconomic-based collective bargaining to competitive 
wage bargaining. Competitive wage bargaining would not be
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compatible with an encompassive trade union membership's 
willingness to define interests in collective terms, as 
each member would try to maximise his personal objectives 
in the bargaining process. Thus rent-seeking behaviour 
could not generate the positive public good outcome of 
centralised collective bargaining. Insofar as the unions 
could not provide positive public goods, we argue that a 
decline in the union's attractiveness could take place with 
accelerating individualism and sectionalism on the part of 
the workforce. The result of dissatisfaction with the
outcome of collective bargain could lead to the break-up of 
the encompassing union body. If the centralised unions 
could no longer provide low inflation and low unemployment 
rates, its membership probably would not feel obliged to 
follow the union leadership's policy.
An encompassing trade union can justify constraints over 
individuals by its achievement of public benefits for all. 
If these benefits are lost, then this justification is 
weakened, and so the corporatist trade union would become 
exposed to the sort of argument that it was a self-seeking 
body with no compensating public benefits. Thus, the
constraints on individual freedom in the name of the 
benefits of corporatism would become unjustified.
Competition may destroy corporatism as the trade unions 
compete for new marginal members and strive for a
leadership position. Equally, employer acceptance of 
corporatism may depend upon its benefits (e.g. control of
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the workforce) being greater than its costs (e.g. loss of 
flexibility for firms).
An encompassing union's ability to break or control the 
violence of factions has depended strongly on the provision 
of public goods. If an encompassing union cannot provide 
such goods, their ability to control the shopfloor 
vanishes. In the case of the accommodationist unions this 
means the collapse of the union, and in the case of the 
activist unions this means increasing self-determination by 
the socialist-minded militant shopfloor representation. The 
position and significance of the trade union leaders would 
be at stake, as dissatisfaction with the provision of 
public goods could trigger attempts towards 
decentralisation within the unions or growing non-unionism.
If the centralised union leadership is not able to control 
its heterogeneous membership, involvement in industrial 
conflicts will probably increase, with negative effects on 
the predictability of the system. Further, we have to 
assess the possibility that the breakdown of corporatism 
accompanied by the emergence of sectionalism might cause 
enhanced idéologisation within the various sections of the 
workforce. Dissatisfaction with the goods provided by the 
unions, enhanced decentralisation, sectionalism and 
possibly idéologisation could trigger the growth of 
multiunionism. Assessing this possible scenario of a neo- 
corporatist breakdown, we have to state that the outcome is 
instability, with the collapse of corporatism causing an
102
irreparable fissure in the trade unions' cohesion. Thus we 
assume that the West German trade union leaders will choose 
a strategy to maintain stability and thus the 
organizational cohesion of the encompassing union.
5.2. The trade union strategy scenario
The purpose of a trade union strategy model is to provide a 
logical framework for evaluating alternative trade union 
strategies in the case of German reunification. The 
intention is to explain within the context why trade union 
leaders decided on particular approaches in the 
reconstruction efforts. The model should include the 
possibility for the analysis of (i) alternative strategies 
and (ii) their desirability and feasibility.
(i^  The assessment of possible alternative strategies
Now we shall turn towards an assessment of possible West 
German trade union strategies to accommodate the new 
situation. By definition the scope of trade union 
strategies comprises the following two alternatives;
- intervention by one trade union in the industrial 
relations system of the other trade union or
- the acceptance of trade union coexistence.
In the first instance the West German trade union leaders 
had to assess whether they would become active in the GDR 
(one-way intervention) or whether they would foster a
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situation of coexistence in a reunified Germany. Both 
strategies may have different corollaries stemming from the 
reactions of the East German actors.
The next step is to set out a basic model of alternative 
trade union strategies. For the analysis of possible 
alternatives we make the following assumptions :
* two interconnected countries, two different industrial 
relations systems, but with the possibility of different 
forms of convergence,
* at least one encompassing industrial trade union in each 
country,
* formal symmetry between the two trade unions (formal 
equality, e.g., proportional distribution of resources).
Figure 1 ; The general alternatives of trade union
strategies
Intervention by East German trade 
unions in West Germany 
no yes
Intervention no 
by West German 
trade unions 
in East Germany yes
Case 1 Case 2
Case 3 Case 4
Now we shall analyse the implications of the cross­
tabulation above. Regarding the assumptions, all four cases 
are possible by definition.
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(i) Case 1 for both unions embraces the strategy of non­
intervention. The strategy of non-intervention encompasses 
trade union coexistence and accommodation. The pattern of 
relationship of cooperative coexistence (collusion) means 
an orientation and action towards the other union by 
cooperative tendencies to assist or preserve. Such a 
strategy can be based on extended trust or on a potential 
of mutual blackmail. To a certain degree collusion could 
include the possibility of upholding the representational 
near-monopoly. Accommodation stands for action strategies 
of an individualistic policy of hands-off towards the other 
union. Whether one union believes in the legitimacy of the 
other would be governed by a level of limited trust (e.g., 
IGM(W)'s early strategy).
(ii) Case 2 encompasses an intervention by an East German 
trade union in the West German industrial relations system, 
as well as a strategy of non-intervention by the West 
German union in East Germany. Such an intervention by one 
trade union could be determined by a competitive spirit and 
insufficient trust in the stability of collusiveness or 
accommodation, in order to weaken or even destroy the 
opponent in the case of the intervening union. The level of 
trust in conducting the intervention in another industrial 
relations sphere results in the future behaviour of the 
opponent. Regarding belief in legitimacy of the other 
union, we predict the denial of legitimacy in the case of 
the intruder. The rationale of an intervention can emerge
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from the objective to protect the representational near­
monopoly.
(iii) In case 3 the strategy of the West German union is 
determined by an intervention in East German industrial 
relations and the pursuit of a non-interventionist strategy 
by the East German union. In this case we refer to the 
arguments already stated in case 2.
(iv) Case 4 is determined by the intervention of each union 
in the sphere of influence of the other union. If both 
trade unions intervene in the sphere of influence of the 
other union the orientation will be determined by distrust. 
The competitive spirit generated in such a case would 
prevent other forms of coordination, and would render a 
stable situation of coexistence virtually impossible.
The decision to take will depend on the orientation towards 
the other union (level of trust), and expectations of 
future behaviour and its effects on the stability of future 
industrial relations.
(ii) The desirability and feasibility of the strategies
Having weighted the intervention and non-intervention 
orientations we shall abandon the assumption of formal 
symmetry between the West and East German actors. Referring 
to the four cases, we find that not all options of the
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cross-tabulation seem to be feasible considering economic, 
political, legal and social constraints.
As German reunification has been determined by a one-way 
convergence towards the West German economic, political and 
social system, we infer a competitive and political 
advantage in favour of the West German trade unions. To 
underscore this statement we refer to the level of West 
German workers' wealth formation, which turned out to be an 
important factor in explaining of the considerable East- 
West migration wave. Further we have to consider that East 
German industrial relations had been governed by a low 
trust Stalinist industrial relations system, imposed by 
violence upon the workforce.
As outlined in the previous chapter, the decision-making 
process will be centred at the peak of the organization. To 
secure their re-election the trade union leaders will 
choose a strategy which allows the union to realise the 
desirable outcome of the neo-corporatist system. As the 
protection of the union's cohesion is determined by the 
membership's willingness, to define their interests in 
collective terms, the leadership will concentrate on 
choosing a strategy which allows a stable solution in a 
unified Germany.
A stable solution refers to the assessment of alternative 
strategies to maximise or satisfy the expected total pay­
offs to the union in the long run. In the case of the
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encompassing West German trade unions, a stable solution is 
shaped by the avoidance of undercutting, the achievement of 
a representational near-monopoly on the part of the West 
German unions (cf. Külp 1993, p.291), as well as the 
avoidance of growing East-West migration, non-unionism or 
multi-unionism in the former GDR.
Now we turn to possible options as illustrated in Figure 1, 
and assess each case to determine to what extent a stable 
solution could be obtained.
Case 1 : For a number of reasons the non-interventionist
strategy of the West German union does not seem to be 
feasible, because such a strategy cannot maintain a stable 
solution; (i) non-intervention cannot prevent the dangerous 
impact of East-West migration, (ii) non-intervention and 
thus organizational inertia cannot stop growing non­
unionism or the emergence of multi-unionism, (iii) a non­
interventionist approach could also help the FDGB to 
recover^^ and present itself as a powerful force on the 
side of the unions, (iv) even a high degree of 
collusiveness between the West and East German trade unions 
could not secure stability, as cartels might break up and 
the West German unions might be viewed as successors of low 
trust industrial relations.
99) An early intervention in the East could prevent a 
recovery of the FDGB. As an example we refer to the 
recovery of the former Communist trade unions in 
Poland.
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Case 2 : This case of an one-way intervention by an East 
German union does not seem feasible, as (i) the East German 
union lacks experience with the new West German industrial 
relations system and probably will not receive recognition 
by the employers, (ii) the East German union compares very 
poorly with its West German counterparts. They cannot 
impress the West German workforce with the Eastern legacy 
of low trust and poor achievements, (iii) a strategy of 
non-intervention by the West German trade unions does not 
seem feasible, as such a strategy cannot prevent the West 
German membership from the impact of undercutting, 
migration, growing non-unionism, multi-unionism or a 
recovery of the FDGB. Thus the strategy of non-intervention 
by the West German union does not turn out to secure a 
stable solution.
Case 3: The intervention by the West German union and the 
non-intervention of the East German union provides a 
feasible option to maintain stability in West German 
industrial relations. The intervention in the East by the 
West German unions seems to be possible, as it could aim to 
introduce the same working and living conditions in the 
East in order (i) to reduce or stop the considerable East- 
West migration, (ii) to avoid the emergence of multi­
unionism or growing non-unionism, (iii) to destroy a rival 
organization, and thus to secure a representational near­
monopoly, (iv) to offer solidarity to the deprived East 
German workforce. Trade union competition could follow but 
in view of the legacy of low trust, a discredited FDGB and
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the inexperience of the East German unions, this 
interventionist strategy could turn out to secure a 
successful intervention with a stable solution.
Case 4: In view of the arguments set out in case 1, an
East-West intervention does not seem to be successful. On 
the other hand the intervention of the West German union in 
East Germany seems plausible, due to its desire for a 
stable solution (cf. case 3).
Assessing the four cases regarding the West German union's 
desire for a stable solution, an intervention in the East 
seems to be necessary in order to reduce or stop the 
undercutting impact (case 3 and 4). An intervention by the 
East German trade union in the West does not seem to be 
feasible due to its poor reputation, inexperience with 
Western unions and poor achievements. We can thus assume 
that case 2 and case 4 are not applicable to the decision­
making process. The West German union will not accept case 
1, as it does not generate a stable solution and could lead 
to a recovery of the East German union. The remaining 
option, and the only possible feasible strategy to reach a 
stable solution, is limited to a one-way intervention of 
the West German union in the East (case 3).
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5.3. The organizational obiectives and the motives for an 
intervention
Regarding the general alternatives of possible trade union 
reconstruction strategies we excluded an intervention by 
the FDGB, so that the remaining option is limited to one­
way intervention by the West German trade unions. This 
option also avoids recovery by the FDGB. This chapter will 
analyse the various advantages of an one-way intervention 
(case 3) by the DGB affiliates in favour of a strategy of 
trade union coexistence between East and West German trade 
unions.
The level and nature of inter-union competition is likely 
to affect the unity of the trade union movement, its public 
image and the future success of trade union membership 
drives. The predominance of market share unionism^®® is a 
depressing scenario for trade union leaders, as this can 
undermine the provision of collective benefits.
Incorporating the East German workforce within the DGB 
affiliated trade unions could prevent the dangerous effects 
of a second powerful trade union organization in a united 
Germany, or the growth of non-unionism in the GDR, and thus 
an erosion of neo-corporatism. According to West German 
association and club law, clubs and other associations such 
as trade unions are prevented from amalgamation.^®^ The
100) Market share unionism is described by a situation of 
competition between unions to secure larger shares of 
the membership in existing organised sectors.
101) Cf. Kittner (1990), pp.162-163.
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principle requires individual and free adhesion. A 
possibility is that the members of the dissolving trade 
union join the other trade union by an individual 
declaration, after an amendment of the organizational 
territory covered in the by-laws.
The justification is that this will protect the 
encompassiveness of the union by securing the continuation 
of neo-corporatism with its positive collective outcome. 
The collapse of the GDR caused or could cause severe 
strains (e.g. influx, growing unionism, trade union 
coexistence, undercutting impact, etc.) on the stability of 
neo-corporatism, with likely repercussion on the union's 
cohesion. Thus we argue that the union's leadership will 
choose a strategy to secure the cohesion of its 
organization by protecting neo-corporatism. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, we established that one-way 
intervention in the East was the feasible strategy (case 3) 
to sustain in a stable neo-corporatist environment. To 
reach a stable solution the union leadership will follow a 
strategy of incorporating the East German workforce within 
the body of the West German union. The following four 
partly interdependent organizational interventionist 
motives have been derived from the Olsonian self-interest 
based contract theory (e.g. incorporation in order to 
prevent undercutting and substitution), the personal 
interest of trade union executives (e.g. re-election, 
membership), as well as from the diffuse exchange 
approaches (e.g. solidarity) in order to secure the
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stability of the fragile cohesion of encompassing
unions^O^.
(i) Enhancement of membership (e.g. economies of 
scale/scope, personal ambitions, reputation).
(ii) Protection of the West German status quo and 
avoidance of growing non-unionism or multi-unionism 
in East Germany:
- protection of the near-representational monopoly 
(e.g., especially accommodationists want to secure 
neo-corporatism, avoidance of a FDGB recovery, the 
organized small groups in the GDR could be the 
basis for free-riding);
- prevention of an undercutting of West German 
collective agreements by the East German 
workforce and avoidance of non-unionism or multi­
unionism (a threat to the system of industry-wide 
regulation of wages).
(iii) Changes in the significance of affiliates within the 
DGB
- improvement in the relative position (e.g., within 
the DGB);
- catching up in membership and relative position 
(reactive strategy).
(iv) Exercise of solidarity with the East German 
workforce.
102) Cf. Appendix no.5
113
Now we shall assess the various aspects of the partly 
interdependent organizational motives influencing or 
determining the strategies of the West German trade unions. 
In this section the author discusses the reasons for a West 
German trade union intervention in East Germany.
(i) The enhancement of membership
Assessing the aspects for an intervention or coexistence of 
West German trade unions in East Germany, it is necessary 
to bear in mind the political problem that the West German 
trade union leadership is committed to growth in order to 
ensure that the extension is acceptable to the majority of 
the West German membership. Growing trade unions must 
generate a 'surplus' in the West German unions in order to 
spend it in others; the current West German membership must 
probably subsidise the acquisition^®^ of new East German 
members, and must, presumably, see some benefit in doing 
so. Leaders of intervening trade unions must in effect 
convince the existing membership that growth will generate 
a return on their 'equity' (Willman 1989, p.267). 
Competition between FDGB and DGB affiliates for the East 
German membership market could turn out to be financially 
unrewarding (cf. Külp 1994, p.291). Low subscription levels 
could reduce the marginal returns from each new member, 
and, further, it can be argued that trade union success in 
an intervention would exacerbate the costs. As density 
within a given area goes up, the costs of recruitment of
103) 'Acquisition' encompasses recruitment or even 
expensive trade union competition.
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the marginal member will rise, and the enticement of such 
difficult recruits may act both to raise costs and to 
depress the average subscription level (Willman 1989, 
p.268). We assume that this problem is likely to be worse 
where there is employer resistance.
Arguments in favour of an enhancement of union membership 
are the possibility of reducing free-riding, the avoidance 
of undercutting, the pooling of strength in an encompassing 
organization, as well as satisfying the ambitions of trade 
union officials.
The trade union intervention can result from the objective 
of enlarging membership. The reason can be the realisation 
of economies of scale^O* effects stemming from enhanced 
membership. Olson's argument rests strongly on the 
assumption that membership in a voluntary body, such as the 
German trade unions, costs something - whether money-costs 
of subscription, costs in terms of time and effort, or 
costs in the sense of punishments imposed by opponents of 
the organization (Crouch 1982, p.57). Undoubtedly, the 
higher these costs, the greater the problem of persuading 
potential membership to participate in collective action or 
to sustain actual membership. This is why Crouch (1992, 
p.57) expects that collective organizations strive hard to 
reduce the costs of membership relative to those of non­
membership. An indication is that trade unions lobby hard
104) Baumol et al. (1982) devised the term 'economies of 
scope' to describe the impact on total costs, plant- 
specific and product-specific, attributable to 
production of more than one product.
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to see that dues are tax-deductible from the individual 
member's taxable income. In order to avoid members feeling 
too sharply the cost of dues, trade union management 
struggles to keep their subscriptions low, and they try to 
make payment of dues as automatic and as painless as 
possible by getting employers to agree to the check-off 
system.
The institution of works councils, the most important forum 
of trade union representation on the company level, offers 
the trade unions the chance to shift a considerable bulk of 
overheads^to the employers. On the shopfloor and at the 
company level the trade unions are heavily subsidised by 
the employers. According to West German labour law, 
employers have to support labour representatives. Through 
the provision of facilities such as office space and 
equipment, time off for union business, check-off and 
training, the trade unions can reduce overheads. With the 
granting of recognition and facilities, the union is able 
to shift some of the costs of organization to the employer, 
presumably in return for its role in the provision of a 
'voice' mechanism within the system of employee control in 
the workplace. The employer and membership markets are 
clearly related, since, without recognition, membership is 
difficult to maintain and, without an adequate level of
105) Hirsch and Addison (1985, p.33) argue that a national 
union can set up representational machinery, 
procedures, and expertise to organise at a number of 
plants, spreading overheads more effectively than 
individual local unions could.
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membership, recognition is difficult to maintain (Willman 
1989, p.263).
If we assume that trade unions are labour-intensive service 
businesses, a trade union will be concerned with the 
protection of collective goods to often heterogeneous 
sectional interest groups. Such goods may be generated 
through collective bargaining and other forms of pressures 
on the employer. They may also be generated through 
reallocation of subscription or investment income, for 
example in the provision of friendly benefits. Some part of 
the services provided by the trade unions can be conceived 
as a public good. In the case of public goods the marginal 
costs of a further user equals zero. But trade unions do 
not solely rely on the provision of public goods. The 
passive extension of latent trade union membership will not 
cause massive investments and direct costs, as the main 
bulk of trade union representation/services is provided 
collectively. Economically, trade unions depend on a simple 
scale of economies in the provision of collective benefits 
and on a certain stability in the economic environment so 
that most of the members will pay their subscriptions and 
not be a drain on trade union resources. Batstone et al. 
(1986, p.17) argue that trade unions achieve economies of 
scale where there are large numbers of members; hence the 
costs for a national trade union of a declining membership 
are significant. One can imagine that if unions achieve
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economies of scale they will be more able to demonstrate 
their value to potential m e m b e r s h i p . 1 ^ 6
Kochan (1980, p.161) submits that the main bulk of 
arguments for trade union mergers centre on the 
administrative advantages associated with economies of 
larger scale. Especially small trade unions which lack the 
financial resources and professional expertise needed to 
service their membership could benefit by an absorption 
into larger and more richly endowed trade unions. Kochan's 
argument (1980, p.161) that trade union mergers produce 
increased administrative or collective bargaining 
effectiveness has been challenged^®^. Critics of trade 
union mergers have stressed the negative consequences of 
large-scale trade unions for membership control and trade 
union democracy. Thus we have to assess the question if 
there is an 'optimum' or 'maximum' size of a trade union 
referring to the possibility of an increasing heterogeneous 
membership.
Offe and Wiesenthal (1980, p.81) argue that with the growth 
of the trade union size the 'heterogeneity of members' 
positions, occupations and immediate interests tends to
106) An important motive for joining a trade union is 
according to Nickel's research (1974, p.151) to 
receive the protection of a 'large, powerful and 
rich' union. Thus the union size and the realisation 
of economies of scale can enhance the attraction and 
thus encompassiveness.
107) Undy et al. (1981, p.158) argue that a common problem 
of small trade unions had been that due to shortage 
of financial support they could not independently 
maintain or improve their existing levels of services 
and benefits.
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increase, which makes it more difficult to formulate 
generally agreed-upon demands and to mobilise a common 
willingness to act that flows from a notion of shared, 
collective identities and mutual obligations of 
solidarity.' The maximum size of a trade union is therefore 
not its optimum size. There is (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980, 
p.81) an 'optimum size beyond which union power decreases,' 
and there are trade-offs between size and the collective 
identity of the trade union (cf. Figure 2).
Figure 2; The financial trade-offs between encompassiveness 
and enhancement of membership
costs per capita
(vertical aggregation 
of curve A and B)
(heterogeneity index)
(administrative 
economies of scale)
membership (size)
Curve (A) symbolises the realisation of a union's economies 
of scale (e.g. synergy effects) and can be derived from its
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cost function. The realisation of economies of scale are 
related to certain administrative (e.g. depreciation of 
computer facilities and buildings) and bargaining costs 
(e.g. collective representation). Curve A is explained by 
the fact that large trade unions are able to provide their 
service more cheaply than small trade unions. In a service 
sector where there are decreasing costs, the market may 
support only a few trade unions of a reasonably efficient 
size. In the case of the West German trade unions the main 
bulk of costs are overheads^®®, in so far as we assume the 
realisation of economies of scale by enhancing membership. 
According to Olson (1971, p.37), an increase in the size of 
the group does not bring competition to anyone, but may 
lead to lower costs for those already in the group. This is 
why associations that supply collective goods in a non- 
market situation almost^®^ always welcome new members. In 
this capacity each trade union has an interest in acquiring 
new members, inside as well as outside its 'own' industry 
or craft, or even in another geographical area, such as 
East Germany.
Curve (B) corresponds to the trade union's control function 
of its membership. We denote it as the union's 
heterogeneity^^® index and it can be measured by the
108) Cf. Kirsch (1993, pp.112-122), Willman and Morris 
(1988, p.97), willman (1989, p.262).
109) 'Almost' refers to the cases that the group in power 
wishes to retain power, or to exclude infiltrators.
110) The kind of heterogeneity that requires unions to 
offer a large variety of special member services 
depends upon the state of mind of the membership 
(e.g. UK miners' strike) and their interests are well 
represented by general demands or not.
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coordination costs. In the case of the heterogeneity index 
(curve B) the author assumes rising costs per capita as 
trade union membership increases. The reasons might be that 
a more heterogeneous membership with diverse demands can 
pose an even greater problem for the union, which must not 
only deal with disagreements but also find selective 
incentives strong enough to hold together dissatisfied 
parts of the membership. A more heterogeneous membership 
could cause slower decision-making within the unions, 
causing crowded agendas and the existence of distributional 
coalitions at the bargaining tables. The underlying 
assumption is that increasing heterogeneity within the 
membership might have risky effects on encompassiveness and 
thus on trade union strength. Expanding the membership to 
East Germany could mean that because of the enhanced 
membership the social heterogeneity could reduce consensus, 
and that collective action could become more difficult. If 
collective action did nonetheless take place, it would 
incur the extra cost of accommodating and comprising the 
different views of the new membership. In order to attract 
new sections of the workforce, certain incentives might be 
necessary to incorporate them. One important problem 
inherent in the objective of enhancing encompassiveness is 
that potential members who wishes to join could force the 
whole organization to offer them significant attractions 
(exploitation of the core group). Extending membership can 
cause considerable strategic behaviour, with subsequent 
demands on the part of the potential membership.
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Assessing the trade-offs between the realisation of 
economies of scale (curve A) and an increasing 
heterogeneity index (curve B), we have to raise the 
question where a trade union may realise its optimum size? 
A trade union can realise its optimum size (O) where the 
vertical aggregation (C) of curve (A) and curve (B) 
realises its minimum. The optimum size depends on how fast 
costs of heterogeneity increase and on the trade union's 
capacity to integrate the heterogeneity. Now we have to 
raise the question why the trade union leadership does not 
realise its optimum size?
Arguments against the realisation of optimum size are that 
extending the membership prevents a union from developing a 
coherent power base in order to cope with free-riding and 
undercutting by non-unionists. According to industrial 
organization theory, the realisation of economies of scale 
is a significant barrier to entry for latent competitors in 
a market. The incorporation of a potential competitive 
workforce (undercutting) and possible free-riders in East 
Germany (extending-the-coverage argument) can be assessed 
as a reduction of negative externalities and as a struggle 
against growing non-unionism. Restoring the representative 
near-monopoly by the West German trade union in a reunified 
Germany, X-inefficiency^^^ in subsequent trade union 
management might accelerate. According to Leibenstein
111) X-inefficiency means in the case of a West German 
trade union intervention in East Germany that 
monopolistic structures often do not realise the 
effective utilisation of inputs. Not all forms 
of synergy can be fully realised.
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(1980, pp.191-193), a monopolistic environment puts much 
less pressure on trade union executives, because decision­
makers for monopolies do not face the pressure to make 
'optimum' decisions in comparison with the market situation 
of perfect competition. Recalling Hicks' quip, we assume 
that perhaps the greatest reward of the monopolist is a 
quiet life. The absence of necessity to compete with rivals 
in the membership market can result in the continuation of 
corporatism with centralised bargaining. A further reason 
of utmost importance is the realisation of economies of 
scale/synergy effects on the part of the trade unions. 
Consequently this is a reason why trade union leaderships 
are interested in being active in the membership market as 
well as in shifting costs to the employers by competing in 
the employers' m a r k e t ^ T r a d e  union finance is an 
argument worth assessing, as a rich trade union is usually 
a more influential one. This raises the general issue of 
the relationship between finances and bargaining behaviour. 
Rich trade unions may be more capable of sustaining 
strikes, and thus may be more aggressive bargaining agents. 
In the case of West German industrial relations one 
explanation (cf. Der Spiegel 29.10.1990, p.188) for the low 
strike record refers to the good financial situation of the 
DGB-affiliates, as their accumulated wealth makes the 
employers shrink back from conflicts (e.g., the joint cost
112) On the one hand, unions compete to provide
representation, insurance and other services to its 
membership. On the other hand, unions compete, under 
competitive conditions, to become bargaining agents 
with employers. In the employer market, they seek 
recognition and facilities from the employer (Willman 
1989, p.263).
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approach). A rich trade union may also secure political 
influence through the establishment of a political fund. An 
argument for an intervention in the GDR can be gained from 
the American AFL and CIO merger. In the case of the AFL and 
CIO merger the underlying reason was to pool their 
political strength (Marshall, Cartter and King 1976, p.79). 
Moreover, enhanced membership can improve bargaining 
strength.113 Hence, when the leadership and membership of 
an organization attains improved bargaining strength, they 
may feel that they possess the ability to alter the formal 
rules of the industrial relations system. In the case of 
German reunification we assume that the DGB's leaders know 
about the former ADGB's failure to resist the Nazi 
dictatorship. A further argument in favour of enhanced 
membership is the union leadership's objective to create a 
powerful organization to pool political strengthU^ in 
order to influence the Conservative-Liberal Kohl 
government. These arguments account for the objective of 
extending membership despite the optimum size determined by 
the heterogeneity index and the realisation of economies of 
scale.
A further argument in favour of enhanced membership is that 
multi-unionism in an industry has been criticised on the
113) Union recognition and union growth are mutually 
dependent, because the degree to which employers are 
prepared to recognise unions is dependent upon their 
membership size (According to Bain and Price 1983, 
p.253 recognition and size combines in a 'virtuous 
circle').
114) Also an obligation to the union leadership due to the 
failure of the ADGB to counter the NAZI-dictatorship 
in 1933.
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grounds that it involves a great deal of duplication on the 
part of all trade unions involved, which is wasteful of 
energy, effort and resources, and requires endless tiers of 
inter-union channels of communication to function at
aiillS^ Intervening in the East German membership market 
can produce various synergy effects in the West German
trade unions, as the 'product' they offer to the East 
German rank-and-file is closely related to the West German 
services^lG, Transferring Ansoff's (1987, p.83) synergy 
types to the situation of incorporating the East German 
workforce within the West German unions, we distinguish the 
following four categories:
- Service synergy: This occurs when the services use common 
distributive channels and a common administration. In this 
case an opportunity will arise if the West German trade 
unions can offer related services in the GDR. Common
recruitment efforts and a positive reputation for past
achievements can have multiple returns for the same 
investment.
- Operating synergy: Ansoff (1987, p.82) defines this as 
the outcome of higher utilisation of facilities and 
personnel, spreading of overheads, advantages of common 
learning curves, and the realisation of large-lot 
purchasing.
115) In a market situation competition normally trims 
costs. But certain organizations seem natural 
monopolies, with their economies of scale so 
important that even a single organization will always 
operate under conditions of decreasing costs, and 
having more than one organization would involve a 
serious loss of scale economics (Scitovski 1971,
p.251).
116) The 'product' of a trade union encompasses public 
goods as well as individual services.
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- Investment synergy: This results from joint use of common 
inventories such as office space and business equipment.
- Managerial synergy: This type represents the experience 
and expertise of the West German trade union executives in 
handling trade union affairs in a market economy. Regarding 
the practise of corporatism and the West German Works 
Council Act, trade union leaders and executives have 
incorporated linkages and informal channels with management 
and government. This has caused an interlocking of the 
personal ties of the social partners so as to stabilise 
West German industrial relations.
Whether a trade union will have to incur start-up costs 
depends on how well its skills and resources are matched to 
the requirements of the new membership-market area. If the 
required new capabilities are very different from those of 
the West German trade unions, then cost diseconomies may 
result in any of the major functional areas. British 
evidence (Willman and Morris 1987, p.98) on trade union 
mergers states that it is of utmost importance for trade 
union management to control the administrative costs after 
the merger. Thus starting-up in a new membership market can 
have potentially negative as well as positive synergy; a 
trade union with positive synergy will have a competitive 
advantage over other trade unions which lack it. Having 
experienced and successfully shaped a market economy for 
the benefit of its membership, the West German trade 
unions, the DGB and affiliates have a competitive advantage 
in comparison with the FDGB. Initial costs in the possible
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case of trade union unity can be neglected, as the FDGB's 
affiliated trade unions will not appear with empty pockets. 
Thus the financial aspect of trade union unity is eased.
A further argument in favour of an enhanced membership is 
the consideration of the personal ambitions of the trade 
union officers. The empiricist literature, some 
sociological texts and some managerial theories all suggest 
that the main beneficiaries of trade union growth are the 
union officials. The ambitions of trade union leaders are 
very strongly endorsed in the empiricist literature, 
particularly in the histories of trade unions where there 
is a very strong identification between the organizational 
development of a trade union and the personalities of its 
trade union leaders. The personal objectives of achieving 
enhanced membership for the trade union leadership can be 
grouped in two categories: personal economic interests,
which include the extension of current earnings, fringe 
benefits, job security (Wachter 1983) and job progression, 
and the personal non-economic interests, which include 
philanthropy, personal ethics, social responsibilities, 
social status and reputation (Ricardi 1992).^^^
Referring to the decision-making process of the West German 
trade unions the union leadership has to assess that the
117) Simultaneously linked with the extension of membership 
is trade union representation on the supervisory 
boards providing royalties, fringe benefits and 
information on the company strategies. It offers the 
opportunity of informal links with management and 
early participation. Several trade union leaders 
expect to conduct a political career.
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enhancement of membership can result in several beneficial 
effects for unions such as the possible realisation of 
economies of scale or synergy effects, the pooling of the 
political strength of the unions, and an improvement in the 
personal ambitions of trade union leaders.
fiil Protection of the achieved West German status quo and 
avoidance of growing non-unionism
In this section we focus on the protection of neo­
corporatism by the West German trade unions.
Economic approaches to trade unionism are often concerned 
with the union as a bargaining agent. In a corporatist 
system unions operate as mediating organizations between 
employers who see some benefit either in the granting of 
recognition or its maintenance (employer market), fearing 
to deal with an unorganized workforce, and employees who 
seek various forms of selective and collective benefits 
(membership market). It follows that to succeed unions must 
appeal to both sets of interests. The model presented here 
is based on the view that trade unions seek to provide 
distinct services in two related markets and, in order to 
be successful, both financially and in terms of membership 
growth, they must reconcile the demands of these two 
markets. If we assume the existence of a trade union 
membership function, the variables will be the union's 
attractiveness to its membership, and the granting of 
recognition by the employers.
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On the one hand, trade unions compete to attract membership 
on the basis of the provision of collective representation 
(e.g., high wages) and selective benefits in the membership 
market. They seek a body of membership, in order to 
guarantee revenue and secure bargaining power, often in 
competition with other unions, or with non-union 
environments. We assume that the attractiveness of a trade 
union is a function of the benefits provided by the union 
to its membership.
On the other hand, unions compete under similar conditions 
to become bargaining agents with the employers. In this 
market the union seeks recognition and facilities from the 
employers. Without recognition, union effectiveness in an 
establishment is difficult to achieve, and membership is 
likely to dwindle over a period of time. We assume that the 
employer's willingness to grant recognition is a function 
of the advantages provided by the union. The advantages of 
unionisation can comprise the exercise of 'voice' and 
employee control in the workplace. Where unions are willing 
to exercise 'voice', the management has little reason to 
resist, and some reason to welcome, the unionisation of the 
employees. By making explicit the discontents of the 
workforce, a union helps to make workers' behaviour more 
predictable and manageable. A union involvement in a 
settlement increases the likelihood that the organized 
workers feel committed to the agreed terms (cf. Hyman 1985, 
p. 54). Thus the workers' commitment and the effective
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control function of the corporatist trade unions shape the 
comparably low strike record of these systems.
The employer and membership markets are related, since, 
without recognition, membership is difficult to maintain 
and, without an adequate level of membership, recognition 
is difficult to secure (cf. Willman 1989, p.263). If we 
assume that the membership function of a trade union is 
determined by the union's attractiveness to its membership 
(e.g. high wages) and by the advantages to the employer 
(e.g. control and low wages) the result is a conflicting 
relationship in the wage-setting between the membership and 
the employer market.
Applying the principal-agent theory to German unification, 
the West German trade unions will have to compete to 
attract the East German workforce (the East German 
membership market) and for recognition by the East German 
employers (East German employer market). With the FDGB- 
affiliated trade unions an agent emerged for both related 
markets.
Regarding the interventionist categories we have the 
following strategic alternatives for the West German DGB 
affiliates which are:
(a) trade union competition between the affiliates of the 
FDGB and the DGB,
(b) trade union cooperation between the affiliates of the 
FDGB and the DGB,
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(c) the incorporation of the FDGB-affiliated union within 
the appropriate DGB-affiliated trade union (the specific 
form of a take-over).
The criteria for the assessment of the desirability of each 
alternative for the West German union membership and trade 
union leadership are:
the avoidance of growing non-unionism (loss of a 
unionised sector),
- the avoidance of emerging multiunionism (protection of 
the representational monopoly and from balkanisation of 
industrial relations) in the former GDR,
- and the protection of neo-corporatism with the subsequent 
maintenance of encompassiveness and centralisation of the 
unions (regarding the provision of public goods).
As the application of neo-corporatism is firmly based on 
the control and predictability of behaviour, we infer that 
the corporatist DGB affiliates are interested in stable 
solutions. Common to all interventionist alternatives 
enumerated above is the underlying traditional argument of 
the union leadership in extending the coverage^of their 
collective agreements. Extending the coverage of collective 
bargaining to enhance membership reduces the elasticity of 
labour demand (e.g., the undercutting impact of the non­
unionised workforce). An early intervention in the East 
could succeed in sustaining a high union density and thus 
avoiding growing non-unionism, or a recovery of the FDGB
118) A supplementary effect of extending coverage is also 
the reduction of free-riding.
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organization or further forms of individualisation. Now we 
shall turn to assessment of the interventionist categories:
(a) Trade union competition
If we assume competition between the West German and the 
East German trade unions in the membership market, both 
trade unions will have to enhance their attractiveness by 
offering better benefits than the other union. Regarding 
the desires of the East German workforce, the 
attractiveness of a union can be enhanced by substantial 
wage increases or other benefits in the collective 
bargaining process.
The attractiveness of a union and thus its size is related 
to the extent it can bring wages up to the West German 
level. In the membership market union competition by the 
agents means attracting members by expensive wage 
bargaining. If one union is able to raise the wages of its 
membership, the other union will have to follow in order 
not to lose membership (inter-union leap-frogging of 
wages). The closing of the existing East-West wage gap 
could mean that with this strategy the 
undercutting/substituting impact (regarding migration and 
investments) of the East German workforce could be reduced, 
but probably at the expense of East German employment. We 
also have to bear in mind that higher wages can lead to 
lower employment, with repercussions on the size of union 
membership. Competition in the membership market is
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financially unrewarding, as low subscription levels reduce 
the marginal returns from each new member. This problem is 
likely to be worse where there is employer resistance.
Figure 3 : The relationship between the employer and
membership market related to the wage
wage
A (membership 
attractiveness)
B (employer
recognition)
membership
As has already been outlined, the membership and employer 
markets are related. Thus we argue that, without gaining 
recognition by the employers, no union will be able to 
offer collective representation to its members. Competition 
in the employer market can lead to the development of 
'beauty contests', where concessions for recognition are 
given (Willman 1989, p.269). Employers will grant 
recognition to that union which in return will provide the 
effective degree of 'voice' and control of the workforce at
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lowest wage costs^^^. Figure 3 gives a sketch of the 
related markets for union representation regarding wages. 
Curve (A) symbolises the union's attractiveness function 
for its membership. With rising wages realised by the 
conduct of the union's collective bargaining, we assume 
enhanced membership. Curve (B) corresponds to the union's 
attractiveness to the employers and their willingness to 
recognise the union^^O, in the case of the employers' 
market we assume an inverse relationship between high wage 
demands by the union and union recognition by the employer. 
The intersection of both curves (C) visualises the 
equilibrium of the differing demands stemming from both 
related markets and emphasises the union's task of 
reconciliation, especially in a corporatist system.
Union competition in the membership market could be 
interpreted by certain parts of the East German workforce 
as an act of hostility by the West (lack of solidarity with 
the East German workforce - just an agent of the West 
German membership). This could trigger anti-western 
sentiments in the East German workforce after a successful 
intervention of the DGB affiliates with negative 
repercussions on union density and thus on the bargaining 
strength of the union. Dissatisfaction with a competitive 
and anti-solidaristic spirit on the part of the West German
119) However, the author submits that trade union control 
over its membership is likely to increase the higher 
the wage mark-up because this increases the cost to 
workers quitting the job.
120) The prime determinant of the slope of curve B is not 
the demand for labour, but rather the employer's 
increasing incentive to refuse recognition.
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trade unions could enhance the emergence of grass-root 
unionism (balkanisation) or growing non-unionism (fear of 
an unorganized workforce)^ . Being perceived by the East 
German workforce as an intruder in East German industrial 
relations could lessen the desire to set up a strong and 
encompassing trade union.
As outlined earlier, the success of the centralised trade 
unions (which are neutralized from the establishment level 
by the Works Constitution Acts and Codetermination Act) has 
rested on the successful application of a neo-corporatist 
industrial relations system with the provision of public 
goods. This was related to both markets, and also the 
provision of private goods to their membership. The 
organizational success of the unions is predominantly based 
upon the provision of public goods. The membership's 
definition of interests in the form of public goods means 
that any competitive behaviour or rent-seeking could erode 
the encompassiveness of the trade union. Competing in the 
East German membership market could mean that bringing up 
wages as fast as possible could take place without a link 
to productivity developments and thus could cause 
unemployment. Further, competing in the membership market 
can lead to a rent-seeking society in which the members are 
not willing to define their narrow interests in collective
121) The author neglected the argument, that competition 
between East and West German unions could make grass- 
root unionism unnecessary as both unions seek out 
additional membership among those who are 
inadequately represented for the following reasons: 
(i) attraction of the West German trade unions for 
the vast majority of both German memberships, (ii) 
the reputation of the FDGB union.
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terms (e.g. wage restraints). The shock emanating from the 
disintegration of the GDR could cause repercussions to the 
FRG industrial relations system and the provision of public 
goods, especially in the case of the accommodationist trade 
unions, as they lack organizational strength on the 
establishment level. In the case of the activist unions a 
failure in the provision of public goods could imply a 
recurrent attempt to achieve decentralisation by the self- 
confident shopfloor representation.
Until now we have neglected the fact that competing in the 
membership market in terms of wage policy is unrelated to 
the employer market. As we have seen in the introduction to 
this chapter, both markets are related regarding the desire 
to build up a large and encompassing union. To analyse the 
impact of union competition for recognition, the kinked 
oligopoly demand curve makes a particularly interesting 
assumption about the response of rivals to the price 
changes of competitors^^^. The assumption is that when a 
union cuts the wages^^S of its members, all existing unions 
go along, but if a union raises its membership's wages, 
none of its rivals will follow suit. When wages are raised, 
the union loses business because rivals keep their wages 
low as the employer hires the cheaper membership. When the 
wage is reduced, however, the union does not gain much of
122) At the first sight, trade unions are not standard 
oligopolists: they do not supply labour, nor do they 
have a price in the oligopolist sense.
123) In this case the assumption is that wages are 
flexible. In reality trade unions are a force to 
establish miniumum wage and thus try to reduce 
competition in the labour market (wage stickiness).
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the business, because their rivals also cut their wages.
The argument of the kinked demand curve is that in an
oligopolist situation, where market policies have settled 
down to routine and become stabilised, each wage maker may 
be reluctant to change his market behaviour for fear of 
disturbing what seems a stable situation. We argue that a 
common market policy agreed upon by the members of a 
collective monopoly is likely to be stable, simply.because 
the parties to the agreement shirk the bother and
difficulties involved in negotiating and reaching a new 
agreement. Scitovski (1971, p.429) stresses that the kinked 
demand curve applies not only to price but to 'other
aspects of price maker's market offer as well.' Thus we 
shall try to apply the kinked demand curve to the unsettled 
East German market for collective representation regarding 
employers' recognition of unions.
Management's willingness to recognise and bargain with a 
union is determined by the union's willingness to offer 
concessions in exchange. Management will thus choose that 
union which offers a high degree of 'voice', control of its 
membership and willingness to accept wage restraints. 
Employers can make use of the competition in the employer 
market by exercising divide-and-conquer strategies in order 
to receive concessions from the unions^(e.g. 'sweet­
heart' deals). To enhance a union's chance to receive 
recognition the employer's market competition will centre
124) Cf. the switch of IBM Germany from IGM to DAG 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung 14.7.1995, p.13).
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on undercutting wage claims stated by other unions. 
Competing on the employers' market means the levelling down 
of wages^ZS. This implies sustaining the West-East wage gap 
with implications for investments and the East-West 
migration wave of the skilled East German workforce. But we 
can argue whether a strategy of pushing wages down is an 
appropriate strategy to attract the East German workforce 
to join or sustain trade union membership. In particular, 
competing for employers' recognition will have a severe 
impact on the stability of the West German neo-corporatist 
environment and thus the membership's willingness to define 
their interests in collective terms.
Regarding the attractiveness of a union for its membership 
and its recognition in the employer market we realise a 
contradiction related to wage demands. The problem of the 
union leadership consists in the reconciliation of the 
members' and employers' demands, as, without recognition, 
membership is difficult to maintain, and, without an 
adequate level of membership, recognition is difficult to 
secure, with repercussions on the substantive outcome of 
collective bargaining. We argue that a reconciliation of 
the demands stemming from both markets is difficult to 
achieve in a competitive environment, and might not provide 
a stable solution. A competitive situation in both markets 
cannot generate the speedy formation of a near-
125) The standard economic analysis predominantly focuses 
on standard prices in oligopolist settings but often 
neglects the possibility of the seller to offer 
discounts and gadgets (free radio) so that the 
effective price paid by the consumer is lower.
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representational monopoly. Competing in both markets 
presents a constellation which emphasises the balkanisation 
of labour representation with narrowly defined sectionalist 
interests. Distributional sections might e m e r g e ^ w i t h  an 
impact on the provision of public goods on which the 
cohesion of the West German trade unions is strongly based. 
Thus competing in the membership and employer markets can 
negatively affect the cohesion of an encompassing union and 
thus is not a feasible strategy for a union leadership in a 
corporatist environment.
(b^  trade union cooperation
As the competition between the West and East German unions 
in the employer and membership market does not offer a 
stable structure (e.g., in form of a collective monopoly as 
an agreement of oligopolists to restrain competition among 
themselves) we will analyse the possibility of cooperation 
between the agents.
In accordance with microeconomic theory we denote the 
inter-union relationship between the DGB's and the FDGB's 
affiliates as an oligopolist market structure, as it 
pertains to representation in the employer or membership 
market. In an oligopolistic situation each trade union 
recognises that its best choice depends upon the choices 
its rivals make. In such a case trade unions are 
interdependent and actually aware of it. We illustrate this
126) Under the condition that the curve A and curve B are 
unrelated.
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kind of interdependence between two unions by assessing the 
moves of a chess^^? player (Simon 1969, p.246) in a game. 
One requirement of a good move is that it puts pressure on 
the opponent by attacking him in some way or by preparing 
an attack (e.g. competing in the employer or membership 
market). The union leaderships' decisions depend, then, 
upon the assumptions they make about rival decisions and 
reactions regarding the employer or membership market - and 
many alternative assumptions might be entertained. Deciding 
on the basis of assumptions and potential reactions can 
clash with the desire for a 'quiet life' and a predictable 
and stable solution. From this dynamic perspective of the 
participants, the oligopolist decision/strategy-making 
problem shares characteristics of a game.
Collusion, in this case, is interpreted as joint bargaining 
by the union affiliates, pulling the oligopolists towards a 
collective monopoly solution and thus can generate neo­
corporatism (centralised bargaining, representational 
monopoly). As collusion between the unions can secure neo­
corporatism with its positive public effects it can 
generate a growth alliance. It is possible to characterise 
this solution as a positive-sum game. In some basic models 
of oligopoly behaviour it is assumed that the trade unions 
see their joint interest in maintaining their demands and 
achieving standards at a monopoly level, thus possibly 
narrowing the existing East-West wage gap. Each trade union 
knows that all trade unions are better off if they can
127) Chess is a vital explanation for interdependence, but 
is limited to a zero-sum game.
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accommodate conditions. Therefore they will not move their 
standards away from this level. Instead, each trade union 
knows that it can hurt the others by reducing its level 
below the accommodated level and taking employment away 
from other unions, but in the process it will probably get 
hurt itself when the other trade union respondents. The 
degree of monopoly power often increases as an organization 
becomes more encompassing.^29 Now we turn towards the 
analysis of the inherent tendency of undercutting in 
oligopolistic relations, the cause of their long-run 
instability.
To assess the stability/instability of the collusive 
solution we have to determine the salient conditions which 
facilitate oligopolistic coordination. Collusive behaviour 
is most likely to emerge when the sphere of influence is 
tightly oligopolistic, sellers' products or services are 
close substitutes, cost curves are similar, there are 
barriers to the entry of new rivals, and the demand for the 
industry's output is relatively inelastic.
Collaboration between West and East German trade union will 
be easiest when no new trade unions enter the field of 
labour representation to disturb possibly comfortable 
collective arrangements. Thus the ideal in the case of the
128) Price wars do sometimes have victors (e.g. Pan Am - 
American Airways)
129) Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argued that successive 
degrees of aggregation of bargaining groups first 
produced increasing scope for selfish behaviour, but 
with full centralisation self-restraint outstripped 
selfish behaviour.
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collaborating oligopolist coexistence of a DGB and a FDGB 
affiliate is for both to be allowed to agree wages and to 
have control over new entries to the market of labour 
representation. Lack of experience and expertise with an 
industrial relations syste m ^ c a n  provide such a barrier 
to entryl^l for new emerging trade unions along with the 
employer's unwillingness to recognise the new unions. Thus 
we predict that neither a FDGB nor a DGB affiliate would 
assist emerging independent trade unions in their efforts 
to establish themselves in East German industrial relations 
during the transition period. Such behaviour could be 
interpreted as withholding necessary information and 
support to protect themselves from competition by 
newcomers. According to Olson (1982, p.46), 'effective 
cartels must always block entry into the line of business', 
which means in the case of the trade unions the field of 
collective representation, in which they have raised wages 
and improved working conditions. Further, the author 
assumes that rebuilding the East German single unions will 
incur substantial starting-up expenditures (new offices 
away from the FDGB and equipment). Another significant cost 
would be supporting individual legal representation of 
dismissed members. Thus we assume that the cost curves of 
the East German unions will not be similar to those of the 
West German unions.
130) For example, in the case of West German industrial 
relations with its characteristic juridification, one 
has to assess the experience of the West German trade 
union personnel as a stronghold in labour 
representation.
131) As discused above, economies of scale are important 
barriers to entry in the case of trade unions.
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Making a cooperation or a collusive agreement between the 
two trade union organizations means giving up some freedom 
of action for each partner. This would only be done when 
others have also restricted their choices, and the 
prospects in the markets for each trade union are improved 
as a result of all the restrictions taken together.
The risk of collusion is determined by the interdependence 
of the two trade union federations in a united Germany. The 
degree of risk can be derived from the stability of 
collusion between both trade union organizations. There are 
several factors affecting collusion; the extent of
structural changes in an industrial relations system; new 
services and processes; and a shift in demand which may 
swamp collusive agreements. Economists expect collusive 
agreements to be maintained only in situations the 
structures of which are relatively constant. In the 
downturn phase of the business cycle and in view of the 
structural change in the GDR, with its impact on
unemployment the author assumes^^Z that such a situation, 
with its strains upon the unions, could destroy collusive 
agreements. Further, a factor influencing the stability of 
collusion is related to increases in the level of
aspirations of the trade union leadership and its
membership. If such increases occur, we might expect to see
132) The assumption is based on Hardes, Krol, Rahmeyer and 
Schmid (1993, pp.311-314) as in an economic downturn 
each trade union is eager to protect its own 
clientele at the expense of other unions. In the 
economic downturn even marginal improvements can 
become important.
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trade union leadership attempting to breach the agreements, 
since small increases become quite important.
Trade union cooperation might carry the threat that the 
discredited East German trade union leadership (especially 
the FDGB) could influence the conditions of the merger or 
cooperation, causing disillusion with the DGB and its 
affiliates in both the East and West German trade union 
membership. On the other hand, sharing industrial power 
with the FDGB's leadership did not seem acceptable to the 
West German trade union leadership and its membership, as 
this implies conspiracy with the FDGB.^^S
Further, there is considerable ambiguity concerning 
management's willingness to recognise the East German trade 
union staff, as large proportions of the East German 
workforce reject this leadership. If the agent is not 
acknowledged by the workforce, it will not be able to 
provide 'voice' and exercise a union's control function.
Realising that the conditions facilitating oligopolist 
coordination are not encouraging, we turn towards 
industrial organization theory to assess the two tactical 
institutions for coordination between oligopolists (for 
adjusting prices), which are the formation of a cartel, 
and, with specific reference to the German unification 
situation, the implicit agreement of wage leadership. The
133) This could mean that the West German trade unions are 
(i) condoning the FDGB's past and (ii) the 
acknowledgement of FDGB/SED staff.
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very importance of these institutions is whether they are 
able to generate a stable solution.
We assess the possibility of a cartel in the form of wage 
leadership^between the DGB and FDGB affiliated unions. 
As the FDGB affiliates are not experienced in the new 
environment, one could think of a dominant wage leadership 
by the DGB affiliate. But there is ambiguity in the desire 
of the East German union leadership to gain recognition by 
the employers if they accept wage leadership by the West 
German union, in the way that the TCO's objectives were 
long dominated by the LO in Sweden. In order to 
guarantee stability in the relationship between the LO and 
the TCO Meidner (1994, p.11) recommends a merger.
Two central problems disturb the stability of union 
cartels. First, the conspiring unions in the cartel may 
have divergent ideas about appropriate wage levels and 
membership market shares, making it difficult to reach an 
understanding which all will respect. Second, when the 
group agrees to fix and abide by a wage approaching the 
monopoly level, strong incentives are created for one 
participant to cheat on the agreement, that is, to increase 
its market share or avoid trade-offs in the form of 
unemployment.
134) Â wage leader is an organization that, by changing 
its price, gives the signal to other organizations in 
the same market to change their wages.
135) Illustrations of the centrifugal forces endangering 
neo-corporatism in Sweden are given by Lash (1985) 
and Ahlen (1989).
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The paramount problem for trade unions trying to make the 
best of an oligopolistic market structure is to devise and 
maintain communications systems that permit behaviour to be 
coordinated in their common interest (e.g., reducing the 
elasticity of labour demand). The conflicts that arise must 
be resolved without resorting to wage competition (e.g., in 
the employer or membership market). Adjustments to changes 
in demand for labour must be made so as to elicit unanimous 
consent and minimise the risk that action taken in the 
group's interest will be misinterpreted as prisoners' 
dilemma-style defecting.
Assessing the analysis of collusion between East and West 
German trade unions we argue that in oligopolistic 
relations there is an inherent tendency to underbid a given 
standard, the cause of long-run instability in an 
oligopolist setting. Due to the inherent tendency to 
underbid by oligopolists emphasizes that prisoners' 
dilemma-style defecting is likely to occur in such an 
environment. Thus strategic alternative of collusion does 
not provide a stable solution to secure beneficial neo­
corporatism.
(c) strategy of incorporating the FDGB affiliate within the 
DGB affiliated union
As not all forms and factors facilitating collusive 
behaviour protect against competition, industrial relations 
probably have to be based upon unstable solutions. One
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oligopolist might be interested in breaking the collective 
monopoly agreement in a procedure comparable to defecting 
in a prisoners' dilemma. As neither trade union 
competition, by definition, nor trade union cooperation can 
prevent actors from competing in the membership and 
employers' markets, the remaining strategic alternative of 
incorporating the East German workforce within the 
encompassing body of the West German union will be tested. 
The question is whether this incorporation strategy can 
provide a stable solution and thus protect neo-corporatism?
Incorporation occurs for a myriad of economic reasons, and, 
in a given case, several different motives may 
simultaneously influence this kind of behaviour. Regarding 
reunification, it is useful to attempt a preliminary 
sorting-out of the diverse motivating forces of the West 
German trade union leaders which are quasi merger-based on 
economies of scale and the desire to achieve or strengthen 
the near-monopoly power of their organizations (cf. Külp 
1994, p.291). As the desire to achieve economies of scale 
has been discussed already, we will turn towards the 
monopoly motive.
The incorporation perspective suggests that a reduction of 
inter-union competition in the membership or employer 
markets generates a stable solution. As trade unions are 
defined as labour monopolies, and as monopoly profits are 
always greater than those achieved under competitive 
conditions, it follows that competing trade unions should
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merge. Monopoly power can be achieved through the formation 
of a single labour monopoly in an industry. Securing 
monopolistic representation can account for the argument of 
avoiding undercutting by other forces. The argument is that 
incorporation can make an organization virtually 
encompassing.
Turner (1952) has argued that the threat of being undercut 
by less skilled workers explains the willingness of the 
skilled organized workforce to incorporate the less 
skilled. As already outlined in the chapter on collective 
incentives, the existence of an encompassing trade union 
might partly be explained by the apprehension of being 
undercut. Attracting and incorporating the less skilled 
workforce can be done by narrowing the wage differential, 
and by avoidance of feelings of 'second class' membership 
on the part of the new or potential membership. This means 
offering a considerable concession to the less skilled in 
order to achieve the secure representational monopoly which 
is a precondition for the application of neo-corporatism. 
Incorporating the potential membership by narrowing the 
differentials could promote the attractiveness of the 
unions, as the potential workforce could perceive the 
'egalitarian' sentiments as 'solidaristic' motivation (cf. 
Külp 1994, p.292). The same strategy can be applied in the 
case of German reunification. We argue that the organized 
West German workforce has a vital incentive to incorporate 
the skilled East German workforce within their trade union 
organization in order to prevent any forms of undercutting.
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and thus an erosion of neo-corporatism. To attract the East 
German workforce, the West German trade union members and 
leaders might be interested in narrowing the existing wage 
differential as soon as possible. Rapid wage convergence 
between East and West Germany could prevent an erosion of 
the corporatist relations on which the West German trade 
unions have depended. If the rapid process of wage 
convergence in the East cannot be linked to an appropriate 
productivity increase, unemployment will follow. Under such 
conditions, we infer that the West German unions defend
their wage levels, encompassiveness and neo-corporatism at 
the expense of East German employment.
The apprehension of competing in the membership or employer 
markets can cause a breakdown of the benefits of neo­
corporatism, and might cause a deterioration of the living 
and working conditions in West Germany. Thus we presume the 
combined interest of the West German membership and its 
leadership to incorporate the East German membership within 
the encompassing union body. The objective of incorporating 
the East German workforce is explained by the attempt to 
protect the West German workforce and its trade unions from 
the dangerous impacts (such as the influx of labour)
stemming from the East, as well as the repercussions
emanating from competition in the East German employer or
membership markets. In such a case the West German trade 
union leadership could possibly act on behalf of the West 
German membership as they would enjoy full membership 
backing.
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If we assess the outcome of this interventionist category, 
the underlying motive is to curb the tendencies towards 
competition (monopoly motive). Thus it is the desire to 
achieve or strengthen monopoly power (single trade union 
status ) on the part of the trade unions. The author 
demonstrates that an important objective of the West German 
trade union leadership has been to protect the West from 
the threatening impacts of the East. The trade union 
leadership's goal was to secure the position of its West 
German membership. For the West German trade unions the 
incentive to intervene actively in the GDR means partly 
determining the terms of trade union unification, and thus 
softening the negative effects on its West German 
membership. The drive to intervene is determined by the 
encompassiveness (strength/density on the shopfloor in West 
Germany) of the trade unions in relation to the whole
German workforce. This means that a less encompassing trade 
union will be immensely interested in intervening in the 
GDR in order not to jeopardise the position of its West 
German membership, as well as to secure the survival of the 
organization, even at the expense of East German 
employment, by narrowing the differential.
The more a West German union has to rely on the application 
of neo-corporatism (e.g. social partnership) and public 
goods, the more its leadership will be interested in a
stable solution, which is the incorporation of the East
German workforce within its own organization. Having made
its membership define their interests in the form of public
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goods, a union leadership would not be willing to tolerate 
the disintegration of encompassiveness by competing in the 
related markets, as this could hamper the organizational 
strength.
As has been outlined a strategy, in the case of the 
accommodationists exercising social partnership can be to 
establish themselves in the GDR by incorporating the East 
German union membership and hereby eroding and 
extinguishing the FDGB peak organization. The aim is to 
dissolve the FDGB in order to secure the neo-corporatist 
arrangements of which especially the accommodationists have 
been the beneficiaries (growth alliance) for a long period. 
In the case of the activists one can argue that the 
protection of the neo-corporatist environment will be 
necessary to avoid decentralisation efforts by the militant 
rank-and-file.
Incorporating the East German workforce could also trigger 
support from the West German government and from some 
employers' associations in order to prevent communist 
agitation and resistance by FDGB personnel during the 
reconstruction period. A side-effect of the Works 
Constitution Act 1972 was a drastic decline in unofficial 
movements on the shopfloor. Having experienced the various 
positive forms of the institutionalisation of conflict in 
the area of industrial relations. West German trade unions 
and employers have been extremely keen on avoiding any 
erosion of encompassiveness.
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Regarding the German employers' interest in sustaining the 
centralisation of the unions, the employers prefer strong, 
reliable, and trustworthy trade union leadership that is 
able to provide 'voice' and control over its membership. We 
argue that an objective of the employers' associations is 
to avoid any form of 'balkanisation' on the part of the 
trade union movement. Management fears having to deal with 
an unorganized workforce (Wever 1990). A further reason for 
management's desire for continuation of neo-corporatism 
might also be seen in the fact that, since shopfloor trade 
union organization has only little capacity to act, 
managerial prerogatives in organising production are 
unchallenged by direct trade union intervention. The same 
argument might also account for the trade union 
leadership's desire to continue with centralisation. The 
collapse of neo-corporatism could harm the level of 
centralisation. The process of incorporation, on the other 
hand, could pay off, as government and employers might 
support the West German unions in the reconstruction 
process.
Thus incorporating seems to be an appropriate and stable 
interventionist strategy, as it allows the avoidance of 
non-unionism, hinders multi-unionism, and protects 
organizational encompassiveness.
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(iii) Changes in the significance of the affiliated trade 
unions within DGB
The enhancement of membership in a DGB-affiliated union can 
improve its significance within the federation. The balance 
of forces among the unions has substantially determined the 
overall political strategy of the West German labour 
movement. In practice, the larger a trade union is, the 
more powerful its presence within the DGB, and consequently 
the greater its influence over other trade unions. Small 
trade unions perceive themselves to be at a disadvantage 
within the forums of the DGB, and the DGB disputes 
machinery is biased in favour of the largest trade unions, 
because the DGB is not seriously in a position to 
discipline the largest affiliates.With reference to 
game theory, an intervention of one DGB member union in 
East Germany can improve this union's significance within 
the DGB at the expense of the other affiliates.
At the federal level, the DGB congress is the basic 
legislative body. Delegates from the seventeen member 
unions attend each DGB congress. Each affiliated union is 
assigned a given number of delegates proportionate to its 
size (the criterion is the number of members) within the 
federation. The delegates to the DGB congress are not 
elected, but are chosen by the leadership of the member 
union (about 60 to 70 per cent of the delegates are full-
136) According to Martens (18.5.1990, p.16), large trade 
unions have eroded the DGB's authority, reducing its 
role to a 'dispatching office for social and economic 
appeals to parliaments and parties.'
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time union officials). Since each member union sends a 
number of delegates in proportion to its size, and since 
union delegates almost always vote as a block, it is 
possible to draw conclusions about the power constellation 
at DGB conferences and thus within the DGB itself. Each DGB 
congress elects a Federal Executive Committee which 
actually runs the organization. Between congresses, the 
Executive Committee is responsible to the DGB Federal 
Council. The power of this reviewing body is called the 'de 
facto chief organ' of the DGB (Markovits 1986, p.21). Its 
role is symbolic of the member unions' dominance over the 
DGB.
As there have been two main groups of unions within the 
DGB, corresponding to the notion of the radical activists 
and the moderate accommodationists, enhancing membership on 
the part of one group can produce an improvement in the 
significance of the group and especially of the individual 
trade union within the federated body. Enhancement of 
membership can improve the member union's ability to 
promote its conception and policy within the DGB and thus 
exercise more influence upon the other unions. Despite the 
fact that union strength predominantly rests with the 
affiliates, an assessment of the DGB's history unveils the 
fact that to a certain degree some strategic decisions 
(e.g., the decision on working time reduction - activists: 
35-hour-week versus accommodationists: early retirement)
have often been decided by the DGB congress in favour of 
the activists. Regarding the organizational dynamics of an
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intervention by one DGB affiliate, it is possible to draw 
some conclusions from Schumpeter's economic theory of 
'creative destruction' (1994, pp.81-106). Thus we 
distinguish between two interventionist categories, which 
are:
(a) an intervention by one DGB affiliate in order to 
improve its position and significance within the DGB 
('pioneer' union) and
(b) as the voting procedures and decision-making process 
within the DGB are limited to a a zero-sum game, other 
affiliated unions will possibly intervene in order to 
reduce the loss of their significance within the DGB 
('imitators' - reactive intervention).
Now we will exemplify the two interventionist categories:
(a) The first objective of some trade union leaders is to 
improve the position and significance of their organization 
within the DGB. This implies that other affiliates do not 
follow, or that the recruitment reservoir of a trade union 
is relatively more favourable than in the case of other 
affiliates. When there is an intervention by a 'pioneer' 
trade union, its significance within the DGB can improve. 
Some trade unions in one country might also be interested 
in the single trade union status in order to improve their 
relative position within the peak organization (cf. 
appendix no. 6 and no.7), or the ob j ective of their 
intervention is improvement of their disadvantageous 
treatment within the DGB. This argument is especially true
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for small and accommodâtionist trade unions which 
experienced set-backs at the hands of the IGM.
(b) Other 'imitator' unions might be forced to follow with 
an intervention to improve the deteriorated position 
(reactive intervention) within the DGB. If such a union 
does not intervene, its relative position in a new peak 
organization will deteriorate. As the first trade union 
intervenes successfully in the other country, the others 
will follow in order to improve the deteriorated position.
Two categories for the changes in the formal significance 
of single trade unions within a federation will help to 
exemplify the desirability of an intervention in the GDR 
and the necessity to follow by others. After German 
reunification the desirability of trade union unity with 
reference to its formal position depends mainly on three 
interdependent figures ; - the number of recruits by each 
trade union in the GDR, the change in membership of the DGB 
as a result of the affiliated recruits, and the extent of 
structural unemployment in each industry, as one can infer 
that with increasing unemployment trade union membership 
can decline.
As the relative position of a DGB-affiliated union depends 
on these three factors, we assess the desirability of an 
intervention by means of the following three scenarios: 
Scenarios: (H) means retention of all FDGB membership
(100%), (I) means that only 50 per cent and (J) means that
156
thirty per cent of the former membership could be 
symmetrically retained by all DGB single trade unions^^?.
after a oossible meraer with their relevant East German
sister trade union 
Trade union
q 138
formal significance 
H(100%)139 I(50%)140 J(30%)141
IGM 34.1% 25.7% 28.3% 29.7%
ÔTV 15.8% 16.0% 15.9% 15.8%
IGCPK 8.4% 6.8% 7.3% 7.6%
Gew. Bergbau (IG BE) 4.3% 4.8% 4.6% 4.5%
Gew. Textil.... 3.7% 5.1% 4.7% 4.5%
Gew. Land + Forstwi. 0.6% 4.0% 2.9% 2.4%
Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: partly Schmitz, Tiemann and Lohrlein (1991, pp.83- 
89) and author's estimations
The scenarios outlined above indicate with reference to 
recruitment success to what extent an insignificant trade
137) This means that each DGB-affiliated trade union is 
able to recruit the same percentage of the old FDGB 
membership in the GDR.
138) This column visualises the percentage (influence) of 
each trade union within the DGB before reunification 
took place.
139) This column visualises the percentage of some DGB 
trade unions under the condition that they could 
recruit 100% of the East German workforce.
140) This refers to successful recruitments of 50% of the 
East German workforce.
141) This refers to a recruitment success of 30% of the 
East German workforce.
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union such as Gew. Land- und Forstwirtschaft is interested 
in intervening in the GDR. The scenarios outline that 
recruitment efforts will be extremely valuable especially 
for the smaller trade unions within the DGB. In order to 
improve the deteriorated situation in the other DGB- 
affiliated trade unions, it becomes inevitable to intervene 
(eg. IGM). In the case of the IGM its leadership acquired a 
controlling interest in the DGB. With more than thirty per 
cent (34,1%), IGM's leadership exercised a blocking 
(vetoing) minority, as almost no important decision within 
the DGB could take place without the IGM's approval. This 
is important, as the threshold for a blocking minority is 
1/3 of the delegates of a DGB congress or 1/3 of DGB 
Federal Council members. We assume that the IGM's 
leadership would be extremely worried about the impact of 
losing the blocking vetoing minority. This scenario will 
take place if the IGM abstains from recruiting in the GDR, 
while other DGB affiliates undertake recruitment efforts.
The underlying motive for an intervention is that the 
political strength of large trade unions is obviously 
greater than that of small ones. The absence of 
intervention by even one DGB trade union could encourage 
trade unions outside the DGB confederation to become 
active, thus reducing the DGB's absolute power. Despite the 
eagerness of each DGB-affiliated trade union's leadership 
to improve its union's relative significance, all are 
interested in securing the DGB's dominant position in
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German industrial relations. Thus they recommend an 
intervention by all other affiliates.
fivl Exercise of solidarity with the East German workforce
Now we will turn to the interventionist motive of offering 
solidarity to the East German workforce. Following Fox 
(1974), we distinguish between two types of exchange, which 
are firstly the Olsonian approach based on self-interest, 
and secondly, the 'diffuse' or social type of exchange 
(solidarity, altruism, charity), which we will now discuss. 
Offering solidarity can turn out to be a symbiotic force in 
order to achieve the other interventionist Olsonian based 
motives (e.g. economies of scale, protection of neo­
corporatism) .
An intervention by a DGB trade union can also be the result 
of solidarity with the workforce in the other country. The 
exercise of solidarity means a social exchange between the 
East and West German union membership engendering feelings 
of personal obligations, gratitude and trust. As outlined 
on the role of collective benefits provided by the trade 
unions, Akerlof (1986) mentioned that groups exercise 
considerable non-economic sentiments in their interactions. 
Despite the existence of profound self-interest on the side 
of the West German trade unions as regards avoiding the 
harmful effects of the break-up of the GDR, it is possible
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to assume a certain^interest on the parts of the West 
German trade union leadership and membership in the welfare 
of the East German workforce. The hardships and the 
suppression of the East German workforce by the Soviet 
Union after the War, and the horror of the SED/STASI State 
caused sentiments of compassion on the part of the West 
German population^^S for East German citizens. Improving 
the poor working and living conditions of the East Germans 
was seen as a desirable objective for the main bulk of the 
West German population.1^4 offering solidarityl^S to the 
East Germans is a means to prove loyalty and thus altruism.
Further, we submit that solidarity is an important 
component of political legitimacy of the union, which that 
needs to appeal to society rather than to sectionalist 
groups. From this point of view, we argue that a two-tier 
membership in the case of encompassing industrial unions is
142) The notion 'certain' refers to the fact that the 
West German union leaderships had not been extremely 
interested in the exercise of solidarity with the 
East German population. From the 1981 Basic 
Programme onwards the DGB omitted any mention of 
Germany's unification as one of the main 
preconditions for a peaceful order in Europe.
143) It is necessary to bear in mind that most West German 
families have relatives in the former GDR towards whom 
they feel obligations.
144) The West German basic law, politics and formal 
education were based on the desire to realise 
reunification and thus support the East German 
population.
145) The evidence for the offering of solidarity for the 
East German population by individual West German 
citizens was seen in significant financial 
contributions, extensive donations in kind, 
widespread invitations, and holidays offered to East 
German friends and relatives. These activities were 
carried on and financed by West Germans, mainly 
privately, over forty years.
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not a viable strategy, as this implies discriminating 
against the East German workforce.
As the East German workforce almost never received 
solidarity from the FDGB and its bodies, help and social 
exchange from the West stimulated the trust of the East 
German workforce in the West German labour organizations, 
and improved the attractiveness of the DGB unions. Thus the 
solidarity received facilitated the process of 
incorporation and the recruitment of potential membership. 
If someone makes contributions of time, money or goods to 
unrelated persons or to organizations, he is said to be 
'charitable' or 'philanthropic'. The discussion of
contributions indicates that charitable^behaviour can be 
motivated by the desire to improve the general well-being 
of the recipients (e.g., the East German workforce). The
recipient of support is likely to feel indebted to the
extent that he perceives that the donor was more concerned 
with the recipient's welfare than with his own. This could 
imply that the protection of neo-corporatism as well as the 
pursuit of other non-altruistic objectives are virtually 
imperceptible for the East German w o r k f o r c e ^ ^ ? ,  as the
needy East German recipients feel particularly obligated to 
reciprocate when the West German unions have acted from
146) Often charitable behaviour is defined as improving 
the welfare of other people without reciprocity. But 
we have to point out that even this behaviour depends 
upon goals.
147) When the donor is perceived to have acted in response 
to role requirements, the recipient may perceive that 
the donor's net costs are not very great, since the 
donor is likely to receive certain benefits from 
others for fulfilling role obligations.
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altruistic motives. Apparently 'charitable' behaviour can 
also be motivated by the donor's desire to avoid the scorn 
of others, or to receive social acclaim (Becker 1976, 
p.273). As recipients of the DGB affiliate's support, the 
East German workforce may be motivated by the desire to 
receive further future rewards from the donor, which seems 
to be an important argument considering the inexperience of 
the East German population in a new and rather complicated 
economic, social and political system. Offering solidarity 
to people in a situation of inexperience and personal 
uncertainty may generate an organizational dependence of 
the East German workforce towards the DGB affiliates. 
Further, the attractiveness of the West German trade unions 
can be enhanced, as the East German workforce is able to 
increase its level of trust in the new industrial relations 
system as well as the achievement of narrowing the wage 
differentials between East and West in order to avoid 
second-class treatment of the East German workforce, even 
at the expense of growing unemployment. Incorporating the 
East German workforce within the West German trade unions 
as 'equal partners' and offering them voice can generate a 
feeling of corporate identity that may trigger improved 
loyalty towards the organization and greater strength. 
Willingness to join the West German unions may be motivated 
by the need of the East German workforce to reduce their 
indebtedness towards the interventionist DGB member union 
by joining, and thus improving encompassiveness.
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A cultural value orientation such as solidarity might help 
to sustain the cohesion of an organization. Solidarity can 
also be used by the leadership to enforce internal 
discipline within the union, which predominantly means 
IGM's militant rank-and-file. Especially on the part of the 
West German union membership, offering solidarity can 
generate intrinsic satisfaction. Hence solidarity can also 
be used as an integrative force to secure the inclusiveness 
of a union. Insofar as an intervention is determined by 
solidarity, we assume overwhelming approval by the union 
membership.
In comparison with the above-mentioned reasons that speak 
in favour of an intervention (economies of scale, relative 
position, protection of neo-corporatist industrial 
relations) trade union solidarity is not just an aspect of 
altruism. Acting on behalf of trade union solidarity 
additionally offers a vital moral justification for an 
intervention by the DGB affiliates.
5.4. Conclusion and predictive trade union strateov model
The structure of West German industrial relations at the 
workplace ('neutralizing') has permitted high productivity, 
which has permitted centralised and thus macroeconomically 
based wage bargaining with high real wages, low inflation 
rates, low unemployment rates (a good Okun-index), low 
strike records, and the provision of an elaborate social 
system. In this sense (Streeck 1981, p.153) the West German
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industrial relations system has moved in a 'virtuous 
circle'. Especially in the case of the activists the 
accomplishments of the neo-corporatist growth alliance have 
contributed to trade union moderation in general, and trade 
union acceptance of the industrial relations system in 
particular.
The distance of the West German trade unions from shopfloor 
representation ('neutralization') as determined by the 
Works Constitution Act and the Codetermination Acts has 
resulted in the organizational success and survival of the 
West German trade unions, based predominantly on the 
provision of collective and to a minor degree on selective, 
incentives.
With regard to the fact that organizational strength on the 
shopfloor differs between the accommodationist (weak) and 
activist (strong) wings within the DGB, especially the (i) 
accommodationists are often bound to the practice of social 
partnership with the employers (cf. Markovits 1986) in 
order to secure the cohesion of their organization. In the 
case of the (ii) activist trade unions the application of 
neo-corporatism with its outcome has led to a moderation of 
the militant rank-and-file and thus has successfully 
defeated the various attempts at decentralisation.
The success of the West German unions rests predominantly 
on the application of collective benefits. The shock 
stemming from the disintegration of the GDR can account for
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various threats, namely: possible features of undercutting 
by the influx of the East German workforce or FDGB trade 
unions, probably the loss of a unionised sector in the 
former GDR, possibly growing non-unionism or multi-unionism 
which can erode the representational near-monopoly and 
encompassiveness of the DGB affiliates. Especially 
undercutting can trigger severe problems for the West 
German trade unions, as this can cause a collapse of the 
provision of collective goods (a bad Okun-index) with 
likely repercussions on the beneficial application of neo­
corporatism. If neo-corporatism breaks down, the trade 
union encompassiveness and organizational strength may 
deteriorate, as they have made the membership define their 
interests in terms of public goods (e.g. a good Okun-index) 
and in the continuation of the beneficial growth alliance.
(i) If we assess the weakness of the accommodationist trade 
unions on the shopfloor and their necessity to provide 
beneficial collective goods, their organizational existence 
is based on the representational near-monopoly and the 
avoidance of growing non-unionism. As outlined in the 
explanatory part, accommodationist trade unions, with their 
organizational weakness on the shopfloor and their desire 
to survive, do not in the short run have any other 
alternative than the application of neo-corporatism, 
probably by gaining recognition from the employers. We 
predict that the accommodationist trade unions will 
intervene in the GDR in order to restore the single trade 
union status and thus to continue with the beneficial neo-
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corporatist growth alliance. The dominant objective of the 
West German trade unions and especially the 
accommodationists will be to generate a stable solution by 
their intervention.
The strategy applied especially by the accommodationist 
unions will centre around the following two motives, which 
are:
First, centralised union decision-making will be focused on 
the protection of neo-corporatism and the subsequent 
undercutting of public goods by existing or emerging East 
German labour organizations. Securing centralisation and a 
virtually representational monopoly status, an encompassing 
union could apply a reunification strategy of incorporating 
the East German workforce within its own organization. 
Hence the motive for the strategy of an encompassing 
organization is based on standard economic exchange, which 
means incorporating the East German workforce in order to 
secure the representational near-monopoly, the provision of 
public goods, and neo-corporatism. Turner's argument in 
favour of incorporation is not just applicable to different 
skill levels, but even to the case of the economic and 
political integration of countries. Recalling the fact that 
the West German trade unions have been 'neutralized' to a 
certain degree from the shopfloor, trade unions with weak 
shopfloor organizations have been especially keen on the 
application of social partnership, as this means gaining 
recognition by the employers. In comparison with the
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activist trade unions, the accommodationist unions will 
seek to cooperate with the employers, and their bargaining 
efforts will possibly focus on East German productivity 
growth in order to bridge the existing East-West wage gap. 
As a result of their lack of alternatives, the 
accommodationist trade unions will be eager to avoid any 
erosion of public goods and neo-corporatism. Hence these 
unions will foster an approach of incorporation. In line 
with the self-interested desire to incorporate to protect 
neo-corporatism and to improve organizational strength are 
the additional motives of enhancing membership as well as 
expanding union significance within the DGB.
Second, despite the contractual model described above, 
motives of diffuse exchange also guide the West German 
union leadership and membership. Partial gift exchange, 
reciprocity and solidarity with the East German workforce 
could turn out to be important factors in a strategy of 
incorporation. As we have seen, solidarity can turn out to 
be a widely accepted interventionist motive which can 
improve the cohesion of the union and especially facilitate 
recruitment in East Germany.
(ii) The activist trade unions which have a considerable 
stronghold on the shopfloor will also protect the positive 
outcome of neo-corporatism, thus as defining interests in 
collective terms by the membership has secured 
centralisation of decision-making and collective 
bargaining. The fact that the membership appreciates the
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outcome of corporatism moderates the behaviour of the 
militant rank-and-file. The trade union leadership has been 
able to fend off the various decentralisation attempts. In 
order to avoid decentralisation and probably the weakening 
of the encompassing trade union body, the activist union 
leadership will protect the neo-corporatist environment.
The strategy of protecting the neo-corporatist environment 
is also based on standard economic exchange following 
Turner's proposal of incorporation. In comparison with the 
accommodationist unions the activist trade unions' strategy 
will be more focused on competing in the membership market 
in order to present its 'challenger face' (cf. Markovits 
1986). This means that the activist union leadership will 
focus its strategy on pushing up wages in order to attract 
the East German workforce and thus to reduce the migration 
wave to the West and the other undercutting impacts of the 
GDR's collapse.
In the case of the activist trade unions socialist ideology 
has been a means to inspire and mobilise the socialist- 
minded rank-and-file. The sudden collapse of the East 
European countries and socialism caused a severe shock to 
the German left, as socialism had lost its attraction and 
the Stalinist systems did not prove to be a desirable 
alternative to the West German system. The collapse of 
socialism caused displacement of the integrative utopian 
trade union objective. Especially in the case of the 
activist trade unions, the diffuse exchange of solidarity
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with the East German workforce or another ideology could be 
a vital integrative factor replacing socialist ideology and 
thus sustaining union cohesion.
Common to both trade unions is the prospect that despite 
the protection of neo-corporatism and the exercise of 
solidarity with the East German workforce, the enhancement 
of membership as well as changes in the significance of the 
unions within the DGB might be further objectives 
compatible with the strategy of incorporation.
Before we test the predictive interventionist model, we 
have to determine and assess the factors that will generate 
a competitive advantage for the West German trade unions in 
order to intervene in the GDR, probably by the strategy of 
incorporating the East German workforce within the 
encompassing union body.
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II. The main determinants of the reconstruction process
This chapter is of interest, as it accounts for the 
preconditions and arguments in favour of a successful one­
way intervention by the West German trade unions, possibly 
by incorporation, in East Germany in order to maintain 
their organizational position and thus to protect neo­
corporatism. A successful intervention had been feasible, 
as the East German workforce hardly showed any commitment 
towards the FDGB and the East German industrial relations 
system. The reason for the dissatisfaction can be explained 
by (i) the legacy of low trust inherent in the Stalinist 
determined transmission belt industrial relations system 
and (ii) after the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, the 
e d g e's ignorance of and inexperience with the new and 
attractive West German economic, political and social 
system. Thus the hope of the East German population rested 
with the West German trade unions, explaining the virtual 
absence of emerging grass root unionism. The one-way 
convergence of the former East German economic, political 
and social system towards the West German system offered 
the DGB and its affiliates a competitive advantage and 
prepared the ground for the organizational intervention.
The chapter on the legacy of low trust is of importance for 
the case of the activist trade unions, as their leadership 
has used socialist ideology to motivate its West German 
socialist rank-and-file shopfloor. As socialism became 
discredited, the force of socialist ideology might
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deteriorate, with possible repercussions on union cohesion 
and on the choice of the appropriate interventionist 
strategy.
As a corollary to the dissatisfaction of the East German 
workforce, and especially the FDGB's former affiliates, the 
process of the dismantling of the FDGB started in 
cooperation with the DGB affiliates.
1.1 The legacy of low trust
According to Fox (1974, p.73), a low trust industrial 
relations system is characterised by roles of the following 
kind - 'a perceived disposition on the parts of 
subordinates to behave as if the role occupant cannot be 
trusted, of its own volition, to perform according to their 
goals and values; - the imposition of permanent close 
personal supervision, specific impersonal rules by the 
remote personnel, or other forms of systematic control; - 
the imposition of tight coordination through externally 
applied standardised routines and schedules, thereby ruling 
out the open unrestricted communication and interaction 
patterns... ; - an assumption that failures or inadequacies 
of performance result from negligence or 
insubordination...'
As a result of low trust industrial relations, virtually no 
commitment of the East German workforce towards this 
imposed transmission belt industrial relations system took
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place. Even the sentiments of the workforce had been
characterised by distance, as the FDGB did not represent 
the workforce as its agent. The subject of this chapter is 
to demonstrate that former East German industrial relations 
had been governed by a low trust system wherein the East
German trade unions failed to act on behalf of the East
German workforce. This is important, because the East
German workforce was able to assess the advantages of both 
German industrial relations systems after the dismantling 
of the Iron Curtain. An East German industrial relations 
system characterised by distrust offered the West German 
trade unions a significant competitive advantage over the 
East German FDGB, and could thus facilitate an intervention 
in the East by protecting West German neo-corporatist 
industrial relations.
Labour representation in the former GDR
The Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) was a 
federated monopoly, which embraced some 97 per cent of 
eligible members and was organized in sixteen industrial 
trade unions (cf. appendix no. 8). All employees, including 
management, belonged to the same union.
It should be emphasised that the organizational structure 
of the FDGB and its affiliates was similar to that of the 
DGB (cf. Schmitz, Tiemann and Lohrlein 1991, p.74). It is 
worth bearing in mind that the demarcation (organization by 
industries) between the trade unions had been virtually
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identical with that practised in the FRG, which was a 
significant fact, as this offered the possibility of inter­
union links on the affiliate level. If we contrast East and 
West German trade union structure, the organizational 
strength and representation in the East rested solely on 
the FDGB, the peak organization, whereas trade union 
representation and strength in the West rested mainly with 
the affiliates. From the beginning, the FDGB was a highly 
centralised, unified body that rested on two organizational 
pillars. It was organized along territorial lines, and its 
16 unions were organized on the basis of production. The 
individual unions acted as specialised divisions, lacked 
fiscal autonomy and were bound by the FDGB board decisions. 
Consequently, their members belonged to the FDGB and not to 
the union responsible for them. The most important task of 
the latter was to maintain trade union organizations in the 
larger enterprises (Betriebsgewerkschaftsorganisation, or 
BGO), which served as the 'primary organizations' (Wilke 
1990, p.367). The body governing the primary organizations 
was the Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung (BGL, works union 
management).
With approximately 9,500,000 members (Müller 1990, p.350), 
the FDGB was the most important 'social organization' in 
the GDR. The Constitution of the GDR (Art. 44 and 45), 
Labour Code (AGB §§ 6-8 and 18-27) and the by-laws of the 
FDGB stressed its role as a mass organization and as the 
'transmission belt' (cf. appendix no. 9) of the Communist 
SED, as 'the conscious and organized advance guard of the
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working class and working people in the socialist GDR,' to 
which the FDGB professed allegiance (cf. National Executive 
of the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions 1969, 
pp.3-6 and Autorenkollektiv (ed.) 1986, p.15). In 1950 the 
FDGB expressly acknowledged the leading position of the SED 
in its statute. According to this statute, the SED 
constituted the 'leading force of all organizations of the 
working class and of the working people generally, and of 
state and social organizations;' this entitled it to use 
the organizations to transmit its will to the masses. The 
party's statute imposed on members the duty to carry out 
the party's directives and decisions within the other 
organizations to which they belonged.
Unlike the SED, the FDGB had no direct influence on the 
government machine and disposed of no direct means of 
sanctions in the state. The union activity centred on so- 
called production tasks assigned to the enterprise level. 
The function of the transmission belt encompassed; the 
promotion of socialist competition, application of more 
modern methods, collaboration in collective bargaining, 
application of the socialist principles of achievement, 
participation in the affairs of the cadres, development of 
cultural and sports activities and accident prevention, and 
protection of health. For the promotion of the SED policy 
the FDGB provided a large variety of publications, 
especially through its Tribune Verlag. After the 
dismantling of the Berlin Wall the author's interviews with 
East German workers revealed that the workforce's attitude
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towards the FDGB's promotion of policy had been determined 
by the FDGB leaders' propagated 'distortion of reality' in 
their 'simulated' glorification of socialist achievements.
The end of the FDGB as the agent of the workforce was 
sealed at the Bitterfeld Conference on 25-26 November 1948, 
when the FDGB relinquished its union rights in favour of a 
communist dictatorship, after having experienced severe 
opposition on the shopfloor by the works councils as a 
result of the introduction of payment-by-result schemes 
(cf. Zank 1990, pp.59-61). The structure of the FDGB 
corresponded to that of the party on all levels: the
chairman of the executive body of FDGB usually belonged to 
the corresponding echelon of the party, so that the party's 
leading role was always assured. The official history of 
the FDGB (Bundesvorstand des FDGB 1982, p.222) termed this 
decision as a 'fundamental rejection of all attempts to 
separate the party and the trade unions or to countenance 
trade union neutrality toward SED policy.' In accordance 
with Stalinist doctrines, the industrial relations system 
of the SED did not provide for the possibility of 
dissenting interests. The SED's leadership always claimed 
that their system had been an example for harmony of 
interests ('all-social interest'), resulting from the 
leading position of the party and the fact that, since all 
enterprises were nationally owned, they were in the hands 
of the workers themselves, and no conflict could thus arise 
between the political leaders and the workers.
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From the Bitterfeld Conference on the SED expanded its 
position on the shopfloor by disbanding the works councils, 
and replacing them by loyal party members forming the BGL. 
Jendretzky (1961, p.63), the former FDGB leader, 
legitimated the abolition of the works councils with the 
following words: 'The works councils are not able to
provide the necessary level of mobilisation which is vital 
for the attainment of the new objectives.' The rationale 
behind the formation of the BGLs during the FDGB's period 
of Stalinisation was to avoid the influence of the SPD on 
the works councillors and to strengthen the SED and FDGB 
representation on the shopfloor (Suckut 1982, pp.2-5). 
Relating the imposition of the BGLs to Fox's definition 
(1974, p.73) of a low trust industrial relations system, we 
argue that this introduction accounts for the ruling out of 
'open, unrestricted communication and interaction 
patterns.' In interviews conducted by the author with older 
East German labour delegates, the forced implementation of 
the 'inorganic' BGLs^^® and the dissolution of the highly 
appreciated works councils have been described as an act of 
the Communist leadership to 'straighten' the will of the 
workforce towards the Party line.
With the establishment of the FDGB's monopoly in labour 
representation on the company level, the codecision and 
codetermination rights vanished. The unions in the GDR 
acted, like their model the Soviet Union (cf. Zimmermann
148) Bahro (1977, p.148) explains the poor productivity 
in the GDR by 'inorganic restructuring' efforts 
causing a severe reduction in the spontaneity of the 
masses.
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1986, p.15) since the 1920s, as transmission belts between 
the workers in the enterprises and the party state : they 
were organizations with quasi-compulsory membership, often 
led by 'geriatric apparatchiks, acting both as agents of 
labour discipline and as channels for allocating social 
welfare provisions' (Hyman 1990, p.14). The membership of 
the FDGB was not officially compulsory; but to opt out 
amounted to an act of defiance against the regime, 
entailing the loss of many important social benefits.
The FDGB's primary function as the SED's transmission belt 
consisted in the implementation of Party policy. In the 
economic field this involved carrying out state plans, 
reducing waste and inefficiency, encouraging technical 
progress and worker discipline, and organising 'socialist 
emulation' to improve various aspects of worker 
performance. The socialist emulation had been defined as 
the 'comprehensive expression of voluntary, deliberate and 
creative initiative of the workforce for the promotion and 
implementation of scientific-technological progress in 
order to improve productivity, working and living 
conditions, as well as the democratic participation in the 
planning and management of production' (Ehlert et al. 1983, 
pp.815-817). The trade unions participated in planning, 
although in reality their impact was marginal (cf. Jeffries 
and Melzer 1987, p.22). In accordance with the principle of 
'exclusive leadership', the FDGB and its affiliates 'did 
not even have an influence on the economic aspects of the 
production plan, though they are responsible for the
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political and ideological promotion of it' (Grebing 1985, 
p.187). The East German government compensated for the 
limitations of collective bargaining and planning by a 
trade union veto on certain items under the labour code 
such as termination of individual employment contracts, 
work rules, changes in the hours of work, and wage rules, 
but this veto right had never been exercised by the FDGB's 
leadership. In the author's interviews with East German 
labour delegates a severe discrepancy between what could be 
achieved by the FDGB's leadership and its actual behaviour 
had been stated. Verifying the reason for the perceived 
deviation, the workforce stressed the FDGB leadership's 
strict obedience to the imposed terms of the SED.
The FDGB congress had to take place a short time after the 
SED held its Party conference, because the former had to 
discuss and interpret the decisions of the latter. The 
basic wage rates were formally agreed by the Council of 
Ministers and the FDGB. Real power, however, lay in the 
former body. Like its western counterparts, the FDGB played 
a part in determining wages; but their function was 
fundamentally different from that of, for example, the West 
German unions. In the FRG, the unions may resort to the 
strike weapon in an attempt to enforce wage demands, but 
that was impossible in the GDR, where, in the official 
view, class conflicts and struggles for the distribution of 
incomes were done away with when private ownership of the 
means of production had been abolished. Any attempt to 
oppose the employer (i.e. the State) and to try and
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negotiate working conditions and wages, was considered (in 
view of the predominant theory of class struggle) an anti­
socialist and thus a counter-revolutionary action. Such an 
attempt was viewed as a violation of the labour code, which 
was developed into a system of strict and very detailed 
regulations with practically no room for negotiation.
The labour contract was in fact reduced to a contractual 
declaration of entry into labour relations with the 
employer, i.e., the State, on terms fixed by the 
government.
The framework for the development of incomes was determined 
in accordance with the priorities set out by the economic 
plans. The guidelines for wages and incomes policies were 
formulated by the Council of Ministers in cooperation with 
the FDGB Central Executive. The crucial issues affecting 
the system of wage agreements were similarly settled by the 
Council of Ministers by agreement with the FDGB. The wage 
rates in publicly owned enterprises were fixed by standard 
collective agreements between the authorities in charge of 
an economic sector and the unions concerned. In accordance 
with the prevailing organizational principle of 'democratic 
centralism' (§ 14 FDGB bylaws), all agreements and 
directives of a superior union body had to be obeyed by 
subsequent union bodies (cf. Bobke-von Camen 1990, p.317). 
Therefore the impact of the affiliated unions on wages was 
less than marginal, because they had to stick to the
149) There was almost no room for negotiations in the
Stalinist-style industrial relations systems behind 
the Iron Curtain. Cf. Tomes (1991), pp.2-4.
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agreements set out by the FDGB. In the author's 
questionnaire conducted with East German labour delegates, 
one important reason for the workforce's low commitment to 
the existing industrial relations system had been the 
principle of 'democratic centralism', neglecting the 
desires of the workforce. Democratic centralism is in line 
with Fox's (1974, p.73) feature of a 'tight coordination 
through externally applied standardised routines and 
schedules' by central planning, often causing low trust.
That the FDGB was not able to motivate its membership by 
codetermination, was a logical result of the abolition of 
the independent works councils and the implementation of 
the BGLs with the dominant principle of 'democratic 
centralism.' A further reason was the way the FDGB ignored 
its membership's initiatives and did not act on them (cf. 
Hürtgen 1992, p.28). 'Voice' refers to the use of direct 
communications to present issues in order to bring about 
actual and desired conditions. It means talking about 
problems. As problems had not been acknowledged or dealt 
with by the FDGB, and the actual and desired conditions had 
been framed by the FDGB strictly according to the 
guidelines of the SED, virtually no voice had been 
provided. The participation in East German industrial 
relations consisted in approving the policy of the SED. 
Table 2 accounts for the inappropriate representation of 
the FDGB's and SED's representation on the establishment 
level.
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Table 2; The desirability of the FDGB's representation on 
the establishment level
Question: 'Does the FDGB 
establishment level in a
or SED represent you on the 
desirable way?'
workforce in per cent answer
74.1 'no'
10.3 'do not want to answer'
8.9 'do not understand'
6.7 'yes'
Source; Voigt (1971), Montagearbeiter in der DDR, Giefîen,
p.110.
In their assessment of the cause for the ratings (Table 2), 
East German labour representatives identified the principle 
of democratic centralism. The research of Voigt (1971) 
supports the view of Bust-Bartels (1980) that the unions in 
the GDR did not offer 'voice'. In the political context 
voice refers to participation in the democratic process, 
through voting, discussion and bargaining. Since the FDGB 
controlled and manipulated these three channels of voice. 
East German industrial relations had clearly not been 
shaped by democratic proceedings.
The darkest hour of the existence of the SED/FDGB occurred 
in Spring 1953, after the regime cancelled an increase in 
wage payments, and actually increased the prescribed norms. 
The East German workforce reacted with mass demonstrations, 
the SED regime called in Russian troops, which crushed the 
demonstrations by killing hundreds of workers. This 
upheaval also saw massive demonstrations against the FDGB's 
leadership, and the devastation of FDGB property (Chronik
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des 20.Jahrhunderts, 1983, pp. 780-782). The FDGB virtually 
lost the confidence of the workforce as their agent in the 
GDR after its leadership condemned the upheaval as a 
'fascist riot' and called for 'severe punishment of the 
ringleaders' (Die Arbeit, 1953, p.902). Despite the severe 
punishment by the SED, newly released information (Der 
Spiegel, 27.5.1991, p.88) revealed that upheavals on the 
company level were quite common after the Russian troops 
and STASI crushed the demonstrations. The archives of the 
FDGB show that FDGB officials were not only involved in 
gathering information on those members of the workforce who 
participated in the upheaval, but also drew up the 
accusations for the punishments^^®. The author's 
questionnaire conducted with East German labour delegates 
uncovered the fact that the events of 17 June 1953 caused 
sentiments of low trust, hardly any commitment, and even 
alienation towards the FDGB and the industrial relations 
system. After this upheaval the workforce in the GDR 
realised that the power of the FDGB was based on violence. 
For more than four decades, the people in the GDR did not 
forgive the FDGB's behaviour in their struggle for freedom. 
Shortly after the upheaval the SED/FDGB experienced the 
most severe e x o d u s ^ o f  its workforce to West Germany. The 
FDGB's uncompromising stand on the side of the SED caused
150) Cf. Zentrales Gewerkschaftsarchiv des FDGB 
11/2348/4450, 'Streikende in der DDR-Metallindustrie 
am 17.Juni 1953 - Aufstellung des Zentralvorstandes 
der IG Metall des FDGB.' In Eckelmann, Hertle and 
Weinert (1990): FDGB intern. Innenansichten einer 
Massenorganization der SED, Treptow.
151) One corollary of the 17.June 1953 was that the East 
German workforce left the GDR. The subsequent 
reaction to the exodus was the erection of the 'Iron 
Curtain.'
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the East German workforce to lose any credibility that the 
FDGB had. From this event onwards the FDGB was treated as a 
suspicious entity by the workforce and even by the SED's 
leadership. An assessment of internal documents and a 
subsequent interview conducted by the author with a former 
member of the FDGB's ideological department confirmed that 
after June 17, 1953 the SED's leadership blamed the FDGB's 
board for deficiencies in the system, while at the same 
time the SED's leaders claimed to be responsible for any 
East German achievements. An indicator of such a strategy 
was that in August 1956 the FDGB had to take over the 
'political, organizational and financial administration' of 
the social security s y s t e m . ^52 explanation for shifting
the administration from the Government to the FDGB was that 
the SED did not want to be blamed and made responsible for 
the increasing time lag in which pensions followed the 
income of the working population, and especially the SED's 
unwillingness to raise the low living standard of the 
pensioners (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 1988, pp.40-41). The 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (1988, p.40) argues that the 
rationale of the SED's policy was the ever-present fear 
that members of the FDGB could form a second Marxist party 
causing the dismantling of the SED's monopoly. Eckelmann et 
al. (1990, p.52) describe that from 17 June 1953 onwards 
the relationship between the SED and FDGB was dominated by 
'institutionalised suspicion.' As a corollary of the events 
of 17 June 1953, the SED intensified the recruitment of
152) For a survey of the varieties of tasks in social 
security administered by the FDGB, cf. Bëcker and 
Steffen (1990), pp.275-281.
183
Party-loyal FDGB representatives, cleaning out those with a 
'bourgeois' representation. Subsequently the FDGB's board 
members perceived their role as practically members of the 
Central Committee, and only partly as representatives of 
the FDGB. Therefore its leadership was never keen on 
exercising any form of democracy within the FDGB, but 
imposed the Party will on the mass organization. In
subsequent interviews conducted by the author, especially 
older members of the East German workforce often mentioned 
that the events of 17 June 1953 clearly demonstrated that 
the Stalinist industrial relations system was imposed by 
the SED and the USSR, and was not based on voluntarism or 
loyalty. The organizational monopoly of the FDGB and its 
industrial relations system consisted of coercion and 
brutality.
In subsequent years increasing international competitive 
pressure triggered measures in the GDR to improve
motivation within the workforce. For the existence of
motivational problems and low productivity, we refer to 
some indicators. The unions in the former GDR were not able 
to provide the positive aspects of voice or an industrial 
relations climate characterised by high trust. The
totalitarian East German one party system and its 
transmission belt organization were notoriously 
unresponsive to the voice mechanism, and even suppressed 
its exercise. As 'exit' from the industrial relations 
system had been practically denied, and 'voice' suppressed, 
we assume that the commitment of the East German workforce
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to the imposed industrial relations system was weak. Hof 
(1983, p.104) enumerates the following indicators of the 
low commitment and thus of the low trust of the East German 
workforce towards its imposed, practically 'no-exit' 
industrial relations system;
- the constant appeals of SED and FDGB representatives to 
socialist working morale,
the various types of 'socialist competition' (cf. 
Baumeister 1990, p.897), not being a result of spontaneity, 
but dictated and planned by the FDGB's and SED's 
executives,
- the permanent monitoring and criticism of unsatisfactory 
working discipline and slow work,
- the permanent criticism by the FDGB concerning the level 
of absenteeism (cf. Schneider 1988, p.82) and high rates of 
fluctuation, causing financial burdens to the companies 
(cf. Fuchs 1983, pp.218-219),
the quasi-compulsory activities unrelated to the 
workplace (e.g. parades organized by the FDGB, welcome 
parties for Party leaders),
- the severe criticism of poor quality standards by the 
FDGB,
- the large number of hearings by the plant conflict 
commission (cf. Kunz 1980, p.33).
Further indicators for the missing 'voice' as a result of 
the poor performance of the FDGB can be seen in the 
behaviour of the workforce on the shopfloor in such 
different forms of resistance as (Bust-Bartels 1980): the
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inadequate discipline at the workplace, the slow 
production, the waste of time and input, the fiddling with 
the prescribed norms, the level of absenteeism and 
fluctuation (18% according to internal FDGB documents 
In the job market, 'voice' means discussing conditions that 
ought to be changed with the employer, rather than quitting 
the job. The fact that most of the union meetings were held 
during working time showed the resignation of the workforce 
towards the FDGB's policy. Regarding interviews conducted 
by the author with East German labour delegates, we report 
that there was hardly any participation when meetings took 
place during leisure time.
Due to the administrative system in the GDR, the people had 
grown accustomed to the fact that a variety of individual 
needs were not satisfied through particular commitment at 
work. The majority of employees in industry carried out 
undemanding and meaningless work - in some cases under 
psychologically strenuous Tayloristic conditions - and had 
virtually no promotion o p p o r t u n i t i e s . 1^4 the same time, 
however, they did not have to worry about losing their 
jobs. This situation destroyed virtually any achievement 
motivation. Everyone tried to make the best of the 
situation. Turning up late, staying away from work without 
an excuse, or shopping during working time were part of the 
workday routine in the GDR economy.
153) FDGB (ed.), Abteilung Organisation (22.9.1987)
154) Hof (1983, p.114) indicated that working places with 
high intrinsic motivational characteristics were 
rare.
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The low productivity had partly been a corollary of 
insufficient central collective planning and an
inappropriate remuneration policy, which drastically 
reduced incentives. Instead of criticising the SED
government for poor central planning, the FDGB blamed the 
workforce for failures or inadequacies in performance or in 
achieving prescribed norms. According to the SED's
assessment of those shortcomings, and Fox's (1974, p.73) 
low trust characteristics, these failures resulted from 
'negligence, insufficient ideological indoctrination or 
insubordination on the side of the working population.'
Being permanently criticised for their inadequate
achievements by the FDGB, the vast majority of the East 
German labour delegates stated in the author's 
questionnaire that they did not approve of the FDGB as
their agent (cf. Table 5). On the contrary, the rank-and- 
file distanced itself from its organization. The reaction 
of the workmates had been to form groups living an
industrial life of their own despite the FDGB's hegemony. 
An important factor which influenced the workers' outlook 
in East Germany was the collective solidarity of small 
groups of workers, developed and implemented by the FDGB.
The small groups acquired a solidarity which militated 
against the required direct identification with the
interests of the whole community, and which conflicted with
187
the formal organization of the enterpriser's. The 
organization of work was characterised by a parallel 
structure of formal, rational, 'scientific principles of 
organizations,' and an informal organization on the part of 
the small work groups. The informal sector on the shopfloor 
was a sign of the considerably strong position of the 
workforce determined by a permanent shortage of l a b o u r .  
Grebing (1985, p.190) points out that identification with a 
small group of workmates led to a loss of political 
involvement and offered some protection against 
uncomfortable social and political pressures. According to 
interviews conducted by the author with East German labour 
delegates, living their own group-oriented industrial way 
was an expression of the workforce's dissatisfaction with 
the low trust industrial relations system.
Every month the FDGB's department of organization had to 
report to the Central Committee of the SED on the 'mood and 
attitudes of the members towards current political topics' 
and on 'special occurrences' (cf. Pirker et al. 1990, 
pp.130-133). The control system was expanded when massive 
criticism had been voiced after the invasion of socialist 
forces, dashing the reforms of the Czechoslovakian 
government in 1968. The objective of the SED was to provide
155) Bust-Bartels (1980, p.81) reports that the small 
groups 'formally accepted' the norms prescribed, but 
internal solidarity and shortage in labour supply 
allowed them to retaliate by 'insufficient working 
morale','slow work' and the avoidance of 
overfulfilling piece-rate norms.
156) VoBkamp and Wittke (1991) suggest that the permanent 
shortage of labour favoured the development of the 
'passive strength' of the workforce and that the 
workers enjoyed virtually guarantied positions.
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the FDGB with the essential and most advanced equipment to 
pin-point dissenting voices in the companies. Eckelmann et 
al. (1990, pp.85-89) report on new computerised facilities 
in early 1969, in order to install a disciplinarian control 
system, as a result of massive criticism of the invasion.
In the author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates on the FDGB's tasks in East German 
society, its main functions were described as controlling 
and disciplining the workforce. As the two dominant 
features perceived in East German industrial relations had 
been the control and discipline of the workforce, the East 
German workers did not rely on the FDGB, because the trade 
union personnel would denounce critical statements. We 
conclude that East German industrial relations were haunted 
by extreme and extensive 'forms of systematic control' (Fox 
1974, p.73).
The socialist emulation initiated by the FDGB had been 
applied to increase the performance of the workforce by a 
quite differentiated incentive system encompassing the 
conferring of orders and honorary titles, often in 
connection with additional income or fringe benefits. The 
honorary title of a 'hero of the workforce' was based on 
high performance, which meant an overfulfilment of the 
norms prescribed. The movement of the activists within the 
FDGB, responsible for the socialist emulation, often
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manipulated the working conditions of promising workforce 
members in order to create a 'hero of the workforce'^ .
Such an achievement offered the possibility of raising the 
norms. Thus Barthel (1979, p.4) reports different forms of 
assault by the workforce against members of the Hennecke 
activists. Interviews conducted by the author with East 
German labour delegates uncovered the fact that 'heroes of 
the workforce' experienced social isolation by co-workers. 
As 'heroes of the workforce' overfulfilled their norms, 
higher norms were prescribed for the rank-and-file. Despite 
the promotion of prescribed norms by the FDGB, few of the 
East German workforce had information on how the norms were 
determined. The Table 3 mirrors the mood of the East German 
labour representatives towards the determination of the 
prescribed norms.
According to the industrial relations theory of western 
market economists, unions are perceived as a force to 
implement the notion of fairness within an industrial 
relations system. Assessing the results of Table 9, we 
infer that the FDGB was not the labour force's agent to 
counter the perception of unfairness. On the contrary in 
the questionnaire conducted by the author with East German 
labour representatives, the FDGB was described by East 
German labour delegates as the 'agent' or 'long arm of the 
SED.' Bust-Bartel's research (1980, p.83) supports this
157) The incentive for workers to seek such a title often 
referred to the privileged consumption of rare 
goods e.g. telephone, Trabant.
190
view, as he reports on attacks on FDGB and SED time-takers 
during work measurements. The FDGB/SED agents were 
considered by the workforce not to care about the type of 
work and the qualification of the working group. If the 
FDGB had fulfilled its transmission belt function, which 
would have meant representing and not just disciplining the 
workforce on behalf of various government and Party bodies, 
we argue that FDGB would have exercised a two-way 
communication. In interviews conducted by the author the 
East German labour delegates complained that the FDGB 
exercised hardly any two-way communication.
Table 3; The attitudes of the East German workforce towards 
norms
Were your work norms realistic and fair?
Answers workforce in per cent
no 51.5
almost not 31.9
yes, with reservations 11.3
yes 4.2
no answer 0.1
N = 402 100.0
Source: Author's questionnaire with East German labour
delegates
The reality of industrial relations in the GDR revealed 
that the FDGB neglected or simply dismissed the objectives 
of its membership as regarded improvement of its working 
and living conditions. To explain the FDGB's negligence of 
membership objectives, we refer to the SED's and the 
management's personal theory of motivation. In the case of
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East German management, we presume that management's views 
coincided with those of McGregor's Theory X, because it 
tended to regard incentive payment schemes as necessary to 
control the workers. Exercising Theory X is a further 
indicator of a low trust system. If the workers do not 
understand the norms prescribed and feel no sense of 
participation, these shortcomings must have a severe 
adverse impact on the remuneration schemes (cf. Table 4).
schemes
Answer Workforce in per cent
not satisfied 
partly satisfied 
satisfied 
do not know
79.9
7.1
10.4
2.6
p.91.
The dissatisfaction^^® with the remuneration schemes, 
insufficient valence and instrumentality of the wages was a 
further indicator that the FDGB did not fulfil its task as 
the workforce's agent. Slow work, low working morale and 
poor standards might be indicators of the dissatisfaction. 
According to the responses in the author's questionnaire, 
the determination of wages and norms in the interests of 
government without the participation of the workforce
158) The dissatisfaction could also result due to the lack 
of goods on which one could spend extra money, which 
was a common feature in the former East European 
countries.
192
caused a feeling of distance towards the imposed industrial 
relations system and especially the F D G B . 1^9
Balter (1990, p.189) argued that the workforce was annoyed 
by the FDGB, which fostered socialist competition by 
raising the prescribed output norms. The union membership 
became quite disillusioned by this policy when the FDGB 
leaders started a campaign to increase shift work. The 
disillusion meant of the workforce centred on the issue 
that its own trade union was eager to promote shift work 
instead of improving the working conditions.
Table 5 shows that the FDGB had rarely been perceived as an 
agent of the workforce to counter the effects of 
intensification of work.l^O on the contrary, more than one 
third of the respondents rated the FDGB as the 'initiator' 
of such efforts. The great majority of the participating 
labour delegates in the author's sample described the FDGB 
as the agent and promoter of the decisions of the SED, 
which is confirmed by Hürtgen (1992, p.28). The responses 
of the workforce towards the FDGB were very reserved; often 
they did not distinguish between the FDGB and the SED^^l. 
In almost all interviews conducted with the East German 
labour delegates, the criticism centred on the issue that
159) Hof's analysis (1983, p.113) comes to the same 
conclusion.
160) The ratings of table 5 are in line with the 
research conducted by Stoll (1979, p.356), who 
described the FDGB as a 'long arm of plan 
fulfilment.'
161) Daubler and Klebe (1990, p.363-370) confirm this 
assessment in their research.
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all policy had been determined by 'those a b o v e . '1^2 
According to Popitz's West German research (1971, p.91), 
such reflexions represent 'late bourgeois consciousness,' a 
hint of the failure of the FDGB's socialist education 
efforts.
Table 5; The FDGB's influence on the intensification of 
work
Please tick the FDGB's influence 
of work according to 
Ratings
on the intensification 
these ratings. 
Frequency in per cent
'initiator' 35.5
'promoter of SED's decisions' 61.0
'agent of the workforce' 2.3
'no answer' 1.2
N = 402 100.0
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates.
The author's interviews with East German labour delegates 
uncovered some efforts by the rank-and-file to ask the BGL 
representatives to avoid the furtherance of shift w o r k . 1 ^ 3  
The local BGL members dismissed the argument that the 
introduction of shift work could erode family life by 
labelling the demand as 'anti-socialist sentiments.' In a
162) In his research Bust-Bartels (1980, p.87) reports the 
same sentiments of the workforce against the SED and 
the FDGB.
163) In 1986 the FDGB managed to recruit 35,000 people 
from the youth organization (FDJ) for shift work 
(Schneider 1988). The FDGB proclaimed and organized 
the trend towards shift work, despite contradictions 
within Marxist dogma and the deterioration of the 
social climate in society.
194
discussion with former BGL representatives they stated that 
often they did not report such demands of the workforce to 
the local FDGB or SED officer in order not to be blamed for 
the 'insufficient promotion of socialist ideology.'
Eckelmann et al. (1990, p.88) mention that the main reason 
for conflicts on the company level had been the behaviour 
of the directors, revealing a fundamental discrepancy 
between the objectives of the directors and the workforce. 
The FDGB explained this discrepancy of interests by the 
'neglect of political and ideological work' and not by 
insufficient participation (cf. FDGB Bundesvorstand 
22.10.1970). In the author's interview conducted with 
Grundmann, a former FDGB shop steward, she stated that FDGB 
shop stewards received a premium for each member of the 
workforce who participated in the annual ideological 
training sessions to avoid a discrepancy of interests 
between the stated objectives of the SED and the objectives 
of the workforce. After the end of the Cold War and 
intensified contacts with the West, the FDGB's impact on 
training changed from vocational to ideological, creating 
the 'School of Socialist Work' in 1972, and stressing the 
promotion of the prescribed 'socialist culture', further 
indicators for the insufficient ideological indoctrination. 
The author's interview revealed that the East German 
workers had been reluctant to sign up for those courses. 
According to Grundmann the rationale for the premium had 
been to encourage FDGB personnel to conduct the annual 
ideological training and to secure the participation of the
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main bulk of the workforce. The structure of the course 
consisted of specific^®^ lectures on Marxism/Leninism and 
predominantly on the dissemination of current Party 
doctrines, with subsequent review sessions. According to 
the author's interviews with East German labour delegates 
they considered the ideological training as a further 
attempt of the FDGB to strive for compliance on the 
shopfloor in favour of the management. Another reason for 
the stated dissatisfaction with former East German 
industrial relations of the East German labour delegates 
had been that from 1973 onwards even military training had 
been taught by the FDGB in close cooperation with the army. 
According to Gill (1990, p. 63) the military training 
within the FDGB put even more between the workforce and the 
FDGB.
Avoiding active participation by the workforce in the 
decision-making process, the East German directors managed 
to control the flow and kind of relevant information in the 
company. A striking feature of the flow of information was 
the existence of 'information filters' (Schunter-Kleemann 
1977, p.82), which can be interpreted according to Fox 
(1974, p.73) as avoidance of 'unrestricted communication.' 
It was argued that access to information had to be 
determined by the social stratum and role of a person in 
socialist society. The union representatives on the shop 
and company level hardly ever objected to this hierarchical
164) E.g. the courses did not contain the theory of Rosa 
Luxemburg, as she criticised one-party rule and 
the principle of democratic socialism.
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information policy. The feeling of not being informed on 
company policy led to low commitment in the operating 
industrial relations system. In the questionnaire conducted 
by the author with East German labour delegates the BGL's 
influence on workplace industrial relations was rated as 
'marginal' (cf. Table 6).
Table 6: The influence of BGL representatives on industrial 
relations
Please tick how much influence the BGL representatives 
had on industrial relations
Ratings of influence Frequency in per cent
no influence 
marginal influence 
little influence 
moderate influence 
some influence 
great influence 
no answer
9.4 
43.7 
30.9 
13.4
0.1
1.4 
1.1
N = 402 100.0
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates.
The most common reasons for those ratings are the ignorance 
shown by the FDGB and management and the anxiety of 
reprisals. Further interviews conducted by the author 
uncovered the fact that active and critical workforce 
representatives had to experience special 're-training 
sessions' directed by the FDGB in order to adjust them to 
the prevailing Party line. The duration of such 're- 
training-sessions' was about six months; workforce 
representatives who did not comply in the desired way after
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the training were imprisoned for two years and were denied 
training courses and job promotion within their companies. 
A further reason for these ratings above cannot solely be 
fear or the existence of information filters, but also the 
asymmetric training opportunities of the BGL members and 
management. The management had to attend courses at the 
Psychological Institute of the University of Jena dealing 
with concrete problems in the field of industrial 
relations, in order to acquire interpersonal skills to 
solve social conflicts to its own advantage (cf. Schunter- 
Kleemann 1977, p.85).
The tough control system of the FDGB on the one hand and 
the directors' behaviour on the other hand inhibited 
innovative movements on the company level. According to the 
SED, industrial relations at the workplace offered the 
essential vital opportunity for the socialist education 
process, to be achieved mainly by socialist competition. 
But the type of emulation applied consisted of an 
intensification of work^^S launched by the FDGB. The 
intensification of work had been launched by reducing the 
times per production unit allowed. The organization on the 
shopfloor was dominated by Taylorism, which had never been 
challenged by the u n i o n s . Qn the contrary, as already
165) For an extremely hypocrite description of the 
necessity to launch measures to intensify 
work by the unions cf. Brzoska (1978).
166) According to Bust-Bartels (1980, p.179) Taylorism 
had never been challenged, as it offered the 
possibility to control the workforce from 'outside of 
the plant.'
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mentioned in the case of extending shift work^^?, the FDGB 
sought to please the SED leadership even by overfulfilling 
the introduction of the intensification of work. According 
to the Party doctrine the worker, while a 'co-owner' of 
social property, was also an obedient executor, with his 
primary interest vested in an effective contribution to 
production, to plan fulfilment. The SED supposed its 
workforce to be, in a sense, an ideal Taylorian worker. The 
economists of the GDR did not concentrate on the 
development of the 'universal man', but their orientation 
had been determined by productivity and high utilisation of 
the capacity of the workforce and machinery. This produced 
a bureaucratic system creating the classes of the 
'commanders' and the 'receivers of instructions' (Bahro 
1977, p.148). These 'instructors' secured their system of 
exploitation by means of 'inorganic structures' such as 
transmission belts and control systems. The impact of the 
BGLs and the FDGB on training and development lagged far 
behind constitutional rights. In the author's interview 
conducted with Sivers, he reported that despite the fact 
that he had been a FDGB shop steward for more than 14 
years, his application to be admitted to the 'Meister' 
course was rejected by the FDGB and the Party with the 
argument that he was not a Party member. Hence a 
professional career was hardly conditioned by formal 
regulations, but rather by political obedience to 
supervisors and to patronage. According to the author's
167) Schneider (1988, p.77) emphasised that extending
shift work had caused a further deterioration in the 
social climate between labour representation and the 
workforce.
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interviews with former BGL shop stewards, the overriding 
criterion for promotions on the shopfloor and within the 
FDGB was 'perceived' loyalty towards the ruling Party. 
'Perceived' loyalty eroded the whole promotion system, 
favouring opportunism and nepotism instead of measurable 
endeavour and abilities. These promotion criteria isolated 
the workforce and placed them at a considerable distance 
from the top echelons in the industrial relations system.
The FDGB's department of organization, together with the 
STASI, had been responsible for planning and conducting the 
'working visits' of SED and FDGB leaders to companies. 
Intricate preparations were carried out to prevent the 
leadership from being asked undesired and unprepared 
questions by the workforce. The FDGB banned critical 
members of the workforce from the premises of the company 
during these 'working visits'. The goal of the preparations 
was to demonstrate the 'high s p i r i t s o f  the workforce. 
Interviews with East German labour delegates by the author 
confirmed that the workmates disliked these 'working 
visits'. Real problems were not discussed. Management, the 
STAS I and the FDGB concentrated on harmony of interests to 
please the SED's leadership. The ban on critical personnel 
was perceived by the workers as an attempt to undermine the 
solidarity of the small working groups, as the author's 
interviews with East German labour delegates revealed. The 
BGLs' and FDGB's unwillingness to discuss and tackle
168) Cf. FDGB Bundesvorstand (ed.), Abt. Organization
'Informationen über die Stimmungen und Meinungen von 
Werktâtigen zum Besuch des Vorsitzenden des FDGB, 
Harry Tisch, im VEB Plauener Spitze am 3.Juli 1987.'
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genuine insufficiencies within the industrial relations 
system did not foster the demonstration of the 'high 
spirits' of the East German workforce. On the contrary, it 
distanced the labour organization further from the rank- 
and-file.
The task of the BGL representatives on the company level 
was dominated by the reconciliation of disputes within the 
workforce, the allocation of holiday places, political 
education of the workforce, preparation of the massive 
statistical requirements of the FDGB, activation of the 
masses (e.g., socialist emulation, parades), and the 
control of security, kindergartens and canteens. The social 
benefits were selected and distributed by the FDGB to the 
public according to the 'utility of a person for socialist 
society' (Hedtkamp 1982, p.122). The Party's and FDGB's 
'utility' doctrine even made the provision of hospital 
places and urgent operations dependent on socialist 
criteria.169 Distinguishing between different personal 
'utility' levels caused especial resentment on the part of 
the critical and less productive workforce (Hedtkamp 1982, 
pp.122-123).
Assessing the devastating condition of pollution in the 
East German companies, we argue that the company and local 
unions bodies failed to secure or improve the qualitative 
living conditions of their workforces (cf. Table 7).
169) Cf. Wulffius (1982, p.157-158): the utility doctrine 
was determined by the preservation of the workforce.
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Table 7: The assessment of the monitoring of the statutory
safety standards bv the BGL
Please assess the BGL's monitoring of the statutory 
safety standards. Please tick.
Ratings frequency in per cent
excellent 1.0
good 9.3
satisfactory 19.8
poor 35.1
extremely poor 33.6
no answer 1.2
N = 402 100.0
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates.
Table 7 indicates that the vast majority of the labour 
delegates rated the monitoring efforts of the BGLs as poor 
or extremely poor.^^O assume that the BGLs often failed 
to exercise their statutory rights and to offer voice. 
Eckelmann (1990, p.121) reports that in the chemical 
industries more than 7,000 people had to work with a 
special licence because of extremely polluted and dangerous 
working conditions, without any resistance on the part of 
the FDGB. In the author's interview with Grundmann she 
stated: 'The greatest problem for us shop stewards was that 
a lot of written complaints were handed in. The workforce 
was dissatisfied with the working conditions. There was 
never any protective clothing or face guards. The written 
reports were never evaluated. They circulated within the
170) Thalheim's assessment (1982, p.93) of the monitoring 
efforts of the BGLs comes to the same conclusion, 
that these efforts were poor, in order not to 
interfere with the fulfilment of the plan.
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union organization. The reply always came from the Party. 
The trade union leadership never intervened. 
Environment protection issues, which represented a part of 
the bargaining claims of the DGB-affiliated unions (cf. Die 
Quelle 1990b, pp.10-11 and European Industrial Relations 
Review 10/1990, pp.21-22), were rarely stated and never 
implemented. Despite massive rights, the FDGB and its BGL 
failed to monitor the safety standards^^^ (Dichmann 1990, 
p.130).
In all interviews conducted by the author with the East 
German labour delegates they overwhelmingly expressed the 
view that with the exception of the company kindergarten 
and the cohesion of the small working groups there had been 
no commitment towards the low trust Stalinist transmission 
belt system operating in the GDR.
Summary
Referring to Fox's (1974, p.73) criterion of the low trust 
industrial relations which characterise the system 
operating in the former GDR, we must report that there was 
a system of severe control and even violence.
171) A similar assessment of the poor working conditions 
in the case of the metal industry is given by 
Linkersdorfer (1990 p.12)
172) Discussions on the inappropriate security standards in 
East Germany took place during the IGCPK's trade union 
congress. Participants stated that FDGB personnel 
manipulated reports, or did not report accidents on 
the company premises. The rationale had been to please 
the SED and avoid any changes on the company level.
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Especially June 17, 1953 disclosed that the FDGB was no
longer perceived as an agent of the workforce. The FDGB's 
policy was described as the long arm of the SED, and partly 
as the initiator of the intensification of work. The 
absence of voice, the Tayloristic working conditions, and 
the FDGB's permanent disposition to blame its membership 
for the shortcomings of the incumbent political and 
economic system caused distrust and even alienation (cf. 
Schmitz, Tiemann and Lohrlein 1991, p.70). As a result of 
the legacy of the low trust industrial relations system, 
the East German workforce adopted an anti-socialist 
attitude, causing a difficult situation especially for the 
West German activist trade unions, as they used socialist 
ideology as a means to inspire their militant rank-and- 
file. As socialism had been discredited in the GDR, a 
reconstruction strategy in the East by means of 
incorporation and upholding union cohesion by socialist 
ideology probably was not be a viable strategy.
As socialism had been discredited in the East, we predict 
that the existence of a high trust (neo-corporatist) and 
successful industrial relations system with trade unions 
acting as agents of their memberships was able to offer an 
attractive alternative to the East German workforce, 
generating a competitive advantage in favour of the West 
German trade unions.
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1.2. Implications of the strategies resulting from the one- 
wav convergence of East Germany towards the West German 
economic, political and social system
Introduction
The topic of this chapter is to demonstrate the competitive
advantage of the West German trade unions in comparison
with the FDGB, the FDGB affiliates or emerging trade
unionism in the former GDR, as the GDR was integrated
within the system of the FRG institutionally and 
politically. In principle, institutional integration was 
accomplished at one stroke when East Germany joined the FRG 
according to Article 23 of West Germany's Basic Law, 
thereby adopting West Germany's institutional system. 
Monetary integration was also realised at one stroke by 
extending the currency area of the DM to East Germany and 
by establishing the monetary authority of the Bundesbank in 
the former GDR.
This chapter is of importance, as it accounts for arguments 
in favour of a successful intervention of the West German 
trade unions in the GDR. The support of the West German 
unions was appreciated by the East German workforce. 
Despite the legacy of low trust, research has determined 
two intertwined factors that influenced the welcome of the 
West German trade unions by the East German workforce, 
namely;
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(i) The apprehension of the East German workforce triggered 
by the rapid change and their feeling of inexperience 
regarding the new West German system and
(ii) the attractiveness of the West German trade unions and 
industrial relations system in comparison with the FDGB and 
its inappropriate reconstruction efforts.
Now we will analyse the two features that generated a 
competitive advantage, and hence facilitated the successful 
West German intervention.
(i) Apprehensions of the East German workforce
The result of the ad hoc introduction of the West German 
system in the GDR meant a rise in the degree of uncertainty 
concerning their future (cf. Canibol 1990, p.18) for the 
majority of the East German population. Being used to a 
'quiet and organized life' controlled by the SED, the East 
German population was eager to reduce its uncertainty 
regarding an actually unknown system by the 
institutionalisation of exchanges within organizations 
(Froese 1990, p.7). The complexity and incompleteness of 
information at this time increased uncertainty. Accordingly 
the East German workforce wanted and expected a reduction 
of uncertainty and insecurity. In this state of mind they 
particularly appreciated the expertise of experienced and 
reliable agents and their organizations. Table 8 accounts 
for the three most important worries expressed in the
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political priorities of the East German population during 
the reconstruction period.
Table 8; The political priorities of the East German 
population in 1990
Political priorities Frequency in per cent
Social security 92
Employment 85
Independent trade unions 64
Source: Feist (1990), 'Votum für einen konservativen
Modernisierungskurs,' p.240.
Social security had been rated as the dominant objective in 
the process of reunification when the East German workforce 
experienced the first dismissals. The author's interviews 
with East German labour delegates revealed that social 
security was viewed as a precondition to ease the impact of 
unemployment triggered by the structural change in the 
former GDR and the introduction of the monetary union. 
Appendix no. 10 illustrates the rise of unemployment and 
short-time working as one of the most dominant worries of 
the East German population. The author's interviews with 
East German labour delegates revealed that unemployment 
would cause a loss in income and status, but especially it 
would destroy the collective solidarity of the small groups 
of w o r k e r s . 173 small working groups' solidarity had
173) Despite the break-up of the informal network, newly 
released research (VoDkamp and Wittke 1991, Kern and 
Land 1991) states that the process of the 
disintegration the East German system took place 
virtually without major resistance from the 
workforce.
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been viewed as a means of overcoming uncomfortable 
political pressures of the SED and FDGB. Any erosion in 
inter-labour relations caused uncertainty.
In the author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates the fears shaped by the East German 
workforce were above all the rise of unemployment, short- 
time working and privatisation, which could weaken labour 
representation and improve management's 'right to manage.' 
Given such conditions, the workers would be less able to 
resist the introduction of more technology and more 
flexible working practices. In the author's interviews
conducted with East German labour delegates the management 
buy-outs were treated with suspicion. Fear of the impacts 
of privatisation and buy-outs^?* by the old discredited
management enhanced the desire for a strong and experienced 
body of labour representation in order to counter the 'new' 
management's prerogatives^According to the author's 
questionnaire conducted with East German labour delegates, 
the desire for 'independent trade unions' (cf. Table 8) is 
partly explained by the legacy of low trust and partly in 
terms of defending the interests of the workforce, so that 
the workers would not be at the 'mercy of the high-handed
company bosses.' The monitoring influence of the works
councils and of an independent trade union have been viewed
174) The old East German managers proved to be extremely 
active in the privatisation process. Until June 1992 
the Treuhand realised 1350 management buy-outs 
(Sonntag Aktuell 21.6.1992, p.2)
175) An indicator of management's increased right to 
manage had been especially the dismissals of young 
and critical apprentices (cf. Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung, 11.10.1990, p.586).
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as a means to counter increasing management's prerogatives. 
Thus the East German workforce has realised that the 
training of works councillors is vital. As these training 
courses have been supplied by the experienced West German 
trade unions, their influence upon the East German labour 
delegates improved significantly. The support and 
solidarity offered by the West German unions had been 
extremely well perceived by the labour delegates and 
workforcel^G, They often reciprocated by requesting an 
intervention of the Western unions in the former GDR.
If issue of German reunification turned out to be extremely 
complex and unique, the outcome for the East German 
population has been all the more uncertain. The complexity 
in the environmental change during the reconstruction 
process has been enormous for the East German workforce, as 
labour delegates explained in the author's interviews. The 
uncertainty about the future arose as a consequence both of 
the complexity of the problems to be solved and of the 
problem-solving abilities possessed by the inexperienced 
East German workforce. The uncertainties or worries arise 
from incomplete information of the FDGB and the East German 
workforce. In the author's interview of with Mr. Ernst the 
latter stated that in many East German companies the 
introduction of works councils had been invalid and 
illegal, as the East German workforce did not understand
176) The appreciation of legal representation in the case 
of dismissals and bargaining on severance pay 
improved the attraction and the belief in the 
capacity of the West German unions as an agent of the 
workforce.
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the statutory provisions of the Works Constitutions Act^??. 
Given that example, the complexity of West German 
industrial relations, with the enormous extent of 
juridification, has caused extreme forms of dependence by 
the East German workforce on the expertise of the West 
German unions. The expectations of the East German 
workforce concerning reduction of the impact of uncertainty 
rested predominantly on the West German trade unions. 
Because of the new, never-experienced dynamic environment 
and the inadequate problem-solving mechanisms, the worries 
of the East German workforce became a motor for the process 
of incorporating the Eastern workforce within the West 
German unions. An indicator of the reliance on the problem­
solving capacity of the West German trade unions is the 
virtual absence of grass root unioni s m ^ i n the former 
GDR. In the author's interviews conducted with East German 
labour delegates the explanation given for the absence of 
grass root unionism has been the problem-solving capacity 
of the West German trade unions, as well as the fact that 
few workers had any experience of organising themselves.
The criterion for belief in the problem-solving capacity of 
the West German trade unions has been their record in 
improving the working and living conditions of the West 
German workforce. This result was confirmed by the European
177) Especially the East German workforce did not stick to 
the § 9 BetrVG, which determined the number of works 
councillors.
178) The Initiative zur Gründung unabhângiger Gewerk- 
schaften (lUG) called for the formation of basic 
groups within the plants in order to found an 
independent trade union in Spring 1990.
210
Industrial Relations Review (9/1991, p.6), as studies
carried out with the East German workforce revealed that 
the East German workforce described the West German trade 
unions as a 'hope factor'. Thus we predict a certain
attraction to the West German trade unions by the East 
German workforce.
fiil Attractiveness of the West German trade unions and 
insufficient reformability of the FDGB
The attraction to the West German trade unions results from 
the dissatisfaction with the former East German industrial 
relations system and the insufficient reformability of the 
FDGB. First we wish to analyse the attractiveness of the 
West German trade unions. Therefore we will refer to equity 
theory. The disillusionment with former East German 
industrial relations and its agent, the FDGB, was based on
individual comparisons of the East German workforce with
the West German working and living standards. According to 
Leventhal (1980, p.28), equity theory employs a 
unidimensional concept of justice. The theory assumes that 
an individual judges the fairness of his own or others' 
rewards solely in terms of a merit principle. Fairness 
exists when rewards are in proportion to contributions^^^. 
The equity theory proposes that in an interpersonal 
exchange (East - West), individuals (especially the East
179) In some discussions with East German workers the 
difference in productivity between East and West 
Germany was not an important criterion for 
determining different rewards. The criteria most 
often applied for the assessment were the working 
conditions and the working time.
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German workforce) are concerned with the ratio of the 
perceived value of outcomes (e.g., income) to inputs
(labour supply), and that they consider themselves to be 
fairly treated when the ratio is the same in their job as 
they perceive it to be elsewhere (West Germany). The 
author's interviews with East German workers during the
reconstruction period often unveiled statements like that: 
'I have worked for 28 years and for what? During that
period a colleague in West Germany could afford to buy his 
third new car.' The perception of the situation by the East 
German workforce has been strongly determined by severe 
disappointment with the former industrial relations system, 
especially the FDGB, and sentiments of 'betrayal and 
exploitation' by the SED-system^®®. Analysing the statement 
above, we can say that the East German workforce realised a 
comparative^®! unfairness in remuneration in relation to 
their West German colleagues. Table 9 accounts for
arguments stated in the questionnaire by East German labour 
delegates to support this view of unfairness.
180) This answer is in line with Bahro (1977, p.156), who 
described the State as playing the role of an 
exploiter and Hiirtgen (1992, p.29), who wrote that 
strike actions by the rank-and-file took place 
because of the 'high life that the union officials 
had been living at the expense of the workers.'
181) In almost all cases the comparison took place on an 
individual assessment of East German remuneration 
packages with those of the FRG.
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Table 9 : The fairness of the former East German
remuneration in comparison with the remuneration of a West 
German colleague
Please compare the fairness of former East German 
remuneration in comparison with the remuneration of a 
West German colleague. Please tick.
Sentiments Frequency in per cent
fair 8.3
somewhat fair 28.6
unfair 57.0
no answer 6.1
N = 402 100.0
Source; Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates
In subsequent interviews conducted by the author the 
ratings above referred predominantly to the amount of the 
monthly income and the much better working conditions of 
the West German colleagues. Overall, the vast majority of 
the East German workforce felt that the level of payment 
was unfair for their job. In line with this assessment is 
Thalheim's (1982, pp.94-96) comparison of income and 
benefits between the FRG and GDR. Heym (1990, p.4) also 
reports that the 'mood of the of the workforce changed in 
the direction of hatred (of East German institutions); 
derived from frustration' caused by perception of 
unfairness and exploitation. The corollary has been that 
'the hatred was directed against Communism and especially 
against its delegates' (Heym 1990, p.4). We have seen from 
the equity theory that the perception of the relation of
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input of labour supply to the wages received was assessed 
as unfair in comparison with the West. Thus we predict a 
certain attraction to the West German trade unions, in 
order to insure that this ratio is brought in line with 
what the East German workforce perceives. Thus the West 
German trade unions were viewed as a means to restore 
fairness and thus equalise the working and living 
conditions in a united Germany. To verify the data obtained 
by the East German labour delegates we refer to Kern and 
Land (1991), who reported that the East German workers 
expected the West German industrial relations system to 
provide a fairer system.
The perception that they had been treated unfairly as well 
as the legacy of low trust caused severe disillusionment 
and hatred against the FDGB (Heym 1990, p.4). This alone
explains why the East German workforce did not follow its
former peak organization. East German workers felt strongly 
during the transition period that the FDGB did not possess 
sufficient reformability. After the collapse of the SED- 
system massive^®^ and constant revelation of scandals^®® 
within the FDGB took place (cf. Der Spiegel 28.1.1991,
pp.89-90). The unveiling of the FDGB leadership's
corruptibility and high-handed behaviour caused a severe 
loss of trust in the FDGB's leadership (Table 10).
182) After Tisch resigned, 2,000,000 Ost-Marks were 
found in a FDGB safe. Also, the old leadership 
fraudulently took 100,000,000 Ost-Marks from the 
solidarity fund in order to finance the FDJ.
183) FDGB leaders had used funds carried on the books as 
subway works expenses and subway personnel to build 
themselves houses (cf. Die Quelle 1990a, p.7).
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Table 10: The dimension of trust in the FDGB leadership 
during the reconstruction period^
Please classify your dimension of trust in FDGB's 
leadership during the reconstruction period. Please tick. 
Classification Frequency in per cent
'trustworthy' 2.3
'no answer' 3.5
'untrustworthy' 94.2
N = 402 100.0
Source; Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates
Instead of working off its past and the scandals, the newly 
elected leadership of the FDGB tried to generate a new 
organizational profile by opposing the East German 
government (cf. Pirker et al. 1990, p.25). According to 
Wilke and Müller (1990, p.43), the plan was to present the 
FDGB as an aggressive and maximalist lobby of the workforce 
and, hence, perceivable as indispensable. Opposing 
government, however, as the FDGB did, caused massive 
protest from the company directors fearing an erosion in 
the principle of individual management. Some directors 
started to prevent the FDGB representatives from organising 
meetings on the company premises and refused to remunerate 
the company's FDGB representatives. In order to counter 
management, the FDGB's leadership massively demanded a
184) To underscore the validity of the data it is possible 
to refer to Wilke's assessment (1990, p.366) of the 
level of trust in the FDGB: 'In its previous form, 
the umbrella organization can no longer meet the 
challenges of the day. The FDGB remains politically 
discredited.'
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trade union bill to secure its position. Demands for 
special protection of union officials and monopolistic 
privileges for the BGLs were the common theme running 
through everything published by the FDGB (cf. Tribüne 
18.12.1989). When the SED could no longer guarantee the 
FDGB's monopoly position, the task fell to the state. The 
FDGB officials' call for state protection via a trade union 
bill ignored the interests of the union members (Wilke 
1990, p.369). The FDGB could not realise that the future 
strength of a union rested on members voluntarily joining 
the union. With reference to the demands of a trade union 
bill, Daubler (1990, p.357) described the FDGB 
representatives as people 'without any ability and 
willingness to learn' from the discontent of the 
membership. On 20 February 1990 the FDGB faction within the 
still Communist-controlled Volkskammer introduced the trade 
union bill, which was enticing: It prohibited lockouts, and 
granted extensive company veto rights as well as the right 
to call a strike (cf. Nagele 1990). Wilke and Müller (1990, 
p.43) argue that the FDGB leadership's temptation was to 
secure its representational monopoly, to speak in the name 
of the whole workforce.
The dominance and claim to power of the FDGB was severely 
challenged by the emergence of independent and spontaneous 
works councils. The FDGB's organizational reform plan could 
only function if the organizational basis was not 
obstructed. However, the works councils emerged where the 
entanglement of the BGL, FDGB and SED had been close. Not
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implementing works councils^®^ was perceived by the 
workforce as the continuation of the former low trust 
industrial relations and a policy determined by 'above.' 
The workforce viewed the works council as an important 
means to counter the threats of the transition period and 
as a forum to exercise 'voice' for the first time (cf. 
Table 11).
Table 11: The East German labour delegates' preference
regarding the tvoe of codetermination
Which type of codetermination do you prefer? Please tick.
Type of codetermination Frequency in per cent
Works councils 85.5
Other forms 7.3
BGLs 6.1
No answer 1.1
N = 402 100.0
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates.
The author's interviews for this rating in favour of works 
councils revealed that setting up such a body was meant to 
challenge^GS and break the industrial relations system 
imposed by the FDGB and SED and at the same time enhance 
self-determination on the part of the rank-and-file.
185) The FDGB's officers estimated trade union density to 
be higher than in the case of works councils. The 
calculations of the FDGB's personnel was that BGLs 
offer a more preferable forum for political agitation 
than the distanced and independent works councils.
186) Not tackling the most burning interest, namely 
whether or not to operate with works councils or 
BGLs caused emerging protest and later the 
introduction of works councils by the workforce.
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Realising the voice effect of works councils triggered a 
spontaneous movement^that spread quickly over the GDR, 
replacing the BGLs. This eroded the FDGB's monopoly on the 
company level, and lockouts of the FDGB representatives 
from the company premises by the workforce were reported 
(Die Mitbestimmung 1990a, p.135). Access was permitted to 
the members of the industrial unions as well as the West 
German trade unions. The lockouts of FDGB personnel from 
the premises represented extreme dissatisfaction with its 
paternalistic policy and the way it had ignored the will of 
the East German workforce. Hiirtgen (1992, p.28) described 
the behaviour of the East German workforce thus: 'they
demonstrated no loyalty to the union; they distanced 
themselves.' Since it did not foster any attempt for a 
reconstruction from below, the vast majority of the East 
German labour delegates rated the FDGB leadership's 
willingness to conduct reforms as weak or non-existent (cf. 
table 12).
Arguments for the ratings of Table 12 (page 218) were, 
according to the author's questionnaire conducted with East 
German labour delegates: the FDGB's permanent tutelage (no 
reconstruction from below) of the workforce, the constant 
efforts by its leadership and FDGB personnel to protect 
their position, and especially the unresponsiveness towards 
the demands of the workforce and inexperience with the new 
system. The FDGB's policy of challenging the newly elected
187) Pirker (1990, p.68) gives an interesting abstract of 
the process of introducing works councils in the 
former GDR.
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government in East Germany proved its inexperience and 
incapacity to solve the problems, according to the author's 
interviews conducted with labour delegates. Organising 
rallies together with the PDS, formally the SED, in order 
to put pressure on the democratically elected Volkskammer, 
offered the FDGB a platform from which it agitated against 
the voter's choice. The alliance with the PDS/SED and the 
attempt to put pressure on the government with unacceptable 
demands caused the new government to exclude the FDGB as a 
partner for further consultation (Hertel and Weinert 1990, 
p.960). In contrast to other East European countries (e.g. 
Poland) at no time during the reconstruction process was 
the FDGB able to influence the government or other 
movements in political terms. The explanation can be seen 
in the fact that the former opposition (Neues Forum, 
Biindnis 90) in the GDR did not acknowledge the FDGB as a 
forum of political activities.
Table 12; The FDGB's reformability during the transition 
period
Please indicate FDGB's willingness to conduct reforms 
during the transition period. Please tick.
Willingness to conduct reforms Frequency in per cent
strong willingness 2.1
intermediate willingness 5.7
weak willingness 42,5
unwillingness 46.6
no answer 3.1
N = 402 100.0
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates
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Despite the banning of the FDGB personnel from the premises 
of companies and the establishment of works councils, we 
have to consider further indicators of the dissatisfaction 
of the East German workforce with the FDGB. Developments in 
the membership indicate this state of dissatisfaction. 
Within the first three months after the break-up of the 
GDR, 983,000 members left the ranks, or more than 10 per 
cent. Lecher (1990, p.320) called it 'astonishing' that 
only ten per cent of the membership left the FDGB within 
the first three months. Interviews conducted by the author 
with East German labour delegates revealed that the 
remaining high density did not indicate loyalty towards the 
FDGB, but rather that until this time the FDGB administered 
the social system (pensions) as well as the reservation of 
holiday places. This proved to be an institutional barrier 
to leaving for the East German workforce (cf. selective 
incentive). Thus we argue that the persistently high union 
density in the GDR was not an indicator of attachment. 
Bialas and Ettl (1993, p.73) point out that the legacy of 
low trust generated suspicion and disillusionment on the 
part of the East German population towards East German 
organizations. A feature of the weak attachment of the East 
German workforce was that about one third refused to pay 
their dues, others only paid the minimum of 0.5 Ost- 
Marks^®®, others froze their dues in blocked accounts or 
even barred^®^ the FDGB from collection (Die Quelle 1990h,
188) Interviews revealed that these payments had been 
effected in order to qualify for entitlement to a 
subsidised holiday place.
189) According to Hertle and Hemmer (1990, p.659), by 
May 1990 more than sixty per cent of the workforce 
were barring their dues.
220
pp.11-12). As a result, the FDGB did not have access to a 
large share of membership funds.
Quite early on, the affiliated trade unions of the FDGB 
realised the dissatisfaction with the peak federation and 
therefore demanded autonomy, especially in financial 
affairs. This demand meant the radical transformation of a 
centralised oligarchic mass organization comprising 
independent trade unions, thus causing the disintegration 
of the authority of the FDGB's executives and a financial 
disruption in the FDGB's position. At the FDGB's congress 
the member unions decided to eliminate the hegemony of the 
FDGB and received full autonomy. Realising that the free 
elections in the GDR would change the economic structure of 
the GDR, the East German trade unions became active in 
signing collective agreements. During the conduct of 
collective bargaining actually all the West German DGB 
member unions supported the East German sister 
organizations.
A number of factors combined to topple the FDGB. Populism 
and demagogy had been substituted for labour union policy; 
the problem-solving capacity was inadequate; the FDGB made 
declarations without consultation; and absolutely 
unrealistic demands were on the agenda. The split between 
the FDGB and its affiliates accelerated further. 
Introducing the West German social market economy in the 
GDR not only meant freedom of trade, but also wage autonomy 
and adoption of the substantive and procedural rules of the
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West German industrial relations system. Most of the West 
German unions were or had been actively seeking to 
cooperate with their East German partner. Apparently the 
FDGB leadership did not realise the extent to which this 
cooperation threatened its organizational security and thus 
its existence (cf. Wilke 1990, p.371). The DGB and its 
affiliates kept a clear distance from the FDGB, but engaged 
in cooperation with the FDGB single unions. In mid-April 
1990 the DGB publicly proclaimed that the FDGB no longer 
had the support of the workers in the East German 
enterprises.
The FDGB affiliates held central conferences of delegates 
to elect boards with democratic legitimation and to decide 
on their next tasks. They were generally assisted by the 
corresponding DGB union. In April 1990 the East German 
Miners' union declared the goal of achieving trade union 
unity with IG Bergbau und Energie under the umbrella 
organization of the DGB. The finale for the FDGB began in 
April 1990, when the affiliated unions demanded the 
immediate disclosure of finances and union assets. They 
also reduced their payments to the umbrella organization 
and threatened to take active steps to dissolve the FDGB 
and its union assets for the benefit of the affiliates.
Under this severe pressure the FDGB's executives tried to 
provoke the newly elected government by presenting a list 
of excessive demands, and to ensure its survival by calling 
for a mass demonstration. The demands, which were made
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without contacting the member unions before, proved to be 
completely irresponsible^^®. IG Bergbau und Energie 
suspended its membership in the FDGB, denied the FDGB the 
right to make statements in its name in the future, and 
called all other member unions to take the same position, 
and if necessary to prepare an extraordinary congress for 
the purpose of dissolving the FDGB (Wilke 1990, p.372). The 
accelerated discrepancy between the FDGB and its member 
unions resulted in an emancipation on the part of its
individual unions, achieved with the cooperation and
experience of the DGB trade unions. The Western support for 
the East German unions meant that the FDGB was no longer 
indispensable. In May 1990 the remaining trade unions 
within the FDGB decided to call an extraordinary congress 
in autumn to dissolve the FDGB^®^ (Deutschlandarchiv 1990, 
p.90). The decision to dissolve the FDGB was not difficult 
to take, as Junge^®^ explained in an interview with the 
author explained. The reason was that the expectations of 
the East German workforce rested on the West German trade 
unions' experience, and by this time the FDGB had lost its
entire credibility as a result of its inappropriate and
policy.
190) The FDGB's leadership demanded the immediate 
introduction of a 38-hour week and wage increases of 
50 per cent (Stuttgarter Zeitung 8.5.1990, p.l).
191) The decision to dissolve the FDGB had been fostered 
by the DGB affiliates, and it was 'recommended' to 
the FDGB's affiliates to take this action 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung 10.5.1990, p.3).
192) Junge was the IGCGK's executive during the 
transition period, and since 1991 he has been a 
member of the IGCPK's executive board.
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Summary
This chapter explains the factors which provided a 
comparative advantage for the West German trade unions 
during the reconstruction period; the residual fear of the 
old East German command and control system, the 
attractiveness of the West German unions, and the profound 
dissatisfaction with the FDGB.
The East German workforce felt insecure, which caused them 
to welcome the West German unions as the agents who could 
bring equal working and living conditions soonest. The 
feeling of betrayal and exploitation by the FDGB and its 
representatives, as well as the leadership's incapacity to 
act as an agent of the workforce, resulted in a situation 
of virtually no commitment to the FDGB. This absence of 
loyalty towards the FDGB by the East German workforce shows 
that a strategy of collusion between the West German unions 
and the FDGB was not viable for the DGB trade unions.
Thus the intervention in the East seems to have been based 
on solid ground, especially as the East German workforce 
expected that the attractive West German unions would be 
able to reduce insecurity, and offer voice and equal 
working and living conditions. As the East German workforce 
demanded the West German living standards, the strategy of 
incorporating the East German workforce within the 
encompassing West German union body would be able to secure 
neo-corporatism and thus the cohesion of the union.
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III. Comparison of applied trade union strategies
The subject of the subsequent chapters is an analysis of 
the different reconstruction strategies of the IGCPK and 
the IGM(W). The analysis follows the chronological order of 
the events and the various strategies which the unions' 
applied to rebuild free labour representation in former 
East Germany.
The last chapter compares the different approaches taken by 
the IGCPK and the IGM(W) in so far as the results can 
confirm the hypothesis set out for the reconstruction of 
labour representation.
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1.1. IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik (IGCPK); Unification in 
accordance with West German conditions
(i) Introduction
Comparing the various strategies of all DGB affiliates 
aimed at trade union unity, one has to point out that the 
IGCPK pursued the most determined strategy, based on social 
partnership and in accordance with the values of the West 
German constitution (Wilke and Müller 1991, p.128).
The reason for this strategy was based on the IGCPK 
leadership's firm determination to protect its 
organizational survival by the avoidance of an erosion in 
the provision of collective goods to its membership. The 
objectives of the IGCPK's leadership in the case of 
reconstruction were to continue successfully exercising 
their industrial relations climate of social partnership, 
thus securing organizational success and stability within 
the industrial relations system of the FRG. The application 
of social partnership has been the corollary, as the IGCPK 
lacks organizational strength on the shopfloor.
(ii) The IGCPK unification strategy
Before it had any hint of the forthcoming break-up of the 
SED-system in the GDR, the IGCPK passed its basic paper^^S 
in June 1989. The theme running through this programme
193) IGCPK (1989), Einig im Ziel.
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emphasised (Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 4/1989, p.l) that the 
'basis of our union policy has been the conviction that the 
democratic and social constitutional state is an 
inalienable prerequisite for the development of free trade 
union work and solidaristic coexistence.' In comparison 
with some other DGB trade unions, this maxim meant that the 
IGCPK had a profound and generally accepted starting point, 
which was to demand and support the démocratisation process 
in the GDR. The firm demand for démocratisation and support 
of democratic forces in the GDR had been one of the basic 
objectives for reconstruction of labour representation.
Concerning the forthcoming developments in the GDR, the 
IGCPK's chairman Rappe stated (presse-dienst 14.12.1989) 
that it would be necessary to undertake a complete change 
and that there was no chance of survival with the 'rotten 
remainder of the old corrupt and suppressive' East German 
dictatorial system. Thus free elections were necessary to 
form a new government. According to the IGCPK's chairman 
(presse-dienst 14.12.1989, p.2), 'each change in the GDR's 
economic order towards the direction of market economic 
structures and concepts has to take place with social 
priorities and with social protection. This is why free 
trade unions are a prerequisite. If there is a desire for a 
social market economy it will be necessary to have a free 
and powerful trade union movement.' Regarding the East 
German transmission belt industrial relations system, Rappe 
distanced his organization from the FDGB. He offered 
support solely to the East German 'colleagues.' The
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analysis of various IGCPK documents shows that its 
leadership regarded the whole East German system, and 
especially the SED and FDGB with suspicion.
Quite early, in fact as soon as December 1989, the IGCPK's 
leadership made it plain that the démocratisation process 
launched in the GDR would inevitably flow sooner or later, 
due to the political reunification efforts, in the 
direction of trade union unity. According to Rappe (presse- 
dienst 14.12.1989, p.2), when the IGCPK offered 'solidarity 
and support for the reconstruction of free and powerful 
trade unions in East Germany, then I am thinking some years 
ahead. I would like to help to prepare a trade union 
movement in the GDR that some time in the future can unite 
with a trade union with our character and self-evidence.' 
Rappe also distanced the IGCPK as an organization from the 
current debate within the DGB launched by the activist wing 
to protect 'socialist achievements' and prepare the GDR for 
a 'third path'^94 experiment. The IGCPK's clear distance 
from the FDGB and the condemnation of low trust industrial 
relations improved the IGCPK's credibility with the East 
German workforce. The author's interviews with West German 
IGCPK members confirmed that the firm stance of the IGCPK's 
leadership also assured the concerned West German 
membership and also the West German employers that an 
important part of the IGCPK's strategy was the continuation 
of social partnership.
194) For the discussion of the third way and democratic 
socialism approach within the DGB's affiliate unions 
cf. von Beyme (1990) and Die Zeit (9.2.1990, pp.37- 
44).
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When considering the IGCPK's early offer of support 
combined with the stated objective of uniting with a 
reformed East German union, we have to assess the reasons 
for this behaviour. Thus we refer to the results of the 
author's questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's 
leadership. The objectives of the IGCPK's leadership in the 
reconstruction process fell into two categories, first the 
protection of neo-corporatism by incorporating a reformed 
East German union (exchange relationship) and second, the 
exercise of solidarity with the East German workforce 
(diffuse exchange relationship). Having established the 
objectives for an exchange relationship and solidarity, we 
have to assess their causes. We will start by referring to 
the exchange relationship aspect, and test the objectives 
which determined the intervention.
(a) The protection of neo-corooratism
The protection of neo-corporatism was based on the 
apprehensiveness of the IGCPK leadership and West German 
membership (cf. appendix no. 11 and petitions of IGCPK's 
West German membership for IGCPK's 14th ordinary congress) 
about the effects stemming from the disintegration of the 
GDR. The author's questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's 
leadership centred on the threats stemming from the East, 
which had been that the disintegration of the GDR might 
cause the following results:
- the loss of a unionised sector and emerging non-unionism,
- the emergence of grass root unionism or multiunionism.
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- the revival of the FDGB,
- the influx of the East German workforce into West
Germany.195
All the features enumerated above would have likely 
repercussions on the future conduct of social partnership 
by the IGCPK, and could undermine the IGCPK's 
organizational strength. The loss of a unionised sector 
might attract some West German employers to invest in the 
GDR. The influx of a skilled workforce from East Germany 
could account for a rise in the elasticity of the West 
German labour s u p p l y ! 95^  The emergence of multiunionism and 
a revival of the FDGB could interfere with upholding the 
virtual representational monopoly in German industrial 
relations, a vital precondition for the subsequent 
application of neo-corporatism. All of these worrisome 
features could trigger undercutting behaviour by the East 
German actors, and thus cause damage to social partnership 
and on the IGCPK's organizational strength. The response by 
the IGCPK's leadership focused predominantly on the 
protection of neo-corporatism, as its success had rested 
mainly on the provision of collective benefits (a good 
Okun-index). Thus the protection of the near- 
representational monopoly was identified as a means to
195) To confirm these threats we refer to: Breit (1990) in 
Der Gewerkschafter (5a/1990) pp.4-7. Protection from 
further deregulations was also a stated objective.
196) Cf. Mersmann (1990,p.6): 'The apprehension, that the 
GDR or the area of the GDR, will become a "cheap 
wage country" will have to be perceived as a 
challenge to the unitary union.' An illustration of 
the inelastic nature of the German labour supply is 
given in Elliott (1991), p.18.
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secure an erosion in neo-corporatism. If the IGCPK could 
sustain alliance and predictable industrial relations with 
its growth, this might secure the organizational 
encompassiveness of the union. Trade union competition in 
the membership or employer market, trade union coexistence, 
decentralisation or deregulation might divide the workforce 
and cause divisive conditions in the plants. The plant- 
specific differences might cause conflict within the union 
and might limit centralised collective bargaining, with 
adverse repercussions on the cohesion of the IGCPK.
An evaluation of the situation is given by M e r s m a n n ^ ^ ?  
(1990, p.6): 'two competing organizations in one industrial
area cannot solve the future tasks.' In an interview
conducted by the author with Mersmann the 'future tasks' of 
the IGCPK consisted in the continuation of social 
partnership with the employers as well as the enhancement 
of white-collar membership. Mersmann's answers confirm the 
belief in a virtuous circle in the related markets if IGCPK 
were to be able to uphold its near-monopoly status in union 
representation.
In interviews conducted with the author, the IGCPK's
leadership and union officers, referring to the existing 
East-West wage gap ('the GDR is a cheap wage country'), 
assessed it as a potential erosion of the IGCPK's
successful activities, which had for a long time rested on
197) Mersmann had been the personal assistant of IGCPK's 
chairman Rappe during the reconstruction period and 
signed accountable for the determination and 
implementation of IGCPK's reunification strategy.
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the provision of collective goods. To confirm this 
assessment we refer to Mettke^^® (Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 
2/1990, pp.4-5), who argued that the impact of the wage gap 
can cause a deregulated bargaining system' which 'will lead 
to the end of a predictable, reasonable and responsible 
bargaining policy. The deregulations can lead to the 
dispersal of the workforce and thus to a weakening of the 
unions. The diverging conditions in the companies could 
cause harsh conflicts.' Company-specific regulations could 
impede national and centralised collective bargaining, with 
harmful repercussions on the union's attractiveness. Thus 
Mettke (1990, p.5) emphasised that employers and unions 
could no longer pursue 'the path of common basic 
interests', such as a good Okun-index, a threat in the form 
of rent-seeking behaviour to the bargaining system of 
industry-wide regulation of wages.
The opinions and evaluations of the IGCPK's officials of 
the unification situation reported here confirm the 
author's prediction that its leadership was interested in a 
rather stable solution shaped by centralised collective 
bargaining and virtual single union status. The next step 
in the analysis is to test to what extent the IGCPK 
membership were willing to define their interests in 
collective terms, as this strongly determines the 
attractiveness and cohesion of an encompassing trade union 
with a weak shopfloor. Before we assess the willingness of
198) Mettke had been the e^ert on collective bargaining 
on the IGCPK's executive board until his death in 
1990.
232
the IGCPK's membership to define interests in collective 
terms we have to raise the question of how they define the 
economic outcome of the IGCPK's conduct of social 
partnership (cf. Table 13).
Table 13: The economic effects of social partnership
What is the outcome of social partnership? Please tick. 
Ratings Frequency in per cent
low inflation 5.5
low strike record 6.7
low unemployment record 3.6
comparatively high wages 22.4
combination of high wages, low inflation, 
low strike record, low unemployment record 59.3
no answer 2.5
N = 165 100.0
Source; Author's questionnaire conducted with West German 
IGCPK members
Table 13 indicates that the great majority of the 
respondents said they were aware of the economic results of 
the application of neo-corporatism in the chemical 
industry. Further evidence of the outcome of social 
partnership and its effects on union cohesion is given by 
Die Tageszeitung (25.6.1991) and Mettke (1990, p.5). Die 
Tageszeitung (25.6.1991) described the IGCPK's 
determination to pursue social partnership successfully as 
the IGCPK's 'unitary doctrine.' Mettke (1990, p.5) outlined 
that combining different interests of a heterogeneous 
membership is the 'precondition to taking over 
responsibility for the conduct of collective bargaining' 
which can trigger positive results for the whole workforce.
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Mettke (1990, p.5) dismissed 'conducting any bargaining 
policy in favour of one group.'
The results of Table 13 confirm that the IGCPK's membership 
was aware of the economic effects of social partnership. 
The IGCPK's 'unitary doctrine' (Die Tageszeitung 25.6.1991) 
and Mettke's assessment confirm the author's prediction 
that the IGCPK leadership was using the integrative force 
of defining interests in collective terms in sustaining 
organizational cohesion. The IGCPK leadership's decision to 
protect the collective goods and thus the cohesion by an 
appropriate strategy can be derived from its leadership's 
strong incentive to secure its position, which implies 
acting as its membership's agent. If we assume that the 
IGCPK's leadership was acting on behalf of its membership, 
the subsequent step in the analysis is to test the 
membership's willingness to continue with social 
partnership and thus to protect the good Okun-index.
To support the argument of protecting the public good 
r e s u l t s ^ o f  collective bargaining, we can refer to the 
IGCPK membership's motions passed at the ordinary congress 
1991 (cf. Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 2/1991, pp.6-10) 
supporting continuation with the positive economic effects 
stemming from the conduct of social partnership.^00 Table
199) Mettke (1990, p.5) called on 'conservative and 
economically liberal politicians' to ponder about the 
positive macroeconomic outcome of centralised 
collective bargaining.
200) The same argument is mentioned in Hannoversche 
Zeitung (22.6.1991).
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14 provides further evidence of the IGCPK membership's 
appreciation of a continuation of social partnership.
Table 14: The desirabilitv of the continuation of social 
partnership
Regarding the experience and economic outcomes of 
social partnership, continuation is (please tick): 
Ratings Frequency in per cent
desirable 70.9
partly desirable 13.9
undecided 4.8
undesirable 8.5
no answer 1.9
N = 165 100.0
Source; Author's questionnaire conducted with West German 
IGCPK members
Accustomed to the benefits of social partnership, most of 
the IGCPK members defined their interests in collective 
terms^Ol (presse-dienst 20.2.1990, p.2: high productivity, 
extremely low strike record, low unemployment and high 
wages in the chemical industry). Any stoppage in the 
provision of collective benefits might cause damage to 
IGCPK's attractiveness for its members and thus to its 
encompassiveness. Combining Table 13 with the results of 
Table 14 the highest approval of the pursuit of social 
partnership came from the group of respondents who defined 
the outcome in the terms of a good Okun-index.
201) In the author's interview an IGCPK officer defined 
'interest' in collective terms as an important 
'common denominator' of the attractiveness and 
coherence of an industrial union.
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In the author's questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's 
leadership the respondents reported that the 'lack of 
alternatives' referred to the weakness of labour 
representation on the shopfloor; the encompassive structure 
of the West German union also determined the strategy of 
incorporation. Incorporation was the strategy to avoid any 
interdependence between unions, such as competing in the 
membership or employer markets.
The task of the IGCPK leadership consisted in developing a 
stable solution which could secure the continuation of 
corporatism with its achieved standards (substantive goals) 
and its bargaining system (procedural goals). The IGCPK 
leadership identified the single union status as the best 
means for maintaining corporatism. The stated preferences 
of a stable solution did not just apply to the avoidance of 
trade union competition with the FDGB, but even referred to 
duopoly situations and the various forms of interdependence 
between oligopolists. A rival organization could lead to 
competitive behaviour and thus trigger fragmentation within 
the workforce, with a subsequent weakening of trade union 
power by decentralisation, as well as the outbreak of 
uncontrollable conflicts on the plant level (Gewerk­
schaftliche Umschau 5/1990, p.5). A decentralisation of 
collective bargaining could entail two effects. First, it 
could account for an erosion in the provision of beneficial 
collective benefits and limiting the excess burdens 
(possibly with the formation of distributional coalitions). 
Second, it could weaken the exercise of control over the
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membership. The exercise of control over the workforce is 
an important aspect for an employer when deciding whether 
to grant recognition to a union.
Referring to the threats stemming from the disintegration 
of the GDR, we will explain the early intervention. To 
combat growing non-unionism, the emergence of grass root 
unionism^®^, and recruitment efforts by West German 
Christian unions and the DAG within the IGCPK's 
organizational territory in the GDR, Rappe (Gewerk­
schaftliche Umschau 3/1990, p.4) demanded an early 
intervention. The author's questionnaire conducted with the 
IGCPK's leadership revealed that with an early intervention 
in the East, the emergence of growing non-unionism^might 
be anticipated and a large proportion of the East German 
membership might join. Increasing membership was a dominant 
objective in order to reduce non-unionism, and free-riding 
and thus can account for the argument that the bargaining 
area should be extended. The author's questionnaire 
conducted with the IGCPK's leadership also revealed that in 
the long run membership growth could lead to the 
realisation of economies of scale based on cost structure.
202) The rarely emerging trade unions on the plant level 
(lUG) were not supported by the IGCPK.
203) Non-unionism might result because of the legacy of 
low trust experienced by the East German workforce. 
The East German workforce suffered from collective 
representation by East German bodies (cf. Reimer 
1990). Further arguments for growing non-unionism 
are: accelerating individualism, growing unemployment 
and thus the decreasing utility of trade union 
representation.
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This interventionist category of 'exchange' is determined 
by the protection of neo-corporatism, which in turn implies 
the strategy of incorporating the East German workforce 
within the West German union. According to Turner (1952), 
where a danger of undercutting exists it is in the interest 
of the better-off workers (West German union members) to 
incorporate the threatening group (skilled East German 
workforce) within a comprehensive body. The strategy of 
incorporation is determined by 'exchange' in order to 
induce the potential or actual violators to join. Thus the 
application of egalitarian policies to attract the 
outsiders will be appropriate. Narrowing wage differentials 
and offering selective incentives (e.g., legal 
representation) can prove to be a policy to attract the 
outsiders and thus to avoid the potential of undercutting. 
The policy of incorporation means attracting and inducing 
the East German workforce to join the encompassing body of 
IGCPK. Thus the task of the IGCPK's leadership consisted in 
deriving and presenting a trade union profile attractive to 
the East German workforce. This meant above all avoiding a 
perception of second class membership on the part of the 
East German colleagues. Thus a strategy in the initial 
period of reconstruction could be to offer the East German 
workers 'first class' treatment, to secure the continuation 
of the desired social partnership in a united Germany.
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(b) The exercise of solidarity with the East German work 
force
Referring to Akerlof (1986), we argue that, despite the 
potential of undercutting by the East German workforce, the 
West German workforce had a humanitarian interest in the 
welfare of the East German population, as they had been 
pressed hard for forty years by the SED. The author's 
interviews with East German labour delegates revealed that 
they had been impressed by the hospitality, the office 
facilities and the experienced exercise of codetermination 
by their hosts. According to the author's questionnaire 
conducted with the IGCPK's leadership, the exercise of 
solidarity with the East German workforce had been one of 
the objectives for cooperation and finally unification. In 
interviews with the IGCPK executives they evidenced strong 
sentiments of solidarity with the East German workforce. In 
the context of the questionnaire, all the union leaders 
stated that the intervention in the East mitigated the 
transition towards a market economy, especially in social 
terms.
Despite the element of diffuse exchange relationship 
between the West and East German workforces and union 
members, the exercise of solidarity proved to be important 
supporting factors in the reconstruction process.
First, solidarity (e.g. presse-dienst 19.11.1990) as a 
cultural value orientation helped to enforce internal
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discipline within an encompassing union in order to tackle 
'the greatest challenge' to West German industrial 
relations. Thus an erosion in the significance of the union 
leadership and its macroeconomically inclined advisory 
staff was avoided. Rappe (Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung
24.6.1990) told the West German membership that solidarity 
was a shared national obligation', and that 'solidarity can 
entail harmful effects', referring to the necessary 
financial transfers from West to East Germany. In the 
author's questionnaire the IGCPK's leadership emphasised 
that its early determination to support the IGCPK had been 
welcomed by its West German membership. Virtually no
objection had been reported to cooperation and u n i t y . ^04
Second, solidarity offered an integrative force in 
supporting neo-corporatism, as well as entering East German 
territory without being criticised as an intruder. In
publications sent to the IGCPK's membership Mersmann (1990, 
p.6) demanded that the 'historic chance to overcome the
long-term division of the labour movement' be seized. 
Mersmann (1990, p.6) continued that exercise of the 'often 
adjured principle of ('international') solidarity' should 
become a 'true touchstone for each trade union member', 
referring to the notion of a 'cheap wage country, the
204) Assessing the IGCPK's conferences no West German
representative denied the necessity for solidarity 
and incorporation of the East German workforce.
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GDR.'205 Extending solidarity to the East German workforce 
would generate a feeling of reciprocity by this workforce 
towards the West German unions, facilitating the process of 
incorporation.
Third, solidarity with the East German workforce referred 
to the IGCPK's political legitimacy, which appealed to the 
whole workforce or society, rather than to sectionalised 
groups. We argue that for an industrial union a two-tier 
membership that would mean differentiating between a West 
and an East German membership would not be a viable 
strategy. An explanation for this prediction is that, in 
accordance with their political legitimacy, industrial 
trade unions represent the whole workforce. In the case of 
German unification a two-tier strategy would mean 
discriminating against the East German workforce. 
Discrimination against certain factions of the workforce by 
an embracing union could be interpreted as an act against 
solidarity, possibly generating contempt from society and 
negative repercussions on the union's integrative power to 
achieve solidarity.
Having analysed the background of the objectives for an 
intervention, we have to conclude that stability and the 
continuation of neo-corporatism have been of the utmost
205) The perception of a 'cheap wage' neighbour 
realistically underscored the necessity of 
international union solidarity concerning the impact 
of the further economic integration in Europe. Thus 
in the case of German reunification demanding and 
exercising solidarity can improve member compliance 
with trade union policy in the future.
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importance. The IGCPK's leadership therefore proved that it 
profoundly understood the shock emanating from the 
disintegration of the GDR. The strategy to establish near- 
representational monopoly had been an early incorporation 
of the East German workforce within the IGCPK. The exercise 
of solidarity with the East German trade union is an 
interventionist objective in itself, but it permits 
important 'by-products', such as improved cohesion, and can 
effect reciprocity on the part of the East German 
workforce.
(iiil The history and analysis of the IGCPK's incorporation 
strategy
Now we will turn to the analysis of IGCPK's incorporation 
strategy. Advocating the introduction of West German 
industrial relations improved the IGCPK's competitive 
advantage. Also, the IGCPK's massive support for the East 
German workforce to guide it while it gained experience of 
the new economic, legal and social environment reaped a 
large amount of goodwill.
(a) The IGCPK's condemnation of socialism
Early on, the IGCPK's leadership (Denecke 1990, p.6 and 
Leibfried 1991, p.3) made it clear that it 'would not 
deviate one millimetre from its basic principles.' With 
reference to IGM(W), the IGCPK leadership dismissed the 
'third path ideology' that 'rescuing of some socialist
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features' is not necessary (Denecke 1990, p.6). At the 
IGCPK's New Year reception Rappe (presse-dienst 20.1.1990, 
p.l) declared that 'with the collapse of the GDR system it 
has finally been proved that Communism could not offer 
solutions to the existing problems of the people.' He 
continued 'that in the new period of reconstruction we have 
to struggle against the SED as a Communist party.'
The condemnation of former East German industrial relations 
by the IGCPK could have caused a dilemma. On the positive 
side it could have triggered a dismantling euphoria within 
the East German workforce leading them to oust the FDGB 
personnel and thus erode the FDGB. On the other hand, 
criticising the East German system might be interpreted by 
the East German workforce as devaluing their work and thus 
their s e l f - e s t e e m . ^06 The dilemma was solved by the IGCPK's 
condemnation of the representatives and institutions with 
low trust levels, such as the SED and FDGB, accompanied at 
the same time by praise of the East German workforce, their 
skills, courage and active participation in the 
reconstruction of labour representation. The dilemma did 
not turn out to be existent in the case of the IGCPK, as it 
had made virtually no commitment to the East German system 
and its institutions. On the contrary the IGCPK's firm 
condemnation of the East German system had been assessed by 
the vice-chairman of IG Medien Hensche (1990) and Wunderer
206) The devaluation of East German products by East
German consumption behaviour after the collapse of 
the GDR and in comparisons with West German 
quality standards partly eroded the self-esteem of 
the East German workforce.
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(1990) as appropriate for the reunification process. 
Hensche (1990) and Wunderer (1990) argued that their unions 
'neglected to conduct a discussion on the perversities of 
socialism', causing negative repercussions on their unions' 
image in the East German membership market. Hensche (1990) 
further assumed that a firm condemnation of East German 
socialism could improve a union's chance to gain 
recognition by the employers.
The condemnation of socialism by the IGCPK had been an 
important aspect of the union's political programme, since 
the ideology of the left no longer had a function within 
the IGCPK (cf. Markovits 1987). On the contrary, since the 
1960s IGCPK's leadership has promoted the IGCPK's image as
an active, successful and reliable bargaining agent
renouncing left-wing ideology in order to facilitate the 
recruitment of white-collar workers. The author's
interviews conducted with IGCPK officers and attendance of 
the union congresses confirmed the fact that the union's 
target group for future recruitments were the white-collar 
workers. We explain the IGCPK's firm stance in the
reconstruction efforts as resulting from its relatively 
high proportion of white-collar members (1992: 20.2%).
White-collar workers were also to be the main field for 
subsequent recruitments.
Rappe (presse-dienst 20.1.1990, p.l) submitted that the 
organizational support by the IGCPK was directed towards 
the reconstruction of a social market economy with free
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trade unions in the GDR. The IGCPK's leadership outlined 
that the FRG, with its successful and experienced political 
and economic order, determined the East German 
reconstruction process. Assessing the sentiments of the 
vast majority of the East German workforce towards the SED, 
the old management and the FDGB, IGCPK's chairman Rappe was 
the first of the DGB's affiliates to condemn former East 
German socialism and to promote West German industrial 
relations. The demand by the IGCPK's leadership that the 
West German economic and political system should be copied 
increased the importance of the IGCPK's expertise, thus 
creating a competitive advantage on the part of the West 
German trade union. Denecke (1990, p.8) argues that the 
IGCPK leadership's objective was that the East German 
workforce would realise the indispensability of the West 
German trade unions during the necessary reconstruction and 
transition period.
In comparison with other DGB trade unions, the IGCPK's 
assessment of the situation, and especially the mood of the 
East German workforce, had been more accurate (cf. Wilke 
and Müller 1990). Early on, the IGCPK leadership set up 
reliable information channels to the East, allowing the 
West German union to respond quickly and appropriately. 
This improved information collection, and the enormous 
amount of information flowing from the East German 
workforce offered an opportunity to arrange plant 
partnerships between East and West Germany, as well as to 
deploy IGCPK officers to the East.
245
On 18.12.1989 the IGCPK's leadership met with the newly 
elected leadership of the IGCGK for the first time to 
discuss practical support and the arrangement of plant- 
partnerships (cf. presse-dienst 19.12.1989). Despite the 
actual support for an organizational renewal and a 
reconstruction of the IGCGK from below, the IGCPK's 
leadership followed a dual strategy consisting of 
persuasion and preventive pressure.
(b) The function of the information offices
In order to provide information to the East German 
workforce, IGCPK's leadership decided to set up 
'information offices' in Leipzig and East Berlin. Mersmann 
(1990, p.6) reported that the representatives deployed by 
the IGCPK were confronted with more than 100 inquiries each 
day in January 1990. The subject of those inquiries were 
issues concerning the implementation of works councils, the 
conduct of collective bargaining, environment protection 
and the mediation of plant partnerships (presse-dienst 
16.1.1990, p.l). Presse-dienst (16.1.1990, p.l) continues 
by stating that 'the information centres are accessible to 
all interested persons in the plants. This encompasses all 
opposition parties in the GDR, such as the SPD and Neues 
Forum. Cooperation with the East German IGCGK is regarded 
as natural by IGCPK's leadership.' IGCPK started to 
distribute its magazines such as 'gp magazine,' 'Umschau' 
and a special edition for East Germany of 'gp Extrablatt'. 
Providing the information for the East German workforce at
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the same time offered IGCPK the opportunity to promote West 
German industrial relations and thereby present the 
achievements of their organization. The task of providing 
information was to demonstrate a competitive advantage in 
the form of expertise in a market economy by referring to 
the West German industrial relations standards. Thus we 
assume that the rationale of support for the East German 
workforce consisted in promoting an attractive image of the 
IGCPK within the GDR (membership market).
The author's interviews with the IGCPK's leadership and 
union officers revealed that these 'information offices' 
had been of great importance for receiving vital and 
reliable information on the sentiments of the East German 
workforce. In comparison with other DGB affiliates, the 
IGCPK's leadership was able to exercise two-way 
communications speedily through these information offices. 
In a questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's leadership 
the existence of the 'information offices' was described as 
the most important factor the disseminating and promoting 
of the IGCPK's policy and achievements within the East 
German paper, ceramics and chemical industry. The two-way 
communications were used by the IGCPK's officers to 
encourage the East German workforce to build up their 
shopfloor representation by ostracising the former SED and 
FDGB staff. The 'information offices' were set up as a 
means of providing vital information on the mood and 
expectations of the East German workforce. In comparison 
with other DGB unions the IGCPK's leadership identified the
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'information offices' as the precondition for their 
reconstruction achievements. The correct assessment of the 
information received emphasised the attractiveness of the 
IGCPK and thus accelerated the renewal process within the 
IGCGK.
The preventive part of the IGCPK's dual strategy consisted 
in the plan to set up the 'information offices'. Building 
up 'information offices' followed the strategy of 
threatening the IGCGK's organizational existence and 
forcing the IGCGK's leadership to comply. The IGCPK's 
leadership made it plain that if the IGCGK did not comply, 
the IGCPK would set up its own East German trade union 
organization emerging from those 'information offices.'
(c) The IGCPK's firm reconstruction demands
As a precondition to any cooperation and to eventual 
unification, the IGCPK insisted that the IGCGK reform 
itself into a democratic trade union. Because it partly 
retained the former trade union structure and exercised 
self-determination during the reconstruction efforts (e.g., 
elections, cooperation, dismantling of the FDGB^O?) the 
East German workforce developed a certain degree of self­
esteem. The author's interviews conducted with the East 
German labour delegates revealed that cooperation with the
207) Despite the IGCPK's strong condemnation of low trust 
industrial relations and its firm determination of 
the reconstruction process, the formal dissolution 
was left to the East German workforce, in order not 
to be blamed as an intruder or violate the self­
esteem of the East German membership.
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IGCPK and being able to determine the reconstruction of 
labour representation triggered self-esteem and commitment 
towards the new system on the part of the East German
workforce.
Reformability had been strongly demanded by the IGCPK's 
leadership in order to enter further cooperation with a 
democratically legitimated leadership on the part of IGCGK. 
Reforms had been launched by the IGCPK to prevent its
identification as a successor to the FDGB^^® and its low 
trust system, and to dissipate possible reservations on the 
part of the East German workforce^and the West German 
membership.
The firm condemnation of the former system by the IGCPK's 
leadership diminished those reservations. In the author's 
interview, Mersmann reported several reasons for the 
IGCPK's firm convictions: first, democratic elections would 
help to clean out discredited personnel and thus facilitate 
union unification. The conduct of elections would generate 
self-esteem on the part of the East German workforce. 
Second, the willingness of the West German membership to
incorporate the East German workforce would be enhanced. In
addition, the difficult recruitment of the 'conservative' 
white-collar workers would be facilitated if the East 
German union officers and its membership abjured left-wing
208) According to a letter of the former Home Secretary 
Schauble, the West German trade unions 'avoided any 
relationship with the FDGB to avoid becoming the 
successor in title.'
209) For a discussion of reservations we refer to Der 
Beamtenbund 6/1990, p.27.
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ideologyZlO. Third, upholding an encompassing organization 
required sticking to the principle of a unitary unionism 
and a non-partisan organization. The reformability had been 
a precondition in order to avoid an infiltration by the 
SED, the STASI and the FDGB staff (Bading 26.6.1990, p.3 
and Handelsblatt 26.6.1990, p.l). Fourth, breaking with the 
legacy of low trust and left-wing ideology would facilitate 
the necessary cooperation with the Conservative-Liberal 
Governmental! and the employers.
The IGCPK's uncompromising stance and the strict conditions 
it placed on cooperative links were described as 'arrogant' 
and 'condescending' (European Industrial Relations Review 
5/1990, p.12). Table 15 shows that the vast majority of the 
East and West German labour delegates supported the firm 
reconstruction strategy of the IGCPK.
210) The IGCPK's history (cf. Handelsblatt 28.6.1990, p. 10 
and IGCPK (ed.) (June 1987), Chronologische 
Darstellung am Beispiel der 'Fuldaer Beschlüsse' der 
Industriegewerkschaft Chemie-Papier-Keramik,
Hannover) has been shaped by intensive discussions 
and measures to expel extreme political fractions 
from the organization. In interviews conducted with 
union executives it was reported that after 1945 
IGCPK's leadership had been worried by the SED's
and FDGB's attempts to infiltrate and thus influence 
the DGB and its affiliates.
211) According to a letter of former Home Secretary 
Schauble, he received 'unequivocal signals' from the 
DGB trade unions to support the dismantling of FDGB. 
The West German government responded to the demand of 
the DGB unions by eroding the FDGB's hegemony and the 
trade union act by Article 17 of the Inter-German 
Treaty, principles III (Sozialunion), Sections 1-4. 
The objective of the West German Government has been 
not to jeopardise the success of the WWSU by 'SED's 
long arm', but to carry on successful industrial 
relations with reliable unions.
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The author's subsequently conducted interviews with East 
German delegates revealed that the firm stance had been 
described as necessary in order to support the East German 
workforce in eliminating the system of low trust, and in 
dismissing its representatives.
Table 15: The assessment of IGCPK's firm stance in the
reconstruction and démocratisation process
Please assess 
reconstruction 
Ratings
IGCPK leadership's 
and démocratisation 
Frequency 
East German rep.
firm stance in the 
process. Please tick, 
in per cent 
212 West German mem.
necessary 73.3 64.5
exaggerated 15.7 8.6
do not know 8.5 19.6
no answer 2.5 7.0
N = 165 186
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
IGCPK labour representatives and West German union members
Table 15 confirms that the vast majority of the East German 
labour delegates rated the determination of the IGCPK's 
leadership as necessary in order to bring an 'end to the 
system of low trust', as the author's interviews with 
labour delegates confirmed.
The IGCPK's early interest and support in shaping East 
German industrial relations was appreciated by the East 
German workforce, as is evidenced by the author's
212) The abbreviation 'rep.' means labour representatives 
of the IGCGK, 'mem', means members of IGCPK.
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interviews with East German labour delegates. The 
unstinting willingness of the IGCPK's deployed personnelles 
to share their experience with the East German workforce 
promoted an opportunity for the IGCPK to act as an agent of 
the workforce. With the establishment of these 'information 
offices' the IGCPK's leadership pursued the historic chance 
to overcome trade union disruption without being blamed as 
an intruder in East German industrial relations. Table 16 
confirms that the overwhelming majority of the East German 
labour delegates did not perceive the IGCPK's 'information 
offices' as an intrusion in East German industrial 
relations.
Table 16: East German labour representatives' perception of 
IGCPK's information offices
Please indicate (please tick) your perception of IGCPK's 
information offices in the former GDR. 
Sentiments responses in per cent
- 'intruder in East German industrial relations' 4.2
- no answer 6.7
- 'supportive agent of the East German workforce' 89.1
N = 165 100.0
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
labour delegates
213) In an interview with Mersmann, he stated that the
working conditions of the deployed personnel had been 
extremely hard. The early transition period had 
been shaped by extreme information deficits and 
constant demands for consultation by the East German 
rank-and-file.
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Despite the 'strong incentives' of the West German union 
members and their leadership to participate in the 
reconstruction activities, it was extremely rare that they 
were made to feel like intruders. The exercise of plant 
partnerships between East and West German workers was 
predominantly determined by altruistic motives, as the 
author's interviews with labour delegates of both countries 
revealed. Interviews with West German union members 
conducted by the author confirmed altruistic sentiments^ 
as well as intrinsic satisfaction with the process of 
participation in easing the uncertainty of the East German 
workers and improving the working and living conditions of 
the hard pressed East German workforce.
The establishment of information offices had been a 
strategy aimed at securing single union status in a unified 
Germany, while fulfilling several other functions at the 
same time:
- Presenting the IGCPK as an experienced agent of the East 
German workforce, meeting their extensive information 
demands, and reducing their insecurity.
- Offering support paid off, as the East German workforce 
acknowledged the IGCPK's experience and help with 
reciprocity, demanding further support and representation 
in the GDR in order to achieve the same living and working 
conditions as in the West.
214) Several West German union members sacrificed a 
certain part of their holidays in order to offer 
support. Friendships also developed between East and 
West German union members as a result of the plant 
partnerships.
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- Neatly interwoven with the other functions enumerated 
above, the IGCPK exercised considerable influence upon the 
IGCGK to comply with the demands of the IGCPK. Realising 
the threat emanating from the establishment of information 
offices, from the IGCPK's growing experience in the new 
system, and the warm welcome given to the IGCPK by the East 
German workforce, all these pressures accelerated the 
IGCGK's compliance in undergoing reforms and destabilising 
the FDGB.
Setting up information offices, together with the 
reception by the East German workforce, gave a clear signal 
to potential unions that entering the membership market was 
not remunerative and to the employers and governments that 
the IGCPK was the recognised agent of the workforce.
At a summit on 27.1.1990 the IGCPK's and the IGCGK's trade 
union leaders agreed that German unity was inevitable and 
desirable. Thus they concluded that the IGCGK would have to 
undergo severe political and structural reforms to support 
the process of German reunification. The IGCGK's leadership 
promised to realise and to secure independence from 
political parties (unitary unionism) and to call an 
extraordinary union conference on 27 and 28 April 1990 
(presse-dienst 30.1.1990, p.l). At this conference the
IGCGK would elect trade union leaders who would represent 
its membership in negotiations about cooperation. The IGCPK 
insisted on the democratic legitimacy of the East German 
trade union leadership, with whom it expected to sign a 
cooperation agreement. We argue that an agreement signed
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with non-democratically legitimated East German union 
executives could have undermined the IGCPK's high trust- 
based strategy. Thus democratic elections of the trade 
union leadership could secure encompassiveness on the part 
of the workforce and lead to successful cooperation. The 
author's questionnaire conducted with IGCPK's leaders 
revealed that democratic legitimation was of paramount 
importance, as it demonstrated the end of imposed 
'democratic centralism' and its replacement by the free 
will of the East German workforce. This meant that the 
IGCPK could use the existing East German trade union 
structures. According to the author's interviews, retaining 
existing structures had been considered by the IGCPK's 
leadership as a possibility to realise an early trade union 
unity with a working organization and without the immense 
expenditures for establishing a separate organization from 
the ground up. This was able to account for a sound 
appraisal of the available resources and to convince the 
West German membership that the intervention in the East 
could generate a return on the investments of their 
'equity' quite soon (of. Wiliman 1989, p.286).
At the summit it was also agreed that the IGCPK would 
provide its sister organization with the necessary 
equipment for the running of the offices. It was decided 
(presse-dienst 30.1.1990, p.2) that the IGCGK would 
undertake efforts towards a 'profound political and 
structural reform of East German trade unions', and it
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promised to 'stick strictly to the principle of party- 
political independence.'
The IGCPK's leadership pointed out that 'time is pressing' 
and that union unity had at least to be in line with the 
speed of German political and economic reunification 
(presse-dienst 20.2.1990, p.3). This was one reason why the 
IGCPK intensified its representation in the GDR by setting 
up further information offices (Halle, Erfurt and East 
Berlin). Extending union representation by further 
information offices reinforced the strain upon IGCGK's 
leadership to comply with the conditions set out by the 
IGCPK (Wilke and Müller 1991, p.131) for subsequent union 
unity. After setting up further information offices, Rappe 
made it absolutely plain that the objective was trade union 
unity. The IGCPK's plan and conditions for cooperation and 
subsequent unity had been outlined by Rappe as follows 
(presse-dienst 28.2.1990, p.l):
- 'the union unification should take place parallel to 
national unification,
- the process of cooperation and subsequent unification 
will also be dictated by way of Western investment in the 
GDR. The intention is to set up several commissions with 
the West German employers' associations in order to prepare 
future collective bargaining in the GDR.'
Rappe enumerated the preconditions for trade union unity in 
accordance with West German conditions as follows (presse- 
dienst 28.2.1990, pp.1-2):
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'acknowledgement of the political principles of the 
IGCPK. This means respecting and upholding democracy, the 
rule of law, parliament and independence from political 
parties and other institutions.
- acknowledgement of the works council system based on the 
West German works council act. The existing BGL system in 
the GDR did not conform with parliamentary democracy, but 
only with dictatorship. However, the dictatorship in the 
GDR had collapsed. For the IGCPK codetermination was part 
of social democracy. On the basis of the Codetermination 
Act, and Works Councils Act, and carrying out the strategy 
of the trade unions, the German workforce experienced great 
success in industrial relations. This also meant
- avoidance of a trade union act,
- avoidance of political strikes,
- support of the principles of cooperation, according to 
the basic programme ('Einig im Ziel'),
- acknowledgement of the headquarters of the trade union - 
as before 1933 - in Hanover'.
Chairman Rappe said that he expected the IGCGK to 
demonstrate its will for unification at its conference. The 
subsequent tasks for the cooperation period would be 
influencing the decision process of amendments in the by­
laws of the IGCGK. Further, the IGCPK's leadership demanded 
massive 'consultation' rights for the necessary amendments 
in the IGCGK's by-laws. The IGCPK justified these 
'assisting' rights with the necessity to assess whether 
trade union unity was feasible. During the cooperation
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period both trade unions installed various committees 
(presse-dienst 28.2.1990, p.2). The system of enabling 
rights and the work of the committees facilitated the 
efforts of the experienced IGCPK representatives to direct 
the reform process of the IGCGK.
(d) The IGCPK's exercise of social partnership with the 
employers
As outlined in the predictive trade union strategy model 
the author assumed that in accordance with the IGCPK's
organizational weakness on the shopfloor, the union would 
work hard to gain recognition and support from the 
employers. As the trade union's success and 
encompassiveness was determined to a large degree by the 
application of a good Okun-index, it would try to secure 
the continuation of social partnership. Thus we predict 
that the union would be extremely active in working for 
employers' recognition by sustaining the beneficial growth 
alliance and avoiding decentralisation.
On 1.3.1990 the IGCPK's leadership appealed to the West
German chemical industry to invest in the GDR, and also 
claimed that the IGCPK intended to continue with the social 
partnership relationship (presse-dienst 1.3.1990). Willke
and Müller (1990, p.132) argue that the rationale for the
IGCPK's statement was that they realised that the 
reconstruction process would take its time. Thus Rappe 
offered continuation of the social partnership, expecting
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from the employers 'not to exploit the representational 
vacuum in the GDR'. Given this explanation, we argue that 
the early and intensive consultation with the employers
accounted for the IGCPK's willingness to gain recognition 
in the East German employer market.
Now we raise the question why the employers' association 
have been interested in the continuation of social 
partnership with IGCPK. An explanation for the strategy of 
the employers' associations could be that the IGCPK was
strong enough to influence the ideological and 
institutional circumstances of the unification process (cf. 
Wever 1990, p.601). Referring to Wever (1990, p.601), we 
assume that the employers' associations expected especially 
from the accommodationist trade unions that they would 
'channel the unpredictable political and workplace-related 
interests of the East German workforce.'
The early and intensive consultation between the IGCPK and
the employers' associations bore out this argument. The
author's questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's 
leadership revealed that they had been asked by the 
employers to establish the same predictable industrial 
relations system in the GDR. Documents of the Chemical 
Employers' Association (BAVC) and the German Employers'
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Association (Adomeit 1990a, p.586 and Mische^lS 1990, p.44) 
confirmed statements in favour of 'moderation' that were 
not limited to the GDR. They also applied to West Germany 
in order to minimise negative repercussions in connection 
with the highly appreciated 'social peace' (e.g., low 
strike record) and the avoidance of an outbreak of 
sectionalism with an uncontrollable distribution struggle 
(of. Mettke 1990, p.5). Thus the employers had granted 
their recognition in exchange for control and the exercise 
of 'voice'.
A further reason for the employers' associations 
cooperation is that we assume that since the IGCPK's weak 
shopfloor organizations had only little capacity to act, 
managerial prerogatives in organising production were 
unchallenged by direct union intervention, with positive 
effects on productivity (cf. Streeck 1981, p.153). Thus we 
predict that management's interest consisted in cooperating 
with the IGCPK, thus strengthening beneficial neo- 
corporatist industrial relations and avoiding other less 
desirable forms and actors of labour representation.
Rappe recommended a common declaration by the social 
partners. Advocating his organization, the IGCPK Rappe
215) Mische is the president of the Federal Chemicals 
Employers' Association (BAVC). He (1990, p.45) 
mentioned that the cooperative relationship between 
the BAVC and IGCPK greatly improved the working and 
living conditions of the chemical workforce. He also 
emphasised the continuation of social partnership 
with a strong and reliable social partner to meet 
the competitive and technical challenges of the 
future.
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referred to the polluted environment caused by the chemical 
industry in East Germany and stressed it was in the 
interest of the Government and employers to solve this 
problem with an experienced, competent and strong union.
The IGCPK leadership's strategy was based on a two-tier 
system, on the one hand establishing itself in the GDR and 
making itself indispensable to the workforce and at the 
same time offering intensive cooperation with the West 
German employers' association. The cooperation and early 
recognition by the employers had been of importance, as it 
discouraged other trade unions from starting recruitment 
efforts within the IGCPK's sphere of action. Gaining early 
recognition in the 'employer market' acted as a barrier to 
entering this market.
In the author's interviews with East German labour 
delegates social partnership was appreciated in order to 
enhance investments by West German companies in the GDR, 
thus easing the impact of unemployment. IGCPK's work in the 
employer market was shaped by the 'four points agreement' 
signed on 13.3.1990. This arrangement was signed by the 
BAVC and the IGCPK. It said (presse-dienst 13.3.1990, p.l 
and Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 5/1990, p.20) that: 'As a
corollary of the current developments in the GDR, the IGCPK 
and the BAVC have agreed on the following basic principles: 
- Mutual information. Both organizations will consult each 
other about their initiatives and activities in the GDR.
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- Mutual support for events. Both organizations declare 
their willingness, with the approval of the other side, to 
deploy representatives for special events.
- Acknowledgement of social partnership in the chemical 
industries. Both parties will emphasis the positive 
implications of the special system of social partnership in 
the social market economy in the FRG and of the freely 
elected works councils in their contacts with East German 
representatives.
- Parity ad-hoc committees on "GDR questions". Both 
organizations agree on ad-hoc meetings to discuss problems 
emerging from the developments in the GDR and interesting 
questions.'
We argue that the 'four-points agreement' as a declaration 
of both social partners expresses their shared willingness 
to continue with the social partnership. The author's 
questionnaire conducted with IGCPK's leadership and an 
interview with an officer of the BAVC confirmed that for 
the union the top priority was gaining recognition 
(constructing a barrier of entry for other unions) and for 
the industry a predictable and successful union-employers 
relationship.
The same agreement was signed for the paper industry, in 
which the IGCPK and the Paper Producing Employers' 
Association concluded that the sphere of responsibility of 
the trade unions should be congruent with that practised in 
West Germany (presse-dienst 5.4.1990). On 11.4.1990 the
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same agreement was reached for the rubber and ceramic 
industries (presse-dienst 11.4.1990, p.l). Through these
joint declarations with the relevant employers' 
associations the IGCPK virtually secured single trade union 
status in a unified Germany. Under the terms of these 
agreements none of the social partners tried to gain a 
competitive advantage or to exploit a weakness (Wilke and 
Müller 1991, p.132). In comparison with other 
organizations, the IGCPK followed its own distinctive way 
towards unification.
(e^  The IGCGK's reforms
After the first free general election (18.3.1990) in the 
GDR, with its clear referendum for German unification, the 
IGCPK's executives demanded that the East German trade 
union leadership should reform their organization according 
to the preconditions set by the West German sister 
organization. On 27.3.1990 Rappe explained that his 
organization was waiting for the IGCGK's extraordinary 
congress on 27 and 28.3.1990. He pointed out (presse-dienst
27.3.1990) that the decisions taken at this congress would 
reveal that 'after a period of cooperation with different 
joint executive commissions a subsequent unity is 
achievable.' One week before the IGCGK's decisive 
extraordinary congress Rappe publicly explained the dual 
strategy. When asked about a possible rejection of the 
IGCPK's cooperation and the unity offered by the IGCGK's 
extraordinary congress, Rappe declared his union's
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intention to found its own IGCPK in the GDR (cf. Neubauer
30.4.1990). In this case the 'information offices' would 
have turned out to offer an opportunity for the
establishment of an IGCPK trade union in East Germany, if 
the IGCGK's extraordinary congress had not followed the 
outlined strategy of cooperation. According to the IGCPK
(presse-dienst 20.4.1990, p.l), the task of the
extraordinary congress was that the 'IGCGK will decide on 
the programme and by-laws and will elect a new leadership 
to legitimate the process of renewal. The delegates want to 
debate questions and ways for a further cooperation with 
the IGCPK.'
Before the IGCGK's extraordinary congress the IGCPK's 
executives determined the political path for the
organization for their colleagues (Denecke 1990, p.7). On 
this occasion the IGCGK's chairman Ldschner claimed that 
his union was developing an 'entire new profile' which 
would include independence from government and political 
parties (European Industrial Relations Review 5/1990, 
p.12). Rappe dismissed (presse-dienst 27.3.1991) the 
possibility of continuing trade union workplace 
representation with the BGLs: 'A trade union bill and the 
old BGLs only fit into a dictatorship.' The IGCPK seized 
the initiative to sign a standard agreement with the East 
German Ministry of Industry which allowed the premature 
introduction of works councils in the GDR according to the 
West German Works Constitution Act. As the BAVC joined this 
standard agreement, the discussion of BGLs versus works
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councils was virtually obsolete. The neo-corporatist social 
partnership offered the anticipation of organizational 
reconstruction to the IGCPK even before the institution of 
West German industrial relations law and juridification. 
Fostering works councils offered the IGCPK the chance to 
distance itself from the legacy of low trust and to gain a 
competitive advantage over the IGCGK. Dismantling the BGLs 
proved a popular step for the East German workforce 
(dismantling euphoria), but it also helped to undermine the 
FDGB's organizational strength, as the author's interview 
with Mersmann confirmed.
The IGCGK's leadership started to prepare this congress of 
27 and 28 April 1990 by launching discussions within the 
plants about the renewal process. The corollary of these 
discussions was the personnel defeat of the old SED cadres 
in the elections for the delegates of the extraordinary 
congress (cf. Denecke 1990, p. 7, Grundmann 1991, p.12, 
Wingfield 1991, p.28).
In a report on the extraordinary congress (27/28 April 
1990), the IGCGK's chairman Loschner described the history 
of the GDR and especially the role of the FDGB critically. 
The chairman of the IGCGK vehemently demanded German unity. 
A report by Rappe followed, emphasising the necessity for 
trade union unity as a result of the WWSU and ecological 
problems. With a great majority the congress approved the 
following motion (Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 3/1990, pp.8- 
9): 'The IGCGK supports the democratic renewal in the GDR
265
on the basis of parliamentary rule of law and democracy in 
the economy. It fosters the right of trade union 
codetermination for the protection of the interests of its 
membership. As a self-determined and independent industrial 
union, it fosters an ecological and socially oriented 
market economy. ...The extraordinary congress wants to 
decide on and establish the following amendments in its by­
laws:
The realisation of a strong and free all-German 
industrial union with the Hanover as the location of the 
headquarters... .
- The acknowledgement of the democratic rule of law... .
- The principal of independence from political parties... .
- The transformation of the BGLs to a system of works 
councils... .
- The application of consensus when partnership offers 
acceptable results... .
The extraordinary congress fosters the realisation of a 
unitary industrial union between the IGCPK and the IGCGK. 
The timing of the merger will result from the political 
implications of the WWSU, and a consensus will be reached 
by the trade union leaders.'
On 28 April 1990 IGCGK's delegates voted unanimously for 
the 'realisation of a common industrial trade union' 
(Denecke 1990, p.8). According to presse-dienst 
(30.4.1990), no substantial differences between the IGCGK 
and IGCPK became evident and thus the motion was passed.
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The results of all the elections showed great 
encompassiveness and homogeneity. Lôschner^^^, who was 
responsible for the democratic renewal and the supersession 
of the old leadership, received 84 per cent of all votes. 
Very impressive was the result of Junge, who had been 
responsible for collective bargaining. He won 96 per cent 
of all votes. Overall, the Bernau conference of the IGCGK 
was determined by the unanimous will of the delegates to 
merge with the IGCPK in accordance with the preconditions 
set out by the West German leadership.
A further argument accounts for the smooth achievement of 
unity: the early IGCPK's leadership determined that dynamic 
and reformative trade union officers without STASI 
membership might be offered a position within a united 
IGCPK. The prospect of a possible career within the IGCPK 
contributed to the IGCGK's leadership and to officers not 
obstructing the cooperation and unification procedures. On 
the contrary the IGCGK promoted them, as the author's 
interview with Junge confirmed. From 27.6.1990 onwards the 
IGCPK deployed so-called 'political' secretaries to the 
IGCGK to scrutinise the backgrounds of the IGCGK personnel 
and to train them for the forthcoming work (cf. EisenbeiB 
1990, p.32). Willke and Müller (1991, p.137) submit that 
the task was to secure internal compliance towards the 
IGCPK's values and objectives. In the author's interview
216) Despite the fact that Lôschner had been responsible 
for political agitation within the FDGB and a later 
member of the executive board of the IGCGK, he and 
Junge showed to be extremely committed to the 
internal reforms of their union.
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with Mersmann he reported that one intention of the IGCPK's 
training sessions for East German union members was to 
dissipate worries especially on the part of the West German 
membership.
Assessing the results of the IGCGK's extraordinary congress 
(identical programme with the IGCPK, unanimous vote for 
cooperation and unity, acceptance of all preconditions), we 
argue that the IGCPK's persuasive work and strategy paid 
off. In the author's questionnaire conducted with East 
German labour delegates the explanations for the unanimous 
vote were:
- That the IGCPK would act as an agent of the workforce to 
improve working and living conditions. It was anticipated 
that the social partnership with the employers would 
encourage investments in the GDR, so that the impact of 
unemployment could be mitigated, for example, by social 
plans. Expectations included bringing up the wages and 
working conditions to the West German standards. Some 
respondents stated that they regarded the IGCPK as a force 
to overcome the 'second-class citizens' image of the East 
German population and to offer training facilities to raise 
skill levels.
- That the economic, political and legal unification with 
the former FRG had made the inhabitants of the GDR feel 
like 'foreigners in their own country.' Millions of East 
Germans had suddenly been concerned with questions about 
tax schedules, codetermination, or how to claim 
unemployment benefits. Many respondents reported that the
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sense of strangeness had not been an individual experience; 
rather, existential uncertainty had become a mass 
experience. In this respect the IGCPK's expertise and 
support had been viewed as a means to overcome the 
strangeness of the unknown system.
- That the IGCPK's uncompromising stance would stop the 
legacy of low trust. Some labour representatives stated 
that, if the IGCPK had not assisted the East German 
workers, representational bodies of low trust would have 
still been in office. Some labour delegates stated that 
they expected the IGCPK as a force to oppose management 
buy-outs by the old management, and to prevent the Treuhand 
from liquidating of companies in favour of reconstruction. 
The East German workforce regarded the IGCPK and the works 
councils as a means to impede the old management's 'high­
handed behaviour' (cf. Der Spiegel 24.9.1990, p.79).
- That the unanimous vote to a certain degree constituted 
reciprocity to the solidarity and experience which the 
IGCPK offered during the transition period (e.g. plant 
partnerships).
- Some of the respondents emphasised the lack of an 
alternative to the IGCPK's experienced and successful 
representational monopoly in a new and unfamiliar 
system.217 Especially women stated that they perceived the 
IGCPK as an experienced agent to improve the devastated and 
polluted environment.
217) This answer referred to the threat emanating from the 
'information offices' that in the case of non- 
compliance the IGCPK would set up its own 
organization without the participation of the IGCPK's 
staff and members.
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- The exercise of beneficial social partnership was one of 
the most popular answers of the respondents. The excellent 
connections of Rappe with the West German employers and 
companies, together with the application of social 
partnership, would attract necessary investments and thus 
help to keep the chemical industry in the East, with 
correspondingly positive effects on employment.
- The application of selective incentives were an important 
aspect, as the incorporation within the IGCPK would enable 
former IGCGK members to claim free individual 
representation (especially legal representation and tax 
advice).
Assessing the answers above, the IGCPK's strategy of 
working with the dichotomy of high (IGCPK) and low trust 
(old GDR system) and presenting itself as the indispensable 
agent and as a factor of hope to the East German workforce 
paid off. The early support given to the East Germans by 
the 'information offices' was not perceived as an invasion, 
but on the contrary met with gratitude from the East German 
workforce, as the author's interviews with East German 
labour delegates confirmed. The participation of the East 
German membership and their incorporation increased their 
self-esteem, despite the fact that it was the IGCPK which 
set out the conditions of cooperation and unification.
On 7 and 8 May 1990, the IGCPK's advisory board approved 
further cooperation and a possible unification, and called 
for an extraordinary congress in September to amend the by­
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laws (presse-dienst 10.5.1990, p.l). The IGCPK concluded 
that all preconditions had been fulfilled by the IGCGK. On 
10 May the IGCPK intervened and asked the Government for 
amendments in the ' Inter-German-Treaty' to protect the 
already existing works councils in the GDR (cf. presse- 
dienst 10.5.1990).
One week later, on 14 May 1990, the trade union leaders of 
both organizations met and signed a cooperation agreement. 
The stipulation provided for a two-tier objective: first, 
close cooperation and second, subsequent trade union unity. 
According to presse-dienst (14.5.1990, p.l), the
cooperation agreement was intended to prepare for unity 
during an intensified period of cooperation. The stated 
objective of the agreement was 'the unification of both 
organizations, the date to be defined by the executive 
boards of both unions. Therefore a common ordinary union 
congress would be called' (presse-dienst 14.5.1990, p.l). 
With reference to the industrial relations system operating 
in West Germany, the objective of 'both trade unions' is to 
develop and establish the same system in the GDR that has 
operated in the FRG' (presse-dienst 14.5.1990, p.l). Both 
unions declared that the location for the union 
headquarters of a unified union would be Hanover' (presse- 
dienst 14.5.1990, p.l). A trade union executives committee 
was formed to decide on various details of the procedures 
for cooperation and unification. Both unions demanded that 
the East German workforce should declare their will for 
unity by joining the IGCPK by 31.12.1990. Both leaderships
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decided that the future common by-laws would be identical 
with those of the IGCPK. After signing, special commissions 
took up their work of preparing the unification of both 
trade unions (presse-dienst 30.4.1990, p.l). Given this
situation, von Pappenheim (11.5.1990, p.2) argued that the 
cooperation agreement was determined by Rappe's 'gentle 
pressure' upon the IGCGK to prevent competition in the 
membership market.
The cooperation agreement (IGCPK Kooperationsabkommen
14.5.1990) was the apex of the IGCPK leadership strategy, 
because all the requirements set out had been fulfilled, 
and the way to near-representational monopoly in a reunited 
Germany had been achieved. On behalf of the IGCPK Rappe 
declared that the West German trade unions 'do not claim a 
single Mark which the East German unions received from the 
SED and the East German government (Hülsmeier 1990, p.19). 
But he called it justiable that the unions wanted to claim 
those parts of the East German union properties stemming 
from dues paid to the FDGB. 'Finally', he stated that the 
'unions have to fulfil the great task of rebuilding the 
infrastructure for labour representation. And that is very 
expensive' (Hülsmeier 1990, p.19). Despite the fact that 
the IGCPK made extensive use of the facilities of the 
IGCGK, the costs of deployed personnel, provision of 
information material, and investments in the refurbishment 
of the offices and new office equipment had been 
considerable. According to the author's questionnaire 
conducted with the IGCPK's leadership, the annual
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expenditures for union representation in East Germany, 
despite the existence of synergy effects, would not be 
covered by the annual dues collected from the East German 
membership for a considerable time. Taking over the 
organizational structure of the IGCGK proved to be 
successful, and from an early date the IGCPK was able to 
receive their dues.
In the author's follow-up interview, Terbrack reckoned that 
the break-even point could be achieved within a period of 
probably five years, depending on the development of 
investments, unemployment, and the recruitment efforts of 
IGCPK. Regarding synergy effects by providing public 
representation, the IGCPK was also interested in the 
enhancement of its membership. Despite the realisation of 
synergy effects, expenses such as the provision of personal 
legal representation in the East German labour courts gave 
rise to large expenditures by the IGCPK. This provision of 
legal representation provided an important selective 
incentive to join the IGCPK (cf. Momper 1990, p.41), and 
thus encouraged the process of incorporation (Seideneck 
1991).
Expansion by means of East German members had been the 
IGCPK leadership's objective because of the synergy 
effects^^®, such as the increase of reputation and strength 
within the DGB and in the political arena. At the same time
218) In an interview with Handelsblatt (5.5.1992) Berger 
stated that 'we need within and outside of DGB a 
certain quantity of members', indicating the 
necessity of achieving economies of scale/scope.
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it was acknowledged that the protection of neo-corporatism 
had been the dominant objective of the cooperation and 
unity process (Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 4/1991, p.7). In 
the Gewerkschaftliche Umschau (4/1991, p.7) Rappe stated 
that 'with about 900,000 members, our organization is 
strong. Thus it is an important factor in the social policy 
in our country. Even now, no one could afford to neglect 
our demands and proposals.' This statement confirms 
Marshall's et al. (1976, p.69) argument that enhancement of 
membership coincides with the pooling of 'political 
strength.' According to Rappe (Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 
4/1991, p.4), his organization would use 'its power and 
international reputation' to influence German foreign 
policy. Thus we argue that the enhancement of membership 
played a major role in the reconstruction strategy. 
According to the author's questionnaire conducted with the 
IGCPK's leadership, the potential gain in membership was 
rated as a dominant reason for the intervention. The 
parallel objectives of improving the IGCPK's significance 
within the DGB, as well as personal ambitions, have also 
been rated in the author's questionnaire as motives for the 
strategy of incorporation, but not as important ones.^l^ 
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (24.6.1991) reported 
that trade union leaders are not interested in 'the policy 
of its neighbour' (affiliate), they punish the DGB by 
disregard. This is the reason for the DGB's sclerotic 
weakness.' This argument might be partly right, but
219) In the IGCPK especially members of the advisory 
departments and the personal assistants of the 
leaders have been promoted.
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according to the Handelsblatt (3.12.1991, p.7) and 
Stuttgarter Zeitung (3.12.1991, p.3) the 'improvement of 
the significance for the decision-making process within the 
DGB has been described as an important argument for an 
union 'fusion.'
In his article 'in three steps to the goal' Rappe (1990, 
p. 48) described the results of the extraordinary trade 
union congress of the IGCGK and the meeting of the IGCPK's 
advisory board as offering the possibility for a 
cooperation agreement as the first step to trade union 
unity, which could be realised in May 1990. From May 1990 
onwards, the IGCPK's staff worked hard to realise the trade 
union organizational structure (four districts and 33 
administrative offices) in the new Lënder. The 
organizational reconstruction started on the establishment 
level with the election of the works councillors, shop 
stewards and delegates for subsequent elections, and the 
formation of the administrative offices. The delegates had 
to decide on the heads of the administrative offices, while 
the secretaries were appointed by the trade union 
leadership to ensure the continuity of neo-corporatist 
industrial relations and establish credibility towards the 
employers.
With the realisation of the WWSU (1.7.1990), the IGCPK 
seized the initiative to reconfirm its strategy of social 
partnership with the employers. At that time it was also 
necessary to create the basis for a new system of wages. On
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20.6.1990, the IGCPK, the IGCGK and the Ceramical 
Employers' Association agreed to conduct collective 
bargaining and to implement collective structures and 
procedures. According to presse-dienst (20.6.1990), the 
following agreement was approved:
- 'The Ceramical Employers' Association with its East 
German affiliated members and the leadership of the IGCPK 
and IGCGK will conduct collective bargaining from 1.7.1990 
onwards for the ceramic industry in the GDR.
- The social partners will foster the introduction of the 
structures of collective bargaining prevailing in West 
Germany. The material content of the collective agreements 
will have to be developed step by step on the basis of the 
existing collective agreements of the GDR for economic 
development until the level of the Federal Republic is 
reached.
- With the introduction of the WWSU it is necessary that 
the social partners immediately started determining 
collective bargaining and hereby regulating the economic 
and working conditions of the workforce.
For the transition of the East German plants to a social 
market economy it should be possible for management to 
count on the collective structures.'
(f) The incorporation of the East German workforce bv 
closing the wage gap
Incorporating the East German workforce into a unified 
organization was meant to avoid any form of discrimination
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against the new section of membership. For this reason the 
IGCPK laid great emphasis on the introduction of the same 
structures and procedures of collective bargaining and 
offered predictability to potential investors with this new 
system (presse-dienst 20.6.1990). Fôrster (1991, pp.26-27) 
argues that the IGCPK's objective was to close the gap 
between the East and West German remuneration. In training 
courses the IGCPK's leadership made it quite plain that 
collective bargaining would be conducted on the regional 
level and, not as some East German union officers demanded, 
at the plant level (cf. EisenbeiB 1990, p.32). Thus we 
argue that the IGCPK sought to avoid any further wage drift 
in the East, or increasing plant syndicalism (cf.
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 1/1991, p.3). Narrowing the wage 
differential between East and West Germany accounts for the 
strategy of contractual exchange to attract the East German 
workforce to join the IGCPK, and thus to prevent further
negative spillovers to the West. Several petitions
submitted by West German members for IGCPK's ordinary 
congress (cf. Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 2/91, p.41) 
demanded that the gap between East and West German
remuneration to be closed, to avoid undercutting (cf. 
Hickel 1990, p.66). These petitions were overwhelmingly 
made by West German union members who had worked near the 
former German-German border. Raising of the East German 
wages to the West German level had been also demanded by 
certain West German members in order to avoid 'the 
exploitation of the advantageous East German location'
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(Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 2/91, p.41) by employers or 
investors.
Thus Turner's (1952) argument in favour of achieving an 
encompassing organization by incorporation can be verified 
by the IGCPK's reunification strategy. In the IGCPK's case 
the incorporation did not apply solely to different skill 
levels, as Turner (1952) reported in his research, but 
related to incorporation in the process of German 
unification as applied to the whole workforce of a country. 
The incorporation strategy consisted in the protection of 
neo-corporatism, with a significant outcome for the members 
in the more developed country (cf. Kromphardt and Bruno 
1990, pp.60-61). In order to prevent an extreme increase in 
unemployment and to obtain recognition by the employers, 
the IGCPK's leadership did not promote immediate 
equalisation of wages, but agreed to negotiate agreements 
'step by step'220. The contractual exchange policy 
consisted in raising the East German wages to the West 
German level and a strategy to protect the West from the 
threats emanating from the East.^^l The acceptance of the 
step by step agreement by the employers was the consequence 
of various reasons, including assuring the continuation of
220) 'Step by step' refers to the conduct of collective 
bargaining in accordance with the economic situation 
and especially to the development of productivity 
growth in the GDR.
221) An indicator of the objective of protecting the West 
from repercussions stemming from the East was
been that all West German trade unions fostered and 
lobbied for a job-killing exchange rate of 1:1 to 
encourage the East German workforce to stay in the 
East. It might be argued that the ad hoc introduction 
of the currency union contributed to unemployment, 
which provoked migration still more.
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a predictable social partnership with the IGCPK, stopping 
the exodus of the skilled East German workforce (Bispinck 
et al. 1993, p.470) and attracting the East German 
workforce to join the IGCPK.
Adam-Schwatzer described the narrowing of wage differences 
as a 'make-up strategy' (Stuttgarter Nachrichten,
24.6.1991). Further evidence for Turner's contractual 
exchange argument of incorporation to thus secure neo­
corporatism has been that the IGCPK's leadership explained 
the necessity to increase East German wages by 'giving 
clear signals for the East German workforce to stay in the 
East'.222
Despite the evidence of the contractual exchange 
relationship in favour of closing the wage gap, the second 
motive for the intervention was determined by solidaristic 
elements, as Mersmann confirmed in an interview with the 
author.
The employers' associations, together with the IGCPK, 
agreed on common industrial guidelines for the 
reconstruction of the East German chemical industry (cf. 
presse-dienst 1.6.1990 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
22.6.1990, p.l). This referred to the introduction of the 
strict West German workplace and environment protection 
legislation, which could have caused the closure of the
222) Another argument in favour of wage increases was the 
necessity to assure the living standards of the East 
German workforce.
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majority of the chemical plants in the GDR. Therefore both 
union and industry demanded provisional regulations to 
encourage investments for the transition period and 
hastened to support each other in training measures for the 
East German workforce. The privatisation efforts in the 
East German chemical industry turned out to be extremely 
difficult as the West German chemical companies showed 
reluctance to invest in the GDR. Strenger (Financial Times
9.5.1990, p.3 and cf. Marsh 13.6.1990, p.2), president of 
the West German Chemicals Association, claimed that the 
reluctance was caused by unfavourable sites, outdated 
technology, and safety and environmental problems. The 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (23.5.1990a, p.5) argued 
that the IGCPK's leadership became extremely worried about 
dismissals in the East German chemical industry. To avoid 
unemployment or mitigate the impact of dismissals, Rappe 
(Handelsblatt 21.6.1990, p.l) demanded short-time working 
subsidies for training measures, as well as initiatives for 
generous tax depreciations for investments in contaminated 
chemical sites (cf. Kipp 21.6.1990, p.5).
In a comment on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of 
the IGCPK chairman Rappe stated (presse-dienst 27.6.1990): 
'Since 9 November 1989 we have been in a transition period 
influencing the whole of politics and thus also the trade 
union. Centralised, communist party-controlled Socialism 
failed totally. Nothing can be hidden any longer: the
people in those countries have been defrauded, the state of 
the economy and environment is more horrifying than we
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assumed. ... Sooner than expected we will experience the 
unification of both German states and all-German elections. 
... For several years the developments have confirmed the 
political line of the IGCPK. We neither allied with the 
communists, nor did we sign their proclamations or support 
any activist committee. ... We do not scrutinise anybody's 
history, but women and men who do not abjure the former 
ideology are not companions of ours in a unified IGCPK.' 
Rappe decried (presse-dienst 27.6.1990) the 'sale of East 
Germany' and described discussion within the DGB's 
affiliates as a 'mental relic of socialist' research teams. 
Unlike other DGB affiliates, the IGCPK fostered a social 
market economy, thus appealing to the employer market and 
at the same time encouraging investments. Rappe went on to 
outline the pursuit of trade union unity. On 10 and 11 
September 1990 the IGCPK announced the calling of an 
extraordinary congress for necessary amendments in the by­
laws. During the period starting on 1 October 1990 and 
ending on 30 November 1990, the IGCPK would ask the IGCGK's 
membership to convert to the IGCPK in order to elect 
delegates to an all-German trade union congress and to 
determine the East German trade union labour 
representatives. To facilitate the organizational process 
of trade union unity, the IGCPK had deployed personnel. As 
mergers of trade unions were not lawful, it was decided to 
dissolve the artificial entity of the IGCGK after its 
membership had individually joined the IGCPK. The IGCPK's 
and IGCGK's officials and works councillors had worked hard 
to encourage workers to sign up.
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Regarding the introduction of the WWSU, Terbrack described 
the dominant issues of collective bargaining in the 
following way (presse-dienst 11.7.1990); 'That it is 
tremendously important to secure employment by emphasising 
the collective structure, protection from rationalization, 
vocational retraining, and training and development by 
making use of the Labour Promotion Act (AFG).'
The first free collective bargaining in the East German 
chemical industry took place on the executive level of the 
employers' associations and the trade unions. The IGCPK's 
leadership made public the results of its collective 
bargaining: in comparison with IGM(W)'s bargaining
attempts, the IGCPK negotiations took place without any 
noise or stoppages. From 1.7.1990 basic wages increased by 
35%, the short working subsidy rose from 68 to 90 per cent 
of take-home pay, protection from rationalization in 
accordance with the West German cloak agreement was 
achieved; priority of vocational training in favour of 
rationalization, and the introduction of the 40-hour week 
were agreed on; and the most urgent task, the introduction 
of the West German classification structures, was signed 
(Handelsblatt 12.7.1990a, p.5). The IGCPK's leadership, 
together with the employers' association, agreed on 
implementing the structures of cloak agreements and 
remuneration agreements by 1 April 1991 (presse-dienst
12.10.1990). Both social partners concluded that by 1994 
all the regulations of the West German collective 
agreements, with the exception of weekly working time and
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holiday pay, should be applied to the territory of the new 
Lander (Handelsblatt 19.12.1990, p.5).
The same agreements were signed for the glass, ceramic and 
rubber i n d u s t r i e s . 223 The increase in wages has been 
justified by the BAVC as preventing the exodus of qualified 
personnel from East Germany (Handelsblatt 2 . 8 . 1 9 9 0 ,  p.4). 
On 2 2  January 1 9 9 1 ,  the IGCPK and the BAVG implemented the 
same classification system as in the West. Terbrack 
(Handelsblatt 8 . 3 . 1 9 9 1 ,  p.4) emphasised that the 
implementation was of importance for the subsequent 
harmonisation of wages in Germany. Depending on the 
increases in productivity, Terbrack pointed out that the 
'quick step-by-step' e q u a l i s a t i o n 2 2 4  was the dominant task 
of his organization in the East (presse-dienst 2 6 . 7 . 1 9 9 0 ,  
p.l). Thus the incorporation of the East German workforce 
resulted in applying the same classification standards 
which attracted the East German workforce by equalisation 
of wages. Implementing the same structures and publicly 
stating the IGCPK's determination to equalize working and 
living conditions reinforced the concept of an encompassing 
organization. Rappe (Mitteldeutsche Zeitung 2 4 . 6 . 1 9 9 1 )  
emphasised that an encompassing union's organizational 
strength cannot be achieved by differences between 'those 
in the West', and 'those in the East' but the policy of the
223) Cf. presse-dienst (11.7.1990), (2.8.1990), 
(8.8.1990), (15.8.1990), (6.9.1990).
224) Rappe justified the outcome of the East German 
collective bargaining (Mannheimer Morgen, 24.6.1991) 
by saying that 'growing together also means 
generating the same living conditions and 
opportunities.'
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union has to focus on 'us in Germany.' Thus Rappe's policy 
centred on reducing inequality and eliminating 
discrimination (no second class membership). The trade 
unions and employers' associations pointed out (presse- 
dienst 11.7.1990) that this collective agreement was the 
first step in achieving uniform industrial relations in a 
reunited Germany in the case of the chemical industry.
Collective bargaining was dominated by the principle that 
wages and salaries should follow the economic development 
of the East German industry. The first collective agreement 
was therefore due to expire on the 31.12.1990. The 
employers' associations and the IGCPK agreed to establish 
regular economic review sessions in order to assess 
economic development and the possible path for subsequent 
wage bargaining.
The first collective bargaining of the IGCPK proved to 
follow the 'narrow path' of satisfying membership 
aspirations and establishing high trust in the employers' 
market, while respecting the miserable economic situation 
of East German industry. Identical collective agreements 
were signed for the paper industry (presse-dienst 2.8.1990 
and Handelsblatt 3.8.1990, p.5), ceramic industry (presse- 
dienst 8.8.1990) and glass industry (Handelsblatt 
17.8.1990a, p.5). The process of collective bargaining in 
the GDR was dominated by the West German social partners 
determining the procedures. The IGCGK personnel did not 
have the necessary experience. For its part, the West
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German employers' association, on behalf of the emerging 
East German employers, appreciated the conduct of 
collective bargaining with the IGCPK. Dealing with the West 
German union offered the possibility of avoiding bargaining 
with the FDGB, or fragmented unreliable groups not able or 
willing to channel the will of the East German workforce.
The strategy of the IGCPK's leadership in the area of 
collective bargaining was to present its organization to 
the East German workforce as indispensable to protect and 
improve the working and living conditions of its potential 
membership in the current situation. Massive information 
and hand-outs were distributed to East Germany's workforce 
explaining the procedures of collective bargaining and the 
advantages of 'social partnership', especially during the 
period of transition. The author's interviews with East 
German labour delegates confirmed that the conduct of 
social partnership was appreciated, because it would 
encourage investments by employers and assure employment. 
Rappe justified the outcome of collective bargaining in the 
GDR, which had been criticised by the Government. Rappe 
emphasised (Handelsblatt 10.11.1990, p.5) that it was not 
collective bargaining which had been responsible for the 
crisis, but in the GDR rather the repercussions of 'forty 
years of socialist economic mismanagement.' Improvements in 
wages and working conditions were important to avoid the 
migration of East German workers and thus the deterioration 
of investment sites in the East.
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Facing the continuing revelation of the devastating 
conditions of the East German environment, the IGCPK 
leadership passed an industrial-political resolution on 
28.8.1990 calling for a smooth transition from coal to the 
petro-chemical industry. To protect jobs, however, the 
IGCPK demanded a concerted action with the employers and 
government to ease the impact of environmental protection 
regulations and unemployment with reference to brown coal. 
The IGCPK proposed (presse-dienst 28.8.1990) reducing coal 
production, but dismissed a radical reduction. Rappe 
outlined that there was no alternative to restructuring 
East Germany industry by demanding public subsidies and the 
classical set of industry political tools, despite the 
knowledge that these instruments could not be successful in 
the special case of the GDR (Wilke and Müller 1991, p.138). 
When asked if the East German workforce would interpret the 
IGCPK's determination to support privatisation and 
structural reconstruction of the East German industry as 
'job-killing,' Rappe replied that his organization could 
not denounce economic rationality, and that there was no 
other alternative for the survival of a certain part of the 
industries (Stern 6.12.1990, p.268). In the author's 
interviews conducted with East German labour delegates the 
vast majority held the view that the practice of social 
partnership and its predictability had encouraged 
investments.
To influence the liquidation and privatisation policy of 
the Treuhand, with its far-reaching implications, Rappe
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demanded that at least one trade union leader should 
represent the East German workforce on the executive board 
and supervisory board of the Treuhand (Handelsblatt
10.8.1990, p.5 and presse-dienst 10.9.1990c).
On 10 and 11 September 1990, the IGCPK placed the necessary 
amendments for trade union unity before its extraordinary 
congress (presse-dienst 4.9.1990), and called for an all- 
German trade union congress for 23.6.-29.6.1991 (presse- 
dienst 10.9.1990). The IGCPK's leadership emphasised 
(Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 5/1990, p.5) that the all-German 
conference would offer the opportunity to set up an 
encompassing organization without 'first and second class 
labour representatives.' The delegates approved expanding 
the IGCPK's territory and sphere of action to the GDR in 
order to allow official trade union work in the GDR, as 
well as the non-contributory recruitment of the IGCGK's 
membership until its phasing-out (presse-dienst 
10.9.1990a).
Non-contributory membership had been a strong incentive to 
incorporate the IGCGK's membership, and by October 1990 
120,000 East German workers signed up (Die Quelle 10/1990, 
p.20). To cover the costs of administering of pension 
schemes and the expensive build-up of the union in East 
Germany, the IGCPK's delegates changed the existing 
regulations (§31 'Treuegeld' in its by-laws) by terminating 
the expenditure for pensions in favour of the 
reconstruction of labour representation in East Germany
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(Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 2/9 1, 'petitions' pp.1-2 and 
Handelsblatt 11.9.1990, p.3). Thus the strategy to create 
an encompassing union by incorporating the East German 
workforce was shaped by raising the wages of the new 
membership. A further factor in facilitating the East 
German workforce's incorporation was the IGCPK's programme 
to improve the living and working conditions of the new 
membership. To prevent the East German workforce from 
massive waves of dismissals, the IGCPK propagated short­
term step-by-step improvements in line with productivity 
developments. As the overwhelming majority of the West 
German delegates voted in favour of the amendments in the 
by-laws and even incurred costs by renouncing their pension 
schemes, the strategy of the IGCPK's leadership to 
incorporate the East German workforce and thus to prevent 
the erosion of neo-corporatism paid off. The Stuttgarter 
Zeitung (22.11.1990, p.13) argues that the rationale behind 
the willingness to incorporate the East German workforce 
was the fear of dumping and the exercise of solidarity with 
the East German workforce.
A controversy arose as several West German delegates stated 
that trade union unity with a former FDGB affiliate could 
entail great risks for the IGCPK. Their apprehension was 
based on Rappe's decision to enlarge the executive board by 
incorporating two further (Handelsblatt 11.9.1990, p.3) 
East German representatives. Rappe dissipated the 
apprehension by mentioning that the IGCPK's 'conception and 
programme are not at stake.' Rappe also distanced the
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organization from the communists (Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 
8/1990, p.48); 'We are not willing to accept any change in 
the IGCPK's political character. Therefore we will combat 
any infiltration by communists, by SED/PDS members.' To 
dispel any West German apprehensions, the IGCPK executive 
board initiated a clear resolution (presse-dienst
10.9.1990): 'And further there will be no alliance or
agreement with communists or adjacent groups.' Overall, the 
congress approved the IGCPK's uncompromising stance by 
publicly declining even to tolerate communist sentiments.
Rappe and Loscher discussed the topic of the future of 
former IGCGK trade union officers. The strategy of both was 
to take all early precautions necessary to avoid 
infiltration attempts by communists. Despite the formal 
independence of IGCGK, the West German sister organization 
determined the programme, and also the placement of 
personnel within the East German organization. The 
placement of East German trade union officers was 
determined by Rappe's notion (Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 
August 1990, p.48): 'We do not want to alter the political 
character of the IGCPK. Therefore we will combat any 
attempted infiltration by communists, especially by SED/PDS 
members. ' The IGCPK pursued a plan aiming for a smooth 
transition. Legitimating former IGCGK trade union officers 
by elections or replacing them by West German officers, 
within a short period the IGCPK succeeded in setting up 
'workable trade union structures' (cf. Die Tageszeitung,
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25.6.1991) to provide support for the workforce in the East 
German chemical industry.
In comparison with other DGB affiliates, especially the 
IGM(W), the IGCPK succeeded in establishing a working and 
vital trade union organization in the GDR (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 10.9.1990). Other DGB affiliates started 
panics or hostile take-over attempts, whereas the chemical 
trade unions realised a smooth unification. Not being the 
victim of a hostile take-over, but a partner with a working 
and democratically legitimated organization produced pride 
and self-esteem on the part of the IGCGK's membership (cf. 
appendix no. 12). The IGCGK's leadership criticised the 
unification efforts of IGM(W) as 'mischief, to destroy a 
working organization and a troublesome reconstruction' 
(Tribüne 21.9.1990). The author's interviews with IGCPK 
officers and the author's participant observation of union 
training sessions show that both IGC memberships were proud 
of having established 33 regionally working offices.
On 3 October 1990, the date of German reunification, Rappe 
and Loschner repeated the programme and position of the 
IGCPK. Loschner criticised the East German Government for 
the ad hoc introduction of a market economy. Rappe 
condemned political movements whose strategy within Germany 
was based on conjuring nightmares and spreading fears of 
the reunification process, thus generating 'a social powder 
keg' which was not necessary (presse-dienst 2.10.1990,
p.6).
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In December IGCPK's executives conducted a second 
bargaining round. They had established a working 
organization as well as the highest membership in its 
history, despite the fact that chemical production in East 
Germany had fallen by 50 per cent, causing the dismissals 
of about 30 per cent of the former workforce (Handelsblatt
10.1.1991, p.5). The results of the conduct of collective 
bargaining had been a lump sum payment of about 200 German 
Marks, a 40-hour week, and a holiday entitlement of 30 days 
until 1993 (cf. presse-dienst 12.12.1990, 14.12.1990,
18.12.1990, 19.12.1990). After protests (presse-dienst
10.9.1990) against Treuhand's liquidation policy.
Chancellor Kohl nominated IGCPK's chairman Rappe for the 
supervisory board of the Treuhand (cf. Handelsblatt
18.9.1990, p.l). In the author's questionnaire conducted 
with IGCPK's leadership they reported that the 
reconstruction of labour representation led to intensive 
cooperation between the unions, the employers and the 
Conservative-Liberal Government. The nomination of Rappe as 
the trade unions' representative on Treuhand's supervisory 
board was the result of the moderation of the IGCPK's 
policy and its uncompromising stance against left-wing 
ideology (Handelsblatt 19.9.1990, p.4). According to the 
IGCPK's leadership, the success had been the 'confirmation 
of its policy', of its proven responsibility during the 
transition period (presse-dienst 19.12.1990), and a symbol 
of an excellent and predictable employer-union 
relationship, vital for encouraging investments in the 
East.
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In January 1991 chairman Rappe (Handelsblatt 15.1.1991, 
p. 10) publicly underscored that the IGCPK's policy with 
regard to the question of ideology had been the right one. 
Right from the opening of the Wall, his organization had 
distanced itself from the communist groups. Rappe 
(Handelsblatt 15.1.1991, p.10) emphasised that the IGCPK 
believed in the social market economy. Referring to the 
achievements of his organization, Rappe appealed to West 
German employers to invest in the new Lander and demanded 
that the chemical plants stay in East Germany (presse- 
dienst 21.1.1991).
The end of the IGCGK came on the 30 January 1991, when its 
executive board decided on the dissolution of its legal 
existence on 31 May 1991, stating that the IGCPK had been 
the first DGB trade union to achieve the introduction of 
the West German industrial relations structures and 
collective agreement regulations. Thus the IGCGK's 
leadership called for a dissolving congress on 7 May 1991. 
The IGCGK's assets^were transferred to the IGCPK. By 
February 1991 130,000 East German workers had become
members (presse-dienst 30.1.1991, p.l and Handelsblatt
1.2.1991, p.5). Employment had dropped sharply. In late 
1989 about 310,000 people worked in the chemical industry, 
by January 1991 only 220,000 were employed. Referring to 
the severe decline in employment, Loschner requested the 
Conservative-Liberal Government to facilitate investments 
in the new Lander, and Rappe called for a labour market tax
225) These assets that were based on members' dues.
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of the self-employed and permanent civil servants for 
subsequent spending in East Germany, and asked for public 
Hermes pledges for East German shipments to other East 
European countries (Handelsblatt 13.2.1991, p.3). The 
IGCPK's leadership invited Chancellor Kohl and Vice- 
Chancellor Genscher to visit the chemical locations in the 
new Lander and, received guarantees that the government 
would support the chemical region, which encouraged some 
investors to go East (cf. Leibfried 1991, p. 3 and 
Stuttgarter Zeitung 27.3.1991, p.13). Understandably, the 
most common fear of the workforce in East Germany centred 
on the issue of unemployment (Kromphardt and Bruno 1990, 
p.59). The author's questionnaire conducted with East 
German labour delegates and the subsequent interviews 
conducted revealed that the IGCPK's good relationship with 
the Government and with the employers enhanced the 
expectations of the East German workforce that the conduct 
of corporatism could ease the impact of unemployment by 
investments.
In April 1991 the IGCPK and the chemical employers' 
association conducted a bargaining round, agreeing on wages 
at about 55 per cent of the West German level (presse- 
dienst 23.1.1991). In contrast to the case with other trade 
unions, neither the social partners tied the East German 
remuneration packages to the changes in West Germany. 
According to the IGCPK and the employers' association 
(Handelsblatt 8.5.1991, p.4), this system offered the 
advantage of joint review sessions on the impact of the
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recovery process in the chemical industry with the 
possibility of flexible wage adjustments. The Handelsblatt 
(8.5.1991, p.4) argued that the social partners conducted 
the collective bargaining with the objective of not 
engendering additional unemployment. To mitigate the impact 
of unemployment and a further deterioration of skills, the 
Treuhand, the IGCPK and the employers' associations agreed 
to found and support employment companies (cf. Handelsblatt
15.2.1991, p.5). In order to participate financially in
these employment companies, the IGCPK's leadership 
submitted a proposal to the all-German trade union congress 
to amend the by-laws (Handelsblatt 27.5.1991, p.4).
On 7 April 1991 the IGCGK unanimously dissolved its legal 
entity (Stuttgarter Zeitung 8.5.1991, p.13), and called 
upon the East German workforce to join IGCPK.
The motto of the IGCPK's all-German trade union congress 
was 'a strong and democratic trade union in all of 
Germany. ' Some days before, with reference to its West 
German membership, the IGCPK's leadership proclaimed that, 
despite the participation of representatives from the East 
the congress would be determined by the IGCPK's approved 
course of social partnership (Handelsblatt 19.6.1991, p.4). 
The IGCPK's leadership made it plain that it expected the 
East German members had joined in order to follow the 
approved course and policy. With one exception, the 
delegates overwhelmingly approved the IGCPK's policy and 
its reconstruction strategy in East Germany. According to
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Schultze (IGCPK Erôffnungsveranstaltung 18.6.1991, p.18), 
by the beginning of the congress 155,874 East German 
workers had joined the IGCPK (with a trade union density of 
73.5% in East Germany).226
A lively debate took place, as the delegates critically 
discussed the nomination of Loschner and Junge as members 
of the executive board. Loschner, the subject of the 
debate, had been vice-chairman of the FDGB's chemical 
department for agitation and propaganda, and a member of 
the SED. Some delegates described the nomination, 
especially of Loschner as a dilemma, within the IGCPK. The 
union on the one hand was keeping a clear distance from the 
SED, the STASI and old FDGB, an important yardstick for the 
reconstruction efforts. On the other hand, the nomination 
of former SED and FDGB members for leading positions within 
the IGCPK was supported by the IGCPK's leadership. Rappe 
dismissed the arguments against the election of Junge and 
Loschner by granting everyone a 'right to err' (Stuttgarter 
Zeitung 25.6.1991, p.2). Rappe emphasised that the clearly 
democratic way of incorporating the East German workforce 
called for appropriate representation on the executive 
board227 (cf. Die Rheinpfalz 25.6.1991) by people who had 
proved their determination in the reconstruction of labour 
representation. Despite stated anti-FDGB sentiments on the
226) Cf. Letter of IGCPK Hauptverwaltung, Vorstands- 
bereich 3, Organization - Arbeitssicherheit, p.2.
227) When criticised for the policy to elect former
FDGB personnel on IGCPK's executive board, Rappe (Die 
Rheinpfalz 25.6.1991) told the delegates that the 
IGCPK's strategy was not one of a 'cold 
incorporation', but one which respected the interests 
of the Eastern membership.
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part the delegates, Loschner (59.3%) and Junge (70.9) were 
elected on the executive board. The West German executives, 
their policy, and their strategy to incorporate the East 
German workforce were impressively approved by the all- 
German congress (e.g. Rappe 88.7%, Schultze 87,7%, Terbrack 
98,4%). Thus we argue that the results of their re-election 
are an indicator of the approval of the reconstruction 
efforts. Incorporating East German representatives on the 
executive board was the end of the IGCPK's reconstruction 
strategy.
The IGCPK's financial executive Schafer (Handelsblatt
25.6.1991, p.4) welcomed the fact that it would be possible 
to finance the reconstruction of the East German labour 
representation (about 6.9 Mill. DM) solely by the IGCGK, 
and that it would be possible to transfer about 5 Million 
German Marks to the IGCPK's endowed institute of 'Labour 
and Environment' (IGCPK Eroffnungsprotokoll 24.6.1991, p.13 
and Schafer 1991, p.13). Interviews conducted by the author 
confirmed that the East and West German union delegates 
were pleased about the financial situation, especially the 
former, as they were entering the new organization 'without 
empty hands.' The author's interviews with East German 
union delegates revealed sentiments of pride and self­
esteem insofar as they were not joining the IGCPK as 
'petitioners.'
In an address at the all-German conference Rappe stated 
(Gewerkschaftliche Umschau 4/1991, p.12) that the
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reconstruction efforts in 1989 and 1990 had enforced 
discipline within the IGCPK. The collapse of socialism, the 
apprehension of undercutting and the exercise of solidarity 
caused an immediate end to the political and theoretical 
discussions of the 1970s (cf. Markovits 1986, pp.291-326). 
The author's interview conducted with Terbrack confirmed 
Rappe's assessment of the reconstruction process that the 
executive board's early and determined intervention 
improved its authority within the organization and the 
level of centralisation of decision-making. Assessing the 
results of elections within both unions, the existence of 
just 17 grievances in three years (cf. Krenning, IGCPK 
Erôffnungsveranstaltung 23.6.1991, p.53) indicates a strong 
organizational cohesion.
Finally, in the assessment of interventionist categories we 
will refer to personal aspirations in the reconstruction 
efforts. On the part of the former West German IGCPK 
officers, particularly members of the advisory departments 
and the personal assistants to the executive board have 
been promoted, a result of the unification efforts. The 
questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's leadership 
revealed that personal aspirations were a motivation for 
the intervention.
(q ) Summarv
In comparison with other trade unions, the IGCPK conducted 
the most determined strategy to secure its organizational
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survival by incorporating the East German workforce. As 
defining interests in collective terms was a force to 
maintain union cohesion, the IGCPK leadership worked hard 
to protect against erosion in the provision of collective 
benefits. In their reconstruction efforts the IGCPK set up 
information offices in the former GDR, thus putting 
pressure on the IGCGK to undergo a drastic reform process. 
To please the employers and to improve the potential for 
further white-collar recruitments, the IGCPK condemned 
socialist ideology and the representatives of the SED and 
FDGB. The IGCPK was very active in the employers' market, 
offering the continuation of social partnership to gain 
recognition and thus to secure a near-monopoly in union 
representation. The closing of the existing wage gap, and 
also offering selective incentives in order to attract the 
East German workers were of the utmost importance. Despite 
the protection of neo-corporatist results, other 
interventionist categories were the pooling of political 
strength, the advancement of personal interests of trade 
union personnel, the realisation of synergy effects in the 
long run, and offering solidarity to the East German 
workforce.
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1.2. IG MetalKW^: Unification as a hostile take-over 
{i) Introduction
According to the document analysis conducted by Wilke and 
Müller (1991, p.200), the IGM(W) leadership's image of the 
GDR consisted of a belief mainly in the solid power of the 
SED. This is why the IGM(W) was slow in realising the 
importance of events in the GDR such as the crumbling of 
the SED's power and the exodus of the East German people. 
Suddenly, with the dismantling of the Hungarian frontier 
defence in May 1989, and the occupation of West German 
embassies in Warsaw, Budapest and Prague in Summer 1989 by 
East German citizens, a new political constellation 
appeared, and the 'German question' arose. After 
experiencing 40 years of strict, stabilising control by the 
SED, the West German SPD and activist labour leaders could 
not realise^that the decay of the GDR did change to 
lethargy and agony (Wilke and Müller 1991, p.200).
The perplexity of West German Social Democratic and left- 
wing trade union functionaries coincided with the events of 
the democratic upheaval on 9 October 1989. For more than 
two decades they had improved their relationship with the 
SED and FDGB leaders, as the one and only political power 
in the GDR. Schmidt and Tiemann (1991) claimed that some 
activist trade union leaders were worried about the
228) An indication of the dismissal of the 'open German 
question' by the Left is shaped by election results 
in East and West Germany after the collapse of the 
GDR (cf. Brandt 1990, p.19).
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collapse of socialism with its potentially negative 
repercussions on the incorporating force of socialist 
ideology and thus on the activist unions' cohesion (cf.
Brandt 1990, p.20).
In the chapter on the main determinants of the
reconstruction process we concluded that the 
inappropriateness of the reforms conducted by the SED and 
the FDGB also centred on the East German workforce's demand 
for improved material wealth^^B by introducing the social 
market economy (cf. Grebing 1990, pp.78-83). The stated
dissatisfaction of the East German workforce with the 
former system, institutions and representatives made the 
attractiveness of the West German trade unions all the
stronger.
In the predictive strategy model the author assumed that 
the IGM(W)'s leadership would intervene in the GDR to 
secure the results of West German collective bargaining for 
its West German membership. The argument for the protection 
of neo-corporatism referred to the policy applied by the 
leadership of the IGM(W) to fend off decentralisation 
demands from the confident rank-and-file by means of 
attractive bargaining results.
Thus we have to test, first, how IGM(W)'s leadership was 
able to fend off decentralisation attempts by its
229) The evidence for this assumption is shaped by the 
East German election results as well as the stated 
demand to introduce the D-Mark.
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membership and, second, how IGM(W) dealt with the threat 
that the collapse of socialism could weaken the 
organizational cohesion. In the analysis we will try to 
apply Turner's (1952) interventionist argument and the 
interventionist motive of solidarity.
fii) The unification strategy
From 22 to 28 October 1989 the IGM(W) convoked its 16th 
ordinary congress, formulating guidelines, for the IGM(W) 
leadership's relationship with the IGM(E)'s executives 
which proved to be durable for a long period^^O. The apex 
of this congress was the IGM(W) chairman Steinkühler's 
declaration of policy welcoming (IGM Protokoll 22.- 
28.10.1989, p.321) the 'determined departure of Stalinist 
communist perversities of socialist thoughts' and pushing 
back the 'arrogance of the regime.' According to 
Steinkühler (IGM Protokoll 22.-28.10.1989, p.325), the 
'collapse of so-called real existing socialism is by no 
means a defeat of socialism. And it is by far no victory of 
capitalism... . Capitalism has not succeeded socialism, but 
the idea of democracy has triumphed over dictatorship.' The 
collapse of the countries in the East meant, Steinkühler 
continued, that: 'Capitalists of the world unite ... . The 
problems of a modern economy cannot be solved in the long 
run by capitalism or by a free market economy. 
...Democratic socialism is not out-dated, what is out are
230) The congress had initially taken place on 22-28 
October 1989. An extension had subsequently been 
necessary on 21-22 November 1989, as the delegates 
had run out of time to consider all the motions.
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Stalinism and bureaucratic dogmatism' (IGM(W) Protokoll 
22.-28.10.1989, p.327).
a^  The democratic Socialism
Given Steinkühler's statement we have to raise the question 
why he argued that democratic socialism 'is not out-date'? 
In contrast to the accommodâtionist trade unions, the 
author assumes that the collapse of the East German 
socialist system could cause harm to the IGM(W)'s 
integrating force of left-wing ideology used to secure the 
cohesion of its strong self-confident and socialist-minded 
membership.231 For many activist trade unions in capitalist 
societies socialism has been a moral belief and a rationale 
for their daily trade union actions (cf. von Beyme 1990a, 
p.98). The break-up of the GDR discredited the moral belief 
in socialism (Weber 1990, p.49), thus the IGM(W) leadership 
(Bleicher 1990a, p.19 and Blessing 1990, pp.2-9) started to 
assert that Honecker had perverted socialism by 
dictatorship. As was stated in the chapter on the legacy of 
low trust, the past socialist ideology in the GDR had 
ceased to have any moral force. In the case of the West 
German membership, however, socialism was an integrating
231) Indications of the integrating force of left-wing 
ideology in IGM(W) were or have been; since 1920 
Naphtali's 'Wirtschaftsdemokratie', 1945: 
nationalisation of production, 1948: a certain 
sort of socialism within 'organized capitalism', 
Munich Congress 1949 'third way', 1951 the 'battle 
against profit', promotion of the coop enterprise 
system, criticism of emergency laws, 1954 Agartz's 
'expansive wage policy', 1970 backing of Brand's 
Ostpolitik, 1977 'excessive egalitarianism', 1980 
ecology and demonstration against missiles in Europe.
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force to secure the cohesion of the activist unions. Wilke 
and Müller (1991, p.200) confirm this assessment, referring 
to the IGM(W)'s membership composition, which consists 
predominantly of blue-collar workers with strong socialist 
sympathizers among its shopfloor organization.
At the union congress Steinkühler (1989, p.8) emphasised 
that a 'German reunification debate would impede the 
development of reforms in the GDR rather than supporting 
them. The independence and sovereignty of the GDR within 
guarantied frontiers is the precondition that the people in 
the GDR can determine their own way. ... It is a fact that 
a change in the GDR is impossible without the SED.' 
Steinkühler (1989, p.9) stated that his organization does 
'not interfere. ... Independent trade unions and the right 
to call strikes are parts of each democratic order. It is 
the FDGB's task to undergo this way. ... The organizational 
structure they choose is their decision. I only can advise 
them to assess the historic experience of unitary unionism 
in the Federal Republic.' The IGM(W)'s leadership launched 
a discussion on the 'third way' (cf. Sik 1965) as a 
desirable system for the GDR to demonstrate its 
organization's 'challenger-of-the-system image' (Markovits 
1987, p.184) as well as to appeal to the integrative force 
of socialist ideology of its membership.
Having experienced the emotional scenes caused by the 
dismantling of the Iron Curtain in Berlin, Steinkühler 
(1989, p.8) dismissed the widespread joy as 'bawling German
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sentiments.' Finally Steinkühler (1990, p.l) drew attention 
to the danger that the collapse of socialism could be
exploited by the IGM(W)'s conservative opponents, helping 
to impede the introduction of the 35-hour week in the West, 
and that employers could view the GDR as a ' low wage 
country' with repercussions to the FRG. A resolution's^ 
passed by the IGM(W)'s congress warned 'of innumerable
attempts launched predominantly from the conservative side 
to force their conception of the political and economic
system on the East German population from outside.'
The lGM(W)'s early policy was determined by the threats to 
its cohesion in the form of the deterioration of socialism 
as an incorporating force and the impact of economic 
repercussions from East Germany on the IGM(W)'s conduct of 
collective bargaining in the West (von Beyme 1990, pp.101- 
102).
Now we will analyse Steinkühler's statements, which caused
perplexity especially on the part of the East German
population and to some extent on the part of the West
German membership.
First, the author's interviews with East German IGM(W) 
delegates revealed that the statement of 'bawling German 
sentiments' was perceived as a criticism of the peaceful
revolution conducted by the East German population.
Matschie and Schmidt (1990, p.385) confirm the lack of
232) Cf. Resolution des IGM-Gewerkschaftstages zur 
Entwicklung in der DDR, 21./22.10.1989, p.2.
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perceptiveness among West German union executives in the 
case of some DGB unions. The criticism made by Matschie and 
Schmidt (1990, p.385) concerned the insufficient 
appreciation of the revolutionary efforts and the extent of 
tutelage during the reconstruction period by some West 
German union leaders.
Second, the IGM(W)'s East German delegates partly 
criticised the IGM(W)'s inertia and reliance on the SED and 
FDGB to conduct the necessary reforms in the GDR and to 
issue a modest condemnation of the low trust system. 
Regarding the chapter on the legacy of low trust and the 
FDGB's inappropriate reforms the East German workforce 
showed some confusion towards the IGM(W)'s stated 
expectations that the staff of the FDGB and the SED would 
undergo drastic reforms, and relinquish the low trust 
system. Niedenhoff and Wilke (1990, p.183) report the 
growing insecurity of democratic forces in the East 
resulting from the IGM(W) union functionaries' stated 
opinion about the reformability of the former leadership 
(cf. Der Gewerkschafter 2/1990, p.2), and particularly that 
'a change in the GDR is impossible without the SED' 
(Steinkühler 1989, p.9).
The IGM(W)'s stance was determined by respect for the SED 
and especially for the SED reformers (Schwarze 1989, p.l). 
To explain the IGM(W)'s consideration of the SED leadership 
we refer to Brand's conduct of the 'East Policy.' With the 
start of the 'East Policy' the IGM(W) and some activist
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unions had made considerable personal investments in
building up links with GDR representatives and the FDGB. 
The personal links with representatives of the former GDR 
and the advocation of socialist ideology explain the 
activists' early inertia in the process of labour
representation in the GDR, when the problem arose how the 
union leadership should deal with the FDGB (cf. von Beyme 
1990a, p.95).
Given these arguments for the early inertia of the IGM(W), 
we assess the alternative option of an early intervention 
in the East, which might have been dismissed especially by 
the lGM(W)'s strong shop-floor organization as an anti- 
solidaristic and anti-socialist policy. As socialism had 
been an integrative force in the policy of the activist 
trade unions, and the IGM(W) had developed links with the 
SED and FDGB over the years, interference within the sphere 
of influence of the East German institutions could have 
undermined the IGM(W)'s moral authority regarding
solidarity between East and West German unions (cf. Dëubler
1989, p.153).
Third, the author's interviews conducted with East German 
labour delegates revealed that the IGM(W)'s condemnation of 
the West German system caused some perplexity on the part 
of the East German workforce. Wilke and Müller (1991, 
p.203) support this view referring to the fact that after 
the dismantling of the Wall the East German population made 
intensive use of the opportunity to visit the West and
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admired the 'general wealth' generated by the West German 
economic system. East German realisation of the extent of 
Western wealth triggered, according to von Beyme (1990a, 
p. 101), demands by the majority of the East German 
population for a 'desired interference' by Western
institutions and the introduction of the social market 
economy (cf. Grebing 1990, p.78). Table 17 illustrates the 
East German labour delegates' demands for material 
wealth^SS, and thus gives evidence for the attractiveness 
of the West German economic system.
Table 17: The desirability of the economic svstem in the
GDR
Please indicate which economic system you prefer?
Ratings Frequency in per cent
West German system 72.2
East German system 9.7
'third way' 3.7
Other system 2.3
Do not know 6.5
No answer 5.6
N = 216 100
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with East German 
IGM(W) delegates
The answer in favour of the West German system is explained 
by the attractiveness of the income and wealth accumulated 
in the West, and the overall effectiveness of the Western 
system in comparison with the East German worker's
233) The author assumes that the stated demand referred to 
the objective of the labour delegates to receive high 
wages.
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situation (cf. Froese 1990, pp.6-8). Referring to the 
stated preference of the West German system by the East 
German workforce and the results of the East German 
elections, Wilke and Müller (1991, p.203) described the 
IGM(W) leadership's condemnation of the West German system 
as a 'tutelage' of the East German workforce. Wilke and 
Müller (1991, p.203) argued that the IGM(W) leadership 
misread the desires of the East German workforce by 
propagating 'foggy utopian' systems, such as the 'third 
way' approaches which were not of interest in the 
reconstruction efforts of all East European countries (von 
Beyme 1990, p.338).
Steinkühler's praise of democratic socialism or the 'third 
way' had some effect on the perception of the IGM(W) by the 
East German workforce, as follows:
First, Niedenhoff and Wilke (1990, p.183) report that it 
reduced the IGM(W)'s esteem in the GDR, as the former STAS I 
minister Wolf^^^ welcomed Steinkühler's advocacy of 
socialism. Further, in the author's sample the great 
majority of the East German labour delegates were not 
interested in achieving democratic socialism, their 
concerns centred on how to secure employment and social 
security (cf. Table 10), rebuild workable labour 
representation, and improve the poor living and working 
conditions in the GDR, as the author's interviews 
confirmed.
234) Cf. Wolf, M. (1989), 'Die Zeit kann davonlaufen'. In 
Unsere Zeit (24.11.1989), p.3.
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Heym (1990, p.4) underscores the rejection of a system of 
democratic socialism in interviews conducted with East 
German metalworkers by the following stated opinion; 'We 
had socialism for forty years, now we want consumption and 
the same system which operates in the West.' Heym (1990, 
p. 16) exemplified the feelings of most East German people 
by the bread-and-butter question. If the East German 
workforce had the same wages, prices, supply and currency, 
'then all the pressure emerging from the slogan of 
'reunification' creating unrest in the GDR' would not have 
arisen (Heym 1990, p.16). Heym (1990, p.16) pointed out to 
the IGM(W)'s executives that, if the GDR reached the same 
level of wealth as in the FRG, the East German workforce 
would not undercut the West German wages. Advocating 'third 
way' ideology caused some irritation on the part of the 
East German workforce, as their interests had been 
intensely focused on improvements in the accumulation of 
their material wealth.
Second, an intensive discussion^concerning the 'third 
way' was launched within the DGB, mostly condemning the 
IGM(W)'s approach and demanding that some DGB affiliates 
should think about their 'self-evidence'within the FRG 
(Wunder 1989, p.714), as 'socialism has become a synonym 
for reprisals against the population' (Blessing 1990, p.3).
235) Cf. von Beyme (1990) von Beyme (1990a), Pehl (1990), 
Bierbaum and Wendel (1990), Breit (1990), Hemmer 
(1989), Romer (1990), Wunder (1989), Blessing (1990).
236) The connotation 'self-evidence' refers to the 
activist trade unions' reliance on their 
organizational strength and militancy as indicators 
of their image as a countervailing power.
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Several union leaders participated, and stated their 
concern that this approach could violate the 
encompassiveness of a union (cf. von Beyme 1990a, p.98). 
They thus dismissed the 'third way' theme that the unions 
of today do not need new 'visions of a society' (Pehl 1990, 
p. 135), as the people in the East have just dismantled the 
system of socialism as it really existed. Wunder (1989, 
p. 716) argued that the future of encompassing trade 
unionism will focus on the application of social 
partnership, and not on the 'ideology of anti-capitalism.'
Now we will look at explanations for the IGM(W)'s early 
policy. The first explanation is described as the 
continuation of a historic obligation of being perceived by 
the West German workforce as the 'challenger of the system' 
(Markovits 1986, p.184), as the author's questionnaire 
conducted with the IGM(W)'s leadership revealed. The IGM(W) 
leadership stated that it had to take this stance in order 
to present a strong countervailing power to the dominant 
interests of capitalism in the FRG. In the author's 
interviews with IGM(W) union officers it was confirmed that 
left-wing ideology was a force to secure the cohesion of 
the organization, and that the collapse of socialism could 
have caused the disintegration of the union. An explanation 
for the demonstration of distance towards the West German 
system is that the blue-collar workers still account for 
about 85 per cent of the IGM(W)'s membership. On the other 
hand, the application of a left-wing profile could account 
for the lack of white-collar participation within the
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IGM(W) f and in comparison with the IGCPK it possibly
explains the IGM(W)'s poor recruitment record in this area
of a remunerative and growing potential membership (cf. 
Bleicher 1989, p.29 and Der Spiegel 24.9.1990, p.149).
The IGM(W)'s application of socialist ideology was a means 
to secure the organizational coherence of its socially
minded blue-collar workers. In an article Bleicher^^? 
(1990a, p.9) stated that the IGM(W) 'does not see any
reason to draw consequences from the defeat of bureaucratic 
socialism', which indicated that at present the IGM(W) did 
not see an alternative to renouncing socialist ideology as 
an integrating force in the West, as trade union strength 
predominantly rests on the socialist-minded shopfloor 
organization. In the author's questionnaire conducted with 
the IGM(W)'s leadership it was reported that ideology and 
the results achieved in collective bargaining accounted for 
the organizational coherence that has been confirmed by 
Kern and Schumann (1990, p.127).
The collapse of the GDR and the West German coop enterprise 
system could have had severe repercussions on the 
integrative force of socialism, with its long-standing 
vision of a 'better society'. Since 1880 certain parts of 
the workforce have viewed socialism as a vision of the 
'better society', and the application of solidarity as a 
moral idea of a higher objective, which was the 'better 
society' (cf. Klaus 1976). Thus we argue that the IGM(W)
237) IGM(W) executive with special reference to white- 
collar recruitment and representation.
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leadership's advocacy of a 'third way' was rational, as 
because of the collapse of the GDR socialism, the 
workforce's long-term vision of a 'better society' could 
have eroded moral belief in solidarity. If belief in 
solidarity and the vision of a 'better society' is 
weakened, we assume negative effects on the union's 
cohesion, especially among the West German blue-collar 
workers with strongly socialist sympathizers among the shop 
stewards. Thus the target audience for the 'third way' was 
the IGM(W)'s West German socialist-minded membership.
Summarising the IGM(W) leadership's 'third way' approach, 
we conclude that, in the case of the vast majority of the 
East German workforce, the past socialist ideology had lost 
its attraction. However, regarding the significance of 
socialist ideology, the 'third way' approach was an attempt 
to restore a vision of a 'better society' in the West even 
after East German socialism became discredited by 
revelation of the scandals. Thus we assume that the 
IGM(W)'s leadership advocated third way ideology in order 
to win the cooperation of the socialist-minded rank-and- 
file, and hence to avoid sectionalism within the West 
German encompassing union body.
b) The significance of collective bargaining
Von Beyme (1990, p.336) argues that the IGM(W)'s stated 
concern that a lack of ideology causes the emergence of 
sectional interests and will be exploited by the management
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is exaggerated^^®, as employers have learnt that 
centralised collective bargaining with an encompassing 
union has proved that it generates advantages in comparison 
with other countries (e.g. a good Okun-index). Not just the 
employers have learnt to appreciate the economic outcome of 
collective bargaining, but also the IGM(W)'s membership. 
This is of importance in the case of an activist trade 
union, as the positive accomplishments of centralised 
collective bargaining have enabled the leadership to fend 
off demands (e.g., in the case of the IGM(W) for 
decentralisation) from sections of the militant shopfloor. 
Thus the author argues that the economic repercussions from 
the disintegration of the GDR could have had severe impacts 
on the results of collective bargaining, and thus on the 
cohesion of the IGM(W).
As good economic results (e.g. a good Okun-idex) can 
prevent sectionalism within the union (cf. Streeck, 1981a, 
p.155) and thus the possibility of rent-seeking behaviour 
of the various groups, we have to test to what extent the 
IGM(W) membership defines their expectations for collective 
bargaining in collective goods. This is of importance, as 
the disintegration of the GDR could have influenced 
collective bargaining, and thus provision of collective 
goods. Thus we have to test the validity of the argument
238) Bayer (1990, p.945) analysed the IGM(W)'s support of 
a 'third way' as a step towards an erosion of 
'the highly institutionalised industrial relations 
system in the FRG.' The fear that the collapse of 
socialism might hamper cohesion, the IGM(W)'s 
leadership aimed at keeping up centralisation, and 
the analysis of internal documents do not confirm 
Bayer's assertion.
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that the protection afforded by neo-corporatism is an 
objective worth protecting. Table 18 indicates that to a 
certain degree the IGM(W)'s membership is able to determine 
the bargaining outcome in collective terms.
Table 18: The economic effects of IGMfWÏ's collective
bargaining
Please tick. What is the outcome of IGM(W)'s collective 
bargaining
Ratings Frequency in per cent
low inflation 2.1
low strike record 7.7
low unemployment record 6.0
comparatively high wages 27.5
combination of high wages, low inflation, 
low strike record, low unemployment record 48.9
no answer 7.7
N = 182 99.9
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with West German 
IGM members
Table 18 shows that virtually half of the IGM(W) 's 
membership in the author's sample is aware of the 
bargaining results which are congruent with a good Okun- 
index. To support the assumption that good economic results 
in the form of collective benefits will fend off 
sectionalism and can generate union attractiveness, we have 
to assess the desirability of the economic achievements by 
the IGM(W) membership. This is of importance, as the 
disintegration of the GDR might have undermined the 
provision of such goods (e.g. by competition in the
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employers' market) with repercussions on the IGM(W)'s level 
of centralisation and its cohesion.
collective baraainina with reference to the economic
outcome
Considering the experience and economic outcomes of
collective bargaining, continuation is (please tick):
Ratings Frequency in per cent
desirable 
partly desirable 
undecided 
undesirable 
no answer
57.7
20.9
10.4
8.8
2.2
N = 182 100
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with West German 
IGM members
Analysing the results of table 18 with 19, we report that 
those members who appreciate the public good outcome of 
collective bargaining showed the highest level of 
satisfaction with the IGM(W)'s conduct of collective 
bargaining. Thus we argue that a considerable proportion of 
the IGM(W)'s membership defines its expectations from 
collective bargaining in collective terms. Markovits (1986, 
p.184) supports this argument that through the outcome of 
collective bargaining the IGM(W) has projected 'itself as a 
responsible and legitimate actor within the parameters' of 
West German industrial relations. Table 19 underscores the 
fact that a large proportion of the author's sample of the 
IGM(W)'s members (78.6%) described the continuation of
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collective bargaining by the IGM(W) with its economic 
results as desirable or partly desirable. Thus a large 
proportion of the IGM(W)'s membership defines bargaining 
outcomes in collective terms, which is congruent with the 
IGM(W)'s responsible bargaining image.
If we assume that the IGM(W)'s leadership is interested in 
retaining their position and power base within the 
organization, it will protect the responsible bargaining 
image and thus the neo-corporatist industrial relations 
system with a good Okun-index to prevent a deterioration in 
the union's attractiveness. A failure in the provision of 
desirable economic results could result in increasing 
sectionalism and further decentralisation demands by the 
IGM(W)'s strong and self-confident shopfloor 
representatives. Such a failure might even give rise to 
growing non-unionism, with a subsequent deterioration in 
the union's cost function per capita. Now we will look at 
IGM(W)'s efforts to protect organizational cohesion.
c) The set-UD of plant partnerships
At the IGM(W) congress, its membership demanded against the 
recommendation of its leadership (they favoured the non­
intervention approach), to improve and intensify its 
'international contacts' with the GDR on the establishment, 
city and regional level (Die Tageszeitung 23.11.1989). 
According to Die Tageszeitung (23.11.1989), with this 
decision the IGM(W) leadership's international
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representation monopoly could have broken up with severe 
repercussions on the centralised decision-making process 
within the IGM(W). If IGM(W)'s leadership had not responded 
the threat of a resurgent East German shop floor could have 
emerged, and the danger of the militant West German shop 
floor could have linked up to challenge the IGM(W) 
leadership's corporatist policy.
Having experienced several attempts by the membership to 
achieve decentralisation^^^ in its history, the IGM(W)'s 
leadership responded by supporting the establishment of 
plant partnerships. In other words, fearing its rank-and- 
file's determination and experienced militancy, the 
IGM(W)'s leadership pursued a policy of demobilisation by 
supporting plant partnerships rather than risk a loss in 
control over its membership and thus centralised decision­
making. A loss in control and centralisation of a militant 
and self-confident shop floor could intensify the threat to 
the system of industry-wide regulation of wages by a more 
company-based collective bargainings^®. Decentralisation in 
collective bargaing could entail the loss of the positive 
public goods achieved by the application of corporatism.
Very soon partnerships emerged. The set-up of these 
partnerships was also initiated by the IGM(W)'s rank-and- 
file, and was the result of solidaristic sentiments with
239) Cf. Markovits (1987), 'betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik 
I960' cf. pp.193-195, 'wild cat strikes 1970' cf. 
pp.206-211.
240) Like the demand for the 'betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik', 
a way in which the rates shall be applied at the 
works level (Marsden 1978, p.10).
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their East German colleagues, as members of the IGM(W) 
stated in the author's questionnaire. Table 20 indicates 
that the establishment of the plant partnerships was 
predominantly determined by solidarity^^l with the East 
German workforce. Assessing the validity of these data, the 
author's subsequent interviews conducted with West German 
IGM(W) members confirmed their solidarity with the East 
German workforce.
Table 20: The motives for the establishment of plant
partnerships
Please indicate the motive for the establishment of the 
plant partnerships. Please tick.
Ratings Frequency in per cent
Solidarity with the East German colleagues 62.6
Prevention of undercutting of West German standards 8.8
Determined by the union leadership 6.6
Do not know 18.1
No answer 3.8
N = 182 99.9
Source: Author's questionnaire conducted with West German 
IGM(W) members
The IGM(W)'s leadership concentrated its efforts on 
assisting the process of internal reforms, within the 
IGM(E). The IGM(E) conducted internal reforms replacing the 
corrupt Nennstil by Bugiel. Bugiel made intensive use of 
the new freedom, demanding the autonomy of his organization
241) Despite the fact that the dominant objective was
the offering of solidarity, one should remember that 
IGM(E) had considerable assets.
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from the FDGB, especially financial a u t o n o m y . O n  6 
December 1989 the two metalworkers' unions became the first 
to enter into a formal cooperation agreement. The 
'immediate programme'comprised a series of measures of 
practical assistance and cooperation such as: - 'The
establishment of 225 'twinning arrangements' (European 
Industrial Relations Review, No. 193, 1990, p.5) between
East and West German metalworking establishments. This had 
been intended to foster an exchange of views and experience 
as well as provide measures of practical assistance for the 
representation of worker interests in East Germany. - Joint 
training sessions on plant-related issues and special 
seminars on the needs and problems of employee 
representation in East Germany (e.g., job design, appraisal 
and reward systems). - The mutual exchange of specialists 
and experts in areas such as organization, finance, 
membership, fees, training of union representatives.- A 
joint congress of collective bargaining policy experts 
(this was due to take place in January).- The IGM(W) will 
offer a trainee programme for union officials from all 
levels of the IGM(E). - The participants of IGM(W)'s 
Pichelsee training centre in Berlin (West) will be invited 
to visit plants in East Germany.' The 'immediate programme' 
was described as a 'first step' towards closer cooperation 
in the future (IGM(W) Sofortprogramm, 6.12.1989, p.l).
242) The demand for fiscal autonomy was an important 
factor in the disintegration of the FDGB and its 
subsequent dissolution.
243) Sofortprogramm der IG Metall, 6.12.1989, Berlin and 
Frankfurt.
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The author's interviews with the IGM(W) officers confirmed 
that the task of the 'immediate programme' consisted in 
seizing the initiative to secure the continuation of 
centralisation within the IGM(W) (cf. Wilke and Müller 
1991, p.204). Thus the immediate programme was the response 
of the IGM(W)'s leadership to remove the permanent strain 
imposed by the strong and self-confident West German 
shopfloor and hence to counter decentralisation efforts 
within the union.
After intensive consultation in the Kremlin, the SED Prime 
Minister Modrow answered Chancellor Kohl's 10-Point-Plan 
with the acceptance of reunification. With Modrow's 
proclamation the IGM(W)'s leadership acknowledged the 
forthcoming perspective of German reunification (metall
9.2.1990, p.3). On the same day, the FDGB convoked its 
congress and its new leadership recommended a general 
strike instead of conducting collective bargaining. The 
IGM(E)'s leadership warned the politicians and trade union 
leaders in the FRG not to underestimate the speed of the 
East German developments. Bugiel (metall 9.2.1990, p.9) 
emphasised that the plant partnerships were having 
extremely beneficial effects. He recommended that a growing 
together of the trade unions on the basis of the plant 
cooperation should be feasible.
With this background, the IGM(W) started to become more 
active. In an article Steinkühler (metall 9,2.1990, p.3) 
stated 'now we will intervene' as the 'German question is
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no longer open. The answer of the people is unequivocal. 
...Therefore it is even more necessary to have strong trade 
unions as a countervailing power in the FRG as well as in 
the GDR to prevent the threatening dismantlement of social 
welfare. This implies that the trade unions have to break 
completely with their past regarding policy, organization 
and personnel. The FDGB's congress was a start, but not a 
convincing one. We cannot have any trust in turncoats.' 
Steinkühler (metall 9.2.1990, p.3) justified the 
'interference' as necessary for reputation of his 
organization, and finally for the 'interests of our 
membership'.
We interpret the rationale for this change thus: the
planned economy was in retreat and collective bargaining 
was on the agenda for the first time. In order to avoid 
increased pressure from the IGM(E)'s collective bargaining 
attempts, the IGM(W) decided to support its sister
organization (Wilke and Müller 1991, p.206). Der Spiegel 
(22.1.1990, pp.101-102) commented that the IGM(W)'s
interference was an attempt to reduce the risk of wage- 
dumping by the influx of the East German workforce. The 
'interference' offered the IGM(W) the possibility to
influence the process of collective bargaining to protect 
its West German clientele as far as possible.
As outlined earlier, the IGM(W) struggled hard at the same 
time to introduce the 35-hour week. Especially the influx 
of East German personnel caused some fear on the part of
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the West German rank-and-file (cf. Table 21), as its impact 
could have postponed the realisation of the 35-hour week. 
The achievement of the 35-hour week had been important for 
the IGM(W) leadership, as it had been an important 
objective for the militant shopfloor organization (cf. 
Markovits 1990, p.149), and thus an integrating force to 
secure organizational coherence. If the IGM(W) did not 
achieve a considerable step towards this objective, 
sectionalism by the self-confident shopfloor might follow. 
Further, we have to take into consideration that poor 
results in the 35-hour week bargaining might have affected 
the IGM(W)'s image as the pace-maker within the activist 
movement, and as the 'first among equals within the DGB 
federation', and this might have had an impact on the 
union's attractiveness and thus on its cohesion.
Table 21; The IGM(W) membership's perception of 
undercutting
Please assess the possibility of undercutting and loss of 
welfare stemming from the collapse of the GDR. Please 
tick.
Ratings Frequency in per cent
very likely 32.4
likely 53.3
not likely 4.4
do not know 6.0
no answer 3.8
N — 182 99.9
Source; Author's questionnaire conducted with West German 
IGM(W) members
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Table 21 accounts for the fear of the author's sample of 
IGM(W)'s membership that the disintegration of the GDR 
would have some likely negative repercussions on the 
outcome of West German collective bargaining. The causes of 
this assessment centred predominantly on the following 
threats emanating from the East, as the author's 
questionnaire with West German IGM(W) members revealed: 
undercutting by the influx of the East German workforce, 
massive investments of the West German employers in the 
GDR, a divide-and-conquer policy by the management 
regarding the location of the plant (accelerating plant 
syndicalism). A common feature within the IGM(W) had been 
that the disintegration of the GDR would improve 
management's prerogatives and thus weaken the union's 
potential to act (cf. Wolf 1990, p.l. Wolf 1990b, pp.4-5), 
with an overall unfavourable outcome for collective 
bargaining.
The decision to offer support in form of the conduct of 
collective bargaining was based on the threat that the 
East-West wage disparity would have severe repercussions on 
the substantive outcome of collective representation in the 
West (Wolf 1990b, pp.4-5). In the author's interviews 
conducted with the IGM(W)'s leadership this threat was 
acknowledged and it was stated that the undercutting might 
erode the cohesion and the organizational strength of the 
union. In the author's interview Bleicher confirmed that 
high substantive outcomes of collective bargaining would 
intensify the IGM(W)'s attractiveness on the part of its
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membership and latent groups (membership market). The 
possible impact of competing in the membership and employer 
market might produce undesirable results in collective 
bargaining and thus cause a loss in the organizational 
strength of the union and possible increasing demands for 
decentralisation from the rank-and-file.
On 20 February the IGM(W)'s executive board passed a 
political position paper (Positionspapier der IG Metall 
20.2.1990), which for the first time acknowledged German 
reunification as an act of self-determination accepting the 
will of the East German population. The IGM(W)'s leadership 
recommended to the GDR the realisation of the 'economic 
democracy'^ . Further, the IGM(W) condemned attempts 
either to annex or to 'buy out' the GDR by West Germany. 
With these formulations the IGM(W) took over the programmes 
of the SED/PDS. The IGM(W) leadership demanded West German 
economic and financial support without any preconditions, 
but dismissed the immediate realisation of a monetary 
u n i o n . 245 Before this position paper was passed, the 
general election campaigns started during which the 
majority of the East German population chanted 'we are one 
nation'. The will of the vast majority of the East German 
workforce centred on achievement of the WWSU, namely the
244) 'Economic democracy' refers to a concept of Naphtali 
- a democratic alternative to Leninism, which places 
greatest emphasis on labour participation in the 
decision-making process of the economy.
245) The IGM(W)'s leadership dismissed the introduction of 
a monetary union as it would lead to an increase in 
unemployment, which would trigger a 'further influx 
of the workforce into the FRG', causing a 
deterioration in 'social security' (IGM(W) 
Positionspapier 20.2.1990, p.3).
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introduction of the D-Mark (cf. Eyde 1990, p.5), and thus 
the West German system.
Despite the massive influx of the East German workforce 
into the FRG, the IGM(W)'s leadership did not express any 
necessity to intervene immediately. In the position paper 
(20.2.1990, pp.6-7) Steinkühler did not see 'any 
alternative for the reconstruction of labour representation 
than the system practised in the FRG' and demanded that 
'the standards applied in the GDR should be at least on the 
same level as those in the FRG.' Steinkühler (IGM(W) 
Positionspapier 20.2.1990, p.3) warned of the impact of 
East-West mobility, which might be exploited by management 
calling for restraint in bargaining.
Given this statement we assume that an opening-up of the 
GDR could have eroded the IGM(W)'s representational power 
in the FRG. We argue this because wage bargaining restraint 
in West Germany could have resulted in decentralisation 
attempts by the self-confident shopfloor. On the issue of 
how to finance German unification, Steinkühler (IGM(W) 
Positionspapier 20.2.1990, p.8) dismissed all sacrifices on 
the part of the German workforce, stating that there would 
be 'neither a need for a clamp on wage increases nor 
specific taxation sacrifices of the workforce. The 
employers and the state have the capacity, to meet the 
desired demands without any particular strain.' Analysing 
the content of the position paper, we can deduce that East- 
West mobility could have eroded IGM(W)'s bargaining
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strength and thus could have led to restraints on 
collective bargaining results which might have produced 
dissatisfaction in the strong shopfloor. Further, we note a 
lack of solidarity with the East German workforce since 
Steinkühler dismissed any sacrifices on the part of the 
West German workforce to pay for the costs of 
reunification.
Assessing Steinkühler's statement, we assume that the lack 
of solidarity was based on the IGM(W) leadership's strong 
determination to protect the prosperity of its West German 
clientele in order to appeal to the substantive outcome of 
collective bargaining and the subsequent moderation of 
militancy on the shopfloor. Finally, the position paper 
(IGM(W) Positionspapier 20.2.1990, p.9) closes with the 
statement that 'we have no alternative' to the building-up 
of powerful unions to avoid a reduction in the established 
procedural and substantive achievements which have 
repercussions on both countries. Thus we conclude that the 
protection of the IGM(W)'s substantives and procedural 
objectives were of the utmost importance.
d) The open GDR flank
As a consequence to the influx of the East German workforce 
and the threat of wage dumping by the GDR, the IGM(W) 
reacted to 'protect the open GDR flank' (Wilke and Müller 
1991, p.207). Thus both metal trade unions in West and East 
Germany declared the necessity of a democratic renewal of
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the union movement in East Germany ^ and decided to set up 
information offices in the GDR. On 27 February an agreement 
was reached, followed by a 'joint d e c l a r a t i o n ' b y  the 
chairmen of the West and East German unions, Steinkühler 
and Bugiel respectively. Amongst the initiatives announced 
in the declaration were (IGM(W) Gemeinsame Erklarung
27.2.1990, pp.1-3): the establishment of joint committees 
to explore constitutional and organizational matters in the 
unions, plant-level representation and union policy towards 
German unification; and the establishment of information 
and advisory offices in eight East German cities^*?. The 
proclaimed role of these offices was to support the reform 
process of the IGM(E) towards a democratic, free and
independent organization. To avoid further East-West 
migration, both unions asked 'the people in the GDR not to 
leave the country.' Instead they were asked to 'take part 
very actively in the democratic, economic and social 
reconstruction of the GDR' (IGM(W) Gemeinsame Erklërung
27.2.1990, pp.2-3).
The 'joint declaration' continued that 'the wealth and
level of social protection in the FRG is not an automatic 
result of the market economy. It is the corollary of the 
struggle of strong trade unions for more than 40 years. A
market economy will be social only if it is designed and
limited by the social system and free, democratic.
246) See IGM(W) 'Gemeinsame Erklarung 27.2.1990', 
Frankfurt.
247) Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt 
(Chemnitz), Halle, Erfurt, Rostock and Magdeburg, 
cf. Stuttgarter Zeitung 1.3.1990, p.2.
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independent, and strong trade unions.' We assume that with 
this statement the IGM(W) tried to capture the interest of 
the East German workforce in the achievements of its 
organization (e.g. membership market). Despite the 
appreciation of the IGM(E)'s internal reforms, the IGM(W) 
could now massively intervene in its sister organization's 
jurisdiction by means of the information offices. The 
IGM(W) justified (Gemeinsame Erklërung, 27.2.1990, p.2) the 
establishment of the information offices with 'support of 
the reform process and preparation of the desired common 
representation of interests'. The establishment of 
'advisory information offices' in the GDR were an attempt 
to install preliminary organizational units, in case the 
IGM(E)'s reforms efforts should fail.
In the author's interview conducted with Bleicher the 
question was raised why the IGM(W) cooperated so long with 
its East German sister organization, particularly since it 
had been stated that one important priority of the IGM(W) 
had been to secure the establishment of the unitary union 
principle248 in the East. In this respect the IGM(W) 
concentrated its energies on assisting the IGM(E) rather 
than assisting the Independent Union Organizations (lUG) or 
splinter groupings. The avoidance of emerging multi­
unionism with fragmented bargaining was an objective, as 
the author's questionnaire with the IGM(W) leadership 
confirmed. In the author's interview Bleicher emphasised
248) Unitary unionism is a form of organization whereby 
one single union represents all grades of workers in 
an entire industry (one encompassing union).
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that fragmented bargaining could have had a severe adverse 
impact on future collective bargaining in the West. In line 
with Bleicher's answer, the European Industrial Relations 
Review (5/1990, pp.12-13) stated that 'while acknowledging 
the role of its Eastern sister as a 'transmission belt' of 
the SED, the IGM(W) nonetheless viewed the reform of the 
East German union as the most appropriate way of realising 
the unitary union. We expect that the rationale behind the 
IGM(W)'s support for its sister organization in the East 
was based on securing the monopolistic element in union 
representation with the intention of avoiding competition 
in the membership market and of closing the existing East- 
West wage gap. This meant avoiding competition by the 
unions in the membership and employer market and therefore 
securing the existence of the IGM(W)'s prerogative in its 
industries, as the author's questionnaire conducted with 
the IGM(W)'s leadership confirmed.
In the author's interview with Bleicher he stated that 
trade unions prefer a different approach to that which 
entrepreneurs take. Bleicher explained the IGM(W)'s 
reluctance firstly by the wish to avoid being viewed by the 
East German workforce as a 'missionary', and secondly by 
the lack of experience in the reconstruction of former 
transmission belt unions. A third argument in favour of a 
late intervention had been that intervening in the sphere 
of influence of a socialist sister organization could be 
misconceived by the IGM(W)'s socialist shopfloor as an 
anti-socialist event with negative repercussions on the
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force of left-wing ideology. Wolf (1990c, p.11) compared 
the IGM(W)'s early behaviour with a that of a 'tightrope 
walker' balancing between being viewed as an intruder or as 
a companion of low trust union. Regarding the IGM(W)'s 
'inertia' it was determined by ideological considerations. 
In the author's interview Bleicher emphasised that all 
decisions had taken place in circumstances of incomplete 
information and uncertainty.
e) The inappropriate reconstruction efforts
During the general elections campaign the IGM(E) 
distributed leaflets demanding an irreversible democratic 
and attractive socialism in the GDR. Regarding Modrow's 
joint-venture legislation, the IGM(E) leadership was still 
advocating the BGL system in favour of works councils. 
Referring to the IGM(E)'s model for trade union 
representation on the establishment level, Wilke and Müller 
(1991, p.208) point out that the IGM(E) avoided introducing 
any accountability for its officers. Despite some reforms 
within the IGM(E), this meant the continuation of the old 
low trust relationship.
The IGM(E) started as soon as March 1990 to conduct the 
first free bargaining (e.g. Stuttgarter Zeitung 1.3.1990a, 
p.13). But from the beginning collective bargaining was 
supported by the IGM(W), as the IGM(E)'s representatives 
virtually lacked any experience. According to the author's 
interview conducted with Ernst, the West German trade union
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representatives realised the totally insufficient 
bargaining ability and inappropriate policy of the IGM(E)'s 
representatives. Ernst confirmed in the author's interview 
that these two factors could have had severe negative 
repercussions on the substantive outcome of collective 
bargaining. If the outcomes of collective bargaining had 
not been attractive to the East German membership, Ernst 
assumed that decentralised bargaining and a further East- 
West migration would have emerged. Thus intensified 
decentralised bargaining by the inexperienced East German 
union officers or workers might have had adverse effects on 
the system of industry-wide regulation of wages in the 
West.
In the following weeks and months the desired reform 
process of organizational consolidation did not produce 
results, despite immense technical and personnel support 
(Schmitz and Tiemann 1990, p.1613). From December 1989 the 
IGM(W) recruited some of its former and already retired 
union officers (Der Gewerkschafter 1/90, p.8) for the task 
of supporting the transformation process in the IGM(E). 
According to the author's interview with Ernst, the idea 
was to support the sister organization in the GDR by 
minimising expenditure and by avoiding the drain on the 
IGM(W) personnel. The Stuttgart district, for example, 
deployed Eisenmann to the Dresden district (Thelen 1990, 
p.2), for the build-up of links between the IGM(W), the 
IGM(E) and the BGLs.
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The union officials in the GDR were reluctant to support 
the West German trade unionists. In the author's interview 
with Ernst, he related that the strategy of rebuilding the 
IGM(E) with the help of retired IGM(W) personnel failed 
because the IGM(E) officers treated the deployed West 
German union officers as less than sound. Most of them had 
not been provided with the necessary information, or had 
been deliberately isolated by the IGM(E)'s personnel, and 
thus they were forced to conduct face-to-face interviews 
using very few trade union members in the East. In this way 
the process of rebuilding trade unionism from below failed. 
Most of the reactivated union officers of the IGM(W) gave 
up their work after a short period. In the author's 
interview with Ernst he stated that the IGM(E)'s personnel 
deliberately debarred the West German unionists from access 
to the East German workforce to retain their influence and 
jobs. Given this kind of behaviour, we assume that the 
objective of the IGM(E) personnel was to insulate the West 
German representatives from possible recruitment in the 
East, thus building up a barrier to entry to the East 
German membership market. Wilke and Müller (1991, pp.208- 
210) confirm this assumption, as the policy of the IGM(E)'s 
officers towards the IGM(W)'s deployed personnel had been 
dominated by 'shielding' them from the East German 
workforce. As access to the membership market was protected 
by the IGM(E) staff, the West German union probably would 
not receive recognition by the employers, and thus the 
IGM(E)'s personnel could retain their positions.
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In early March 1990 Neues Forum did not have the necessary 
backing from the workforce, and Steinkühler admitted that 
the 'IG Metall understands best the wishes of the people in 
the GDR, which are for wealth and political freedom' 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 3.3.1990, p.18). During the same 
period, the IGM(W) conducted bargaining in the West on the 
35-hour issue, knowing that positive results would boost 
and demonstrate the 'independence' (Stuttgarter Zeitung
5.3.1990, p.l) of all DGB-affiliated unions in their own 
bargaining. Positive bargaining results, could mgke the 
organization of the DGB even more attractive with reference 
to 'all of Germany' (Stuttgarter Zeitung 5.3.1990a, p.3) 
for the membership market. The Stuttgarter Zeitung 
(5.3.1990a, p.3) confirms the significance of the 35-hour 
issue, as this principle was a means to fend off 
sectionalism within the unions and incorporate the militant 
rank-and-file. In the case of the West German militant 
membership the 35-hour issue turned out to be an 
integrating force, and in the case of the East German 
workforce to be a desirable objective which could enhance 
the IGM(W)'s attractiveness and thus boost union 
membership. Positive results and membership growth could 
stand for the continuation of corporatism and the 
realisation of synergy effects in the area of collective 
representation.
The first free general elections in the GDR revealed the 
will for unification of the East German population. 
Responding to the proclamation by the West German
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Employers' Association which called the outcome 'a clear 
vote for the social market economy' (Stuttgarter Zeitung
20.3.1990, p.11), the IGM(W)'s deputy chairman Zwickel 
stated (Stuttgarter Zeitung 21.3.1990, p.9) an 'urgent 
necessity' to make a 'quick social offensive' in the GDR to 
avoid the undermining of East and West German labour 
relations by conservative forces, meaning union competition 
in the employer market.
In an open letter to all companies Bugiel stated that the 
permanence of the nationalised companies was threatened. 
Bugiel claimed that it was the task of his organization to 
prevent an industrial West German take-over. On 1 March 
1990 the Modrow government set up the Treuhand in order to 
start with privatisation. In cases of privatisation the 
IGM(E) recommended the 'Sommerdaer codetermination model' 
(cf. Der Gewerkschafter 5b/1990, p.24). The IGM(E) would 
thus represent 2/3 of all advisory council members. We 
assume that the IGM(E)'s officers tried to secure their 
position within the companies by law in order to avoid 
competition for recognition by employers. The condemnation 
of the 'Sommerdaer' codetermination model by all DGB 
affiliates as an attempt to set up an 'apparatchik 
consolidation', the 'power-sustaining act of the FDGB 
causing a major barrier to the propensity to invest', and 
an 'anti-democratic act' (Bonner Rundschau 1.3.1990) 
confirms our assumption. Despite the arguments against the 
introduction of the 'Sommerdaer' model summarised above, 
the threat stated by the West German union leaders had been
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that, if the IGM(E) officers were able to achieve such a 
strategic position, it would be virtually impossible for 
the West German unions to receive recognition by the East 
German employers. In such a case the IGM(E) officers would 
hold a strategic position.
f^  The IGMfWVs distancing of itself from the IGM(E)
In early April 1990 Steinkühler together with Bugiel of the 
IGM(E) visited for the first time an automobile plant in 
the GDR. During the subsequent staff meeting the workforce 
harshly attacked Bugiel for inappropriate support and 
disarray concerning the directives on the issue of labour 
representation on the establishment level. One week the 
IGM(E)'s headquarters recommended the establishment of 
works councils, whereas the following week it put through a 
personnel change within the BGL. The workforce of the 
automobile plant urged Bugiel to back them, otherwise they 
would withhold their dues from the IGM(E) (Martens
6.4.1990, p.25). steinkühler's address to the workforce 
emphasised the comparatively high human abilities of the 
East German workforce. Martens (6.4.1990, p.25) reports 
that this was highly appreciated by the audience. 
Steinkühler also expressed the opinion that the workforce 
should not impede necessary rationalisations. According to 
Martens (6.4.1990, p.26-27) during this visit Steinkühler 
realised the East German metal workers' desire to join the 
IGM(W).
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From 1 April 1990 onwards IGM(W) deployed eight information 
buses with experienced labour representatives to support 
the East German workforce in cities in the GDR. By means of 
the IGM(W)'s information buses it was partly possible to 
bypass the IGM(E)'s functionaries and reach the East German 
rank-and-file (cf. Moller 1990, pp. 8-9), and thus to 
become more active in the membership market. The enhanced 
activities in the membership market were not just intended 
to bypass the IGM(E) officers' information policy and to 
avoid further recruitment by the DAG and Christian trade 
unions in the GDR. In this case the objective was to secure 
the concept of an encompassing unitary union (Der 
Gewerkschafter 4/1990, p.6). Bypassing the IGM(E) officers 
provided the possibility of two-way communications between 
the IGM(W) and the East German workforce. The metall 
(20.4.1991, p.10) stated that the IGM(W)'s deployed 
personnel and their experience were warmly welcomed.^49 
Huber (1991, pp.28-29) reported that the East German 
workforce condemned the IGM(E) functionaries' personal 
protection of their positions and their neglect of reforms 
and demanded the organizational build-up of IGM(W).
On 8 and 9 April 1990 the IGM(E) convened its union 
congress. This meeting, however, did not demonstrate a real 
will to reform on the part of the old FDGB leadership 
within the IGM(E). Old SED/FDGB cadres had been elected to 
the executive bodies of IGM(E). Schubert, the former
249) The necessary information had been welcomed, as
interviews with IGM(W)'s deployed personnel and East 
German IGM(W) members stated in interviews.
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secretary of the IGM(E) responsible for agitation and 
propaganda, became treasurer. The conference also decided 
not to ask union executives about their past (Wolf 1990c, 
pp. 12-13). Wolf (1990c, p.12) comments that the decisions 
of IGM(E)'s meeting indicate that 'at least on paper the 
IGM(E) distanced itself from the FDGB.' In an address 
Steinkühler stated (GruBwort 8.4.1990, p.2) that the German 
workforce in a united Germany needed a united IG Metall. 
Then he went on to criticise the IGM(E)'s functionaries, 
pointing out that trade union strength does not solely 
consist of high trade union density and the collection of 
dues. The strength of the organization was, rather, 
mirrored by the personal objectives, wishes and hopes of 
the vast majority of its membership. Steinkühler demanded 
that the IGM(E)'s functionaries should go to the sites, 
where they could meet their membership and hold discussions 
with them in order to restore lost credibility. In this 
address Steinkühler reminded the delegates that the East 
German rank-and-file still viewed the old organization with 
distrust. Wilke and Müller (1991, p.210) claim that 
Steinkühler was worried when the IGM(E)'s delegates called 
on its leadership to start with concrete steps for the 
preparation of trade union unity. Wilke and Müller (1991, 
p.210) stated that Steinkühler's worries focused on the 
difficulties of cooperating and uniting with the East 
German leadership and its inexperienced officers. As the 
IGM(E)'s personnel proved to be discredited and 
inexperienced, the IGM(W) could afford to intensify its own 
reconstruction efforts without being blamed as an intruder.
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If an encompassing industrial union wishes to avoid being 
accused of being an intruder, we argue that a two-tier 
membership would not be an acceptable strategy, given that 
all workers are citizens of a united Germany. A two-tier 
strategy would not have been viable for an industrial 
union. How could a trade union claim to stand for all 
workers in an industry, if the union was not willing to 
represent those in the former GDR and thus discriminated 
against them? In view of the situation of East German low 
trust industrial relations, and the structure of an 
encompassing industrial union, a strategy of intervention 
by incorporation would have to be based on moral authority. 
Acting on the grounds of moral authority could turn out to 
be a force to strengthen compliance and internal discipline 
within IGM(W)'s militant rank-and-file, without being 
blamed as an anti-socialist intruder.
More and more, the IGM(W)'s leadership distanced itself 
from its East German sister organization. As a result of 
the failure of the internal reforms within the IGM(E), 
despite some support by their West German sister 
organization, and the hatred (cf. Heym 1991, p.14) of the 
East German workforce for the insufficient reform 
performance of the FDGB and its affiliated unions, all the 
expectations and hopes of the East German workforce were 
concentrated on the IGM(W). In order not to be viewed as
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the partner of a hated^SO and unsuccessful organization 
(cf. Wolf 1990c, pp.9-11), the IGM(W) had to intervene 
massivelyZSl in organizational terms.
q ) The intervention in East Germany
The lGM(W)'s Memorandum (8.5.1991) was an initial step in 
assessing the economic and political environment in Germany 
as a corollary of the WWSU, the victory of the CDU/CSU, and 
the possibility of reunification (Memorandum 8.5.1990, 
p.l). In the Memorandum (8.5.1990, p. 4-5), the IGM(W) 
leadership stated that the strains emerging on both sides 
of the German workforce by the disintegration of the GDR 
and the subsequent reunification 'will best be solved by a 
common strong union movement with free, independent and 
encompassing affiliates.' As one overriding objective for 
the intervention in the East, the IGM(W)'s Memorandum 
(8.5.1990, pp.19-22) emphasised the 'rapid and complete' 
narrowing of the wage gap between East and West Germany as 
well as the avoidance of wage discrimination. The IGM(W) 
dismissed all attempts involving plant-related bargaining, 
as it would entail a weakening of the workforce. Rather, it 
fostered country-wide centralised bargaining (Memorandum
250) The IGM(W) leadership's decision to intervene was 
partly based on the 'Metall-Extra' questionnaire
on the sentiments of the East German metalworkers (as 
an internal document). In its analysis the conclusion 
had been to demonstrate distance towards the IGM(E) 
in order to prevent being also identified as a factor 
of low trust (e.g. Schmitz and Tiemann 1991, p.14).
251) In order to reach great parts of the East German 
workforce, the IGM(W)'s officers used several 
'information buses' in order to expand their 
mobility. Cf. Der Gewerkschafter (4/1990) 
'Gewerkschaftsarbeit in der DDR, p.6.
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8.5.1991, pp.20-21) in order to avoid decentralisation and 
extended plant syndicalism, as these could detract from the 
union's attractiveness in the West, as membership had grown 
accustomed to define interests in collective terms.
A further reason for the IGM(W)'s intervention in the GDR 
could be seen in the fact that in May 1990 a cooperation 
agreement was signed between the Engineering Employers' 
Federation, and the newly founded Metalworking Employers' 
Associations of East Germany. The European Industrial 
Relations Review (7/1990, pp.5-6) states that this employer 
agreement gave rise to the apprehension in union circles 
that the balance of power could turn in favour of the 
employers. The declared aims of the new employers' 
agreement were to further the interests of the metalworking 
and electrical industries in Germany jointly, to provide 
mutual support, and to prepare the ground for the entry of 
East German associations to the West German Engineering 
Employers' Association. For these purposes a joint office 
was set up in East Berlin.
According to reports (e.g. Der Gewerkschafter 4/1990, p.6), 
the IGM(W) legitimated its intervention in the GDR with the 
assertion that the Christian Trade Union Confederation and 
the DAG 'are undertaking enormous recruitment efforts in 
the GDR. The IGM(W)'s plan is still based on the belief of 
unitary unionism.' The IGM(W)'s Memorandum (8.5.1990, 
pp.38-39) was mainly concerned with the modalities of 
German reunification, and mentions implicitly the
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conditions set out by the IGM(W). It said (IGM 8.5.1991, 
pp.3 8 - 3 9 ) 'trade unions will only be successful, if they 
are founded as modern unitary unions. ... The unitary union 
system of the FRG has proved this over the last forty 
years. The unitary union is the result of the experience of 
the workforce before and after the Weimar Republic and the 
Nazi persecution. It encompasses the historical traditions, 
political movements and thoughts of the workforce within 
one organization. This is why union competition is 
superfluous.'
In the author's interview with Bleicher he emphasised that 
competition between trade unions in a neo-corporatist 
system cannot secure a stable solution in the membership 
and employer market. The Memorandum (IGM 8.5.1990, p.39) 
finished by saying: 'the further organizational decisions 
and steps towards realisation of unitary representation 
follow the path of unification between the IGM(E) and the 
IGM(W), a step in which the East German workforce will 
bring in its experiences and knowledge. ' Analysing the 
content of this Memorandum and Bleicher's statement, we 
argue that the aim of the IGM(W) was to protect the single 
union status and thus to secure the continuation of an 
encompassing and centralised trade union. The strategy 
entailed Turner's aspect of incorporation, as closing the 
wage gap had been of paramount importance for the 
subsequent policy of the union (cf. Wolf 1990h, pp.28-29).
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In the author's questionnaire conducted with the IGM(W)'s 
leadership the following reasons for the intervention were 
stated:
First, to secure the continuation of West German industrial 
relations, especially by introducing the proposed 35-hour 
week. This argument referred to likely undercutting of 
union demands or industrial relations standards by the 
employers (eg., 'sweetheart deals'). Features of such 
undercutting potentials were the existing wage gap, the 
influx of the East German workforce to the West and the 
existence of the IGM(E). The Stuttgarter Zeitung 
(26.5.1990, p.2) confirmed the features stated above.
Within this classification we can include the realisation 
that the IGM(E)'s personnel and leadership did not show 
sufficient will to reform and proved to be inexperienced in 
the new industrial relations system^S^. According to the 
IGM(W) leadership's assessment, both IGM(E) failures 
entailed the danger that the dissatisfaction voiced by the 
East German workforce might cause growing non-unionism (cf. 
Martens 6.4.1990, pp.25-27), a further influx of colleagues 
to the West, the emergence of grass-root unionism, and the 
erosion of the principle of an encompassing unitary union 
(e.g., by DAG recruitment efforts).
252) The IGM(E) personnel's inexperience is summarised by 
IGM(W) 'Umsetzung des personellen Konzeptes zur 
organisatorischen Neugliederung der IG Metall der 
DDR' (10.7.1990), and especially IGM(W) 'Mit- 
gliedererfassung und Aufbau einer Betriebsdatei für 
Mitglieder in der DDR' (2.7.1990).
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Further, the IGM(W)'s leadership reported that no workable 
systems of labour representation were operating in the GDR 
(cf. Wilmes 1990, p.5), posing the threat of negative 
effects on plant syndicalism (cf. Wolf 1990e, p.18). The 
IGM(E)'s inappropriate policy was also partly considered a 
barrier to necessary investments. Another important aspect 
was to avoid being engulfed by the IGM(E)'s 'abyss of low 
trust', with negative repercussions on its own recruitment 
efforts. To avoid an identification with low trust 
industrial relations and liability for the IGM(E) and the 
FDGB, the IGM(W) justified the adhesion of the East German 
membership (cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 26.5.1990, 
p. 3 and Stuttgarter Zeitung 26.5.1990, p.2). In an
interview Steinkühler (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
26.5.1990, p.3) confirmed the reasons given above by 
stating that the 'reconstruction aid of the IGM(W) is not 
solely based upon altruistic motives. The IGM(W)'s 
elementary interests are particularly affected by the 
developments in the GDR.'
Second, the exercise of solidarity with the East German 
workforce was stated as an objective for the intervention. 
Undoubtedly the exercise of solidarity by the West German 
rank-and-file was considerable, but all the papers 
published by the IGM(W)'s leadership stated that the West 
German workforce was not to finance the economic build-up 
of the former GDR (cf. Positionspapier 20.2.1990, p.8 and 
Memorandum 8.5.1990, p.10). We assume that offering 
solidarity to the East German metalworkers was based to a
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certain degree on tactics, as the IGM(W) discussed the 
introduction of a solidarity fund^^^, thus appealing to the 
East German membership market, but never implemented it 
(Bispinck 1991a, p.126). Analysing the content of various 
IGM(W) union documents, we argue that the IGM(W)'s strategy 
aimed to minimise the financial burden of the West German 
workforce during the unification process. On the other 
hand, the IGM(W)'s concept of industrial unionism meant 
representing the whole German workforce. Thus the 
intervention was based on a moral obligation. In this way 
the argument of avoiding a two-tier membership strategy was 
reconfirmed.
From early April 1990 onwards the IGM(W) mobilised its 
membership in warning strikes^^^, especially in the
district of Nordwürttemberg/Nordbaden, to press hard for 
the introduction of the 35-hour week. The problem was that 
time was running out for the IGM's bargaining experts, 
because the IGM(W)'s leadership expected them to prepare
and conduct collective bargaining on 1 June 1990 in the GDR
(Pappenheim 21.4.1990, p.17). Pappenheim (5.5.1990, p. 3) 
and Goodhart (9.5.1990, p.2) argued that this was one
reason for the quick and 'classic compromise' in the
Nordwürttemberg/Nordbaden area. The other bargaining areas
253) Cf. Die Zeit (2.3.1990, pp.41-42,), Die Zeit 
(9.3.1990, pp.26-27). The argument of this discussion 
was that IGM(W) should, together with the West German 
employers, allocate some of the benefits of the 1990 
wage round in a solidarity fund to finance East 
German reconstruction.
254) cf. stuttgarter Zeitung (12.4.1990, p.11),
(14.4.1990, p.14), (14.4.1990a, p.27), (23.4.1990, 
p.11), (24.4.1990, p.13).
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followed by accepting the compromise. This shows how much 
the events in the GDR influenced West German industrial 
relations, which were determined mainly by the lack of 
experts on the parts of the bargaining partners. Despite 
huge strike funds on the part of the IGM(W), the support of 
the sister organization in the GDR was expensive. In 
addition, the amendment of AFG §116 could have withered 
away the IGM(W)'s strike funds in the case of large strike
actions. Hence a strike did not seem to be appropriate.
Martens (27.4.1990, p.23) argued that in a period of
rebuilding the East a strike in West Germany would not 
attract support by IGM(W)'s membership and Germany's 
public, a proposal that posed considerable strain upon 
IGM(W)'s conduct of collective bargaining.
At the DGB's 14th Congress Steinkühler demanded a clear 
distance from the FDGB. Steinkühler pointed out (DGB 
Protokoll 24.5.1990, p.319) that trade union unity by no 
means meant the same thing as 'unity with an apparatus, 
which appreciated and represented the interests of a party 
instead of worrying about the troubles and distress of the 
workforce. Such a unity is not feasible. This led to the 
dissolution of the FDGB. Sooner or later there would have 
been just our DGB as the trade union peak federation in a 
unified Germany. Sooner than expected, this moment
appeared, and we are not lamenting the passing of the FDGB. 
Even from the ideological viewpoint there can be no unity, 
between free and independent West German trade unions and 
so-called trade unions, which accepted being degraded to a
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slaves of ideology, which never called a strike and never 
knew what representation of interests meant.'
According to Steinkühler (DGB Protokoll 24.5.1990, p.319), 
trade union unity meant 'unity of the trade unions in the 
FRG with the people in the GDR', and not with the IGM(E) 
officers.255 The background to the last sentence is 
analysed by Roitsch (25.5.1990, p.3), who argued that the 
IGM(W)'s leadership was concerned about the overmanned 
organization on the side of IGM(E)256, and its personnel's 
insufficient abilities. Roitsch (25.5.1990, p.3) reckoned 
that the IGM(E) would need 500,000 members with 10 German 
marks per capita per month to finance the wages of its 600 
functionaries. Given such a situation in the GDR, the 
assessment made by IGM's organization department showed 
that such a financial burden was not f e a s i b l e . 25? According 
to this feasibility study, the IGM(W) set out an ultimatum 
to IGM(E)'s executive board demanding 'that signs be given 
that the leadership is disbanding itself and the membership 
remaining, otherwise the IGM(W) will recruit on its own in 
the GDR' (Roitsch 25.5.1990, p.3).
255) Cf. DGB 'Protokoll Personalwesen' (1.6.1990, pp.l- 
2).
256) According to an internal DGB document 'Protokoll 
Personalwesen' (1.6.1990, p.2) all East German unions 
enlarged their personnel during the reconstruction 
period.
257) Referring to the legal requirement of individual 
adhesion of the East German metalworkers by IGM(W)'s 
recruitments, its organizational department reckoned 
that for 35 offices a break-even size of 400,000 
members was necessary (IGM(W) Einführung 10.7.1990, 
p.5 and Handelsblatt 11.7.1990, p.5).
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Steinkühler (Einführung 10.7.1990, p.2) justified this
decision that the 'situation in the GDR does not offer any 
hope. The East German membership does not have any trust in 
their trade union, the financial situation is desolate and 
the functionaries lack experience and knowledge in all 
areas^SB. in such a situation the hopes of the people are 
directed towards the IG Metall of the Federal Republic. Our 
information and advisory offices in the GDR are totally 
overcrowded. More and more employees are asking us when 
they can join the IG Metall of the Federal Republic... 
Therefore it was necessary to give a signal and to act 
immediately'.
Steinkühler's assessment was right, as labour 
representation on the plant level was in total disarray, 
because the East German metalworkers lacked knowledge and 
experience. On the other hand they, partly banned the 
IGM(E) and FDGB officers as a result of the legacy of low 
trust (cf. Anger 1990, pp.4-6). In turn, the IGM(E)'s 
personnel debarred IGM(W) from an assessment of the 
distribution and size of its membership. These numbers were 
of importance for the IGM(W) in order to determine the 
organization and manning structure for the new Lânder.
h) The hostile take-over
During the 14th Congress of the DGB in Hamburg, the IGM(W) 
and IGM(E) executives signed a declaration in favour of the
258) Cf. Pappenheim's (19.5.1990, p.2) description of the 
qualifications of the IGM(E)'s personnel.
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realisation of a reunited IGM. The central points of this 
Hamburg declaration (IGM(W) 6-Punkte-Erklërung 25.5.1990, 
pp.3-4) were: - Both German metal unions intend to form a 
strong unitary union for the metal industries in Germany. 
The introduction of WWSU will determine the speed of this 
process. - Both unions will install common commissions to 
prepare the necessary modalities of unity. - At its 
conference in September 1990 the IGM(E) will decide the 
necessary legal preconditions that will enable its 
membership to transfer to the IGM(W). - At a special
congress in November IGM(W) will pass the constitutional 
amendments needed for a united organization, and IGM(E) 
will provide a membership inventory. - Both sides 
acknowledge that unity is to be achieved as soon as 
possible. It should be achieved on 1.1.1991.
Wilke and Müller (1991, p.212) described the Hamburg 
declaration as the 'dictation of the IG Metall (West)' 
which finally stopped the IGM(E)'s 'trial of IGM(W)'s 
patience.' In the declaration (6-Punkte-Erklërung
25.5.1990, p.l) the IGM(W) explained the reasons for the 
annexation by referring to the deterioration of the 
economic (unemployment) and social (social unrest) 
situation in the GDR, and the IGM(E)'s incapacity to meet 
this challenge. Further reasons were the IGM(E)'s 
'precarious financial situation, its inappropriate 
organizational structure' as well as its 'restricted level 
of trust' (6-Punkte-Erklarung 25.5,1990, p.l). Steinkühler 
(1990, p.4) justified the incorporation of the East German
348
workforce in its membership by referring to the severe 
repercussions of weak union representation on West German 
industrial relations (e.g. deadlock, or the reduction of 
further wealth formation) and solidarity with the East 
German workforce, whose 'hopes are focused on the IG 
Metall', thus invoking to the moral authority of an 
industrial union (Steinkühler 1990, p.5).
By means of the Hamburg declaration (6-Punkte-Erklërung
25.5.1990) the objective for unification of the unions 
became concrete in terms of the procedure and the 
timetable. Looking at the timetable and the necessary 
constitutional amendments, we argue that the IGM(W) 
determined the conditions and modalities of union unity. 
Steinkühler (1990, p.5) emphasised that 'what we want to 
achieve together is unique in the almost 100 years' history 
of the IGM. It is the historic task that there will be only 
one IGM in Germany.' In the author's interview with a 
senior IGM(W) officer he stated that a further reason for 
the incorporation of the East German metalworkers was 
partly based upon the IGM(W) leadership's desire for the 
prestige of representing the largest encompassing union in 
the free world. Thus the thesis that the interventionist 
objectives were enhanced membership and the personal 
reputation of union leaders is confirmed. The author's 
questionnaire conducted with the IGM(W)'s leadership, and 
the content analysis of several minutes revealed such 
personal objectives.
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The IGM(W)'s domination of the reconstruction process 
reached its peak with the 'Ergebnisprotokoll' (IGM
15.6.1990). The most important abstracts were the following 
(IGM 15.6.1990, pp.1-3): - The IGM(W) will nominate a
lawyer who will represent the IGM(E)'s financial claims 
against the FDGB. The fees will be paid by the IGM(E). - 
The IGM(E) will not conduct any more elections for the 
positions of regional union executives. - The bargaining 
regions will correspond to the boundaries of the new 
Lander. Each new bargaining region will receive the support 
from specific regions (e.g. Saxony will be supported by the 
district of Munich and Stuttgart). - The future division of 
the regional offices will take place in accordance with 
IGM(W)'s constitutional regulations. The final division 
will depend on the number of members and their financial 
contributions. - The IGM(W) will be entitled to deploy two 
members to 'participate' in all further meetings of the 
executive board of the IGM(E)^^^. - This year the IGM(W) 
will open regional offices in order to organise the works 
councils elections and to prepare the union unity.
The Ergebnisprotokoll (15.6.1990) gave an indication that 
until this time the IGM(W) had not received information on 
the actual size of IGM(E)'s membership (inventory of 
membership), which would allow a precise organization of 
the districts. After the IGM(E) failed to provide an 
inventory of members (the IGM(E) finally delivered personal
259) The IGM(W) deployed its former chairman Mayer to 
control the IGM(E)'s executives in the form of a 
guardianship.
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files of just 250,000 members instead of about 1,600,000 to 
1,700,000) the IGM(W) interpreted this as an indication of 
the IGM(E)'s legacy of low trust and insufficient 
acceptance by its membership, as the East German workforce 
did not provide the IGM(E) with the requested necessary 
information (Handelsblatt 11.7.1990, p.5).
The massive intervention, with the subsequent transfer of 
personnel and business equipment, was justified^GO by 
Schreiber (1990, p.l) as an 'initial investment in the GDR 
securing our organizational future.' The task of the 
organizational reconstruction was to set up financially 
autonomous districts in order to avoid a 'two-class IG 
Metall' (Schreiber 1990, p.l). Schreiber's statement proved 
that a two-tier membership was not viable. The first 
explanation for the avoidance applied to the unstable 
economic solution within a corporatist environment, and the 
second to the moral authority of an encompassing union to 
represent the whole workforce.
In the case of the IGM(W) the size of the membership was of 
great importance, especially regarding the financial aspect
260) Justification of the 'investments' was based on 
the fear of IGM(W)'s leadership that the 
financial support directed to the GDR might be 
interpreted by its West German membership as a 
weakening of the IGM's financial basis, with negative 
repercussions on IGM's ability to sustain a long 
strike.
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of union unity^Gl. According to Schreiber^, (1989, p.22) 
new recruitments mean enhanced financial power for the 
union, and thus also improved organizational power for the 
union in sustaining a strike. In the author's questionnaire 
conducted with the IGM(W)'s leadership it was stated that 
the enhancement of membership^was an important motive 
for the intervention.
With the realisation of the WWSU, collective bargaining 
conducted by the IGM(W) concentrated on the harmonisation 
of the East German bargaining structures with those of the 
FRG. This meant the extension of West German collective 
agreements to the East (cf. European Industrial Relations 
Review 8/1990, p.5 and Stuttgarter Zeitung 7.6.1990, p.9). 
The IGM(W)'s demand for a two-years' employment guarantee 
caused extreme criticism on the part of the employers and 
the West German public as, it did not conform with a market 
system (cf. Stuttgarter Zeitung 28.6.1990, p.11 and 
Handelsblatt 28.6.1990a, p.l). Neubauer's (29.6.1990, p.l) 
article discussed the East-West wage dilemma and criticised 
the IGM(W)'s conduct of collective bargaining as irrational 
and determined by fear of the undercutting 'cheap Ossi' 
with his negative impact on the West. Neubauer^®^ asked
261) For an assessment of the financial assets of IGM(E) 
and its transfer to IGM(W) we refer to IGM(W) 
'Gründung einer Verlags- und Vermogensverwaltung in 
der IG Metall GmbH der DDR mit Sitz in Berlin'
(3.7.1990).
262) Trade union executive and cashier of IGM(W).
263) A further indication of the desire for an enhancement 
of membership is Steinkühler's statement when he was 
asked what he ejected from the intervention in the 
East: 'membership.'
264) Neubauer is one economic journalist of the 
Stuttgarter Zeitung.
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(29.6.1990, p.l) if it makes any sense to recruit new 
membership in the East, and then to negotiate irresponsible 
and job-killing wages in the East just to dissipate the 
worries of the West German union members.
Several warning strikes took place in East Germany (cf. 
Stuttgarter Zeitung 2.7.1990, p.9, 6.7.1990, p.14 and
7.7.1990, p.14), which were severely criticised by the 
government and employers (cf. Mundorf 4.7.1990, p.2), 
Finally an agreement was settled, and the employers argued 
that the IGM(W)'s dominant objective was not to link wages 
to productivity, but on the contrary to please the majority 
of the East German workforce in order to facilitate the 
IGM(W)'s recruitment efforts in the membership market (cf. 
Handelsblatt 16.7.1990, p.l and Stuttgarter Zeitung
14.7.1990, p.l). We argue that raising wages is a strategy 
of contractual exchange by closing the wage gap and thus 
trying to reduce the migration wave to the West. On the 
other hand, the criticism made by the employers was 
unjustified as they signed the collective agreement. 
Referring to Bispinck et al. (1993, p.470), the 
management's willingness to agree to these collective 
bargaining results was initiated to stop a further drain of 
qualified workers to the West.
i) The organizational reconstruction
In early July the IGM(W)'s leadership intensified its 
efforts to assess and administer the potential size and
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distribution of its new membership in the GDR. Deckstein 
(7/8.7.1990, p.3) submits that the result was depressing 
for the IGM(W)'s deputy chairman Zwickel, as all the IGM(E) 
offices had been in disarray. The IGM(E)'s personnel failed 
to provide the requested membership inventory and to 
represent the East German workforce. For the Erfurt 
district the IGM(E) officers claimed that 95% of the former 
FDGB workforce could be retained as membership, which had 
been 119,000 members. When the IGM(W) checked this 
inventory of membership, just 26,000 members had filled in 
the union registration card (Füssel 18.7.1990, p.3). On 
this occasion Zwickel stated (Deckstein 7/8.7.1990, p.3) 
that 'we should have intervened much earlier', as the 
organizational disaster in the GDR will impede 
organizational reconstruction and the strength of a united 
IGM(W). In a further interview conducted by the author with 
a senior IGM(W) officialese the IGM(W)'s misreading of the 
IGM(E) personnel's willingness to conduct the necessary 
reforms was criticised, since it necessitated long, 
expensive and complete reconstruction process.
With the Hamburg declaration and the 'Ergebnisprotokoll' 
the modalities of achieving unity became concrete. Specific 
amendments followed with Steinkühler's 'introduction'
(10.7.1990) at the decisive meeting of IGM(W)'s board. He 
clarified that (IGM Einführung 10.7.1990, p.2) 'there will 
be no fusion of both trade unions, but a transfer of
265) In this case due to the critical statement a senior 
union official requested that his identity should not 
be revealed.
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members from the IGM(E) to the IGM(W), with the
simultaneous disbandment of the IGM(E). ...It is necessary 
to mention, that under no circumstances do we want to 
become the assignee of the IGM(E) or indirectly of the 
FDGB. In such a case the financial and personnel risks are 
such that one could not neither estimate nor vindicate 
them.' Steinkühler stated the various different reasons
that led to the IGM(W)'s i n t e r v e n t i o n . 266 por the
realisation of unity Steinkühler (Einführung 10.7.1990,
p.3) emphasised the necessity 'of building up the West 
German IGM on the territory of the GDR. This means the 
transfer of our structures, the recruitment of members, the 
organization of works council elections, and all that 
before the formal date of 1.1.1991. Realistically, from now 
on the IGM(W) has to represent the interests of the
workforce in the GDR, despite the fact that the structures 
and the formal legitimacy are still missing.' Further 
inertia in East German industrial relations could have 
altered the parity of forces between unions and employers 
in favour of the latter.
Steinkühler (Einführung 10.7.1990, p.3) explained to his 
officers that failures in the reconstruction of East German 
labour representation would have even more of a negative 
influence on the IGM(W)'s organizational strength than the
266) Cf. Der Gewerkschafter (7a/1990, p.7), according to 
Steinkühler, the unions in the GDR had not learnt to 
represent their members' interests. They had not been 
able to act in a 'totally different economic and 
legal system.' The IGM(W) had the obligation to avoid 
a further deterioration in the membership's belief in 
union representation.
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introduction of §116 AFG, Thus we infer that a failure 
would have had a severe impact on the procedural and thus 
on the substantive objectives of the IGM(W).
According to Steinkühler (IGM 10.7.1990, p.3), a 
coordinated strategy was necessary for such a project. The 
transfer of responsibility to the regional offices did not 
mean that they would be independent in their decisions. The 
IGM(W)'s chairman stated (IGM 10.7.1990, p.4); 'Despite the 
fact that as good as nothing worked in the GDR, you can 
rely on one thing: the old information channels are still 
working as they did in former times.' Several union minutes 
claim that this was the reason why personnel policy became 
quite important within the IGM(W). The introduction 
('Einführung') discussed some issues of personnel policy, 
but then turned to the financial aspect of unity. The 
stated objective of the IGM(W) was to establish structures, 
and to finance these structures by their dues^G?. with 
reference to the West German membership, the chairman 
declared that subsidies would only be granted for the 
period of transition. The necessary relationship of trust 
between the organization and its new membership and
267) Wilke and Müller (1991, p.214) confirm that one of 
the most urgent problems of the IGM(W)'s leadership 
consisted in the sabotage by the IGM(E)'s personnel. 
One factor was that, despite massive demands by the 
IGM(W), personnel files of the membership 
disappeared, and the IGM(E)'s personnel always 
claimed that they represented 1,600,000 members. The 
size and regional distribution of the membership were 
of the utmost importance in order to determine the 
financial burden of the reconstruction and 
organizational structure of union representation in 
the East (e.g. location, number and capacity of 
offices, number of personnel).
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recruitment would rely on the IGM(W)'s reputation. The most 
powerful argument for the DAG's recruitment in the GDR is 
its leadership's statement that (IGM 10.7.1990, p.6) 'it is 
absolutely free of any FDGB contacts, and that its 
representatives had never visited Harry Tisch. If we build 
up our organization with the old (FDGB) staff, we will push 
potential membership into the DAG and other groups.' 
Steinkühler also emphasised (cf. Einleitung 10.7.1990, p.5) 
that the workforce in the GDR wanted to join the IGM(W), 
but as long the IGM(W) cooperated with the old cadres no 
adhesion of the East German workforce would take place. The 
last sentences give a clear indication of the IGM(W) 
leadership's stated objectives, that is to determine its 
policy according to the most dominant goal, namely securing 
the union's near-representational monopoly.
The IGM(W)'s executive board decided to deploy 100 union 
officers in the East^^S in order to start recruitment, and 
to build up 35 recruitment offices^®^, the so-called 
'emergency unit' (Füssel 18.7.1990, p.3) to 'fill the 
organizational vacuum'. To demonstrate their clear distance 
from the legacy of low trust, the IGM(W)'s personnel were 
told to avoid any regional vicinity to the FDGB offices or 
even the use of offices of the FDGB.
268) According to IGM(W) (9.7.1990, p.2) 'Vorlage 
Informationstagung Büroleiter DDR', more than 200 
IGM(W) officers were deployed.
269) Cf. IGM(W) 'Strukturierung der DDR-AktivitSten'
(2.6.1990).
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The IGM(W)'s board meeting on 10.7.1990 finally determined 
all the modalities for the IGM(W)'s intervention in the 
GDR, asking its membership to recruit East German 
metalworkers. On this occasion the board decided on the 
'time and activities plan' (IGM Anlage B 10.7.1990, pp.l- 
14) which has been the basis for all further actions by the 
organization and the organizational structure (IGM Anlage A
10.7.1990, pp.1-16).
Due to IGM(E)'s incapacity or unwillingness to provide a 
membership index (Anlage A 10.7.1990, p.3 and Anlage 5) the 
IGM(W)'s leadership developed the regional structure on the 
basis of a scenario that structural change would reduce 
employment in the metal industry by 25 per cent, and that a 
union density of 60 per cent would be feasible. Further, 
the IGM(W)'s leadership stated that the 'objective of all 
organizational actions is to achieve structures as fast as 
possible' in order to demonstrate the IGM(W)'s 'abilities 
and competence' (Anlage A 10.7.1990, p.4). The explanation 
for the IGM(W) leadership's determination to achieve a 
workable union structure as fast as possible is given in 
IGM(W) 'Works Councils Elections in the GDR' 
('Betriebsratswahlen in der DDR' 10.7.199Od, p.2) and 
IGM(W) 'Elections for the Representation of Joung People 
and Trainees' ('Wahlen zur Jugend- und
Auszubildendenvertretung in der DDR' 10.7.1990e) by the 
threat of a recurrent East German shop floor organization. 
There the IGM(W)'s leadership stressed that an early 
intervention by the IGM(W) on the company level by
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supporting the organization of the works councils would 
help to avoid 'competing unions', 'different political 
groupings' and growing non-unionism and would allow control 
over the shop floor. Ernst confirmed^^O this assessment in 
the author's interview.
Clearly, the Memorandum (8.5.1990), the 6 point 
clarification (6-Punkte-ErklSrung 25.5.1990), the statement 
of results (Ergebnisprotokoll 15.6.1990) and the 
introduction (Einführung 10.7.1990) demonstrated a complete 
turn from the early non-interventionist approach to ad hoc 
intervention. The IGM(W) leadership's early inertia, its 
stated belief in the reformability of the IGM(E)'s 
personnel, and the sudden 'hostile take-over' (Deckstein 
7/8.7.1990, p.3 and Füssel 18.7.1990, p.3) caused a certain 
dilemma how to explain the hostile take-over. The IGM(W)'s 
leadership justified the ad hoc intervention by using the 
following arguments: first, it had to intervene in order to 
oppose the increased power of the employers in the WWSU, 
second, the IGM(W) had to stop a further continuation of 
the IGM(E)'s practised style of low trust industrial 
relations offering no hope to the East German workforce, 
and third, it was argued that the hopes of the East German 
workforce rested with the IGM(W) appealing to the West
270) Ernst also mentioned that several works councils
had been set up by metalworkers without adhering to 
the legal preconditions set out in the Betriebs- 
verfassungsgesetz. Any defective title during the 
establishment of the works councils can cause 
unlawful representation, and thus a vacuum in 
collective representation on the company level.
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German membership that a two-tier membership approach was 
not a viable strategy.
The next step to achieving union unity followed on 
5/6.9.1990, when the IGM(E) held a special congress at 
which it established the constitutional preconditions for 
the transfer of its membership and the disbandment 
modalities, preparing the extinction of the IGM(E) by
31.12.1990. The referendum of the East German workforce 
representatives at the congress was impressive: of the 362 
delegates, one abstained, two voted against and 359 
approved it (Der Gewerkschafter lla/1990, p.7). Despite 
this clear referendum in favour of the dissolution of the 
IGM(E) and adhesion to the IGM(W) Steinkühler had to 
dissipate sentiments on the part of the delegates that the 
way to union unity should not be accompanied by depression 
or humiliation (cf. Tribune 8.10.1990, p.l). Subsequent
interviews by the author with East German IGM(W) members 
confirmed that the hostile take-over resulted in sentiments 
of humiliation on the part of the East German workforce 
despite the fact that vast majority described the IGM(W) as 
a factor of hope. These sentiments of humiliation had been 
promoted by the IGM(E)'s officers, as they proclaimed that 
the IGM(W) would continue the cleaning out of discredited 
membership, as the IGM(W) had already done in the case of 
IGM(E)'s staff.
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Before the IGM(E)'s dissolving congress the IGM(W)'s 
officers worked hard to promote^?! the impression of an 
'honourable switch' to the IGM(W) (Tribune 19.10.1990/ 
p.3). The IGM(W) undertook a strategy of appeasing/ in the 
form of providing a generous social plan^^^ for the IGM(E) 
staff to avoid a further dissemination of propaganda with 
negative repercussions on the IGM(W)'s image and thus its 
recruitment potential (cf. Der Gewerkschafter lla/1990/ 
p.7). Steinkühler promised that the new East German 
membership would have equal rights within the organization 
and that the IGM(W) would acknowledge the tenure of 
membership within the IGM(E) for the entitlement of 
specific selective incentives. We argue that the 
acknowledgement of East German membership tenure served as 
a selective incentive in the IGM(W)'s incorporation 
strategy. Avoiding an immediate exploitation of selective 
incentives (especially individual legal representation and 
strike compensation)/ the IGM(W) demanded a minimum tenure 
of three months within IGM(W) (cf. Handelsblatt 8.10.1990/ 
p.4). The author's interviews conducted with deployed 
IGM(W) officers and East German IGM(W) members confirmed 
that individual legal representation had been an important 
incentive to join the Western union. Koppelberg (1991/ 
p.31) reports that in the Sonneberg district the management 
cancelled about 1/000 of 3/800 dismissals when IGM(W)'s
271) Interviews with IGM(W) officers confirmed the 
sentiments of an 'unconditional surrender' and 
humiliation were common/ despite the hatred 
towards the IGM(E) and especially the FDGB.
272) Further information concerning the modality of the 
social plan is given in Handelsblatt (17.9.1990/ 
p.3).
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regional officers announced that they would represent its 
dismissed membership in court. The author's interviews 
conducted with East German labour delegates confirmed that 
such support improved the East German workforce's 
perception of the IGM(W) as a factor of hope.
The almost unanimous vote in favour of the IGM(W) and the 
dissolution of the IGM(E) was last taken because of the 
IGM(W)'s image as a successful and experienced bargaining 
agent (factor of hope^?^, IGM(E)'s lack of organizational 
experience) as well as the dislike of the IGM(E)'s 
insufficient reformability, as the author's interviews with 
East German labour representatives revealed. The 
Handelsblatt (4.8.1990, p.4) confirmed these arguments.
According to the Hamburg declaration, the IGM(W) convened 
an extraordinary congress on 1/2.11.1990 and passed the 
constitutional amendments needed for unity (Der 
Gewerkschafter 1lb/1990, p.6). Steinkühler (1990, p.4) 
justified the transfer of membership to the IGM(W)'s 
organization by the necessity to bridge the wealth 
difference between East and West Germany. Steinkühler 
(1990, p.5) emphasised that the task of his union would be 
to focus on reduction of East-West mobility and 
undercutting impacts^?*. The IGM(W)'s leadership
273) Füssel (18.7.1990, p.3) confirms that a large 
proportion of the metalworkers viewed IGM(W) as an 
'institution of hope', especially regarding the 
IGM(W)'s experience in the area of legal 
representation.
274) An illustration of the mobility and undercutting 
impacts is given by Der Spiegel (26.11.1990, pp.130 
-133).
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recommended that the Government should pay the difference 
between East and West German wages due to the differences 
in the productivity levels (cf. Der Spiegel 26.11.1990, 
p.133).
At the IGM(W) extraordinary congress discussions centred 
predominantly on the impact of East-West wage disparity and 
its repercussions on the West^^S (cf. IGM(W) 2. 
AuBerordentlicher Gewerkschaftstag am 1. und 2. November 
1990 in Bonn and Der Gewerkschafter 11/1990, p.5-6). The 
IGM(W) leadership repeatedly emphasised that the 
incorporation of the East German membership was financially 
feasible^^^, and that 'there will be neither reductions in 
the provision of the by-law guarantied benefits nor a 
curtailment of our militancy' (Handelsblatt 11.7.1990, 
p.4). The special and extraordinary congress of the IGM(E) 
and the IGM(W) opened the way for the IGM(W)'s near- 
monopolistic union status and offered its leadership the 
chance to create the largest encompassing free trade union 
in the world.
275) Cf. Steinkühler (1990b, p.26-27) the wage policy
for the next East German bargaining round would focus 
on 'the necessity to equalise wages towards the 
West German level. The reasons are: - To secure the 
material livelihood. - To secure sentiments of 
justice, as equal work should bring equal wages.
- The necessity to reduce the East-West migration 
wave.'
276) An analysis of the financial situation of the unions 
is given in Der Spiegel (29.10.1990, pp.185-188). 
Despite enhanced wealth formation and a reduction in 
strike actions, the West German trade union 
leadership did not reduce dues; on the contrary, dues 
were continually raised.
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At the extraordinary congress Steinkühler (1990a, p.5) 
referred to the 'ideological turn, the still insufficient 
organizational structure, and the deficiencies in trade 
union experience of our new members.' The IGM(W) 
leadership's early non-intervention and cooperation 
approaches, its reliance on the reformability of IGM(E)'s 
personnel, inadequate information, the continuation of 
left-wing ideology (the 'third way') were at the root of 
the hostile take-over. The early inertia of the IGM(W) 
caused the ad hoc dismantling of existing and partly 
working union structures in the GDR (cf. Wilke and Müller 
1991, p.219). After the IGM(W) destroyed the whole IGM(E) 
system, it faced the difficult task of rebuilding its own 
organizational structures. Thus the IGM(W) had to deploy 
the vast majority of the West German IGM(W) personnel for 
the organizational build-up.
The IGM(W)'s self-confident rank-and-file did not criticise 
its leadership's reconstruction policy. In the author's 
interviews with IGM(W) members the following arguments were 
stated for the rank-and-file's calmness : first, the
membership expected an intervention by the IGM(W) in order 
to protect West German industrial relations from the shock 
stemming from the disintegration of the GDR. Second, when 
devastating situation of East German industrial relations 
was realised, the incorporation of the East German 
colleagues became a moral imperative. The late 
intervention, in combination with the dismantling of 
IGM(E), caused a delay in the organizational reconstruction
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(cf. IGM (W) 10.7.1990c, Anlage B), despite the achievement 
of formal legal unity on 1.1.1991, which took until early 
1992.
The late reunification policy had some repercussions on the 
East. When the IGM(W)'s intervention took place, the extent 
of short-time working^?? had been significant (cf. appendix 
10). The virtual absence of the short-time working 
personnel from the company sites and the gaps in the 
membership's files provided by the IGM(E) made contacting 
and recruiting the East German workforce difficult. 
Different sources stated (e.g. Schmitz, Tiemann, Ldhrlein 
1992, p.84, Steinkühler 1991, p.4) that by July 1991 about 
1,700,000 East German workers had joined the IGM(W), which 
confirmed to a certain degree their belief in the IGM(W) as 
a factor of hope to ease the changes in the former GDR.
i) The closing of the wage gap
Despite the recruitment success the IGM(W) had severe 
difficulty in controlling some new works councils^^® which 
were exercising decentralised wage bargaining on the 
company level (cf. Wilke and Müller 1991, p.220). In the 
case of decentralised bargaining attempts the explanation 
can be twofold. Firstly, decentralised bargaining can be an
277) Several companies actually practised '0-hour' short- 
working, this means that its workforce did not work 
at all, and thus did not turn up at the company 
sites.
278) Those works councils had been extremely loyal FDGB 
BGLs who had been attracted by IGM(W)'s radical 
profile (challenger face).
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indicator for IGM(W) leadership's threat of a recurrent 
East German shop floor organization and its possibility to 
challenge the level of centralisation within the union. 
Secondly, decentralised bargaining could be the result of 
concessions of the works councils terrified by the 
management's announcement of job losses in the case of non- 
compliance. Both explanations mean a challenge towards the 
level of IGM(W)'s centralisation, the industry-wide conduct 
of collective bargaining and thus the realization of the 
positive results of corporatism. The IGM(W) had to appeal 
to solidarity (Wolf 1990f, pp.18-20), and provided several 
training sessions with these works councillors in order to 
secure compliance and thus the centralisation of collective 
bargaining. Wolf (199Og, p.22) reported a massive wave of 
legal suits which had their causes in the 'inappropriate 
behaviour of the works councillors,' 'deficiency in our 
information relationship with them' and 'insufficient 
supply of training and qualification courses.' Klôppel 
(1990, pp.23-25) confirmed these deficiencies, and the fact 
that they had some impact on the recruitment of union 
members, works councillors and shop stewards.
From November 1990 onwards the IGM(W) and the employers' 
associations conducted collective bargaining in order to 
provide the same classification systems that had been 
operating in the West (cf. Wolf 1990h, p.28). The conduct 
of bargaining resulted in a step-by-step adjustment plan by 
means of which the East German wages were linked
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consistently with West German wages.^79 The step-by-step 
adjustment plan determined the equalisation of the existing 
West-East wage gap (Der Gewerkschafter 12/1990, p. 5: 
'equalisation component') until April 1994. Thus the 
strategy of the IGM(W) sought to appeal to the East German 
workforce by closing the wage gap and thus avoiding further 
undercutting effects on the West. Zwickel (1992, p.19) 
submitted that raising the wages to the West German level 
by 1994 had been 'a great success.' Closing the wage gap 
fast had been the IGM(W)'s bargaining strategy to appeal to 
the East German workforce (membership market) by avoiding a 
'second class membership', enhancing the IGM(W)'s 
encompassiveness. The increase in membership accounted for 
the argument for maintaining a system of industry-wide 
regulations. Thus Turner's (1952) argument of incorporation 
by narrowing wage differentials was applied.
In February, March and April 1991 the IGM(W) participated 
in and partly organized the 'Monday Demonstrations' against 
the Conservative-Liberal Government (cf. Schreyer 1991, p.3 
Rogge 1991, p.3). On 17 April the IGM(W) called a mass- 
demonstration in Berlin against rapidly increasing 
unemployment in the former GDR and unsocial Government 
policy. Despite the expected 150,000 to 250,000 
participants, just 35,000 IGM(W) members participated 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung 18.4.1991, p.3 and Thelen 30.4.1991, 
p.l). In response to several articles on the unsuccessful
279) Cf. Stuttgarter Zeitung (8.3.1991, p.11), von
Mitzlaff (1990, p.5), Der Spiegel (29.4.1991, p.36), 
and Der Spiegel (10.6.1991, p.101), Eckelmann (1992, 
p.44)
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rally, the IGM(W) reacted by stating (cf. Mechelhoff 1991, 
p.l) that the low participation rate should not be 
interpreted as an organizational weakness and a loss in 
militancy. Steinkühler (Der Spiegel 29.4.1991, p.37) 
criticised his deployed senior union officers for 
misreading the sentiments of the new workforce. Other 
sources (cf. Der Spiegel 29.4.1991, p.37, Stuttgarter 
Zeitung 18.4.1991, p.3, et al.) stated that the IGM(W)'s 
prime objective had been the recruitment of further 
membership. In an interview by the author with a senior 
IGM(W) union officer the argument of enhancing membership 
was confirmed. By December 1992 the IGM(W)'s density rose 
to 71.92 per cent, or an increase of 787.961 new East 
German members. The interventionist objective of improving 
or maintaining the union's significance within the DGB was 
rated as unimportant in the author's questionnaire with the 
IGM(W) leadership.
On IGM(W)'s 100th anniversary IGM(W)'s executive board 
decided to incorporate 6 East German members on the 
advisory board (cf. Der Gewerkschafter 7-8/1991, p.5 and 
Handelsblatt 21.3.1991, p.5) and one East German 
representative in the control committee. Organizational 
unity and the process of incorporation was finally 
completed with a joint union congress at IGM(W)'s 17th 
ordinary congress in Hamburg (10.-17.10.1992). On this 
occasion Toppel was elected as the East German 
representative on the IGM(W) executive board (cf. Der 
Gewerkschafter 11/1992, pp. 11-13).
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k) Summary
The IGM(W)'s reconstruction of labour representation 
started with a strategy of non-intervention in the East and 
a discussion of 'third way' ideology. The collapse of 
socialism posed a severe threat to the IGM(W)'s integrating 
ability to ensure the cooperation of the self-confident 
rank-and-file. Thus the discussion of the 'third way' was 
an attempt to assure the cooperation of the shopfloor while 
the vision of a 'better society' was crumbling. After 
experiencing attempts at decentralisation by the shopfloor, 
the IGM(W) responded by setting up plant partnerships and 
by intensified cooperation with the IGM(E).
The general election results, the introduction of the WWSU, 
the influx of the East German workforce, the existing wage 
gap, recruitment efforts by the DAG and Christian trade 
unions in the East, and the IGM(E)'s inadequate reforms 
resulted an ad hoc intervention by the IGM(W) in the East. 
The strategy of rebuilding labour representation was 
determined by Turner's thesis of incorporation by closing 
the wage gap, but to the extent that union unity was 
reached later, and that old organizational structures were 
not used. The following interventionist objectives 
determined IGM(W)'s reconstruction efforts: protection of 
the near-representational monopoly, an increase in union 
membership, and personal aspects of the union personnel. 
Solidarity with the East German workforce was an important 
factor in explaining intervention. On the whole, the
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IGM(W)'s strategy focused on the protection of centralised 
decision-making with good economic results in order to fend 
off attempts at decentralisation by the strong shopfloor.
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1.3. Discussion of the results and conclusion
The collapse of the GDR and the subsequent German 
reunification offered an opportunity to examine the causes 
of stability or instability in corporatist systems and 
their institutions, and how they maintained membership and 
organizational coherence. The aim of the thesis was to 
study the strategies applied by two differing trade unions 
seeking to maintain their organizational position and to 
protect the neo-corporatist industrial relations system 
that secured the survival of the West German unions. The 
unions' strategies for organizational survival were partly 
determined by the neo-corporatist industrial relations 
structure (eg., encompassiveness) and their different 
organizational constraints (strength/weakness on the 
shopfloor).
In comparison with other East European countries, the 
process of reconstruction of labour representation in the 
former GDR was predominantly determined from the outside, 
namely by the West German trade unions. The explanation for 
this was the expectation of the East German workforce that 
the West German unions would intervene in order to abolish 
the former low trust industrial relations system and soon 
offer the same working and living conditions as in the 
West.
The important features facilitating the one-way 
intervention by the West German trade unions were (i) the
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legacy of low trust industrial relations in the former GDR 
and (ii) the inappropriate reforms conducted especially by 
the FDGB. In this situation the East German workforce 
showed practically no commitment to the transmission belt 
industrial relations system. Therefore the ad hoc 
introduction of the WWSU improved the status of the East 
German workforce by linking it to an experienced bargaining 
agent. This partnership generated a comparative advantage 
on the part of the West German trade unions ('factors of 
hope') for overcoming the uncertainty of the East German 
workers and offering them rapidly improved working and 
living conditions comparable to those in West Germany.
In both West German trade unions the decision-making 
process was located on the centralised executive level, 
with strong participation on the part of the highly trained 
personal union assistants. After the reconstruction had 
taken place, particularly the personal assistants pursued a 
career within the unions. Thus personal ambitions had been 
of importance in both trade unions. The prospect of a 
possible career within the IGCPK contributed to the support 
of the IGCGK personnel in not obstructing the unification 
process, whereas, in the case of the metalworking trade 
unions, attempts to achieve smooth cooperation and 
subsequent unity failed, as the IGM(E) officers did not 
reform. On the contrary, the IGM(E)'s representatives 
responded by shielding the IGM(W) officers from the East 
German workforce. The behaviour of the IGM(E)'s personnel 
was one reason for the IGM(W)'s late ad hoc intervention.
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In the case of the IGCPK it was possible to demonstrate 
that the majority of its membership had been accustomed to 
define the outcome of collective bargaining in collective 
terms. In the case of the IGM(W) almost half of its 
membership defined their interests in collective terms. As 
a large share of each membership in both trade unions is 
able to determine their interests in collective terms 
(e.g., a good Okun-index), protection of the system which 
generated collective benefits and of its neo-corporatist 
institutions was of the utmost importance.
The intervention in the East launched by the IGCPK was 
dominated by the objective of securing neo-corporatism, and 
thus protection of the procedural and substantive 
objectives. This entailed upholding its near- 
representational monopoly, as well as the continuation of 
social partnership (growth alliance). The strategy of 
intervention by incorporation was explained by the 
following arguments: first, by the intervention the IGCPK 
avoided increased undercutting of West German standards by 
the East German workforce, second, by the intervention 
IGCPK was able to avoid the emergence of grass-roots 
unionism, fragmented bargaining, growing non-unionism, or 
the loss of unionised sectors. As the IGCPK's 
organizational strength rests on the centralised level 
(weakness on the establishment level), mainly by the 
provision of collective benefits (a good Okun-index and 
growth alliance), almost no alternative to the policy of 
intervention by incorporation seemed to be feasible. The
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strategy of incorporation thus fulfilled the task of 
protecting West German industrial relations from the 
threatening effects stemming from the East, and appeasing 
the worried West German union clientele. The objectives of 
the IGCPK's leadership in the case of reconstruction were 
to continue exercising their industrial relations climate 
of social partnership, thus securing organizational success 
and stability within the industrial relations system of the 
FRG. The author's questionnaire with the IGCPK's leadership 
confirmed that the union's weakness on the shopfloor and 
the encompassing union structure limited the reconstruction 
alternative to the incorporation option ('lack of 
alternatives').
The strategy of incorporation meant the application of two 
important features which were dominated by (i) Turner's 
(1952) contractual exchange and (ii) the aspect of 
solidarity.
(i) In the case of German reunification, the process of 
incorporation did not correspond to different types of 
workers but rather to an adjacent country. Turner's thesis 
of an exchange relationship through incorporation of the 
East German workforce within the encompassing union body 
was applied. The process of incorporation entailed 
narrowing the existing West-East wage gap (e.g., raising 
East German wages, application of the same classification 
systems), and offering selective incentives (e.g., legal 
representation, non-contributory membership, changes in the
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union's pension schemes). The strategy of incorporation was 
appreciated by the East German workforce, as they expected 
the West German union to offer them the same working and 
living conditions.
(ii) The aspect of solidarity between the East and West 
German workforces was an important motive and a symbiotic 
force in the strategy of incorporation. Solidarity with the 
East German workforce validated the IGCPK's political
legitimacy, which appealed to the whole workforce. In the 
case of unification, a two-tier membership strategy would 
have meant discriminating against the East German
workforce. Acting on behalf of a moral authority (e.g. 
solidarity) supported IGCPK's reconstruction efforts.
The IGCPK's firm stance (working with the high-low trust 
dichotomy of East and West German industrial relations) in 
the reconstruction process was appreciated by both the West 
and East German memberships. Especially on the part of the 
East German membership, the break with the past partly 
generated aspirations to self-determination regarding the 
East German workforce's ability to dismantle the old low 
trust FDGB structures. As the East German membership
participated in the reconstruction process, it voiced very 
little resentment towards Western intruders on the East 
German industrial relations scene. On the contrary, the
East German workforce assessed incorporation as an act of 
solidarity, and accorded it high acclaim.
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The early intervention of the IGCPK improved its capacity 
to recruit (enhancement of membership), and showed to other 
trade unions (e.g. DAG) that the IGCPK was a factor to 
reckon with on the membership market. In order to build up 
a barrier to entry to the membership market, the IGCPK's 
leadership soon practised close cooperation and the 
continuation of social partnership with the employers' 
associations. In exchange for recognition by the employers, 
the IGCPK offered a climate of stability and predictability 
on the part of labour representation (canalising the will 
of the East German workforce).
Further, due to its early intervention the IGCPK gained 
vital and reliable information from its deployed personnel 
(e.g., 'information offices') and from the closely 
cooperating and supportive IGCGK personnel. Making use of 
the IGCGK's structures and personnel improved its capacity 
to build up a working organization quickly, avoiding higher 
costs in the reconstruction process. The objective of an 
enhancement of membership, and thus the realisation of 
synergy effects (economies of scale) with an early break­
even point in public representation, was a relevant factor, 
but the dominant goal consisted in the protection of neo­
corporatism. An improvement of the IGCPK's relative 
position within the DGB was acknowledged by the IGCPK's 
leadership as an interventionist motive, but the 
significance of this objective was not rated as important.
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In the case of the IGM(W), its leadership's early image of 
the GDR was impressed by the power of the SED and the FDGB. 
The explanation for this assessment was that the activist 
trade unions had improved their relationship with the East 
German leadership by their personal investments in building 
up these links. In comparison with the IGCPK, the IGM(W) 
leadership's early stated expectations regarding the 
reformability of the SED and the FDGB ^ were inappropriate. 
The early recommendations of the IGM(W)'s leadership, such 
as 'democratic socialism', a 'third way', and especially 
the reliance on the IGM(E)'s reformability, caused some 
perplexity on the side of the East German workforce.
The explanation for the dissemination of left-wing ideology 
centred in the IGM(W) leadership's fear that the collapse 
of socialism could negatively affect its organizational 
cohesion. In the IGM(W)'s history the application of 
socialist ideology has been a means to court the strong 
rank-and-file and convince them to continue their active 
support and cooperate within the union. Advocation of the 
'third way' had been an attempt to restore a better vision 
of society in the West after East German socialism became a 
synonym for reprisals against the population.
After the IGM(W)'s rank-and-file started to set up plant- 
based cooperation with the East German workforce, the 
IGM(W) leadership responded by intensified cooperation with 
the IGM(E). The reason for the IGM(W)'s cooperation was to 
demobilise its confident shopfloor in order to prevent
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further attempts at decentralisation. The IGM(W)'s history 
has been shaped by repeated attempts at decentralisation by 
its membership. Over the years the IGM(W) leadership's 
policy consisted in fending off the decentralisation 
demanded by the strong shopfloor. When labour 
representation had to be rebuilt, the IGM(W)'s leadership 
intervened in order to protect West German industrial 
relations. Securing substantive bargaining results in the 
form of a good Okun-index had been of importance, as 
desirable bargaining results (e.g., the 35-hour week) led 
to compliance by the militant membership. To prevent 
sectionalism and decentralisation within the encompassing 
organization, the IGM(W)'s leadership responded to the 
strains emerging from the collapse of the GDR by sustaining 
neo-corporatism. The strains or threats to the continuation 
of desirable bargaining results were: first, the influx of 
the qualified East German workforce, second, increased 
undercutting by the East German workforce, third, growing 
multi-unionism and the loss of a unionised sector. To 
counter these threats, the IGM(W)'s leadership intervened 
in the GDR. The explanation for the IGM(W)'s late, ad hoc 
intervention in the GDR was its leadership's assumption 
that the FDGB and IGM(E) would reform.
In the case of the IGM(W), the objective of its leadership 
consisted in fending off the attempts at decentralisation 
by its members. Thus the incorporation strategy of the 
IGM(W) took account of the same two important features as 
in the case of the IGCPK. These features were:
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(i) Turner's (1952) thesis that the incorporation of a 
threatening workforce can make a union virtually 
encompassing. The incorporation aspect entailed closing the 
threatening West-East wage gap and offering selective 
incentives, such as legal representation. By the 
intervention the IGM(W) tried to protect its West German 
membership from the worrisome threats coming from the East.
(ii) Solidarity was important, as was seen in the 
spontaneous support of the West German rank-and-file in 
establishing plant partnerships. The IGM(W)'s leadership 
laid great emphasis on the argument that a two-tier 
membership approach would have produced a 'second-class 
membership', a strategy which was not viable for an 
encompassing industrial union. Using this moral principle, 
the IGM(W) justified its late intervention.
The author's questionnaire conducted with the IGM(W)'s 
leadership and the interviews confirmed that securing 
organizational encompassiveness by means of desirable 
bargaining results had been of the utmost importance. Other 
interventionist goals, such as enhanced membership, and to 
a minor degree the relative significance within the DGB 
were confirmed.
As the IGM(W) 's cooperation with the IGM(E) failed, it had 
to intervene late and ad hoc. As a result, the IGM(W) had 
to build up a new organization from the ground. The late, 
hostile take-over, almost without participation on the part
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of the East German workforce, extended the time lag until a 
workable union structure could be erected. This 
intervention cost the IGM(W) a considerable investment in 
time. In comparison with the IGCPK, the IGM(W) gained 
recognition without offering social partnership in the 
employer markets. The IGM(W)'s late intervention also 
accounted for the fact that, in comparison with the IGCPK, 
reliable information was received tardily.
The research demonstrated that encompassing trade unions 
are bound to specific strategies in the cases which affect 
the stability of the neo-corporatist industrial relations 
systems. The course which the unions adopted, in order to 
maintain their organizational position, was Turner's (1952) 
strategy of incorporation. The unions' strategies varied 
partly in accordance with their different organizational 
constraints.
The study showed that corporatist arrangements are dynamic 
rather than static. They respond to external shocks (such 
as the collapse of the GDR) to their equilibrium (e.g. by 
incorporation). Their capacity to respond ensures their 
survival. As the author's study shows, the limits of the 
capacity to respond to shocks are determined by all the 
actors on the industrial relations scene (State, employers 
and unions) and their assessment of the capacity of 
corporatist arrangements to provide enough benefits to 
workers, employers and the public. If for example, on the 
part of the employers, the costs of corporatism exceed the
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benefits of corporatism the system will break down. In the 
case of the shock of the break-up of the GDR even the 
employers showed interest in the protection of corporatism 
because they were party to the wage convergence agreements, 
despite the severe productivity gap between East and West 
Germany. It seems to the author that the employers did not 
have to agree to the rapid wage equalisation if they had 
not wanted it. Indeed, their organizations have paid a high 
price for the wage agreement and the subsequent amendments. 
Therefore we assume they benefited from the protection of 
corporatist arrangements^®®.
In the trade unions corporatism has served to ensure 
organizational coherence by the members' willingness to 
define interests in collective goods. As trade unions are 
partly 'neutralized' from the shopfloor, unions with weak 
shopfloor representation are especiaaly interested in 
sustaining corporatism. In the case of the activist trade 
union the positive results of centralised collective 
bargaining have helped to fend off the various 
decentralisation efforts by the rank-and-file. With respect 
to the unions the author's study demonstrated a strong 
interest to sustain corporatism.
In regard to the government (state) the author has assumed 
a considerable interest in maintaining corporatist 
arrangements as these have had positive effects on economic
280) The author assumes a strong interest in sustaining 
corporatist industrial relations in industries which 
are concentrated (e.g. chemical industry).
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growth. A favourable trade off between unemployment and 
inflation can enhance a government's chance for a 
successful re-election. Thus the application of corporatism 
seems likely.
As long as the benefits of corporatism (e.g. public good 
outcome) outstrip the costs of corporatism to all of the 
industrial relations actors, this system can be sustained.
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Appendix no. 1: Index of interviews conducted 
(i) The IGCPK
The interviews conducted with trade union executives:
- Heinz Junge, (former deputy-chairman of the IGCGK and 
since 1991 member of the IGCPK's executive board, trade 
union executive of the department for training, young 
people, technology).
- Hans Terbrack, (member of the IGCPK's executive board 
since 1990, trade union executive of the department for 
humanisation of labour relations, collective bargaining and 
job evaluation.
The IGCPK's executive board consists of nine full-time 
members, all of whom serve for three-year periods and must 
stand for election at every congress. Each of the nine 
executives is entrusted with the responsibility of tending 
to particular areas within the organisation. Terbrack had 
been selected for the interview as he has conducted 
collective bargaining for narrowing the East-West wage 
differential. Junge had been selected for the interview to 
gain further information on the East German strategy to 
achieve trade union unity. With the selection of Terbrack 
and Junge it was possible to obtain East and West German 
views of the reconstruction process.
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Interviews with IGCPK trade union officers;
- Michael Mersmann, former personal assistant to trade 
union leader Rappe and union officer responsible for the 
implementation of the IGCPK's reconstruction strategies.
- Peter Hüttenmeister, trade union officer, assigned to 
East Germany, member of the IGCPK's department of social 
policy and women affairs.
Peter Kripzak, trade union officer, member of the 
economic department.
Interviews with the above mentioned IGCPK officers took 
place. The criterion for selection was that all three 
officers had been the IGCPK's experts in the reconstruction 
process. Virtually all of them had been deployed to East 
Germany and had been partly responsible for the 
reconstruction processs (Mersmann).
Two of the three interviewees have been promoted after the 
end of the reconstruction process. Thus we can assume a 
personal attachment of the interviewees towards the process 
of rebuilding labour representation in East Germany.
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members
Composition of the interviewees:
interviewees % of % of the
sample West German
IGCPK membership
women 4 20 19.8
foreign workers 2 10 10.5
blue collar
workers 15 75 79.8
white collar
workers 5 25 20.2
Total interviewees 20
Column 2 does not add up to 100% because, for example, one 
woman could be foreign and a blue collar worker at the same 
time. Thus the characteristics chosen are interdependent.
The author selected the interviewees in accordance with the 
composition of the West German membership of the IGCPK (see 
column 3). The respondent sample deviates from the IGCPK's 
West German composition, especially in the case of the 
blue-collar workers (4.8%). The interviews took place in 
the IGCPK Stuttgart branch office.
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deleaates;
Composition of the interviewees :
interviewees % of % of the
sample East German
IGCPK membership
women 9 45 45.8
blue collar
workers 18 90 89.9
white collar
workers 2 10 11.1
unemployed
members 1 5 16.6
Total interviewees 20
Because of duplication of interdependent characteristics of 
the interviewees, column 2 adds up to more than 100%.
The 20 interviewees were selected by the author in 
accordance with the composition of the East German 
membership of the IGCPK (see column 3). With the exception 
of the unemployed participant, the sample is representative 
according to the trade union composition. The interviews 
took place at IGCPK's Stuttgart branch office during a 
union training session.
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fill The IGM
The interviews conducted with trade union executives;
- Siegfried Bleicher, (member of the IGM's executive board 
and trade union executive of the department for 
humanisation of labour relations, technology, white-collar 
workers);
- Identity concealed, (senior trade union officer) in light 
of the critical assessment of IGM's tardy reunification 
strategy.
The IGM(W)'s executive board consists of eleven full-time 
members, all of whom serve for three-year periods and must 
stand for election at every congress. Each of the eleven 
executives is entrusted with the responsibility of tending 
to particular areas within the organisation. Bleicher had 
been selected as he represents the white-collar workers 
within the IGM(W) and supported the early 'third way' 
discussion. The other member had been chosen as he has been 
a union executive for a long period. In view of their 
particular areas and their tenure (e.g. influence) in 
office, both interviewees seemed to offer a representative 
sample of the IGM(W)'s board.
389
Interviews conducted with IGM union officers;
Klaus Ernst, deployed trade union officer,
codetermination and bargaining expert of the Stuttgart 
district.
- Heinrich Tiemann, former trade union officer in the IGM
central department and expert in IGM's reconstruction
efforts in the GDR, now full-time adviser of the SPD- 
leadership.
- Günther Wickert, deployed IGM officer in the Dresden
district.
These interviewees were chosen for the following reasons: 
First, Wickert and Ernst had been deployed to East Germany 
to build up the IGM(W)'s organisation. Second, Tiemann had 
been the IGM(W)'s expert in the reconstruction process in 
the IGM(W) 's Frankfurt headquarters. He is an expert on 
trade union developments in the FRG and has published 
various articles on German trade unionism (e.g. 
Gewerkschaftliche Jahrbücher) and the history of the 
IGM(W).
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Table 3: The interviews conducted with 20 West German IGM 
members
The composition of the interviewees:
interviewees % of % of the
sample West German
IGM membership
women 15 15.8
foreign workers 
blue collar 
workers 
white collar 
workers
17
10
85
15
12.2
84.4
15.6
Total interviewees 20
Because of interdependent characteristics of the 
interviewees column 2 cannot be totalled.
The author selected the interviewees in accordance with the 
composition of the West German membership of the IGM(W) 
(see column 3). The sample shows a good fit according to 
the IGM(W)'s membership composition. The venue of the 
interviews was a works councillor's office in Stuttgart.
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Table 4: The interviews conducted with 20 East German IGM 
delegates
The composition of the interviewees:
interviewees % of 
sample
% of the 
East German 
IGM members
women 7 35 33.9
blue collar
workers 15 75 78.2
white collar
workers 5 25 21.7
unemployed
members 1 5 18.3
Total interviewees 20
Column 2 cannot be totalled, as the characteristics of the 
interviewees are interdependent.
With the exception of the low participation of the 
unemployed members, the selection examined by the author 
shows a good fit of the sample according to the composition 
of the IGM(W)'s East German membership (see column 3). The 
interviews took place at the IGM(W)'s Stuttgart training 
site.
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Appendix no. 2; The attendances at trade union congresses 
(i^  The IGCPK
- Festakt zum lOOjahrigen Bestehen der IGCPK 6.-7.7.1990, 
Hannover, (100th Anniversary),
- 3. AuBerordentlicher Gewerkschaftstag 10.-11.9.1990, 
Bonn, (Extraordinary Trade Union Congress),
- 14. Ordentlicher Gewerkschaftstag der IGCPK 23.- 
29.6.1991, Bonn, (Regular Trade Union Congress),
fii) The IGM
- AuBerordentlicher Gewerkschaftstag 1.-2.11.1990, Bonn, 
(Extraordinary Trade Union Congress),
- Festakt zum lOOjahrigen Bestehen der IGM und 
Zukunftskongress der IGM 4.-10.6.1991, Frankfurt a. M., 
(100th Anniversary and Futurological Congress),
- 17. Ordentlicher Gewerkschaftstag der IGM 10.-17.10.1992, 
Hamburg, (Regular Trade Union Congress).
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Appendix no.3: The index of questionnaires conducted 
fi^  The IGCPK
The questionnaire conducted with the leadership of the 
IGCPK;
5 questionnaires were distributed to the IGCPK's executive 
board (Schafer, Terbrack, Junge, Walter, Keller-Lauscher). 
Of these 4 were returned and processed. The IGCPK's board 
consists of nine executives.
Thus a broad view and representative assessment of the 
reconstruction efforts undertaken by the IGCPK was 
received.
Follow-up interviews took place with Terbrack and Junge.
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The questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's East German 
labour delegates
Of 191 questionnaires distributed 186 were returned and 
processed. The response rate was high due to the following 
reasons: first, the East German delegates were highly
interested in responding to the questionnaire; second, the 
trade union leadership encouraged participation; and third, 
the conduct of the questionnaire took place after lunch 
with rather bad weather conditions outside.
Information on those labour delegates who did not 
participate regarding a non-response bias was not 
available. The 5 non-respondents are of marginal 
significance compared with the respondent sample (186) in 
terms of possible bias. If we assume that the non-response 
bias might be disproportionately distributed, its marginal 
significance will account for about 2.6%. Despite the low 
non-response rate, secondary sources (e.g., election 
results) were appraised for evidence in order to check the 
possible non-response bias effect.
If we compare the characteristics of the participants with 
the composition of the IGCPK's East German membership, the 
respondent sample shows a lower rate of women's 
participation (5.0%), as well as a higher rate of white- 
collar participation (6.1%).
395
Table 5; The composition of the deleaates;
186 questionnaires had been received
Criteria Participants % of in % of the IGCPK's
sample East German membership 
1992
women 76 40.8 45.8
blue collar
workers 154 82.7 89.9
white collar
workers 32 17.2 11.1
foreign
workers 2 1.0 0.9
Total participants 186
Column 2 cannot be totalled because of the interdependent 
characteristics of the participants.
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The questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's West German 
trade union membership
The interest in participating in this short questionnaire 
was lower than in the case of the East German labour 
delegates. Of 191 distributed questionnaires 165 have been 
returned and processed. Thus the response rate accounted 
for 86.4% and the non-response rate for 13.6%.
As a representative sample had been chosen by the author, 
the deviations in the respondent sample can account for the 
non-response effect. The respondent sample varies slightly 
(women 2.8%, blue collar workers 1.4%, and foreign workers 
2.2%) from the IGCPK's West German composition.
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Table 6; The composition of the participants
Criteria Participants % of % of the West German
sample trade union
membership
women 28 17.0 19.8
white collar 
workers 31 18.8 20.2
blue collar 
workers 134 81.2 79.8
foreign
workers 21 12.7 10.5
Total participants 165
Because of the partly interdependent characteristics of the 
participants, column 2 cannot be totalled.
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fill The IGM
The questionnaires conducted with the leadership of the 
IGM(W);
5 questionnaires were distributed (Zwickel, Schreiber, 
Schulte, Bleicher, Vitt), and 3 were returned and 
processed. The IGM(W)'s board consists of eleven 
executives.
Follow-up interviews took place in two cases.
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The questionnaire conducted with the IGM/s East German 
delegates
229 questionnaires were distributed, of which 216 were 
returned and processed. 13 labour delegates did not want to 
participate (non-response rate 5.7%). The IGM's leadership 
encouraged its membership to participate. The questionnaire 
was distributed during lunch and collected afterwards.
The following characteristics applied to the 13 non­
respondents: 3 women (10 men) did not participate, 4 white- 
collar workers (9 blue-collar workers). Thus regarding the 
existence and composition of the non-response group, there 
is possibly a bias in the representation of women and 
white-collar worker. Nevertheless, the impact of the non­
response rate does not seem to be significant.
Comparing the characteristics of the participants with the 
composition of the IGM(W)'s East German membership in 1992 
the respondent sample shows a lower rate of participation 
by women (5.7%) and blue-collar workers (6.0%).
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216 questionnaires received
Criteria Participants % of
sample
% of the trade 
union membership 
in East Germany 1992
Women 61 28.2 33.9
blue collar 
workers 156 72.2 78.2
white collar 
workers 60 27.8 21.7
foreign
workers 0 0 0.03
Total participants 216
Column 2 cannot be totalled, because of the interdependent 
characteristics of the participants.
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The questionnaire conducted with the IGM's West German 
membership
The willingness to participate in this short questionnaire 
was lower than in the case of the East German delegates. 
177 questionnaires were distributed and 152 were returned 
and processed. This accounted for a response rate of 85.9% 
and a non-response rate of 14.1%.
As a representative sample had been chosen by the author, 
the deviations in the response sample can account for a 
non-response bias. The response group deviates from the 
composition of the IGM(W) West German membership's 
composition as follows: a 2.6% higher participation rate of 
women, a 1.8% higher participation rate of blue-collar 
workers and a 4.9% higher participation rate of foreign 
workers. Despite the existence of a non-response group, the 
composition of the participant group gives a good sample of 
the IGM(W)'s West German membership.
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oarticioants
Criteria Participants % of 
sample
% of the West 
German membership
women 28 18.4 15.8
white collar 
workers 21 13.8 15.6
blue collar 
workers 131 86.2 84.4
foreign
workers 26 17.1 12.2
Total participants 152
Because of the interdependence of the characteristics of 
the participants, column 2 cannot be totalled.
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Appendix no.4: The composition of the membership of both 
trade unions 1992
Trade union IGCPK^®^
Criteria___________ West________East______West________East
membership 662,958 155,874 2,650,235 787,961
trade union
density 48.1 73.5 41.2 71.9
retired members
in % 14.3 16.6 16.0 15.6
foreign workers
in % 10.5 0.9 12.2 0.03
white collar
workers in % 20.2 11.1 15.6 21.7
blue collar
workers in % 79.8 89.9 84.4 78.2
Women in % 19.8 45.8 15.8 33.9
unemployed
membership in % 6.2 16.6 5.4 18.3
281) Source: Letter of IGCPK's Hauptverwaltung, 
Vorstandsbereich 3, Organisation - Arbeitssicherheit.
282) Source: Letter of IG Metall Vorstandsverwaltung, 
Abteilung Beitrags- und Leistungswesen.
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Appendix no.5; The derivation of organizational objectives
Following the example of deriving objectives in the case of 
companies (cf. Kubicek 1981) the author transferred this 
method to the case of a trade union.
The starting assumption was that the dominant objective of 
the trade union leadership is their re-election (self- 
interest) and thus the survival of the union organization. 
In the case of the West German trade unions the factors 
which makes them successful rest predominantly on the 
desirability of beneficial outcomes to their members on the 
macroeconomic determined level. Thus any setbac in the 
achievement of good macroeconomic results could cause a 
decline in trade union cohesion and thus weaken trade union 
strength. The potential of non-members to substitute for 
organized workers would increse. Further, trade union 
strength and attractiveness to its members rest on the 
achievement of economics of scale and on the promotion of 
its members' objectives within the DGB. Improving trade 
union encompassiveness and membership can enhance the power 
of a trade union within the economy, in politics and the 
DGB. Such a strategy can secure the union's potential to 
survive and improve its leadership's chance of successful 
re-election.
On the other hand, trade union strategy is not solely 
determined by self-interest. Solidarity within a trade 
union is a strong morale belief. This strong moral belief
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is a means to secure the cohesion of an organization as 
this can offer some intrinsic satisfaction on the side of 
the members.
Linking the self-interest based interventionist motive with 
that of solidarity could turn out be a symbiotic force for 
an intervention in East German industrial relations by the 
West German trade unions. In this way they are able to 
secure their representational near-monopoly and thus their 
organizational survival.
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Appendix no,6: An example of an intervention with reference 
to the relative position within a union federation
Annotation; Trade unions A and D, B and E, C and F can only 
incorporate along industrial lines.
Country W E
Union membership rel.position Union membership rel.position
A 30 60% D 45 45%
B 15 30% E 30 30%
C 5 10% F 25 25%
Sum 50 100% 100 100%
With reference to Table 2, for some trade unions it is 
possible to improve the relative position by a trade union 
merger or a membership extension strategy. The desirability 
of such a strategy will be underscored in Table 2 for the 
case of hypothetical trade union incorporation alongside 
industrial lines.
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Appendix no.7: The desirability of an incorporation with 
reference to the relative position (significance)
Unions combined membership relative position
A and D 75 50%
B and E 45 30%
C and F 30 20%
Sum 150 100%
In this case trade union C can immensely improve its 
relative position within the trade union movement (e.g., 
influence on the trade union congress, self-esteem/personal 
aspirations of trade union leaders). The corollary of C's 
improvement is that the relative position of A deteriorates 
(zero-sum game)^®^. If C's changes in relative position in 
comparison to its affiliated trade unions are above the 
average changes of affiliated trade unions, then C will be 
attracted in an intervention.
283) Calculation of the relative position 
(significance) within the DGB = membership of the 
affiliated trade union /total membership of DGB.
284) The motive behind this intervention is seeking to 
enhance the relative position vis-a-vis other unions 
(cf. Undy et al. 1981, p.159).
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Appendix no.8; The membership of the East German Trade 
Unions in 1989
Union________________________________ Membership 31.1.1989
IG 9 3 5 ,aoa
IG BetgMti-mewle 473,035
IG , Glaa u M 531,301
IG GttldK M pi^t 153,408
IG 1 ,8 1 9 ,3 5 8
IG 801,747
IG mû Bachtlchteaweaea 799,480
IG ( hi'&hlhm-mlhlhg ) 85,081
833,000
Gew, r mû G^hW 1 ,1 5 3 ,7 8 0
G0W^ Ktih^ t 83,557
Gw^ hmûf Nah^pagagütet mû fof^t 
Gew^ û^t Mltatbelter û^t staataotgahe
854,815
mû dat Kommbhalwi5rtachaft 885,505
Gaw. Et2ilaMhg mû Gütar&laht 574 ,913
Gaw^ Wlaaaaaahaft 184,333
Gaw. daf ^ivilbaacMftigtah daf
.. : Batiohalah VoIKaarmaa 73,504
Source: Anlagen zum Geschaftsbericht des FDGB vom 25.4.1987 
bis 9.12.1989, Ostberlin, Januar 1990.
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Appendix no.9; The industrial relations model of the 
'classical' (Stalinist) planned economy
'Co-owners' of the means of production, 'obedient 
subjects' and executors of the plan as defined by the 
party state
The owner of most means of production represents 'all 
social interests': takes decisions of economic and social 
policy (formulates the plan) and implements them by 
bureaucratic administrative guidance and control
PSJîty ëtAW CSBO ôJû«â block pcktlcc) ;
Directors of enterprises = 
state bureaucrats responsible 
for the operation of state 
property and the fulfilment 
of the plan
'transmission 6 
down the will of the 
'party state' to the 
employees and promotes the 
fulfilment of the plan
m W
Source: partly Hethy, L. and Csuhaj, I.V. (1990), p.6.
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Appendix no.10: The rise of unemployment and short-time
working in East Germany 1990 to 1991
Month_________________ Unemployment______Short-time working
July 1990 272,000 656,000
August 1990 361,000 1,500,000
September 1990 445,000 1,729,000
October 1990 537,000 1,704,000
November 1990 589,000 1,710,000
Dezember 1990 642,000 1,794,000
January 1991 757,000 1,856,000
March 1991 802,000 2,204,000
August 1991 1,069,000 1,734,000
Sources: partly Siebert (1991), p.307 and Adamy and Bosch 
(1991), p.303.
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Appendix no.11: The extent and subjects of worries
The extent of worries of the IGCPK's West German membership 
about the impact of the disintegration of the GDR
Ratings Frequency in per cent
severely worried 32.6
worried 47.6
not worried 17.3
no answer 2.5
N = 175 100
Source; Author's questionnaire conducted with West German 
IGCPK members
The subjects of the worries of the IGCPK's West German 
membership
Based on the author's interviews West German IGCPK union 
members said they were worried about the following:
- the influx of East German workers could lead to more 
competitive wages, reduce or deteriorate wage developments,
- increased possibility of skimming the cream off the East 
German labour market with subsequent dismissals in the 
West,
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- extended potential for employers to apply divide-and- 
conquer policy concerning investment and location decisions 
with reference to social dumping and increased plant 
syndicalism,
- apprehension of fragmented bargaining with the FDGB as a 
mighty opponent, with adverse repercussions on the 
beneficial exercise of social partnership,
- the transition might be exploited by management to 
enhance management's prerogatives.
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X X V  #  . k  X * #  ^  X X V  V A ^ X l i W X X V O .  w x x
reconstruction efforts stated bv the East German IGCPK
deleoates
Ratings frequency
more than appropriate 10.2
appropriate 67.7
not appropriate 15.1
do not know 5.4
no answer 1.6
N = 186 99.9
Source: Author's questionnaire with East German IGCPK
membership
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Appendix no.13: The questionnaires conducted
The questionnaire conducted with the East German IGCPK 
labour delegates
1) Please explain the factors that had been responsible for 
the exercise of the FDGB's low trust industrial relations 
system!
2) Please tick the FDGB's influence on the intensification 
of work according to these rating:
Ratings
'initiator' 0
'promoter of the SED's decisions' O
'agent of the East German workforce' 0
'no answer' 0
3) Which functions had been fulfilled by the FDGB?
415
4) were the norms of your work been realistic and fair? 
Please tick.
Ratings
no O
almost not 0
yes, with reservations 0
yes O
no answer O
5) Please tick how much influence the BGL representatives 
had on industrial relations.
Ratings 
no influence 0
marginal influence 0
moderate influence 0
some influence 0
great influence 0
no answer 0
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6) Please assess the BGL's monitoring of the statutory 
safety standards. Please tick!
Ratings
excellent O
good 0
satisfactory O
poor 0
extremely poor 0
no answer O
7 ) Please enumerate the apprehensions of the East German 
workforce as a result of the collapse of the GDRI
8 ) Are independent trade unions a force to counter these 
apprehensions? Please give arguments.
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9) Please compare the fairness of former East German 
remuneration with the remuneration of a West German 
colleague! Please tick!
Ratings
Fair 0
Somewhat fair 0
Unfair 0
No answer 0
10) Please classify your dimension of trust in the FDGB's
leadership during the reconstruction period. Please tick.
Ratings
'trustworthy' 0
'no answer' 0
'untrustworthy' 0
11) Which type of codetermination do you prefer? Please
tick.
Type of codetermination
Works councils 0
Other forms 0
BGLs 0
no answer 0
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12) Please indicate the FDGB's willingness to conduct 
reforms during the transition period. Please tick.
Ratings
strong willingness 0
intermediate willingness 0
weak willingness 0
unwillingness 0
no answer 0
13) Please assess the IGCPK leadership's firm stance in the
reconstruction and démocratisation process. Please tick.
Ratings
necessary 0
exaggerated 0
do not know 0
no answer 0
14) Please indicate (please tick) your perception of the
IGCPK's information offices in the former GDR.
Ratings
'intruder in East German
industrial relations' 0
no answer 0
'supportive agent of the
East German workforce' 0
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15) Please indicate (please tick) the extent of 
satisfaction with the participation of the East German 
workforce in the reconstruction efforts of labour 
representation.
Ratings
more than appropriate O
appropriate 0
not appropriate 0
do not know O
no answer O
16) Please give reasons why the delegates of the IGCGK's 
extraordinary congress unanimously voted in favour of trade 
union unity?
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The questionnaire conducted with the West German IGCPK 
members
1) Please indicate (please tick) what is or what are the 
economic effect or economic effects of social partnership 
between the IGCPK and the employers.
Ratings
low inflation O
low strike record O
low unemployment record 0
comparatively high wages 0
combination of high wages, low inflation, 
low strike record and low unemployment record O
no answer O
2 ) Regarding the experience and economic outcome/outcomes 
of social partnership between the IGCPK and the employers 
the continuation is (please tick):
Ratings
desirable O
partly desirable O
indecisive O
undesirable O
no answer 0
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3) Referring to the disintegration of the GDR please 
indicate the extent of your worries (please tick).
Ratings
severely worried O
worried O
not worried 0
no answer O
4) Please state those worries.
5) Please assess the IGCPK leadership's firm stance in the 
reconstruction and démocratisation process of rebuilding 
East German labour representation. Please tick.
Ratings
necessary O
exaggerated O
do not know 0
no answer O
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The Questionnaire conducted with the IGCPK's leadership
1) Please give reasons that caused the disintegration of 
the FDGB.
2) Please enumerate the reasons that provoked you for the 
cooperation with the IGCGK.
3) Please explain why other DGB trade unions could not 
realise such an early trade union unity as the IGCPK did.
4) What had been the IGCPK's alternatives towards trade 
union cooperation and the subsequent union unity?
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5) Please give reasons for the IGCPK decision to intervene 
in East German industrial relations?
6) Why has the IGCPK introduced and practised 'social 
partnership' in the former GDR?
7) Please define the tasks of the 'information offices' in 
the former GDR,
8) Which of the following objectives had been of specific 
importance in the IGCPK's East German reconstruction 
efforts? Please indicate the significance by numbers (8 = 
very significant,...., 1 = not significant)
Solidarity with the East German workforce 
Continuity of social partnership in a united Germany 
Enhancement of membership
Improvement in the IGCPK's significance within the DGB 
Personal ambitions
Union as a countervailing power to soften the transition 
towards a market economy
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( ) Avoidance of a second trade union or union competition 
in a united Germany
() Financial improvements as a result of union unity
9 ) Does your membership define their interests in 
collective terms (e.g. low unemployment, low inflation)?
O Yes O No
10) What have been the aims of the 4 point agreement?
11) Have there been any forms of resistance within the 
IGCPK against cooperation and union unity? Please specify.
12) Could the IGCPK realise economies of scale/scope due to 
the enlargement of membership? Did the cost structure 
change? Please explain.
O Yes 0 No
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The questionnaire conducted with the East German IGM labour 
delegates
1) Please explain the factors that had been responsible for 
the exercise of the FDGB's low trust industrial relations 
system!
2) Please tick the FDGB's influence on the intensification 
of work according to these ratings:
Ratings
'initiator' 0
'promoter of the SED's decisions' 0
'agent of the East German workforce' 0
'no answer' 0
3) Which functions had been fulfilled by the FDGB?
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4) Were the norms of your work been realistic and fair? 
Please tickI
Ratings
no 0
almost not 0
yes, with reservations 0
yes 0
no answer 0
5) Please tick how much influence the BGL representatives 
had on industrial relations.
Ratings
no influence 0
marginal influence 0
moderate influence 0
some influence 0
great influence 0
no answer 0
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6) Please assess the BGL's monitoring of the statutory 
safety standards. Please tick!
Ratings
excellent 0
good 0
satisfactory 0
poor 0
extremely poor 0
no answer 0
7 ) Please enumerate the apprehensions of the East German 
workforce as a result of the collapse of the GDRl
8 ) Are independent trade unions a force to counter these 
apprehensions? Please give arguments.
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9) Please compare the fairness of former East German 
remuneration with the remuneration of a West German 
colleague! Please tick!
Ratings
Fair 0
Somewhat fair 0
Unfair 0
No answer 0
10) Please classify your dimension of trust in the FDGB's
leadership during the reconstruction period. Please tick!
Ratings
'trustworthy' 0
'no answer' 0
'untrustworthy' 0
11) Which type of codetermination do you prefer? please
tick.
Type of codetermination
Works councils 0
Other forms 0
BGLs 0
No answer 0
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12) Please indicate the FDGB's willingness to conduct 
reforms during the transition period. Please tick.
Ratings
strong willingness 0
intermediate willingness 0
weak willingness 0
unwillingness 0
no answer 0
13) Please indicate which economic system you prefer for
the GDR? Please tick.
Ratings
West German system 0
East German system 0
'Third way' 0
Other system 0
Do not know 0
No answer 0
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members
1) Please indicate (please tick) what 
effect or the economic effects of the 
bargaining?
is the economic 
IGM's collective
Ratings
low inflation 0
low strike record 0
low unemployment record 0
comparatively high wages
combination of high wages, low inflation.
0
low strike record, low unemployment record 0
no answer 0
2) Considering the experience and economic 
of collective bargaining, continuation is:
outcome/outcomes
desirable 0
partly desirable 0
undecided 0
undesirable 0
no answer 0
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3) Please indicate (please tick) the motives for the
establishment of the plant partnerships.
Solidarity with the East German colleagues 0
Prevention of undercutting of West German standards 0
Determined by the union leadership 0
Do not know 0
No answer 0
4) Please assess the possibility of undercutting and loss 
of welfare stemming from the collapse of the GDR. Please 
tick.
Ratings
very likely 0
likely 0
not likely 0
do not know 0
no answer 0
5) Referring to the disintegration of the GDR please 
indicate your worries.
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The questionnaire conducted with the IGM/s leadership
1) Please give explanations that caused the disintegration 
of the FDGB.
2) Please give reasons for the non-intervention strategy of 
your organisation in 1989 and early 1990 with IGM(E).
3) Which factors determine the organisational cohesion of 
the IGM? Please explain those.
4) Please give arguments for the IGM's intervention to East 
Germany.
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5) Is the enhancement of membership an objective for the 
intervention? Please explain.
6) Which of the following objectives had been of specific 
importance in the IGM's East German reconstruction efforts? 
Please indicate the significance by numbers. (8 = very 
significant),..., 1 = not significant)
() Solidarity with the East German workforce 
() Continuity of neo-corporatism in a united Germany 
() Enhancement of membership
0  Improvement in the IGM's significance within the DGB 
() Personal ambitions
() Union as a countervailing power to soften the transition 
towards a market economy
( ) Avoidance of a second trade union or union competition 
in a united Germany
() Financial improvements as a result of union unity
7) Have there been any forms of resistance within the IGM 
against the union unity? Please specify.
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8) Have financial considerations influenced the 
intervention? Please specify.
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